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Foreword
Developing Asia’s economies are returning to healthy growth. In the face 
of continued sluggishness in the United States, the euro area, and Japan, 
the region is finding ways to bolster its resilience. The Asian Development 
Outlook 2013 estimates regional growth will pick up to 6.6% in 2013 and 
reach 6.7% in 2014. While this is a distinct improvement on 2012, when 
growth stood at just over 6%, it is far from the heady double-digit pace 
before the global financial crisis. 
But in many ways this new Asian reality is a positive development. 
Leading regional economies are settling into a pattern of more moderate, 
more sustainable growth, founded on new opportunities nearer to 
home. Asia’s contributions to global imbalances—its persistent current 
account surpluses—are smoothly winding down. Muted demand from 
wealthy countries is providing the impetus for the region to turn to 
internal sources and trade with its neighbors. With the major industrial 
economies expected to grow by only 1% in 2013, the roles of domestic 
demand and intra-Asian trade will continue to expand.
Yet growth has been uneven, as the region recovers at different 
speeds. Growth acceleration in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
supporting the rebound of the region. The PRC will expand by 8.2% in 
2013 and 8.0% in 2014, up from 7.8% in 2012. India looks set to improve its 
growth rate from 5.0% in fiscal year 2012 to 6.0% in 2013 and further to 
6.5% in 2014, but it must assiduously break down the barriers inhibiting 
investment.
The rising importance of intraregional trade is most evident in 
Southeast Asia. Economies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) will maintain their robust growth supported by increasingly 
strong trade ties within Asia. The vision of the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership is a broader free trade area with ASEAN as the 
hub. Making this vision a reality will further enhance Asia’s dynamism.
One effect of regional economies returning to their production 
potential in the midst of rising global liquidity is that inflation has begun 
to pick up. Though inflation is expected to remain in check, helped by 
stable global commodity prices, authorities must carefully watch for 
pressures on consumer prices and financial markets and take action 
where necessary.
The immediate horizon presents a number of challenges that could 
derail developing Asia’s recovery. Political squabbling is creating tensions 
within the region and beyond. Passions must be kept in check while 
long-term solutions are sought.
Looking further ahead, Asia must secure sufficient energy to 
drive economic expansion in the decades to come. The region already 
consumes roughly a third of global energy, and this is set to rise to over 
half by 2035. But Asia still remains home to two-thirds of the world’s 
poor, and many of its megacities are mired in polluted air and water. 
Therefore, securing adequate physical energy supplies must be achieved 
while preserving the environment and extending the benefits of electricity 
to the millions who still live without it. 
The related set of energy goals will be challenging and require 
creativity and commitment from policy makers. Action is urgently 
needed on multiple fronts. Asia must find ways to restrain its energy 
demand by making the most efficient use of scarce energy resources. 
Replacing inefficient subsidies with support targeting the poor will 
send the right signal. Investment in new technology and infrastructure, 
along with a healthy dose of creativity, will be needed to achieve cleaner 
transport and greener cities. Asia must also prioritize renewable energy 
supplies and new technologies that can make conventional power cleaner 
and more efficient.
A bold vision of a regionwide market in energy is needed to bring 
together all the demand and supply solutions. Asia can achieve the 
degree of energy system integration currently enjoyed in Europe if its 
leaders take urgent action. The region has enjoyed immense gains from 
intraregional trade and cross-border production schemes. Applying these 
lessons to energy markets will help usher in a “Clean Asian Century.”
BINDU N. LOHANI 
Ranking Vice President 
Asian Development Bank
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Asia builds 
momentum amid 
global doldrums

Through the depths of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, 
developing Asia managed to maintain a respectable pace of 
gross domestic product (GDP) expansion. Despite continued 
weakness in the advanced economies, the region looks set 
to maintain its momentum, bolstered by robust spending 
for private consumption. Deepening trade links within the 
region are partly offsetting the tardy return of demand from 
industrial country consumers.
This evolution is reflected in the narrowing of the 
region’s current account surplus. While it is too early to claim 
victory over the persistent global imbalances of the previous 
decade, which aggravated the weaknesses that led to the 
global downturn, steady progress suggests that the region is 
adjusting to the new realities. 
Recognition of change in the world’s growth drivers 
is what must underlie the region’s macroeconomic policy 
responses. This is not simply a cyclical slowing that should 
be met with monetary and fiscal stimulus. Signs suggest the 
region has moved back to its potential growth path. The 
uptick in inflation hints at the potential for price pressures 
ahead, which need close monitoring. The low deficits and 
debt enjoyed by many regional economies should not be 
squandered; rather, fiscal policy should be directed to lay the 
groundwork for future growth that is more inclusive.
Asia is emerging as an important global consumer, and 
this is nowhere more evident than in commodity markets 
(Figure 1.1.1). The region’s energy demand, in particular, is 
expanding more rapidly than its economic might. Looking 
ahead, policy makers must meet the challenge of securing 
adequate energy to support its growth, in a way that 
safeguards the environment and provides to populations 
broad access to affordable energy.
Asia builds momentum amid 
global doldrums
1.1.1  Petroleum and copper consumption, developing Asia
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Note: For petroleum consumption, developing Asia covers 39 economies. 
For copper, it covers the People’s Republic of China, India, the five largest 
economies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-5: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), and seven other economies. 
Sources: ADB estimates using data from Asian Development Outlook database; 
World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance 
database. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do
This chapter was written by Arief Ramayandi, Akiko Terada-Hagiwara, Changyong 
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and Joseph E. Zveglich, Jr., of the Economics and Research Department, ADB. Manila. 
Background materials from Dongchul Cho, Donghyun Park, and Ganeshan Wignaraja 
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Regaining growth at different speeds
After moderating in 2012, growth is starting to recover 
across developing Asia. It is forecast to accelerate in the next 
2 years, driven largely by domestic factors this year and by 
external demand and a strengthening global economy next 
year. Developing Asia is forecast to grow by 6.6% in 2013 
and 6.7% in 2014, up from 6.1% last year (Figure 1.1.2). As 
economic activity gains strength, inflation is also expected to 
rise gradually, reaching 4.1% during the forecast period from 
3.7% last year.
The advanced economies continued to be weak in 
2012, growing by only 1.2% as a group (Box 1.1.1). Though 
uncertainties remain, forecasts for 2013 point to a period of 
consolidation for the advanced economies in the first half 
of the year, then GDP rising slowly during the rest of the 
forecast period. GDP growth is expected to moderate to 1.0% 
in 2013 before strengthening to 1.9% in 2014. 
Most subregions of developing Asia anticipate growth 
picking up. However, the speed of recovery differs by region. 
The growth rebound will be supported by the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and continued resilience in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The PRC 
will expand by 8.2% in 2013 and 8.0% in 2014, up from 7.8% 
in 2012, as strong domestic demand continues and export 
performance picks up. ASEAN is expected to post resilient 
growth during the forecast period. Larger trade with other 
regional countries—particularly within ASEAN and with the 
PRC—will help cushion the impact of slow recovery in the 
advanced economies. ASEAN members are projected to grow 
by 5.4% in 2013 and 5.7% in 2014. India’s strong consumption 
will support its growth, which is expected to recover from 
5.0% in FY2012 (ended 31 March 2013) to 6.0% in FY2013 and 
further to 6.5% in FY2014. Attaining these goals will require reforms that 
resolve contentious structural and policy issues inhibiting investment. 
In 2012, the main factor depressing growth in developing Asia was the 
larger-than-expected slowdown in the PRC and India. Growth in the PRC 
slid from 9.3% in 2011 to 7.8% in 2012, the lowest rate in 13 years, driven 
by a cooled real estate sector and slower exports. India’s economic growth 
in FY2012 is believed to have slowed to 5.0%, its lowest rate in a decade, 
from 6.2% in FY2011. Overall, regional factors explained about half of 
the growth slowdown in developing Asia, the main external drags being 
unexpectedly severe contraction in the euro area and elevated oil prices 
(ADB 2012). 
1.1.2 GDP growth and inflation, developing Asia
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1.1.1 Industrial economies continue to consolidate
Growth in the major industrial economies was subdued 
and somewhat mixed in 2012. Relatively strong GDP 
growth in the third quarter in the United States (US) 
and the euro area was followed by a slowdown in the last 
quarter. Japan slipped back into a recession in the middle 
of the year, but growth turned positive in the fourth 
quarter. For the group as a whole, 2013 is likely to be a year 
of consolidation, with expected growth of only 1%, slightly 
less than in 2012. While fiscal tightening may constrain 
growth in the US and the euro area in the short term, 
Japan’s spending plans are expected to boost its growth.
In the US, GDP grew by 2.2% in 2012, exceeding 
the 1.8% increase in 2011. In 2013, the start of budget 
sequestration in March, along with other fiscal tightening, 
could inhibit growth. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates the spending cuts from sequestration will total 
$85.4 billion in 2013. While the markets have not reacted 
adversely to these cuts, there may be a lagged effect 
on consumer spending and on employment. However, 
positive signs in consumer spending, investment, and 
housing and labor markets suggest that the economy 
is strengthening, though only gradually. House prices 
began to rise in 2012, as did the number of housing units 
authorized, started, and under construction. Labor market 
indicators closely watched by policy makers, such as the 
unemployment rate and the number of people filing for 
unemployment benefits, also improved for the first time 
since the downturn in 2008–2009. Provided that the 
fiscal drag phases out and monetary policy continues to 
be supportive, output in the US is expected to pick up 
gradually and the economy to expand by 2.6% in 2014.
Japan’s economy grew by 2.0% in 2012 after declining 
in 2011. However, GDP contracted in the second and 
third quarters of 2012 for many reasons: a strong yen, 
territorial tensions with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), Europe’s debt crisis, and surging energy imports. 
Investment and exports remained sluggish, and the 
balance of trade remained in deficit for 8 consecutive 
months. Deflation persisted in 2012 without any sign of 
ending. In response to the bleak outlook, the Shinzō Abe 
administration has instituted a set of expansive policies 
referred to as Abenomics. The government announced an 
economic stimulus package amounting to over ¥23 trillion, 
or 4.8% of GDP, and hopes to encourage private sector 
investment. To battle deflation, the Bank of Japan has 
adopted an inflation target of 2% and announced further 
easing of monetary policy. Recent data show some gains in 
manufacturing, mainly in auto sales and machinery orders. 
Positive policy measures should spur growth to 1.2% in 
2013 and 1.4% in 2014.
Unlike the US and Japan, the euro area saw output 
decline by an estimated 0.6% in 2012. While German 
industrial production and economic growth are starting 
to improve, the other large euro economies remain weak. 
Most other countries in the euro area saw their economies 
shrink. Low private consumption and fixed capital 
formation have hampered growth. Youth unemployment 
reached 24% in the euro area. The recession in the euro 
area is seen extending into the first half of 2013 before 
slow recovery begins in the second half of the year. For the 
whole year, GDP is expected to contract by 0.3%. 
Several euro area peripheral economies remain ridden 
by crisis. Greece continues to face unsustainable debt, 
despite international rescue efforts led by the European 
Commission, European Central Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund. In mid-March, Cyprus became the latest 
country to be offered a bailout package, in this case for 
€10 billion, by the International Monetary Fund and 
European authorities. Concern about the viability of the 
euro area remain, as austerity measures are deepening 
unemployment, social unease, and economic contraction. 
The European Central Bank will have to uphold its firewall 
against speculative attacks until fundamental structural 
and institutional reforms start addressing deep-rooted 
euro area flaws. It remains unclear whether European and 
national politics will withstand this important test. 
Euro area countries have begun to introduce fiscal 
tightening, as the European Union Fiscal Compact 
requires that fiscal deficits be less than 3% of GDP by 
the end of 2013. This may depress domestic demand and 
employment. On the other hand, an easing of financial 
tensions and improvements in external demand may boost 
the region’s exports and thereby support growth. Monetary 
policy will likely remain accommodative as inflation stays 
under control, in line with the declining trend in the 
international commodity prices. GDP growth is projected 
to pick up to 1.2% in 2014.
GDP growth in major industrial economies (%)
2011 2012 2013 2014
Area Actual ADO projection
Major industrial economies  1.2  1.2  1.0 1.9
United States  1.8  2.2  2.0 2.6
Euro area  1.4 –0.6 –0.3 1.2
Japan –0.6 2.0  1.2 1.4
Notes: Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income using 
the Atlas method. More details in Annex table A1.1.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://
www.bea.gov; Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic and 
Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp; ADB estimates.
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Boost from domestic consumption
With weakened demand from the PRC and India added to 
dim global demand from the major industrial economies, 
only domestic factors remained as drivers of growth 
for many economies in developing Asia. The external 
slowdown affected trade-oriented open, economies in East 
and Southeast Asia most severely, with growth plunging to 
less than 2% in the Republic of Korea, Taipei,China, and 
Singapore (Figure 1.1.3).
Despite anemic external demand, some economies, 
mainly in Southeast Asia, managed to maintain growth 
momentum on the back of growth in private consumption 
and investment. Economic reforms after the Asian financial 
crisis, a better-balanced economic structure, and natural 
resources all contributed to the robust performance of the 
ASEAN economies in 2012. 
Among domestic factors, private consumption continued 
to be the key driver of growth in 2012, contributing more 
than half of growth across the economies in developing 
Asia. By comparison, growth in other factors, such as 
investment and exports, varied considerably across countries. 
Unemployment rates kept declining in most countries, 
however, and labor markets continued to improve, lifting 
consumer confidence at least during the first half of last year. 
Nonetheless, retail sales weakened in the second half 
of 2012, slowing sharply in the third quarter (Figure 1.1.4). 
Of ASEAN’s 10 economies, only Thailand and Indonesia 
showed relatively resilient retail sales, while, toward the end 
of the year, Singapore and Viet Nam joined the economies 
in East Asia that were showing weaker retail sales. Some 
signs indicate that the soft patch is ending, and consumption 
should pick up again in the second half of 2013.
Investment, both private and public, was uneven across 
countries. Investment was generally resilient in Southeast 
Asian economies, with both private and public investment 
rising in Thailand and Malaysia. But it declined in a few 
economies such as the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China, 
due largely to sluggish export performance (Figure 1.1.5). In 
the Philippines, buoyant economic activity fueled a large 
decline in inventories, which exceeded relatively robust fixed 
investment. As a result, gross investment declined.
On average, inventories rose in 2012, particularly in 
Southeast Asia, driven by robust domestic activity, after 
declining in 2011. However, economies in East Asia were left 
out of this trend, as investors remained cautious about the 
global and regional outlook, and for the PRC in particular. 
Taipei,China and the Republic of Korea may continue to 
wait for a clearer signal of global recovery before private 
investment picks up this year. 
1.1.3  Demand-side contributions to growth, selected 
developing Asia, 2012
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1.1.4 Retail sales, selected developing Asia
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Drag from weak export demand
On the external front, global economies remained sluggish, 
particularly with the euro area contracting by 0.6 percentage 
points in 2012, during which the growth forecast for major 
industrial economies for 2013 was revised down by almost 1 
percentage point. The sharp slowdown in the PRC and India 
added to the already dim external prospects. Although the 
PRC’s growth started to stabilize late in 2012, boosted by 
stimulus measures, the economies with strong trade ties with 
the PRC still felt a sharp downturn over the entire year. The 
slowdown in India also contributed to weak exports in Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh, but the slowdown was felt mainly 
within India. 
Weakened external demand sharply decelerated 
merchandise export growth in developing Asia from 18.5% 
in 2011 to 4.4% in 2012 (Figure 1.1.6)—much lower than the 
10.5% forecast earlier, in April 2012. In two of the five Asian 
subregions—South Asia and the Pacific—exports contracted 
in 2012. The weakening of exports was particularly severe in 
South Asia, where all countries except Bangladesh and Nepal 
experienced a contraction. Import demand also diminished, 
and import growth slowed from 21.6% in 2011 to a mere 3.9% 
in 2012, far below the 12.8% forecast in April 2012. 
Southeast Asia bucked the trend toward plunging 
imports, as imports to the subregion remained fairly 
resilient, growing at almost 7% more quickly than exports 
to satisfy strong domestic demand. As a result, net exports 
declined, subtracting from growth in five of the six Southeast 
Asian developing economies, and the merchandise trade 
surplus narrowed by more than 26% in Southeast Asia. In 
the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China, by comparison, 
merchandise imports fell much more steeply than exports, 
reflecting weak demand for capital goods in particular. Thus, 
net exports contributed to growth in these two economies.
The external environment is expected to improve 
gradually in 2013. Although the global economy as a whole is 
forecast to begin recovering only later this year, growth in the 
PRC has already begun accelerating, with economic activity 
showing signs of turnaround in the last quarter of 2012, as 
industrial and electricity production both started to grow 
more quickly (Figure 1.1.7). Growth is expected to continue 
accelerating in the first half of 2013 and then stabilize for 
the rest of this year and next, as the impact of the mid-2012 
stimulus fades and greater efforts are made to comply with 
more stringent environmental targets.
External demand in developing Asia generally is 
rising because of growth acceleration in the PRC and, to a 
lesser extent, in India. Export growth in developing Asia 
economies is expected to accelerate to 8.3% this year from 
the low base last year and to rise further to 9.7% in 2014. 
Imports are expected to grow at a slightly faster rate than 
1.1.5  Contributions to investment growth, selected 
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1.1.6 Export and import growth, by subregion
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1.1.7  People’s Republic of China GDP growth, industrial 
production index, and electricity production
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1.1.8 Current account balance, developing Asia
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exports, by 8.3% this year and 10.1% in 2014, on relatively 
resilient domestic consumption and an expected pickup in 
investment. Weak demand from advanced economies, along 
with strong domestic demand and intraregional trade, helped 
shrink developing Asia’s combined current account surplus 
from 2.5% of GDP in 2011 to 2.0% in 2012. Import growth 
outpacing export growth to support robust domestic demand 
will further shrink the overall current account surplus to 1.9% 
of GDP in 2013 and to 1.8% in 2014 (Figure 1.1.8). This trend 
is expected to be shared across most subregions except for 
South Asia, where exports are expected to grow more quickly 
than imports in 2014. 
The global current account balance, measured as a share 
of global GDP, also shows a narrowing trend. The global 
current account balance shrank to 1.3% of world GDP in 2012 
from 1.5% in 2011, well down from its peak of 2.2% in 2007 
(Figure 1.1.9). Developing Asia as a whole continued to show a 
surplus, contributing nearly 0.5% of world GDP to the surplus, 
of which more than half was from the PRC. Developing Asia’s 
surpluses are still large, but the region’s share of the world 
surplus has been declining, from almost 60% in 2009 to 41% 
in 2011 and to 37% in 2012. 
Aside from developing Asia, the dominant supply-side 
contributors continue to be the Middle East (mainly oil 
exporters), Japan, and the Russian Federation. As the oil price 
has stayed elevated over the past 2 years, the Middle East’s 
current account surplus remained above 0.5% of world GDP. 
On the deficit side, the US is the dominant player, with a 
deficit of nearly 0.7% of world GDP. Stable growth in overseas 
markets, particularly emerging markets, has helped underpin 
demand for US-made goods, keeping the US current account 
gap from expanding as sustained spending in the US drives 
import growth. The figures underscore US dependence on 
foreign investors for funding.
Varying growth prospects across subregions
With the improving external environment, economic growth in East 
Asia as a whole is forecast to accelerate from 6.5% last year to above 7% 
this year and the next, surpassing once again the expansion in the other 
subregions of developing Asia (Figure 1.1.10). 
The positive spillover effects of more rapid expansion in the PRC—
which reflects both rising domestic demand and improved export 
performance—will contribute to more robust growth in all East Asian 
economies, especially Taipei,China and Hong Kong, China (where the 
growth rate will likely more than double in 2013) and, to a lesser extent, 
in the Republic of Korea and Mongolia. 
As Southeast Asian economies are also tightly linked with the PRC, 
higher growth in the PRC in 2013 will support growth momentum in 
Southeast Asia. This subregion is forecast to grow by 5.4% in 2013, little 
changed from last year’s robust growth despite sluggish growth in the 
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major industrialized economies. Factors that helped explain 
the region’s growth acceleration in 2012 were two rebounds, 
in Thailand from the impact of severe floods in 2011 and 
in the Philippines from a slump in government investment. 
In 2013, growth will benefit from generally accommodative 
fiscal and monetary policies supporting consumption and 
investment. Indonesia, the biggest economy in Southeast 
Asia, is seen expanding by 6.5% in the forecast period, a slight 
gain from 6.2% last year. In 2014, subregional growth as a 
whole is expected to accelerate slightly, to 5.7%, as the outlook 
improves for the industrial economies. 
Economies in South Asia will depend on the turnaround 
in India, which is contingent on reform in the South Asian 
giant. Growth in the subregion is seen as rising to 5.7% in 
2013 and 6.2% in 2014. The subregion’s anemic growth of 5.0% 
in 2012 was due to India’s slowdown, marked by faltering 
investment, persistently high inflation, and tight monetary 
policy, compounded by weakening export demand during 
the year. Weaker exports also helped explain slower growth 
in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In Pakistan, a recovery from 
earlier severe floods helped raise growth despite a decline in 
exports. 
Signs of recovery are still weak in India. The economy is 
expected to improve in FY2013 but post only modest growth, 
as constraints on domestic investment and low optimism 
among investors will continue (Figure 1.1.11). A normal 
monsoon and monetary easing would help raise GDP 
growth to 6% in FY2013. Better global prospects, an easing 
of commodity prices, and progress in resolving structural 
bottlenecks are seen allowing growth to increase to 6.5% in 
FY2014.
Unlike in other subregions, economic performance in 
Central Asia and in the Pacific largely reflects the production 
cycles of major export commodities, their economies less 
influenced by developments in external demand. Commodity 
exports, therefore, dominate developments in these two 
subregions. 
In 2012, the Pacific was the fastest-growing subregion in Asia and the 
Pacific. This mainly reflected strong growth in Papua New Guinea, by 
far the largest economy in the subregion. However, once construction on 
a liquefied natural gas project is completed, economic activity in Papua 
New Guinea is expected to slump until gas exports commence at the 
end of 2014. Thus, growth in Papua New Guinea is forecast to slow from 
9.2% in 2012 to 5.5% this year. In the rest of the subregion, performance 
is expected to be mixed, with growth in Timor-Leste continuing to be 
notably high because of its oil and gas resources. Given the strong weight 
of Papua New Guinea, growth in the subregion as a whole is expected to 
slow from 7.3% in 2012 to 5.2% in 2013 before rebounding slightly to 5.5% 
in 2014. 
Growth in Central Asia slipped to 5.6% in 2012, mainly because of a 
poor harvest and virtual stagnation in industry in Kazakhstan, which cut 
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growth to 5.0% from 7.5% in 2011, and less rapid growth in Turkmenistan. 
Growth also slowed in Georgia, as uncertainty linked to parliamentary 
elections curbed investment, and decelerated into negative territory in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, where gold production fell.
Slower economic activity across the subregion is expected to 
outweigh higher public investment in the Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 
keeping Central Asia’s growth flat in 2013. In 2013, projected growth 
acceleration in Kazakhstan to 5.2%, Azerbaijan to 3.1%, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic to 5.5% will not completely offset forecast deceleration in 
most other countries. Higher public investment spending is expected 
to raise industrial production aside from oil in both Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan. Slower agricultural expansion is projected to drag on growth 
in Uzbekistan, while less rapid expansion in the hydrocarbon sector will 
do the same in Turkmenistan. Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan also 
anticipate lower growth rates, while higher gold production should boost 
growth in the Kyrgyz Republic. In 2014, the average regional growth 
rate is expected to rise to 6.0% as higher public investment outlays spur 
growth in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
Differences in country circumstances lie behind the divergent 
outcomes in the region. While oil producers are buoyed or buffeted by 
global markets, and agricultural producers are subject to the whims of 
the weather, the export manufacturing economies have had to adjust to 
weakness in the advanced economies. That said, Southeast Asia’s recent 
robustness raises a question: Has regional integration helped it to adjust 
to the new global realities?
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Integration for a resilient 
Southeast Asia 
ASEAN economies weathered the recent global financial crisis relatively 
well. The region’s economic growth plummeted during the worse of the 
crisis in 2009 but quickly rebounded in the following year. 
ASEAN countries currently supply 15% of total output in developing 
Asia and 25% of the region’s total trade. Robust domestic demand is a key 
reason for the region’s resilience under the recent crisis. Countries with 
large domestic consumer markets, like Indonesia, managed to weather 
the crisis well by relying on domestic demand. In addition, more prudent 
fiscal management in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997–1998 has given ASEAN countries more scope to stimulate domestic 
economies through fiscal expansion (ADB 2010). Other advantages, 
such as abundant natural resources and slower wage growth than in the 
PRC, have contributed to the dynamism of the region’s economies. All 
of these factors helped ASEAN countries avoid a collapse in GDP during 
the global financial crisis and contributed to the region’s sharp recovery 
immediately afterward. 
This analysis does not mean that international trade is no 
longer important to the region. As global trade rebounded in 
2010, the larger ASEAN members—Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand—saw their exports grow sharply, 
fueling stronger consumption and investment that supported 
growth (ADB 2011).
A change in trade structure has also helped secure trade 
for the region. Since 2000, total trade within ASEAN and 
with the PRC and India has grown much more quickly than 
trade with ASEAN’s traditional partners among the advanced 
economies (Figure 1.2.1). Greater trade within developing 
Asia helped cushion the impact of soft export demand from 
traditional markets during the recent crisis. 
Rapidly increasing trade within developing Asia reflects 
the heavy involvement of ASEAN countries in global value 
chains, which has made them important parts of the global 
factory. In the production of durable goods such as electronics, 
most ASEAN economies occupy the middle reaches of value 
chains, where they specialize in processing intermediate goods 
(Ma and Van Assche 2012). The processed intermediate goods 
are exported to countries such as the PRC and Thailand, 
which specialize in the downstream assembly of final durable 
goods that are eventually shipped for final sale in Europe and 
the US. Given weak demand in these latter markets, higher trade within 
Asia can support export demand in ASEAN countries only temporarily.
Nevertheless, economic ties between ASEAN and other countries in 
Asia have grown rapidly in the first decade of this century. The PRC is 
now ASEAN’s most important single trading partner. India may not be 
1.2.1  Trade between ASEAN countries and their major 
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as important to ASEAN as the association’s traditional markets but has 
grown significantly more important in recent years and now provides 
a share of export demand for ASEAN that is no longer 
negligible. The share of exports from ASEAN to the PRC 
and India increased rapidly in the 2000s, marking stronger 
economic ties (Figure 1.2.2). 
Deepening economic ties between ASEAN and the two 
giants of developing Asia propel greater synchronization of 
business cycles. Thus, events in the PRC and India will more 
directly affect economic activity in the ASEAN countries. 
Slower growth in either the PRC or India, for example, could 
be a drag on output growth in ASEAN. In other words, 
a shock in either of the giants will likely have spillover 
implications for ASEAN.
Although the PRC and India are still achieving enviable 
GDP growth rates, their pace of expansion is now projected 
to be slower than that achieved during the high growth 
years preceding the global financial crisis. Output in the 
two economies will therefore tend to be lower than what it 
would be if GDP grew at historical rates. Closer economic ties 
will mean slowdown in the PRC and India will have greater 
implications for ASEAN’s growth outlook. 
How strong is the spillover from the two giants to the 
ASEAN economies? Precisely answering this question is a 
challenge. Figure 1.2.3 provides the likely reduction in the level of output 
of the larger ASEAN economies relative to their baseline forecast in 
response, during the same year, to PRC and India GDP being 1% lower 
than their baselines. 
The spillover into ASEAN of a GDP shock in the PRC is twice as 
large as one from India. Absent any other distortion, GDP being 1% less 
than baseline in the PRC tends to reduce ASEAN’s output by almost 1/3 
of a percent from its baseline in the same year. The spillover into ASEAN 
from a shock in India is only about 1/6 of the shortfall in India. Looking 
at the impact on larger ASEAN countries, spillover from the PRC has the 
largest effect in Malaysia, where it is almost 1/2 as large as in the PRC, 
followed by Indonesia and Singapore at about 1/3. Spillover from India 
into these countries is only 1/2 that from the PRC. In Thailand, a 1% GDP 
drop coming from either the PRC or India has a similar impact, causing 
the Thai GDP to decline by about 1/5 of a percent. The Philippines 
appears to be the least-integrated country in the group, suffering no 
significant spillover from the PRC and only 1/10 of a shock emanating 
from India.
The magnitude of the spillover can also be used to gauge the 
implications of a lower growth rate in either of the two giants on 
ASEAN’s GDP growth. For example, absent any policy response from 
ASEAN authorities, PRC’s growth dropping below its potential would 
induce a roughly proportional drop in ASEAN’s growth below its 
potential. The spillover magnitudes calculated above are the approximate 
proportionality factor. 
To illustrate the median effect of a slowdown in the PRC on ASEAN 
growth, the likely GDP growth reduction in ASEAN is computed on 
1.2.2  Trade shares of ASEAN countries’ major 
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the assumption that GDP historically grew in the PRC at 10% 
annually and in ASEAN at 6%. Growth of 1 percentage point 
lower than the historical rate in the PRC could, absent any 
other distortion, reduce ASEAN GDP growth by about 1/4 of a 
point less than its historical rate. This predicts future growth 
at less than historical potential. If the future potential growth 
rate of the PRC declines 2 percentage points to 8% per annum, 
future potential growth in ASEAN could be 0.5 percentage 
points lower, or 5.5% per annum.
In reality, the PRC economy is not slowing much and 
ASEAN authorities can take measures to offset the blow. As 
such, the effect of any slowdown on the ASEAN economies will 
likely be contained. Spillover from India to ASEAN economies 
is much smaller, limiting the impact on the region caused by 
slower growth in India. In sum, although the two giants are 
expected to grow more slowly to the forecast horizon, the effect 
on ASEAN will likely be limited and amenable to mitigation.
A more integrated ASEAN
To capitalize on ASEAN’s intensive production network, the 
region is moving to intensify its regional integration. ASEAN 
countries aim to achieve the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) by 2015, fulfilling the goal laid out in its Vision 2020 
(1997 ASEAN Vision 2020). The statement envisages ASEAN 
as a highly competitive single market and production base 
that is fully integrated into the global economy and pursues 
equitable economic development. Under the AEC, ASEAN will 
promote the free flow of goods and services, investments, and 
skilled labor among its member countries. A single market and 
production base should enable ASEAN to gain more from its 
contributions to value chains by improving its efficiency and 
economies of scale. Rashid et al. (2009) suggest that ASEAN 
income would be 5.3% higher with the AEC and that benefits 
would spread through all ASEAN countries as trade in goods and  
services expanded. 
By December 2011, ASEAN had progressed considerably toward 
implementing the AEC. The ASEAN Secretariat detailed in 2012 the 
progress made (ASEAN Secretariat 2012). Toward the first pillar of the 
AEC, 66% of the measures leading to a single market and production 
base, and slated for completion by the end of 2011, had been completed. 
So had 68% of the measures toward the second pillar, the competitive 
economic region base; 67% toward the third pillar, equitable economic 
development; and 86% toward the fourth pillar, integration into the global 
economy. That implementation fell short of fully achieving any of the 
targets highlights the difficulty of fully implementing the AEC.
Beyond the AEC, ASEAN is also considering several international 
economic partnership frameworks that would enhance its further 
integration into the global economy, notably the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership. This aims to join ASEAN with six nations enjoying 
bilateral free-trade partnerships with ASEAN members (Box 1.2.1). 
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1.2.1 Toward the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
At the East Asia Summit on 20 November 2012 in Phnom 
Penh, leaders agreed to formally launch negotiations to 
establish the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP). Led by ASEAN, RCEP negotiations 
will include all 10 ASEAN members and their 6 partners 
in free trade agreements (FTAs): Australia, the PRC, 
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. An 
eventual RCEP trade deal would create the world’s largest 
free trade bloc, with profound economic implications for 
the world economy. 
Origins and scope of negotiations
The RCEP concept was first mooted at the November 
2011 ASEAN leaders summit in Bali. While 
strengthening ASEAN’s central role in the regional 
trade architecture, the key purpose of the partnership 
is to reconcile two long-standing proposals for a 
large region-wide trade agreement: the East Asia Free 
Trade Agreement, which focused on ASEAN members 
plus the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and 
the Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which 
added Australia, India, and New Zealand. The RCEP 
bridges the two proposals by adopting open accession. 
Negotiations among the 16 current parties began in 
early 2013 with the aim of concluding talks by the end 
of 2015.
The RCEP seeks to achieve a modern and 
comprehensive trade agreement. It is comprehensive in 
that its negotiating agenda will cover trade in goods, 
trade in services, investment, economic and technical 
cooperation, and dispute settlement. Negotiations adopt 
as principles that the RCEP will
•	 be consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules on trade in goods and services,
•	 seek to improve on existing ASEAN+1 FTAs,
•	 take into account participating countries’ different 
stages of development and allow for special concessions 
to least-developed countries, and
•	 enshrine open accession to enable other external 
economic partners (including other ASEAN FTA 
partners) to participate at a future date if they agree to 
comply with the group’s trade rules and guidelines. 
Economic benefits 
The size and economic importance of the RCEP free 
trade bloc is striking (box table). The RCEP promises 
to be a powerful vehicle for the spread of sophisticated 
global production networks underlying the rise of Asia 
as the world’s factory and reducing the risk of an Asian 
“noodle bowl” of multiple trade rules in overlapping 
Asian FTAs (Kawai and Wignaraja 2013). Implementing a 
comprehensive, high-quality RCEP will provide open and 
simplified trade rules consistent with WTO agreements 
on goods and services. Rules of origin can be rationalized, 
made more flexible, and better administered through 
electronic means. In the area of investment rules—for 
which the WTO has no agreements—the RCEP will go 
beyond existing multilateral rules and promote easier flows 
of foreign direct investment and technology transfer by 
multinational corporations.
It is noteworthy that the RCEP will provide other 
economic benefits such as freer market access for goods, 
services, skills, and technology; large markets that offer 
economies of scale and scope for specialization; and 
insurance against protectionist sentiments. Additionally, 
the RCEP will provide a blueprint for Asia’s emerging 
regional trade architecture toward achieving a free-trade 
area across Asia and the Pacific. 
Simulation modeling suggests that the RCEP will bring 
significant economic benefits to the global economy in 
the long run. An exercise using a computable general 
equilibrium model showed the RCEP offering income 
gains reaching $644 billion in 2025, equal to 0.6% of world 
GDP (Petri, Plummer, and Zhai 2012). The box figure 
shows the percentage of income gained by anticipated 
RCEP members. All economies party to an RCEP 
agreement are projected to gain.
Measures of trade openness (total trade as % of GDP)
Measure  Magnitude World share (%)
Populationa 3.4 billion 49
Gross domestic producta $21.4 trillion 30
Trade in goods & services, exports & importsb $12.0 trillion 29
Foreign direct investment inflowsb $402.8 billion 26
Foreign direct investment outflowsb $378.9 billion 22
a Population and gross domestic product figures are International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates for 2012.
b 2011.
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (all accessed 20 February 2013).
Asia builds momentum amid global doldrums  15
Challenges and way forward
Realizing these benefits hinges on rising to several 
challenges during negotiations and afterwards (Hiebert 
and Hanlon 2012, Das Basu 2012, Kawai and Wignaraja 
2013). First is the political challenge of ensuring that 
participants, including the regional giants, respect the 
central role of ASEAN in RCEP negotiations. Second is 
overcoming the risk, arising from the divergent interests 
of more- and less-developed economies, that the RCEP 
achieves little trade and investment liberalization and is 
encumbered by many protectionist exclusions. Third is for 
the RCEP to gradually improve its coverage of new trade 
issues, such as competition policy and environmental and 
labor standards, which are increasingly a feature in the 
most comprehensive regional trade agreements in Asia 
and internationally. Fourth is the risk that businesses fail 
to avail themselves of the RCEP because they insufficiently 
understand its legal provisions, particularly as they affect 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The way forward for RCEP negotiations is to use the 
best features of existing Asian FTAs, including existing 
ASEAN+1 FTAs, as the bases for negotiations toward 
the best possible RCEP; to establish a clear timetable for 
concluding RCEP negotiations; and to actively involve 
the private sector in negotiations. Significant outreach 
and business services need to be provided to small and 
medium-sized enterprises to maximize the benefits they 
will enjoy and lower the costs of using the RCEP. 
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Realizing further economic integration, both within and beyond 
ASEAN, has the potential to improve income and welfare in ASEAN 
economies still further. More integration will, however, subject ASEAN 
countries to stronger spillover from shocks that must be carefully 
managed to mitigate higher risks in future crises.  
Historically, external factors have affected output fluctuations in 
the ASEAN countries (Ramayandi, forthcoming). Consistent with the 
“factory Asia” model of cross-border supply chains, shocks originating 
from the advanced economy markets—the ultimate destination for the 
final goods—have generated considerable output fluctuation in ASEAN 
economies. Yet links within ASEAN also play a role in transmitting 
shocks among its members. Because most intra-ASEAN activities are 
through the production network, shocks emanating from one ASEAN 
country can disrupt the region’s supply chain and, hence, destabilize 
output in other members.
Further integrating the region with the global economy exposes 
ASEAN countries to being more directly affected by external events. 
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Therefore, to advance and manage economic integration, ASEAN 
countries must advance regional cooperation and policy coordination. 
This is particularly important to improve the region’s macroeconomic 
surveillance capacity, toward minimizing contagion from possible 
future crises. 
Avoiding the middle-income trap 
 The AEC and the RCEP promise to build on ASEAN’s current strong 
growth prospects to stimulate progress toward higher per capita income 
in each member country. At present, almost all of the 10 ASEAN 
countries have graduated from low-income status. Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam are ASEAN’s two high-income countries as defined by the 
World Bank. Malaysia and Thailand are now categorized as upper-middle 
income countries, while Indonesia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic are lower-middle income.
The climb to middle income poses perils. Once countries reach 
certain income thresholds they face the risk of structural stagnation, 
making it hard for them to achieve higher incomes per capita (Box 1.2.2). 
To reduce the risk of a future growth slowdown gelling as the so-called 
middle-income trap, ASEAN countries must continue progressing from 
lower to higher value-added activity. Doing so requires ASEAN countries 
to keep improving their human capital and shifting their production 
up the technological ladder. ASEAN countries should develop their 
education systems and guarantee adequate infrastructure and energy 
supply to support these improvements. These steps may give ASEAN 
members a better chance of avoiding the middle-income trap.
Greater regional integration and reform are required to sustain 
ASEAN’s growth and avoid the middle-income trap in the medium 
to long run. In the shorter term, however, spillovers caused by the 
abundance of global liquidity and the resulting volatility in capital flows 
remain a worry for ASEAN and other emerging economies in Asia.
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1.2.2 Education and the middle-income trap
Rapid growth in developing countries is an eye-catching 
feature of the world economy. The question is how long 
this rapid growth can continue. Attempts to answer it have 
given rise to a literature on growth slowdowns that have 
become known collectively as the middle-income trap. The 
grim global economic outlook since the global financial 
crisis of 2008–2009 has further intensified interest in 
the middle-income trap. The issue is of great interest to 
the ASEAN-4: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, all of which are middle-income economies 
aiming to make the jump to high-income status.
Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2012) analyzed the 
historical experience of growth slowdowns to shed light on 
future prospects. They considered post-1956 cases of fast-
growing countries that did or did not seem to fall into the 
middle-income trap, defined as sustaining GDP per capita 
at an average annual rate of 3.5% for 7 years or longer but 
then slowing significantly by at least 2 percentage points 
between successive 7-year periods. The authors found that 
growth slowed at a mean GDP per capita of $16,540 in 
2005 constant US dollars adjusted for purchasing power 
parity. At this income, per capita income growth slowed 
on average from 5.6% to 2.1%. By comparison, per capita 
GDP in the PRC was $8,511 in 2007, when the source 
data, Penn World Tables 6.3, ended. Slowdowns most likely 
affect economies with high growth in the earlier period, 
high old-age dependency ratios, very high investment 
ratios, and undervalued currencies. 
Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2013) revisited these 
questions, updating and extending earlier results. There are 
several reasons for doing so. Concerns about slowdowns 
have continued to grow, as has the literature on the 
subject. The PRC’s growth rate has decelerated from more 
than 10% in 2010 to less than 8% in 2012. In addition, 
more and better data are available through 2010, courtesy 
of Penn World Tables 7.1. The paper revises earlier 
estimates of per capita GDP for a number of countries, 
not least for the PRC, whose 2010 per capita GDP at 2005 
prices purchasing power parity is now estimated to have 
been somewhat lower at $7,129. 
The new data illuminates a slightly different list of 
growth slowdowns. The results are broadly consistent with 
the earlier findings but not entirely. While slowdowns 
are still most likely when per capita GDP reaches about 
$15,000, the new data point to two modes, one at around 
$15,000 and the other at around $11,000 (box figure).
A valuable finding is that the share of the population 
with at least a secondary education correlates positively 
with dodging the middle-income trap, other things being 
equal. Education in general has the same effect, holding 
constant the share of secondary school and university. 
The quality of human capital matters in avoiding growth 
slowdowns. In addition, slowdowns are less likely in 
countries with high-tech products accounting for a large 
share of exports. This highlights the importance of moving 
up the technology ladder.
The finding that high-quality human capital reduces 
the probability of a slowdown is especially relevant for 
ASEAN. Skilled workers and professionals are needed 
to move up the global value chain. High-quality human 
capital is especially important for modern services with 
high added value like business services (ADB 2012). It 
matters for moving up the technological ladder and the 
global value chain in manufacturing, as the experience of 
newly industrialized economies clearly shows. Yet the lack 
of skilled workers and professionals is the single biggest 
business concern for employers in ASEAN (ADB 2008). 
Whether or not the ASEAN-4 can avoid the middle-
income trap thus depends largely on whether they develop 
education systems that successfully produce graduates 
with the skills that employers require. A highly skilled 
workforce holds the key to the region’s quest to produce 
and export more sophisticated high-tech goods.
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Managing capital flows under 
quantitative easing
As the global financial crisis unfolded, advanced economies relied 
heavily on expansionary monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize markets. 
However, with credit constraints so severe and nominal interest rates 
nearing the zero lower bound, traditional monetary policy proved 
inadequate. Central banks in advanced economies resorted to several 
unconventional measures to increase money supply. This involved not 
only increasing the size and adjusting the composition of their balance 
sheets, but also expanding the variety of their holdings to include assets 
with longer maturities or higher risk than traditional short-term treasury 
securities. In particular, the US has launched three rounds of historically 
unprecedented quantitative easing (QE) since the crisis erupted in 2008, 
enormously expanding the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet by almost 
threefold in 3 years. The impacts of such unconventional monetary policy 
have attracted a lot of attention from economists and political pundits.
The authorities in the advanced economies take the view that QE 
stabilizes financial markets, promotes growth, and therefore must have 
positive effects globally. Some observers in emerging economies, on the 
other hand, have voiced concern about the negative spillover effects of 
such policies on their capital flows, exchange rates, and asset prices. 
This has prompted the International Monetary Fund to issue regular 
spillover reports to G20 meetings. With the Government of Japan recently 
announcing an aggressive, unconventional monetary policy, emerging 
economies’ fears have resurfaced. Japan’s QE is intended to help spur 
inflation to the central bank’s 2% target and reignite growth, an outcome 
that would benefit economies in developing Asia. But emerging market 
policy makers are concerned that the policy may cause their currencies to 
appreciate, undermining their competitiveness. 
While it is generally accepted in the literature that QE was effective 
in lowering US long-term yield rates and stimulating economic activity, 
evidence of international spillover effects is mixed. Neely (2010) and Chen 
et al. (2012) found that the first round of QE, in particular, substantially 
affected global yield rates, exchange rates, and capital flows. Morgan 
(2011) also found some evidence of impacts of US capital outflows on 
exchange rates and interest rates. The International Monetary Fund (2012) 
found instead no significant traces of US liquidity leaking out of the US.
The analysis of the empirical impact of QE on Asian economies, 
which draws on Cho and Rhee (forthcoming), looks only at US QE, as 
Japan’s QE has only recently been announced. It first analyzes trends of 
capital flow aggregates and their composition, and then uses regression 
analysis to examine more directly the effects on domestic financial 
variables.
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Recent trends in capital inflows
To understand whether US expansionary monetary policy has increased 
capital flows into Asia or changed their composition, the first step is to 
compare trends before and after the global financial crisis. Extraordinary 
movements in capital flows, if any are found, cannot be attributed solely 
to QE, as they can be driven by a multitude of other factors. The trend 
analysis simply identifies noticeable changes after QE that policy makers 
may need to be concerned about, though they may not have 
clearly identified causes.
Figure 1.3.1 shows aggregate private capital inflows 
since 2005 into 10 Asian economies: the PRC; Hong Kong, 
China; India; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; the 
Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand. Capital 
inflows shown as aggregate amounts in Figure 1.3.1a are 
notable for their volatility. Inflows rapidly increased to over 
$1.4 trillion in 2007, collapsed with the crisis in 2008 and 
2009, sharply rebounded to the pre-crisis level in 2010 and 
2011 as the global economy recovered along with QE, and 
then slowed after the second half of 2011, when the European 
crisis escalated. While Figure 1.3.1a shows that approximately 
half of the aggregate capital inflows were accounted for by 
the PRC and Japan, Figure 1.3.1b proves that the volatility 
of capital inflows was perceptible in most Asian countries. 
By presenting average ratios of capital inflow to GDP, Figure 
1.3.1b suppresses the dominating effects of the PRC and Japan, 
exaggerating instead the influence of the regional financial 
hubs—Singapore and Hong Kong, China—as their capital 
inflows are extremely large relative to their GDP. In the depth 
of global financial turmoil, the capital inflows to these 10 
countries plummeted to 1.7% of GDP in 2008–2009 from an 
average of 8.4% in the previous 3 years. But inflows rebounded 
nearly as sharply, returning to an average of 7.4% of GDP 
in 2010–2012. The same pattern is observed even excluding 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China. Capital inflows collapsed 
from 9.3% of GDP on average in 2007 to 1.6% in 2008, and then 
recovered to about 8% in 2010, close to the pre-crisis level.
Figure 1.3.2 presents the composition of capital inflows 
for all countries excluding Singapore and Hong Kong, China. 
It is noticeable that while FDI was robust up to the crisis, 
portfolio investment was most volatile, collapsing from 3.2% 
of GDP in 2007 to –2.3% of GDP in 2008, as foreigners sold 
off Asian equities and bonds, and quickly recovering in the 
very next year. Another noteworthy observation is that other 
inflows, which are mostly bank loans, exceeded the pre-crisis 
level and became the main source of capital inflows after 
the crisis. Meanwhile, the ratio of FDI has been slipping, and the ratio of 
portfolio investment has not fully recovered to the pre-crisis level. 
Figure 1.3.3 shows the composition of capital inflows by individual 
country. For the two financial hubs, capital inflows easily exceed 10% of 
GDP, mainly driven by the category Others. Patterns of capital inflows 
to the PRC and Japan are stark contrasts: Whereas capital inflows to the 
1.3.1 Private capital inflows to Asia
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PRC are mainly foreign direct investment (FDI) and have been relatively 
smooth, the main component of capital inflow fluctuations in Japan 
are portfolio investment. This difference between the PRC and Japan 
seems to reflect their differing degree of financial market liberalization. 
The relatively open financial markets of the Republic of Korea and 
Taipei,China experienced patterns similar to Japan’s, in that portfolio 
investment drove the wild swings in capital inflows around the crisis. In 
other Asian economies (except India), the role of portfolio investment 
was relatively weak, the amplitude of fluctuation relatively small, and the 
patterns similar.
In sum, capital inflows to Asia went through drastic fluctuations 
around the global financial crisis, driven mainly by portfolio investments 
into countries with relatively open financial markets. In particular, the 
quick rebound of capital inflows in 2009 and 2010, despite the heightened 
uncertainties and massive credit constraints in the advanced economies, 
suggests that QE contributed to the sharp rebound of capital flows to Asia.
As capital outflows from Asia have not been as volatile as inflows, net 
capital flow movements generally resemble inflow movements. Excluding 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China, the average ratio of net capital flows 
to GDP fell to –0.3% in 2008 but recovered to 2.8% by 2010, driven mostly 
by fluctuations in portfolio investments, from –1.6% of GDP in 2008 to 
0.8% of GDP in 2010. As for reserve accumulation, the PRC has been a 
dominant player, accounting for 70%–80% of the total accumulated by 
the 10 sample economies from 2007 to 2011. This pace appears, however, 
to have significantly slowed in 2012. In terms of net aggregate financial 
account that includes reserve accumulation as well as private inflows 
and outflows, most Asian economies were capital exporters prior to the 
crisis, with outflows larger than inflows (India excepted). After the crisis, 
however, capital export is shrinking in most countries, which may be 
related to global rebalancing. 
1.3.2 C omponents of private capital inflows to Asia (excluding Singapore and Hong Kong, China)
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1.3.3 Components of private capital inflows to individual countries
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Modeling the impact of quantitative easing
The review of trends before and after the crisis has severe limitations because 
the impact of QE cannot be clearly identified. Regression analysis was used 
to isolate the QE impacts while controlling for other contemporaneous 
factors. As proxies for QE, 10 dummy variables were constructed indicating 
the weeks of important QE announcements (Table 1.3.1).
To examine the effects of QE variables on Asia, regressions were 
carried out for three major domestic financial variables: the credit default 
swap premium on 5-year sovereign debt (CDS); the yield rate on a 5-year 
government bond denominated in local currency (BOND); and the 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar (EXR) in eight Asian economies 
(the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the 
Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand). Included with QE event dummies 
were explanatory variables assumed to be exogenous to Asian financial 
markets: the yield rate on 5-year US Treasuries (USRATE) and an index 
of global investor sentiment and market volatility (VIX). Weekly data 
from 2003 to 2012 were compiled using Wednesday, Thursday, or Tuesday 
quotes, in that order of priority depending on availability for US data, 
and quotes 1 day later for Asian country data.
The three domestic financial variables from each country might, 
however, be simultaneously determined. An implicit assumption was 
that causality ran CDS→BOND→EXR, i.e., CDS was included in BOND 
and EXR regressions, and BOND was included in EXR regressions. The 
results from the eight country regressions are summarized in Table 1.3.2.
Although results differ across countries, QE1 events had pronounced 
effects on domestic financial variables, especially on exchange rates, 
while QE2 and QE3 effects were relatively mute. Despite some exceptions, 
QE1 events generally lowered CDS and BOND and appreciated EXR. 
1.3.1 Event dummies
Event date Event
QE1
2008 Nov 25
The Federal Reserve announces purchases of $100 billion in debt of housing-related government-sponsored 
enterprises (so-called federal agency debt) and up to $500 billion in MBS.
2008 Dec 1 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke mentions that the Federal Reserve could purchase long-term Treasuries.
2008 Dec 16 An FOMC statement first mentions the possible purchase of long-term Treasuries.
2009 Jan 28
An FOMC statement says that it is ready to expand federal agency debt and MBS purchases, as well as to purchase 
long-term Treasuries.
2009 Mar 18
The FOMC announces that it will purchase an additional $750 billion in federal agency MBS and increase its 
purchases of federal agency debt by $100 billion and of long-term Treasuries by $300 billion.
QE2
2010 Nov 3
The Federal Reserve announces the purchase of $600 billion of Treasury securities by the end of the second 
quarter of 2011.
2011 Jul 13
Bernanke says, “The Federal Reserve is ready to ease monetary policy further if economic growth and inflation 
slow much more.” 
QE3 2012 Aug 31 Bernanke mentions that the Federal Reserve is ready to do more, including purchase long-term Treasuries.
2012 Sep 12
The Federal Reserve announces the launch of a new, open-ended program to purchase every month $40 billion in 
federal agency MBS and its decision to maintain extremely low policy rates until at least mid-2015.
2012 Dec 12
The FOMC announces its decision to continue its purchases of federal agency MBS at a monthly pace of $40 billion 
and longer-term Treasury securities at $45 billion.
FOMC = Federal Open Market Committee, MBS = mortgage-backed securities.
Sources: Neely (2010) for QE1 and Federal Reserve Board homepage for QE2 and QE3.
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1.3.2 Summary of local variable regressions
CDS BOND EXR
Domestic variables
BOND “0”
CDS “0” ++
Global variables
USRATE “0” +++ “0”a
VIXb +++ “0” +++c
QE1 (5 Events) - - --
QE2 (2 Events) “0” “0” “0”
QE3 (3 Events) “0” “0” “0”
+++ = coefficients positive and statistically significant at 1%, ++ = at 5%, + = at 10%, --- = coefficients negative and statistically 
significant at 1%, -- = at 5%, - = at 10%, “0” = coefficients not statistically significant, BOND = yield rate on a 5-year government bond 
denominated in local currency, CDS = credit default swap premium on 5-year sovereign debt, EXR = local Asian exchange rate vis-à-
vis the US dollar, QE = quantitative easing, USRATE = the yield rate on 5-year United States Treasuries, VIX = index of global investor 
sentiment and market volatility. 
a +++ for Japan and Singapore. 
b The Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, which provides “a key measure of market expectations of near-term 
volatility conveyed by S&P500 stock index option prices” (http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/vixintro.aspx).
c “0” for the People’s Republic of China and --- for Japan .
Sources: Neely (2010) for QE1 and Federal Reserve Board homepage for QE2 and QE3.
The magnitudes of some QE impacts were sizable: For example, the 
16 December 2008 statement from the Federal Open Market Committee 
first mentioning the possible purchase of long-term Treasuries caused 
Asian currencies (except in the PRC and Hong Kong, China) to appreciate 
by 2%–5%, with Japan being the most sensitive (though, notably, the 
impacts of QE events were smaller when VIX is included, suggesting 
that QE events lessened global uncertainty). The finding that only QE1 
had a significant impact on Asian currency appreciation aligns with the 
observation that capital inflows recovered quickly after 2008 but did not 
show any further sign of increasing after 2010.
The QE events were likely to have influenced Asia’s financial markets 
as well through their impacts on global variables. Without exception, 
Asia’s CDS premiums significantly dropped along with VIX, by more 
than double the rate in most economies, and Asia’s BONDs fell along 
with USRATE, generally by 0.2–0.3 as much. To the extent that the 
QE events have lowered VIX and USRATE, therefore, they must have 
positively contributed to easing financial conditions in Asia. 
The impacts of global variables on Asia’s exchange rates differ across 
countries depending on their exchange rate regimes and their degree 
of financial market liberalization. Asia’s exchange rates are generally 
insensitive to variations in USRATE, except in Japan and Singapore, 
where financial markets are fully liberalized. But these rates are extremely 
sensitive to the variations in VIX, with the Republic of Korea being the 
most sensitive, followed by Singapore. The PRC’s exchange rate is not 
sensitive to VIX. The Japanese yen strengthens on the increase of VIX, 
reflecting its role as a safe haven during the crisis. 
In relation to the different responses of exchange rates to capital flows 
across countries, an interesting observation is their relationship with asset 
price inflation. After the global financial crisis, housing prices in some 
economies increased sharply, raising cautionary flags to regional policy 
makers. It is particularly notable that housing prices have spiked largely 
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where exchange rates have been stable or rigid and have been relatively 
steady where local currencies have appreciated. Figure 1.3.4 demonstrates 
the tradeoff between exchange rates and house prices, with a correlation 
coefficient –0.64, suggesting that QE may have affected Asian countries 
through either currency appreciation or higher prices for real estate, the 
most important household asset in many Asian countries.
These findings suggest that QE events affected Asia’s 
financial markets through at least three channels: They 
stabilized the global financial market, calming sentiment and 
volatility to stabilize capital inflows, which lowered credit 
default swap premiums and strengthened currency values in 
Asia. They lowered the long-term interest rate, which brought 
down Asian domestic interest rates. And they changed 
market expectations through direct announcements.
Implications for policy
QE generally contributed to arresting the free fall of the 
advanced economies after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in 2008. The trend and regression analyses conducted before 
and after the global financial crisis provided some insights 
on the impacts of QE on Asia. The results of the analyses 
highlight three ways Asian policy makers can manage the 
spillover effects of QE in the advanced economies.
Strengthened macroprudential policies. Although 
QE has been extensive in the advanced economies, these 
unprecedented and unconventional policies will inevitably end at 
some point. To the extent that QEs have affected Asia’s financial 
markets, future unwinding will also have impacts, and effects could be 
magnified in countries that have not prepared for them. It is imperative 
to closely monitor cross-border financial transactions—in particular 
portfolio investment, which was most volatile around the crisis—and 
their implications on banking sector soundness. Where necessary, 
macroprudential policy must be strengthened.
Improved monitoring of asset markets. In some Asian economies, 
housing prices have risen sharply enough to cause concern to policy 
makers. As proven by the recent crisis, bubbles in real estate markets 
undermine financial and macroeconomic stability. Policy makers thus 
need to closely monitor potential risks in the banking sector that may 
trigger instability when asset price trends reverse.
Reserves maintained in line with increasingly volatile financial 
flows. While it is not optimal for central banks to target exchange rates 
through extensive foreign exchange purchases, it is prudent for them 
to maintain foreign reserve holdings sufficient to counter increasingly 
volatile financial flows—all the more so if their currencies are not reserve 
currencies. This will give them sufficient buffer to cope with sudden 
reversals in financial flows.
1.3.4  Changes in REER and real house price index: 
December 2008 versus September 2012
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Macroeconomic policy to 
maintain stability
The advanced economies are expected to continue expanding 
liquidity, which has repercussions for developing Asia in 
its current macroeconomic situation. Where recovery has 
progressed to the point that output is approaching full 
capacity, strong capital inflows would have potential to put 
upward pressure on the prices of goods or assets. Authorities 
will need to adjust to the changing environment to maintain 
macroeconomic stability.
Monetary policy alert to price pressures
The continuing economic recovery across developing Asia 
lifted production nearly back to its long-term trend. By 2012, 
actual GDP was very close to its potential in a broad range 
of economies—a situation that is expected to prevail through 
the forecast horizon (Figure 1.4.1). This is an important 
change from recent years, when slack capacity meant there 
was little risk of inflation accelerating. 
Stable food prices are so far helping to keep consumer 
price pressures largely in check. Inflation for the region as 
a whole is expected to pick up slightly, from 3.7% in 2012 to 
4.0% in 2013 and further to 4.2% in 2014. Some exceptions 
are India and Viet Nam, which are still coping with 
high inflation from their previously overheated domestic 
economies. Throughout developing Asia, inflation is 
projected to pick up slightly in 2013–2014 (Figure 1.4.2), driven 
mainly by rising inflation in East Asia. The inflation trend is 
not uniform across the region, however, and some easing is 
foreseen in 2014 in South and Southeast Asia.
Some economies in developing Asia have cautiously 
resorted to easing their monetary policy in an effort to 
counter the downward cycle caused by weak global demand 
in 2012. After an episode of monetary tightening to stem 
rising inflationary pressure in 2010–2011, central banks 
cautiously reversed their policy stance in 2012 to prod 
domestic demand and thus compensate for slower global 
economic activity caused by renewed concerns about the debt 
crisis in Europe (Figure 1.4.3). 
The major industrial economies are likely to continue 
their ultra-accommodative monetary policy, as they are not 
expected to enjoy a rapid turnaround within the forecast 
horizon (see Annex: Consolidation in advanced economies). 
In the meantime, the central banks of industrial economies 
will keep their policy rates near zero and continue pouring 
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liquidity to their economies. The global spillover of this 
excess liquidity raises concerns of asset bubbles building up 
in Asia.
During the forecast period, monetary policy is expected 
to have a limited role to play in stimulating economic activity 
in developing Asia. With output gaps hovering around 
zero and global liquidity expanding, the authorities should 
instead monitor their short-term economic development 
carefully and stand ready to stabilize aggregate demand 
should the economy tip toward overheating. Although 
inflation still looks benign, a slow buildup of inflationary 
pressure is anticipated, in particular in the PRC, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. Monetary policy is better kept 
neutral at this juncture, but central banks should be vigilant 
against the sudden return of inflation. Some fine-tuning in 
monetary management may be required to avoid overheating 
in economies that are already close to their long-term 
trend growth. Countries with high inflation and structural 
imbalance should prioritize stabilization.
Governments in Asia need to be careful that the surge 
in capital inflows does not fuel excessive rises in asset prices 
while, at the same time, being prepared for a possible reversal 
in monetary flows should investor sentiment reverse. The current global 
environment of excess liquidity demands that the authorities watch cross-
border financial transactions closely and consider their implications for 
the soundness of the banking sector. Macroprudential policy should be 
tightened when necessary.
Fiscal policy for future growth
With growth sputtering in 2012, some authorities engineered 
short-term fiscal boosts. This caused fiscal balance to worsen 
in general across the region in 2012 (Figure 1.4.4). However, 
further fiscal stimulus to prop up demand is, like expansionary 
monetary policy, unwarranted in the current environment. 
Many economies have sufficient fiscal latitude—as indicated by 
ratios of debt to GDP that are sustainable and trending down—
but the authorities should not overestimate their fiscal strength. 
Favorable fiscal balances could quickly evaporate in a severe 
macroeconomic shock caused by an interest rate spike, liquidity 
squeeze, or growth slowdown (Ferrarini, Jha, and Ramayandi 
2012). Rather, the region’s current fiscal resources should be 
directed toward enhancing its potential for future growth that 
is inclusive.
Governments throughout the region should pay more 
attention to strengthening public infrastructure, which will 
improve their economies’ capacity to grow more quickly and 
inclusively. Building human capital requires upgraded public 
physical infrastructure to improve connectivity, efficient 
spending on health care and education, and better-targeted 
social protection programs.
1.4.3  Benchmark policy rates, selected countries in 
developing Asia
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To ensure adequate financing for infrastructure 
priorities, governments need to allocate their budgets more 
efficiently, which will entail minimizing inefficient subsidies, 
especially those that encourage wasteful fuel consumption, 
and redirecting these funds to more productive public 
investments. In tandem, revenues must be mobilized more 
effectively to maintain a healthy fiscal balance and avert the 
buildup of public debt. As income tax typically contributes 
very little to government revenues in Asia, broadening the tax 
base is an urgent task for many countries in developing Asia, 
to effectively enlarge government’s capacity to generate future 
revenues (Figure 1.4.5).
Risks to the outlook
Political risk has emerged as the main threat to the global and 
regional outlook. In 2012, the two risks that grabbed attention 
were a fiscal shock from the US and a financial shock from 
the euro area, either of which could have derailed global 
growth. These risks have receded. Yet political tensions in 
the US and the euro area remain, preventing the compromise 
needed to reach long-term solutions to both problems. 
Meanwhile, border disputes in Asia spilled over into the 
economic arena in 2012. The heated rhetoric has since cooled 
but could be reignited for political gain. Finally, geopolitical 
risks in oil-producing countries could shock prices for this 
critical commodity, spilling over into the region as inflation.
Unresolved fiscal drag in the US. Despite the fragility of 
the US economic recovery, lawmakers there have been unable 
to forge a compromise on important fiscal policy issues. Even 
the last minute deal to avert the “fiscal cliff”—a convergence 
on 1 January 2013 of the expiration of temporary tax reductions and the 
beginning of across-the-board spending cuts—provided only momentary 
respite. The deal had delayed the automatic spending cuts for 2 months to 
allow further negotiations, but no compromise was reached, leaving the 
so-called sequester to take effect from 1 March 2013. The Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that the combined effect of the tighter fiscal 
policy under current legislative mandates could reduce US GDP growth 
by 1.5 percentage points in 2013. The administration and Congress 
will also need to reach an agreement to raise the debt ceiling, which 
in January 2013 was temporarily suspended until 18 May 2013. Further 
political wrangling over the debt ceiling remains likely, reprising the 
brinksmanship in 2011 that pummeled global financial markets.
Austerity fatigue in the euro area. It seems that the heightened 
anxiety underlying the sudden swings in euro area financial markets 
since the crisis in Greece erupted has calmed somewhat. Market reaction 
was surprisingly muted when negotiations on the terms of the rescue 
package for Cypriot banks severely strained that country’s relations with 
the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund in March 2013. This confrontation underscores the 
political obstacles ahead to achieving a long-term solution to euro area 
1.4.5 Personal income tax and central government revenues 
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weaknesses. A failure to consolidate the path for economic recovery in 
2013 could send the euro area into another round of financial tensions as 
budget deficits in its member countries are likely to be again above target. 
For example, the fiscal consolidation plan for Greece, signed November 
2012, left out many details on the precise mechanisms for bringing down 
Greece’s ratio of debt to GDP on time. As austerity fatigue deepens, the 
debate intensifies over whether fiscal consolidation, and the consequent 
drag on growth throughout the euro area, is the right approach to getting 
beyond the crisis. The inconclusive election result in Italy—in part 
because of a protest vote against further fiscal tightening—highlights 
the difficult times ahead trying to build political consensus around 
reforms. As the currency zone struggles to gather growth momentum, the 
potential remains for a sharp financial shock emanating from Europe.
Border disputes in Asia. Asia’s long history and the upheavals 
of the 20th century have left a number of national boundaries in 
dispute. Lingering contention over borders rarely obstructs cooperative 
relations within the region. However, when disputes heat up, the sharp 
political rhetoric can spill over into the economic arena. The dispute 
over the islands that the PRC calls the Diaoyu and Japan the Senkaku 
reached a fevered pitch in late 2012. Although the islands themselves 
are uninhabited, sovereignty over them confers rights to aquatic and 
undersea natural resources such as fishing grounds and natural gas 
reserves. The angry exchange of words escalated into a PRC boycott of 
Japanese goods, causing a sharp drop in trade and engulfing Japanese 
investment in a cloud of uncertainty. The region has similar flashpoints 
between the PRC and several ASEAN nations, the PRC and India, India 
and Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea and Japan, among others. The 
potential for nationalistic passions—as happened in the PRC and Japan in 
2012—is a clear risk to the outlook. 
Potential spikes in oil prices. The moderate inflation outlook is 
supported by the forecast decline in oil prices. Brent crude is expected to 
drop from an average price of $112 per barrel in 2012 to $110 in 2013 and 
$105 in 2014 (see Annex: Consolidation in advanced economies). But, as 
past experience demonstrates, geopolitical tensions involving major oil 
producers can demolish supply assumptions. Geopolitical risks stemming 
from the ongoing civil unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, even 
when not in a major oil producer (e.g., Syria and Egypt), has the potential 
to push up prices. Possible supply disruptions in Venezuela and Nigeria, 
and international sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear program, 
could also bid up international oil prices. In addition, oil price projections 
assume a slow recovery in major consuming countries tempering oil 
demand. Stronger-than-expected growth in these economies would put 
upward pressure on oil prices. If any of these risks materialized, an oil 
price spike would add to consumer price pressures and, depending on its 
magnitude, might even shake the region’s growth momentum.
Asia’s growing thirst for oil imports makes the region more 
vulnerable to shocks from geopolitical tensions with potential to affect 
the production of this key commodity. Asia’s rising economic importance 
is giving the region a bigger presence in commodity markets generally. 
How is this change affecting commodity market price dynamics?
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Developing Asia’s rising demand 
for commodities
Commodity price cycles in the past decade have synchronized, 
taking in oil, metals, and many agricultural products 
(Figure 1.5.1). While supply shocks such as bad harvests account 
for commodity price spikes, they do not explain why such 
a broad range of prices have moved nearly in unison. This 
suggests that the commodity boom–bust cycle has a strong 
demand element. To what extent does demand from developing 
Asian economies—particularly larger economies like the PRC 
and India—affect global commodity price trends?
Asia’s growing presence in 
commodity markets
Developing Asia became a major commodity-consuming region 
during the last decade (Table 1.5.1), turning the region into a net 
commodity importer. Its relative importance has increased even 
more since the 2008–2009 global financial crisis started, as the 
economies of the major industrial countries slowed significantly. 
Asian demand for some commodities has made many resource 
exporters heavily dependent on Asian consumers and subject to demand 
fluctuations in Asia. Rising vulnerability to shocks originating in Asian 
commodity consumers has become a serious concern, particularly for 
open economies endowed with rich natural resources both inside and 
outside of the region.
The PRC is Asia’s largest commodity consumer by far. It even 
overtook the US in the consumption of major metals and agricultural 
commodities in the late 2000s, making it the world’s largest consumer 
of many commodities. The PRC consumed in 2011 about 20% of 
nonrenewable energy resources, 23% of major agricultural crops, and 40% 
of base metals. 
The PRC’s share of consumption of agricultural products, such as 
oilseed soybeans, doubled over the past decade, driven by a change in diet 
to foods richer in oil. Yet, the PRC has historically been a major consumer 
of quite a few agricultural crops such as rice, maize, and cotton. Change 
has been more significant in nonagricultural commodities. The PRC’s 
surging share of base metal consumption has been particularly noticeable, 
rising from 10% during the 1990s to over 40% today. 
In tandem with its rapid economic growth, the PRC’s energy needs 
have risen. Its use of primary energy has doubled since the 1990s, and 
it now accounts for nearly 20% of global consumption. The PRC’s 
petroleum consumption—including motor gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, 
distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, and liquefied petroleum gas—now 
occupies about 10% of world consumption, despite being less important 
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in the PRC’s energy mix than other forms of primary energy, particularly 
coal. The PRC has accounted for 45% of the world’s coal usage on average 
during the past 4 years. Its use of natural gas and biofuels, on the other 
hand, remains limited. 
Although the PRC has a greater global presence than India as a 
commodity consumer, India can transmit powerful shocks within 
Asia, all the more so because it relies on regional resource exporters to 
meet most of its needs. India’s role as a commodity consumer is more 
significant for agriculture products than for metals or petroleum. One of 
the largest importers and consumers of edible oils, India consumes more 
palm oil than either the US or the PRC and relies on imports for over 25% 
of its annual requirement, as domestic production is meager. The country 
also consumes more sugar than the PRC or the US.  
India’s energy consumption is still only about a third of what the PRC 
or the US consumes. It relies largely on coal for primary energy and has 
accounted for about 9% of world coal consumption over the past 4 years. 
India’s metal use is much smaller than the PRC’s, but its share of world 
consumption generally exceeds the total for the ASEAN-5: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
The presence of ASEAN-5 as a commodity consumer is notable for 
only a few items, primarily rice, palm oil, and stainless steel. This country 
1.5.1 Consumption share of selected commodities, average of 2009–2012
PRC India ASEAN-5a Total Asia USA
Rest of 
the World
Share of world consumption
Agriculture
Milled rice 30.7 20.1 14.6 65.4  0.9 33.7
Palm oil 12.4 15.1 24.3 51.7  2.2 46.1
Sugar  9.2 15.0  7.0 31.1  6.4 62.5
Cottonb 38.4 18.4  3.6 60.4  3.2 36.4
Energyc
Total energy 19.4  5.7  3.8 28.8 18.2 52.9
Petroleum 10.6  3.7  5.2 19.6 21.9 58.6
Natural gas  3.2  1.9  4.0  9.1 21.5 69.4
Coal 44.9  8.8  1.8 55.5 13.4 31.1
Electricity 19.3  3.8  2.6 25.7 21.2 53.0
Renewable energy 
(biofuels)
 2.5  0.3  1.6  4.4 48.2 47.4
Metalsc
Refined aluminum 40.7  3.9  2.9 47.5 10.4 42.2
Refined copper 39.3  2.6  3.6 45.5  9.0 45.5
Stainless steel 32.5  5.6 ... 38.1  8.4 53.5
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, PRC = People’s Republic of China, ... = data not available. 
a ASEAN-5 are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
b Domestic consumption for cotton of ASEAN-5 excludes Singapore.
c Data for Energy and Metals are up to 2010/11 only.
Sources: Staff calculations using data from Haver Analytics; International Energy Agency. http://www.
iea.org/stats/index.asp; World Bureau of Metal Statistics. World Development Indicators online database 
(accessed 11 February 2013).
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grouping is a net commodity exporter and a major producer 
of palm oil, which over the past decade has relegated soybean 
oil, once the most popular vegetable oil, to second place. As 
palm is generally the cheapest vegetable oil, it is an important 
component in the developing world’s higher intake of oils and 
fats. 
The long-term trend of rising commodity consumption 
in the PRC is illustrated by demand notable for very high 
commodity intensity (Figure 1.5.2). The PRC’s commodity 
intensity, measured as commodity consumption per capita, 
has soared over the last decade, rising far above the historical 
experience of other countries. Its energy consumption is high 
for its stage of economic development. The same is true for its 
copper consumption. The PRC consumed 5.5 tons of copper 
per capita in 2010, more than three times the world average 
in 1960 or eight times higher than what the Republic of Korea 
consumed in 1970, when its per capita income roughly equaled 
the PRC’s today. 
The picture is slightly different for petroleum. The average 
person in India used 2.43 liters of petroleum products daily in 
2011, or five times the 0.48 liters recorded in the PRC in 1998, 
when its per capita income matched India’s current per capita 
income of just above $800. India’s high consumption may 
reflect the subsidies provided for some petroleum products, 
notably diesel and liquefied petroleum gas.
The PRC’s unusually fast-growing commodity intensity 
likely reflects the rapid expansion of its tradable export sector 
and its massive fixed asset investment, particularly since 2000. 
Both are commodity intensive, making the PRC’s economic 
cycles likely have strong bearing on aggregate import demand 
for commodities and hence their prices. 
1.5.2  Production–consumption ratios of primary 
commodities, average of 2004–2012
PRC India ASEAN-5a
Agriculture
Milled rice 0.71 0.41 1.08
Oilseed soybean 0.27 1.00 0.19
Palm oil ... 0.00 3.88
Sugar 0.90 1.04 1.14
Cottonb 0.76 1.27 0.01
Energyc
Petroleum 0.91 1.13 0.91
Natural gas 0.98 0.80 1.47
Coal 1.02 0.92 2.44
Metalsc,d
Refined aluminum 1.03 1.03 0.25
Refined copper 0.67 1.37 0.64
Stainless steel 1.33 1.82 ...
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, PRC = People’s 
Republic of China, ... = data not available. 
a ASEAN-5 are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. 
b Domestic consumption for cotton of ASEAN-5 excludes Singapore; 
c Data for energy and metals are up to 2010/11 only.
d Production data for copper covers only the period 2004–2011.
Sources: ADB estimates using data from Haver Analytics; International 
Energy Agency. http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp; World Bureau 
of Metal Statistics. World Development Indicators online database 
(accessed 11 February 2013).
1.5.2 Commodity intensity of copper and petroleum
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Asia’s consumption of a number of commodities significantly 
exceeds its own supply, forcing the region to rely on external suppliers. 
The production–consumption gap is particularly large in metals and 
edible oil, demand for which is growing rapidly to support industrial 
development and richer diets (Table 1.5.2). The ASEAN-5 countries help 
fill the production–consumption gap of the PRC and India for some 
agricultural products, but these countries are themselves net importers 
of metals and major energy products. Commodity prices are driven in 
the short-run mainly by the business cycle of the main consumers (not to 
disregard seasonality and unanticipated transitory changes in the supply–
demand balance). Because developing Asia has become a heavyweight in 
commodity demand, the ups and downs of its demand make waves for 
commodity-exporting economies. 
Asia’s impact on commodity exporters
If a commodity exporter depends heavily on one commodity or export 
destination, it is especially vulnerable to demand fluctuations. The effects 
can be partly offset if the commodity exporter can influence prices. An 
index to measure the degree of dependency on commodity markets in 
the PRC, India, and ASEAN-5 can be computed for each commodity 
and each importer by taking into account concentrations in a specific 
commodity and export destination, as well as the exporter’s pricing power 
(Box 1.5.1). 
The export dependency index shows quite a few countries around 
the globe heavily reliant on PRC import demand because of its sheer 
size (Table 1.5.3). They include the PRC’s neighbors, exporters further 
afield in Latin America and Africa, and industrial economies such as 
Australia. Within the region, Solomon Islands is the most PRC-dependent 
economy for its exports of wood. It shipped more than 90% of its total 
squared wood exports to PRC in 2011, a share that has tripled in the 
past decade. India and Kazakhstan depend heavily on the PRC for their 
exports of metal. Southeast Asia has several countries exporting several 
commodities that rely heavily on PRC demand: Indonesia for coal, 
natural gas, and palm oil; Malaysia for natural gas and palm oil; Thailand 
for rice and rubber; Viet Nam for rubber, sugar, cement, coal, and wood; 
and Myanmar for rubber and maize. 
Outside of Asia, many Latin American and African commodity 
exporters are subject to fluctuations in PRC demand for metals and 
agricultural products, notably Chile for copper and Brazil for soybeans. 
PRC imports of iron ore and soybeans comprise roughly 60% of global 
import demand for these commodities, including 60%–70% of Australian 
iron ore exports and US soybean exports. The dependency index is much 
higher for Australia than for the US, as iron ore occupies a concentrated 
20% of all Australian exports and soybeans only 1% of US exports. 
Australia is therefore more vulnerable than the US to commodity shocks 
from the PRC. 
India’s import demand is much smaller but rising quickly (Table 1.5.4). 
So far, only a few countries rely heavily on Indian demand, mainly for 
minerals and metals such as coal, iron ore, and steel. However, a few 
commodities can make India a shock emitter to its neighbors, as India 
1.5.1 Computing export dependency ratio
Commodity exporters’ vulnerability 
to changeable Asian demand can be 
measured using the export dependency 
index. The index is a geometric mean of 
three components: how concentrated a 
country’s exports are in one commodity, 
how dependent the country is on a 
specific national market, and the buying 
and selling countries’ relative power to 
set the price. 
Indexi,j = geometric mean of (EXPi.j/
EXPj, EXPi,j,k/EXPi,j, Ave[(IMPi,k/
IMPi),(1-EXPi,j/EXPi)]) 
where
EXPi,j/EXPj = country j’s exports of 
commodity i as a share of its total 
exports;
EXPi,j,k/EXPi,j = country j’s exports of 
commodity i to country k divided by its 
total export of that commodity; and
Ave[(IMPi,k/IMPi),(1-EXPi,j/EXPi)] = the 
average of 2 components: 
(IMPi,k/IMPi) is the share of country k’s 
imports of commodity i in the global 
market. 
(1-EXPi,j/EXPi) is 1 minus country j’s 
export market share of commodity i.
The index is scaled from 0 (no 
dependence) to 1 (complete 
dependence). The higher the score, 
the more vulnerable an exporter is to 
disrupted trade. As the index shows, a 
commodity exporter is not vulnerable 
just because it ships a huge share of a 
particular commodity to one market. 
It is highly vulnerable only if its export 
performance depends heavily on that 
commodity and its pricing power is 
limited.
Reference:
BBVA. 2013. How dependent is Latin 
America’s Economy on China? Economic 
Watch, BBVA Research.
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tends to rely on neighboring countries for its commodity needs. Nepal 
and Bhutan are particularly exposed to Indian demand through exports 
of steel, copper, and construction materials such as cement and aggregate. 
Their export dependency ratios have increased over the past decade.
By contrast, very few commodity exporters rely on demand from 
ASEAN-5 (Table 1.5.4), and the largest of the ASEAN-5 economies, 
Indonesia, is itself a net commodity exporter. While the ASEAN-5 
countries seem to emit lesser shocks than India or the PRC, there are 
exceptions. For example, like the PRC, ASEAN-5 countries import 
substantial amounts of cotton, mainly from African economies that are 
thus subject to shocks originating in ASEAN. 
How have resource exporters managed demand shocks so far?
A growth slowdown hitting commodity importers affects exporters 
through multiple channels but mainly through exports and terms of 
trade. Resource-dependent economies’ terms of trade—i.e., the price of 
exportable goods relative to the price of importable goods—fluctuated 
substantially in response to shifting demand in importing economies 
and the gyrating commodity prices often associated with macroeconomic 
volatility. 
Not all nations have felt the same impact from demand shifts. 
Mendoza (1995) estimates that roughly half of the variation in aggregate 
output in a sample of the Group of Seven industrialized nations and 23 
developing economies is attributable to terms-of-trade shocks. Similarly, 
Kose (2002) finds that terms-of-trade shocks explain almost all of the 
variance in output in small, open developing economies. These findings 
1.5.3  Top commodity exporters to the People’s Republic of China, average of 
2009–2012
Rank Exporter Commodity (excluding petroleum) Export dependency
Top 10 of all exporters
1 Solomon Islands Wood in the rough or roughly squared 0.69
2 Mauritiana Iron ore 0.51
3 Austrialia Iron ore 0.47
4 Benin Cotton 0.45
5 Zambia Copper 0.44
6 Chile Copper 0.42
7 Togo Cotton 0.40
8 Brazil Iron ore 0.36
9 South Africa Iron ore 0.34
10 Gabon Wood in the rough or roughly squared 0.32
Top 5 Asian exporters
1 Solomon Islands Wood in the rough or roughly squared 0.69
2 India Iron ore 0.25
3 Indonesia Coal 0.24
4 Kazakhstan Copper 0.23
5 Kazakhstan Iron ore 0.21
Sources: ADB estimates using UN Commtrade database. http://comtrade.un.org (accessed 11 February 2013).
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1.5.4.  Top 10 commodity exporters to India and ASEAN-5, average of 2009-2012
Rank Exporter Commodity (excluding Petroleum) Export Dependency
India
1 Bhutan Steel 0.55
2 Nepal Steel 0.42
3 Bhutan Copper 0.33
4 Qatar Natural gas 0.23
5 South Africa Coal 0.23
6 Australia Coal 0.22
7 Babhrain Iron ore 0.21
8 Indonesia Palm oil 0.21
9 Nepal Tea 0.21
10 Nepal Copper 0.20
ASEAN-5
1 Burundi Coffee 0.27
2 Benin Cotton 0.20
3 Togo Cotton 0.20
4 Namibia Zinc 0.20
5 Burkina Faso Cotton 0.17
6 Mali Cotton 0.15
7 Indonesia Natural gas 0.14
8 Uganda Cotton 0.12
9 Zimbabwe Cotton 0.12
10 Bahrain Iron ore 0.12
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
ASEAN-5 are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Sources: ADB estimates using UN Comtrade database. http://comtrade.un.org (accessed 11 February 2013).
suggest that small, open economies possessing limited policy levers 
and exposed to external shocks are more severely affected than are the 
industrial economies.
The economies heavily dependent on Asian demand for commodities 
have experienced severe volatility during the past 5 years. Export prices 
dropped sharply across commodities in 2008–2009 in response to the 
widening output gap both globally and in emerging Asia (the PRC; Hong 
Kong, China; India; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the 
Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand). But the terms of 
trade did not always fall. Among exporters to Asia, the terms of trade for 
Solomon Islands and Chile were more severely affected than those for 
Bhutan and Australia (Figure 1.5.3). The different impacts reflected the 
differences in policy levers available to each country. 
Fiscal policy is an important concern for commodity exporters, as 
procyclical fiscal policy in countries heavily dependent on commodities 
for government revenue amplifies commodity shocks. The exchange 
rate regime is also important. When prices are slow to adjust, a flexible 
exchange rate, as in Australia, helps stabilize the economy in response to 
terms-of-trade shocks with rapid adjustments to the nominal exchange 
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rate (Broda 2004, Edwards and Levy Yeyati 2005, Aghion et al. 2009). 
Countries that peg their currencies—such as Bhutan to the Indian 
rupee and Solomon Islands to the US dollar—have less flexibility in 
their response to price shocks. Maintaining flexible fiscal and monetary 
policies can help counter commodity price fluctuations and mitigate their 
impacts. 
An exercise quantifying the effects of a growth slowdown originating 
in Asia suggests that Latin America would, as a supplier of agricultural 
crops and metals, immediately feel a slowdown about a quarter as large. 
South America would also be exposed to volatile price overshooting until 
supply adjusted and commodity prices stabilized (Box 1.5.2). 
These analyses confirm that developing Asia is increasingly important 
as a commodity consumer and emitter of demand shocks. Meanwhile, 
its energy needs have been rising in tandem with its rapid economic 
growth. As energy prices—for petroleum, in particular—are very sensitive 
to demand fluctuations and often overshoot, securing energy supply 
becomes critical to support developing Asia’s growth and avoid creating 
excessive macroeconomic volatility. Developing Asia must rationalize its 
energy use and supply or else resign itself to scaling down its hopes for 
the coming Asian Century.
1.5.3. Asia’s output gap, commodity export price,  and terms of trade
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1.5.2 Asia and Latin America: the commodity market connection
How would a lower growth path for developing 
Asia affect natural resource exporters such as 
Latin America? The overall impact depends on the 
importance of several different effects.
Trade and commodity prices are the main channels 
for transmitting shocks. Regarding trade, lower growth in 
developing Asia reduces demand for exports from Latin 
America. This is partly offset by depreciation in the real 
effective exchange rates of Latin American currencies, 
which improves the competitiveness of the export sector in 
Latin America and of local firms competing with imports. 
In the commodities channel, reduced import demand 
from developing Asia lowers world commodity prices, 
generally worsening the terms of trade for Latin America. 
Commodity prices fluctuate in response to changes in 
demand, but to varying degrees. Oil prices are much more 
responsive to a change in global output—about three times 
more elastic than metal prices and nine times more than 
food prices.
 A slowdown in developing Asia would have less impact 
on world metal and food prices than on oil prices, as the 
region’s share of global metal and food imports is lower 
than of oil (box figure). In 2011, developing Asia’s oil trade 
deficit was 3.6% of GDP, three times the 1.2% deficit in 
metals (the deficit in food is near zero). In addition, world 
metal and food prices tend to be much less sensitive to 
changes in demand. 
The impact of lower commodity prices on growth in 
Latin America is determined by two main factors: the 
supply response of commodity sectors and a wealth effect 
stemming from worse terms of trade. The supply response, 
a decline in production, is larger for metals and food than 
for oil, because metal and food occupy a larger share of 
Latin America’s production and exports. The negative 
wealth effect curbs consumption and tax revenues. 
A global projection model is used to simulate the 
overall impact a slowdown in developing Asia would have 
on Latin America. The model includes three aggregate 
commodities (oil, metals, and food) and seven country 
blocks (the US, the euro area, Japan, emerging Asia, 
the PRC, Latin America, and the rest of the world). 
The emerging Asia block comprises Hong Kong, China; 
India; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the 
Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand—with 
the PRC as a separate block, the Asia-10. 
To gauge the net impact a persistent slowdown in 
Asia-10 would have on Latin America, a model scenario 
is estimated assuming a series of negative shocks to 
aggregate supply that lower the Asian economies’ potential 
output growth by half a percentage point throughout the 
simulation period. The drop in potential output growth 
has a more pronounced impact on Asia-10’s actual 
output growth—a 1.3% contraction in the first year—as 
economies adjust to their lower potential output, with 
negative spillovers to the other economies. Commodity 
prices drop sharply in the immediate aftermath of the 
shock, as short-term price elasticities are much greater 
than long term. Lower commodity prices stimulate a 
modest rebound in the Asia-10 economies that use those 
commodities. This initial overshooting of commodity 
prices leads to greater output volatility in the short run.
The output response of commodity-exporting Latin 
America is quite different. The initial sharp drop in 
commodity prices compounds the effect of lower output, 
reducing growth in the region by 0.3% in the first year. 
The subsequent recovery in commodity prices then 
supports Latin American growth, offsetting the negative 
effects from the trade channel caused by lower external 
demand from Asia-10. Output in Latin America stabilizes 
at a level 0.1% below its initial level by the 5th year. 
The simulation results indicate that the overshooting 
response of commodity prices drives the short-run output 
dynamics. The initial sharp decline in commodity prices 
partly offsets the decline in output in Asia-10 but actuates 
through the trade channel the contraction in output in 
Latin America. A decline in Asia’s growth sharply reduces 
growth in Latin America in the short run, largely through 
a steep drop in world commodity prices. The impact 
is mitigated over time, however, as lower commodity 
prices spur demand across regions and commodity prices 
stabilize slightly below the initial level. 
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Annex: Consolidation in 
advanced economies
The year is likely to be one of consolidation for the major industrial 
economies as a whole, but with diverging fortunes for the United States 
(US) and the euro area. Enthusiasm following strong gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth in the third quarter of 2012 (Q3 2012) in the US 
and the euro area was tempered somewhat by a weak fourth quarter. 
Japan slipped back into recession after a promising start to the year. 
As 2013 opened, economic activity in these economies remained weak. 
Continued fiscal tightening in the US and the euro area will act as a drag 
on growth there, while spending plans in Japan should help its economy 
back to modest growth. Collectively, the major industrial economies are 
expected to manage GDP growth of only 1.0% in 2013, slightly off the pace 
of the previous 2 years, with an uptick to 1.9% in 2014.
Moderate inflation of less than 2% is expected to prevail in 2013–2014, 
providing scope for continued monetary easing. The benign inflation 
environment is supported by slight declines in food and fuel prices as 
boosted supplies more than offset the rise in demand expected from 
increased economic activity. Prices are seen to pick up moderately in 2014 
as production rises closer to its potential (Table A1.1).
A1.1 Baseline assumptions on the international economy
2011 2012 2013 2014
Actual Estimate
ADO 2013 
projection
ADO 2013 
projection
GDP growth (%)
Major industrial economiesa 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.9
United States 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.6
Euro area 1.4 –0.6 –0.3 1.2
Japan –0.6 2.0 1.2 1.4
World trade (% change)
Merchandise exports 5.0 2.5 4.0 5.0
Prices and inflation
Brent crude spot prices (average, $ per barrel) 111.0 112.0 110.0 105.0
Energy price index (% change) 30.1 –0.4 –0.2 –3.0
Food index (% change) 23.9 0.7 –2.0 –0.5
Consumer price index inflation  
(major industrial economies’ average, %)
2.4 1.8 1.2 1.7
Interest rates
United States Federal funds rate (average, %) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
European Union refinancing rate (average, %) 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9
Japan interest rate (average, %) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
$ Libor b (%) 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
a Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method.
b Average interbank quotations on 1-month loans.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.
go.jp; World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org; Consensus Forecasts; Bloomberg; International 
Monetary Fund, Primary Commodity Prices, http://www.imf.org; World Bank, Global Commodity Markets, 
http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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Recent developments in 
major industrial economies
United States
GDP growth dropped to just 0.1% at a seasonally adjusted 
annualized rate in Q4 2012, after showing an increase of 3.1% 
in the third quarter. The slowdown in the last quarter mainly 
reflected falls in inventory investment and federal government 
spending on defense. The declining inventory investment 
suggests that businesses are still reluctant to hold stocks and 
expand production in an uncertain environment. On the 
positive side, private consumer spending remained strong 
throughout 2012, and fixed investment picked up in the end. 
Although export growth slowed in 2012 from the previous 
year, it outpaced import growth. Despite the slowdown in the 
final quarter, GDP increased by 2.2% for the year, higher than 
the 1.8% increase in 2011 (Figure A1.1).
Although the consumer confidence index dropped in 
the last 2 months of 2012 and in January 2013, it recovered 
somewhat in February 2013 as fiscal uncertainty was partly 
resolved and the shock from the expiration of payroll tax cuts 
waned (Figure A1.2). While the February reading of 67.3 points 
is well below the 2007 average (100 on the index), let alone the 
2007 highs almost bumping 110, it recovered from the nadir 
below 25 points in February 2009 and has averaged about 65 
in 2012. Retail sales and industrial production rose gradually 
from the trough in May 2009. Purchasing managers’ index 
values for the first 2 months of 2013, compiled by the Institute 
for Supply Management, are 53.1 for January and 54.2 for 
February, both above 50 and therefore indicating that the 
manufacturing economy is expanding. 
Some positive signs in housing and labor markets suggest 
the recovery in the US is strengthening. House prices, 
measured by the housing affordability index median price, 
declined in Q3 2012 but rose slightly in the last 2 months of 
the year. Looking at the 3-month moving average to smooth 
out monthly volatility shows prices trending upward in 2012. 
In terms of quantities, the number of housing units under 
construction and of housing starts rose in 2012. For houses 
under construction, in fact, the 3-month moving average 
of monthly growth rates measured year on year finally 
returned to positive territory in January 2012 (Figure A1.3). 
In addition, the number of housing units authorized, which 
gives an indication of things to come, increased in 2012. In 
February 2013, the year-on-year 3-month moving average of the 
growth rate was 31.9%.
Unemployment, which tends to lag recovery, fell below 
8% in September 2012 for the first time since early 2009. 
Declines have been slow to materialize, with February 2013 
unemployment still at 7.7% and well above its long-run 
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average of 6%, which is causing worries that no new jobs are 
being added (Figure A1.4). Looking at a broader measure 
of underutilized workers—one that sums the number of 
unemployed with those working part time for economic 
reasons and those who want work but have quit searching—
tells a similar story. While the broader measure has dropped 
from its peak of just over 17% in 2009–2010, the February 2013 
rate of 14.3% was still higher than before the global economic 
downturn. However, the number of people filing claims for 
unemployment benefits fell to a 4-week seasonally adjusted 
average of 339,750 in the week ending 16 March 2013, the lowest 
since March 2008, suggesting further strengthening in the 
labor market is likely in the coming months.
Inflation, both overall and core, remains under control 
(Figure A1.5). Since the US Federal Reserve plans to link 
interest rate changes to the state of the labor market and the 
inflation rate, an accommodative monetary policy is likely to 
continue. Credit from commercial banks grew steadily in 2012. 
The 3-month moving average of credit from commercial banks 
rose by 5.4% in January 2013 over a year earlier. Higher credit 
growth denotes increased lending by commercial banks. 
To avoid the fiscal cliff on 1 January 2013, US authorities 
reached agreement on some revenue enhancements. However, 
the deal only delayed the implementation of automatic 
spending cuts by 2 months. Because lawmakers were unable 
to reach consensus on a compromise deficit-reduction 
package, across-the-board spending cuts through so-called 
sequestration took effect on 1 March 2013. The temporary 
reduction in employee Social Security contributions, from 6.2% 
of earnings to 4.1%, was allowed to expire on 1 January 2013 
as scheduled. With continued uncertainty in the economy, 
the mix of tax increases and spending cuts will likely slow 
output and suppress consumer demand, and hence growth, in 
the short term. The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 
February 2013 that the combined impact of the fiscal policy 
changes would be a 1.5 percentage point reduction in US 
growth in 2013 (Box A1.1). 
The cut in public demand will need to be balanced by continued 
private sector strength to avoid a slip back into recession. The positive 
signs in investment, consumption, housing, employment, and credit 
point in the direction of a gradually strengthening economy. The US 
should grow by 2.0% in 2013, slightly slower than in 2012. Assuming 
that the fiscal drag phases out but that monetary policy continues to be 
supportive, output in the US is expected to pick up gradually and the 
economy to expand by 2.6% in 2014.
Euro area
The euro area’s output contracted by an estimated 0.6% in 2012. The last 
quarter of 2012 saw a decline in Germany’s GDP, but there are signs that 
German industrial production and economic growth have since improved. 
In any case, the strength of the German economy is offset by weakness 
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A1.1 Fiscal tightening in the United States
In August 2011, the United States (US) Congress passed 
the Budget Control Act as part of the compromise to 
raise the US debt ceiling and avoid a technical default. 
The act called on lawmakers to approve a plan to reduce 
the fiscal deficit by $1.2 trillion over 10 years or face 
automatic across-the-board cuts to certain categories of 
defense and nondefense spending: budget sequestration. 
The idea was that the untargeted nature of sequestration 
would be so unpalatable that leaders of both parties 
would be motivated to find a compromise deal to reach 
the deficit goal.
However, the frantic deal to avoid the so-called fiscal 
cliff—expenditure reductions and tax increases that 
were set to take effect on 1 January 2013—only delayed 
sequestration by 2 months. As no deal was reached on 
1 March 2013, and no further extensions were approved, 
affected agencies have begun to implement the cuts. 
Accordingly, after accounting for interest savings from 
the spending cuts, the remaining amount of $984 billion 
would have to be cut over 9 years from 2013 to 2021. This 
amounts to about $109 billion per year. In each category, 
the cuts affect discretionary and mandatory spending.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates the 
automatic spending cuts will total $85.4 billion in 2013—
split evenly between defense and other spending. This is 
equivalent to a 7.8% reduction in defense spending and 
a 4.6% cut to other programs. With regard to the $42.7 
billion in cuts to nondefense spending, the mandatory 
cuts include $11.35 billion to Medicare payments and 
$5.52 billion to other programs. Key mandatory programs 
such as Social Security, Medicaid, the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and 
veterans’ compensation are exempt from sequestration. 
Most of the remaining $25.8 billion in spending cuts 
will be to discretionary programs on health, education, 
research, security, and housing assistance.
Taken together, the budget sequester, increase in payroll 
taxes, and increased tax rate on high earners present 
considerable tightening of fiscal policy in the US. But the 
shock to the macroeconomy has been muted as financial 
markets have largely taken the changes in stride. This is 
partly because the lagged effects of fiscal tightening will 
be felt only over time. In particular, consumers tend to 
respond to lower income by first drawing down their 
savings then adjusting their spending habits. Meanwhile, 
across-the-board spending reductions will be phased 
in over the course of the year as public agencies begin 
to cut expenses and reduce their payrolls. So, while 
the overall impact should be a drag on growth—by 
up to 1.5 percentage points in 2013 according to the 
Congressional Budget Office—it will not deliver an 
immediate shock to the US economy.
in the other large euro area economies, notably France and Italy. The 
euro area recession is seen extending into the first half of 2013 before slow 
recovery begins in the second half of the year, with the year as a whole 
showing contraction by 0.3%. In 2014, the region is expected to continue 
recovering slowly. Assuming that financial tensions do not intensify 
further, improvements in external demand during the year could gradually 
lift the euro area’s exports to support growth. Monetary policy 
will likely remain accommodative as inflation remains in 
check, in line with the declining trend in the international 
commodity prices. GDP growth is projected to pick up to 1.2% 
in 2014.
In Q4 2012, the euro area’s output shrank by 0.6% quarter 
on quarter, following a 0.1% decline in the third quarter, 
which was the weakest euro area performance since the 
slump in Q1 2009. At a seasonally adjusted annualized rate, 
GDP contracted by 2.3% in the fourth quarter (Figure A1.6). 
Economic contraction during Q4 2012 accelerated to 0.9% in 
Italy and 0.8% in Spain. In Germany, fourth-quarter GDP 
dropped by 0.6% and in France by 0.3%. Most other countries 
in the euro area saw their economies shrink.
The unemployment rate rose to 11.9% in January 2013. 
Youth unemployment reached 24.2% in the euro area. This 
aggregate masks considerable disparity among member states, 
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with youth unemployment highest in Spain at 55.5% and 
in Italy at 38.7%, and lowest in Austria, Germany, and the 
Netherlands at 8%–10% (Figure A1.7). 
Throughout 2012, net exports were the major contributor 
to GDP growth. Euro area trade in goods with the rest of the 
world recorded a sizeable surplus, as exports to most of the 
region’s major trading partners expanded while demand for 
imports from these countries was either anemic or shrinking 
(Figure A1.8). The euro area current account, reflecting also 
services, incomes, and transfers, recorded a surplus of 1.2% of 
GDP in 2012, up from 0.1% in 2011.
Fixed capital formation subtracted 0.6–1.2 percentage 
points from GDP growth in each quarter of 2012. This reversal 
comes after almost 2 years of persistently positive investment 
growth from Q2 2010 to Q4 2011. Throughout 2012, changes 
in inventories continued to weigh down on GDP growth. 
Industrial production contracted throughout 2012, at a year-
on-year monthly rate of 1.6%–3.8%. The decline continued at 
2.1% in January 2013. Based on the latest purchasing managers’ 
index, manufacturing production in Germany fell in March 
after growing for 2 consecutive months, while manufacturing 
remained unchanged in France. Ireland and Spain recorded 
positive growth in their manufacturing production in 
February 2013, month on month, benefiting from rising 
export orders. Rates of contraction accelerated in Italy and the 
Netherlands (Figure A1.9).
Private consumption imposed a substantial drag on GDP 
growth, constrained by high unemployment and low consumer 
confidence. Retail trade shrank by 1.7% in 2012, falling by 0.8% 
from November to December 2012, but slightly picked up in 
January 2013. 
Widespread austerity and weakening economies have 
undermined retailers’ ability to increase prices. Consequently, 
price pressures remain subdued. Having peaked at 3.0% in September 
2011, consumer price inflation fell from 2.7% in January 2012 to 2.2% in 
November and December, decelerating further to 1.8% in February 2013. 
This reflects a significant slowdown of oil price inflation in 
Q4 2012, from 8.0% in October 2012 to 5.2% in December, and 
further to 3.9% in February 2013. 
The European Central Bank has been maintaining the 
interest rate on its main refinancing operations at 0.75%. 
However, monetary transmission and banks’ onlending to 
firms remain impaired, as banks in several countries face 
capital constraints combined with the need to further adjust 
their balance sheets. 
Looking ahead, the March 2013 manufacturing purchasing 
managers’ index reading below 50 signals the continuing 
deterioration in euro area business conditions. The index 
improved to an 11-month high in January but relapsed in 
February and March. A similar trend was visible in the 
services index (Figure A1.10). 
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Germany is showing some signs of weakness, notably 
the recent contraction in the purchasing managers’ index 
as new export orders fell again, dampening expectations of 
Germany’s economy returning to growth in Q1 2013. In any 
case, Germany’s capacity to spur euro area manufacturing is 
countered by French slippage, Italy and Spain mired in deep 
recession, and continuing weaknesses and debt overhangs in 
some smaller euro area economies. 
France, the euro area’s second-largest economy, has 
seen its competitiveness slip quickly and, with it, industrial 
activity and exports of manufactured goods and services 
alike (Figure A1.11). The decline of the French economy has 
caused government budgets to fall short of expectations. 
The EU Fiscal Compact requires that fiscal deficits be less 
than 3% of GDP by the end of 2013, and compliance leaves 
the French government with few options other than to adopt 
a tighter fiscal stance in 2013, though this will weigh down 
domestic demand and labor markets. There have been signs, 
however, that euro area policy makers are willing to press for 
less austerity and more leniency regarding Fiscal Compact 
compliance, which is likely to heat up political debates in the 
months ahead.
Italy, the euro area’s third-largest economy, is in its seventh 
consecutive quarter of recession, facing its deepest economic 
and political crisis in postwar history. Contractionary fiscal 
policy may have appeased international financial markets, but 
Italy certainly paid the price of exacerbating the economic 
downturn and with it the burden of the country’s huge stock 
of public debt. Private sector lending and spending remain 
subdued and unemployment rampant. Italy’s deep lack of 
competitiveness requires overdue reforms to the country’s 
bureaucracy, judicial system, tax system, and public sector. 
The implementation of difficult reform is further delayed 
by the outcome of Italian elections in February 2013, which 
gave no single party or coalition control over both chambers 
of parliament. The governability of the country has not been 
assured, making new elections in the latter half of 2013 likely. 
Italy’s economic and political crises sharpen uncertainty 
surrounding the euro area outlook for 2013.
Several of the euro area’s peripheral economies remain 
ridden by crisis. Greece’s economy continues to struggle, 
and its public finances have yet to prove sustainable, despite 
repeated international rescue efforts led by the European 
Commission, European Central Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund. After a long debate, Cyprus became in 
mid-March the latest country to be offered a bailout by the 
International Monetary Fund and European authorities. The 
bailout package is set at €10 billion, with losses imposed on 
large deposits in Cypriot banks. The country’s second-largest 
financial institution will be closed and its deposits over 
€100,000 will be placed in an asset-managing institution. The bailout 
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leaves the island’s economy with a large debt overhang, and the 
sustainability of its public finances remains in question. 
Perceptions about an imminent euro area shake up 
have subsided since July 2012, when the European Central 
Bank announced its bond-buying program in defense of the 
euro. As a result, bond yields against German government 
bonds declined considerably (Figure A1.12). Beyond market 
perceptions, deep concerns about the viability of the 
euro area remain, as austerity measures are sharpening 
unemployment, social unease, and economic contraction. The 
euro area’s salvation continues to rest in the determination 
of the European Central Bank to uphold its firewall against 
speculative attacks until deep structural and institutional 
reforms have addressed the most fundamental euro area flaws. 
It remains unclear whether European and national politics will 
stand up to this important test.
Japan
While Japan grew at 2.0% in 2012 as a whole, driven by strong 
first quarter growth, the economy experienced a technical 
recession, with GDP contracting in Q2 and Q3 2012. However, 
with solid growth in private consumption, GDP growth edged 
up into a positive territory in the final quarter (Figure A1.13). 
Japan’s trade deficit nearly tripled to a record ¥6.9 trillion 
($78.3 billion or 1.2% of GDP) for 2012 as a whole. A strong yen, 
territorial tensions with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
Europe’s debt crisis, and surging energy imports were among 
the factors that contributed to this deterioration. Given general 
weakness in domestic demand, deflation persisted in 2012 
without showing any sign of letting up (Figure A1.14).
Nonetheless, the depressed mood in Japan before the 
Lower House election last December seems to have receded 
substantially, reflecting the success of the Shinzo Abe 
administration in lifting sentiment. The Business Survey 
Index about the economic outlook, particularly for large firms, 
improved noticeably. The new administration has instituted a 
set of policies referred to as “Abenomics” to spur growth. The 
strategy includes aggressive monetary policy, short-term flexible 
fiscal policy with medium-term consolidation, and institutional 
and regulatory measures to strengthen the competitiveness 
To battle stubborn deflation, the Bank of Japan has 
adopted an inflation target of 2% and announced on 22 
January that it will begin open-ended asset purchases in 2014, 
while leaving the size of its current asset purchase program 
unchanged for 2013. In anticipation of further easing of 
monetary policy, financial markets reacted strongly, and the 
currency started a sharp depreciation. Since September, the 
yen fell from ¥78.1 per US dollar to about ¥95, a depreciation of 
nearly 20% in only 7 months (Figure A1.15). During the same 
period, the Nikkei 225 index has soared by 40%, reaching a 
4-year high exceeding ¥12,000 in March. 
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The new Japanese government announced an economic stimulus 
package amounting to over ¥23 trillion, or 4.8% of GDP—one of the 
largest ever packages of its kind. Yet the impact of the package is 
uncertain as more than half of it consists of, first, about 
¥10 trillion in noncash measures such as easing the credit 
environment for farmers and small and medium-sized 
enterprises and, second, about ¥3 trillion to cover the state 
pension deficit. The surplus carried over from the previous 
budget because of difficulty in spending appropriations will 
cover most of the new stimulus package, only 34% of which 
relies on new bond issuance. 
Recent hard data indicators are starting to support a 
positive outlook. After declining in November last year, 
manufacturing resumed its upward trend in December and 
January. Auto sales continued to recover from the September 
slump, which was driven by the expiration of the eco-car 
subsidy program (Figure A1.16). Yet exports and investments 
remain sluggish. Machinery orders, a leading indicator for 
private investment, continued to recover, though still at a 
much lower level than recorded before the global financial 
crisis. Trade figures in February continue to show weak exports and 
strong imports tipping the balance of trade in goods into deficit for the 
eighth straight month—the longest run of such deficits since 1980. 
All in all, expansionary policies, yen depreciation, and consumers’ 
advance purchases in anticipation of an increase in the consumption 
tax from 5% to 8% scheduled for April 2014 should lift Japan’s domestic 
demand. GDP growth is forecast to reach 1.2% in 2013 and 1.4% in 2014. 
This growth is expected to be buoyed by resilient private consumption 
accompanying public spending, with the sizable supplementary budget 
adding to growth. The contribution of external demand is problematic. 
Yen depreciation should help reverse export weakness in the coming 
months. However, sluggish bilateral trade between Japan and the 
PRC continued through the first two months of 2013, even as tensions 
between the two sides have calmed down. The main risk to this 
outlook is insufficient labor supply to reconstruct areas hit by the 2011 
tsunami, which has delayed reconstruction and hence held down public 
investment. Consumer price index inflation is forecast to pick 
up gradually this year and surpass 2% in 2014 because of the 
consumption tax increase planned in April 2014.
International trade
In light of continued weakness in global demand, global 
merchandise trade expanded at a moderate 2.5% in 2012 
(Figure A1.17). Softer-than-expected growth in the PRC 
and other emerging markets helped restrain the pace of 
expansion. Given a modest outlook for growth in the 
advanced industrialized economies, the expansion of 
merchandise exports will likely pick up somewhat to 4.0% in 
2013, remaining well below its 10-year average growth rate of 
10.8%. As global economic activity firms, trade is expected to 
accelerate to 5.0% in 2014. 
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Commodity prices
Average commodity prices in 2012 were similar to those of 
the previous year. Nonetheless, developments in the global 
economic and political arena, as well as natural disturbances, 
created wide fluctuations in prices. Improved conditions for oil 
supply in the face of subdued growth in demand are keeping 
oil prices in check, though continuing geopolitical tensions 
hold the potential to disturb the balance. Food prices remain 
stable as adequate supplies calm the markets, but the risk of 
price spikes persists amid low food stocks.
Recent oil price movements
International benchmark Brent crude averaged $112 per barrel 
in 2012, just a dollar higher than the previous year’s average. 
Crude prices edged higher as the year drew to a close because 
of higher seasonal demand in December and continuing 
geopolitical tensions. Ending 2012 at $113 per barrel, oil prices continued 
to strengthen in the first 2 months of 2013 to reach levels close 
to what they reached the year before. Brent crude spot prices 
hit $120.50 in mid-February, for an increase of 6% in less than 
2 months from the year-end figure and just $7.50 below the 
February 2012 peak of $128 (Figure A1.18). 
The run-up in oil prices was propelled by the continued 
reduction in oil production by Saudi Arabia, early optimism 
about the economic prospects of the PRC, geopolitical tensions, 
and strong financial market activity. Saudi Arabia reduced 
production from an average of 9.8 million barrels per day in 
September to 9.1 million in January 2013, largely on account of 
lower seasonal demand in its domestic market. On the other 
hand, positive economic news improved the outlook for the 
PRC as its GDP growth climbed to 7.9% in Q4 2012 and the 
purchasing managers’ index remained positive since October 
2012, indicating sustained expansion in manufacturing. 
Geopolitical risks heightened as terrorists attacked an Algerian 
oil facility, Israel launched a series of airstrikes on Syria, 
and the US implemented additional sanctions on Iran. The 
upsurge in crude oil spot prices mirrored the gains in financial 
markets as the Standard and Poor’s 500 index breached the 
1,500 mark on 25 January for the first time since December 
2007, while—in another first in more than 5 years—the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average index rose above 14,000 on 
1 February (Figure A1.19). The broader financial market rally 
was supported by US jobs and manufacturing data that were 
better than expected. Consequently, spot oil and futures prices 
reacted positively to the signal of increased demand.
However, after reaching the initial peak, Brent crude prices started 
to decline, wiping out the initial 2-month price increase with a price 
decline of 8.5% in 1 month down to $110 per barrel on 12 March 2013. 
Weak economic statistics from Europe and the PRC dampened earlier 
optimism. The euro area January unemployment rate climbed to 11.9% 
from 11.8% in the previous month, while the PRC’s purchasing managers’ 
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index unexpectedly declined further in February to just slightly 
above the manufacturing expansion–contraction divide.
Theoretically, the futures market should be more stable 
than spot prices, as futures prices are based on long-run 
fundamentals while spot prices reflect short-run shifts in 
demand and supply. However, the two have been moving 
together, and futures prices have been as volatile as spot prices 
amid intensifying and lingering political and economic risks 
(Figure A1.20). The front-month futures price, for example, 
jumped from $111.10 at the end of December to $118.90 in 
February, before subsiding to $109.80 in mid-March.
Oil price prospects
The March report of the International Energy Agency showed 
growth in world oil supply outpacing growth in demand. Supply 
increased by 2.8% to reach 90.9 million barrels per day (mbd), 
while demand increased by 1% to reach 89.8 mbd in 2012. In February, 
supply continued to inch up, largely from rising oil production in Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia.
Supply conditions are forecast to improve in the short term. 
The March US Energy Information Administration report forecasts the 
global supply of oil to increase by 0.8 mbd in 2013 and 1.9 mbd in 2014 
as countries outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), largely the US and Canada, recover from unplanned 
outages and scheduled maintenance. The global consumption forecast 
was revised downward from the February report, to a slight increase 
to 90.1 mbd in 2013 on higher demand expected in the PRC. In 2014, 
consumption is expected to further increase, albeit at a still-tepid rate, 
to 91.5 mbd. The small increase in demand is in line with the ADO 
forecasts of 1.2% growth in 2013 and 2.0% growth in 2014 in the major 
industrial economies—rates that are much lower than the pre-crisis 
average of 2.5% in 2003–2007 and so indicate a global economy that 
remains weak and fragile. OPEC members notionally bound by the 
group’s 30 mbd target are expected to continue to produce more 
than their quotas to accommodate the projected rise in world oil 
consumption and counterbalance supply disruptions. Increases in 
production are expected from other OPEC members such as Iraq, 
Nigeria, and Angola. 
Notwithstanding these developments, periodic disruptions will likely 
continue in light of political tensions in major producer economies and 
a new wave of political unrest in Africa. Tensions are still high in Syria, 
Sudan, and Iraq, where payment disputes between Baghdad and the 
Kurdistan regional government will likely reduce output from Iraq’s 
northern oil fields. With no resolution in sight to the issues confronting 
Iran, its oil production is forecast to continue to fall.
Although concerns about the persisting fragility of the global 
economy are tempering oil price spikes, global oil prices are projected 
to stay close to 2012 levels and average $110 per barrel in 2013. Changes 
in the regional distribution of oil demand and supply, sociopolitical 
upheavals, speculation, and the financialization of commodities will 
amplify price shifts in the short run. In 2014, prices are forecast to soften 
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and average $105 per barrel on account of better-supplied 
markets and easing geopolitical tensions.
Recent food price developments
From their peak in February 2011, agricultural prices fell by 
16.7% as of the end of 2012. All sub-indexes exhibited this 
downward trend, with food prices showing the least decline 
(Figure A1.21). Food prices firmed up in the second half of 
2012, as the heat wave in the US affected maize production and 
drought in Eastern Europe and Central Asia affected prospects 
for wheat. Wheat and maize prices vacillated within a narrow 
band in the first half of 2012. Then, as bad weather affected 
production prospects in major production areas, second-half 
prices jumped by close to 20% for maize and 30% for wheat 
over the first half. Rice prices, on the other hand, were more 
stable, riding below $600/ton for most of 2012. This is mainly 
because the market for rice remains better supplied than those 
for maize and wheat. In sum, food prices remained elevated in 
2012. 
This year, food prices are starting to ease. February food 
inflation, as measured by the World Bank food index, was still 
positive but more than 3 percentage points moderated from 
the previous month (Figure A1.22). Edible oil prices declined 
by only 1% from a year earlier, primarily reflecting the fall in 
palm and soybean oil prices. The price index for other food 
continued its downward trend, showing deflation since the 
end of 2011. This largely reflects the price of sugar, which has 
been on a downtrend and is almost 25% lower than a year 
ago. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, sugar prices have been declining in 
anticipation of higher world production, notably from Brazil 
and Thailand. For the second consecutive month, grain prices 
registered lower rates of growth year on year. Grain prices 
rose by 9% over a year earlier, 3 percentage points lower than in January 
2013. The recent decline was mainly from easing wheat prices as crop 
prospects improved in the US. The average price of maize in February 
2013 was only slightly lower than a month earlier because supply was still 
tight. The increase in rice prices since late 2012 is generally 
attributed to Thailand’s rice-pledging scheme and some 
tightening of supply from the US.
Food price prospects
Weather permitting, harvests in most major grain-producing 
countries are expected to at least match those of 2012, more 
likely increase, especially in areas affected by drought last 
year. The March cereal report of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization revised upwards its 2012/13 crop year production 
estimates for cereals by 4 million tons from the February 
figure of 2,301 million tons. The report said the upward 
revision mainly accommodated positive adjustments in rice 
production, which in Asia is expected to reach 443 million 
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tons, 4.2 million tons more than in T2011/12. As an early 
indication, grain prices have been declining since December.
Utilization is still expected to exceed production, keeping 
the demand–supply balance tight (Figure A1.23). However, 
better international coordination should give countries the 
confidence not to use export bans and thus maintain more 
calm than in 2008 and temper price spikes. Lower crude 
oil prices forecast in the next 2 years should dampen food 
price increases by reducing the costs of major inputs and 
demand for biofuels, which compete for food crops. Given 
these projections and the high base in 2012, food prices are 
forecast to fall in 2013 and 2014. Nevertheless, as low stocks 
of major grains provide little cushion to fluctuations in 
supply and demand, small movements in the supply–demand 
equation may translate into large price adjustments. Indeed, 
the volatility of key grain commodities in the 2000s has been 
higher than in the 1990s (Figure A1.24). 
External environment in sum
Developing Asia should continue to expect soft demand for its exports 
from the major industrial economies. Even with the slight rise in growth 
expected in the US, the euro area, and Japan in 2014, these economies 
will continue to operate below their potential. With fiscal tightening the 
main theme for all but Japan, advanced country central banks are likely 
to continue accommodative monetary policy. Prices of food and fuel 
should remain subdued overall, though further volatility is expected. As a 
result, external price pressures should remain muted.
A1.24 Price volatility of selected grain commodities
0
15
30
45
Wheat
Rice
Maize
2001–20121990–20001970–1980
%
Note: Volatility is measured as the standard deviations of the logarithmic 
changes in monthly average prices at an annual rate.
Source: ADB estimates.

2
Asia’s energy 
challenge

Critical energy needs for the 
Asian Century
Rapid growth has transformed developing Asia’s presence 
in the world economy. The region will likely continue to 
grow rapidly, further weighing, for better or worse, on global 
developments. Developing Asia’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
will more than quadruple from 2010 to 2035, and by 2050 the 
region will generate over half of global GDP. This promising 
vision of Asia’s 21st century is often called the Asian Century 
growth scenario, articulated in Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian 
Century (ADB 2011). Past growth has dramatically improved 
Asia’s living standards, lifting millions out of poverty. Future 
growth will do the same. 
But, crucially, can developing Asia secure the energy it 
needs to fuel this dramatic economic expansion? Energy 
security rests on three pillars: the adequacy and reliability 
of physical energy supply, environmental sustainability, and 
affordable access. Where will this energy come from? Can the 
region expand its energy infrastructure to support its growing 
needs? Even if the adequate supply of energy is available, will 
it be environmentally sustainable and widely accessible and 
affordable? Failure on any of these fronts would hinder efforts 
to realize the environmentally sustainable, inclusive growth 
that lies behind the Asian Century ideal.
Energy and economic growth
In 2010, Asia contributed 28% of global GDP. If Asia follows 
the expected growth trajectory, by 2050 its per capita GDP will 
reach Europe’s current level, and its share of global GDP will 
nearly double to 52%, making about 3 billion additional Asians 
affluent (ADB 2011). Asia will already account for 44% of global GDP 
by 2035 (Figure 2.1.1).
Asia’s energy challenge
This chapter was written by Minsoo Lee and Donghyun Park of the Economics and 
Research Department; and Harry Saunders of Decision Processes Incorporated. It draws 
on the background papers listed at the end of the chapter. Changyong Rhee, chief 
economist, provided guidance at various stages.
2.1.1  Developing Asia’s growing share of GDP and 
primary energy consumption, 2010–2035
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Such economic expansion requires huge amounts of energy. Already 
in 2010, Asia accounted for 34% of world energy consumption. The link 
between the final energy used by firms and households, which rises as 
GDP expands, and an economy’s demand for primary energy depends on 
a complex host of factors (Box 2.1.1). But assumptions on the evolution of 
energy intensity—changes in the physical energy used to generate each 
unit of GDP—have big effects on forecast demand. 
For example, if economic expansion raises by the middle of the 21st 
century energy consumption per capita for Asia’s 5 billion people to the 
level found today in industrialized economies, the region’s share of global 
energy use is projected to increase to 51% by 2035 (Figure 2.1.1 baseline). 
This is a conservative estimate, reflecting an optimistic projection of 
energy intensity trends. This baseline model endogenously projects energy 
intensity declining by 3.2% per year on average over the forecast horizon. 
This would bring energy intensity in 2035 down to 45% of its 2010 value—
an improvement by better than half. 
This compares with the historical trend from 1990 to 2000 of 2.47% 
improvement per year, which is used in the less optimistic scenario. 
If energy intensity follows its historical trend, Asia’s share of world 
energy consumption would be as high as 56% by 2035 (Figure 2.1.1, less 
optimistic). 
2.1.1 The Asian Century scenario: energy consumption projections
Energy consumption forecasts derive from econometric 
analyses by country and sector. Demand equations are 
estimated using historical data of standard explanatory 
variables such as GDP, population, industrial production, 
and vehicle stocks. The econometric model incorporates 
changes in the structure of output and energy efficiency 
improvements. Future values of energy demand are then 
projected using the explanatory variables. The model 
thus takes into account the historical correlation between 
explanatory variables and energy consumption (box figure). 
Broadly speaking, the econometric strategy begins by 
deriving final energy demand projections, from which it 
derives primary energy demand projections. “Final energy 
demand” refers to the consumption of final energy goods 
such as electricity and gasoline, and “primary energy 
demand” to the implicit demand for energy sources such 
as oil and coal required to meet final energy demand.
For all countries, data on key macroeconomic indicators 
such as GDP, population, and crude oil price are used as 
the bases for future projections of final energy demand. 
In addition, some countries have data on more detailed 
socioeconomic variables such as industrial production, 
vehicle stocks, number of households, and floor space, 
which provided additional inputs for these countries’ 
projections. 
Transformation analysis examines the transformation of 
primary energy into final energy. Examples of transformation 
include electricity generation, oil refining, gas processing, 
and coal transformation. Primary energy demand projections 
can be derived by energy type by combining final energy 
demand and transformation analysis. Net imports of final 
energy are also factored into primary energy demand 
projections, as are changes in energy policy. 
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Energy intensity trends are hard to predict as they are 
driven by many factors beyond improved technical efficiency. 
The faster decline of energy intensity in the baseline scenario 
assumes improvements supported by changes in industry 
structure, slower industrialization in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), and productivity gains for non-energy inputs. 
This forecast is subject to greater uncertainty than the less 
optimistic scenario based on historical trend. Figure 2.1.2 
shows the growth of energy consumption under the two 
scenarios. Asia’s energy consumption is projected to double 
from 2010 to 2035 even under the optimistic baseline scenario. 
Note that this report’s baseline forecast shows the 
primary energy growth rate to be 2.82% annually from 2010 
to 2035. This is quite consistent with the forecasts of other 
organizations (Table 2.1.1). Energy consumption grows despite 
substantial improvement in energy efficiency because of 
sharply increased per capita GDP. While Asia’s population is 
forecast to grow only modestly by 0.7% annually, Asians will 
drive more and use air-condition more as they become richer.
Composition of Asia’s energy demand
Aside from becoming higher, energy demand poses many 
challenges for developing Asia in terms of its composition. In 
particular, what is the mix of primary sources that will satisfy 
Asia’s growing thirst for energy? The current composition 
of Asia’s energy demand holds some important clues 
(Figure 2.1.3).
Under the baseline scenario in Box 2.1.1, most of the 
twofold (202%) increase in energy consumption from 2010 
to 2035 will come from fossil fuels. Coal use is expected to 
increase by 81% as oil consumption approximately doubles and 
natural gas use more than triples. The use of renewables is 
set to increase but will make a relatively small contribution to 
2035 energy requirements. The same goes for nuclear power. 
Subregional differences in energy demand and the energy 
mix will be substantial by 2035. Following the Asia 2050 
study’s forecasts (ADB 2011), the scenarios allow for large 
differences in subregional growth rates in the next 2 decades. 
Regional GDP growth will likely be dominated by South and 
East Asia—South Asia because of its high potential growth 
rate and East Asia because its growth at about 6% builds on 
its existing large share of developing Asia’s GDP (the two 
subregions will jointly account for 83% of developing Asia’s 
GDP by 2035).
Aside from these different growth rates, different 
subregions rely on different energy mixes (Figure 2.1.4). 
Coal plays a much larger role in East and South Asia than 
in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, or the Pacific. Natural gas 
occupies a markedly bigger share of the energy mix in Central 
Asia than in the four other subregions. Relatively low demand 
2.1.2  Sensitivity of energy consumption to the evolution 
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2.1.1  Comparison of organizations’ energy consumption 
forecasts
 
Primary energy 
growth rate (%)
Time 
horizon
Energy Information 
Administration  
(non-OECD Asia)
2.90 2008–2035
British Petroleum (Asia-Pacific) 2.72 2010–2030
International Energy Agency 
(New Policies Scenario, Asia)
2.20 2010–2035
Asian Development Bank 2.82 2010–2035
Sources: EIA 2011a, BP 2013, IEA 2012a.
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MTOE = million tons of oil equivalent, NRE = new and renewable energy.
Source: Lee, Park, and Saunders, forthcoming.
in the Pacific islands will be met by oil and natural gas in most 
countries. On the other hand, across all subregions coal, oil, 
and natural gas dominate while renewables and nuclear occupy 
only a limited share of the energy mix. 
An achievable energy future for Asia
Energy consumption that more than doubles under the Asian 
Century vision poses a colossal challenge. Can it be achieved? 
Where will Asia find so much energy—over half the energy 
needed by the entire world in 2035? If the answer is that Asia 
cannot find it, the region will not realize the Asian Century. 
Asia faces a stark reality: Either it secures adequate energy 
supply or economic growth suffers accordingly. Even if Asia 
is able to secure enough physical energy supply, there remains 
the question of whether it can do so while safeguarding 
environmental sustainability and ensuring affordable energy 
for all. The three pillars of energy security are examined 
below, one by one.
Adequacy and reliability implications
Coal is abundant in Asia, which has a 35% share of the world 
endowment (Table 2.1.2). Asia can reasonably expect to source 
coal from other regions if need be. 
Less abundant than coal in Asia is conventional natural 
gas, of which Asia has 16% of proven global reserves. The gas 
trade is widely distributed in terms of sources, though, and 
international trade in gas is growing. As such, Asia can expect 
to have relatively unfettered access to gas (Table 2.1.3). 
Oil is different. And it poses the greatest threat to the 
adequacy of Asia’s physical energy supply. Proven reserves of 
crude oil in the region amount to a mere 9% of the world total. 
When combined with natural gas liquids, the Asian share is 
15% of world reserves (Table 2.1.4).
Crude oil supply is by no means the only element of 
energy supply security, but it is the most problematic for 
Asia because of the region’s limited endowment and how it 
compensates. In 2010, Asia imported nearly half of all crude 
oil traded on international markets. If crude oil demand grows 
as projected in Figure 2.1.3, developing Asia’s oil imports will 
expand dramatically (Figure 2.1.5). Taking into account Asian 
production, Asia’s oil imports are expected to almost triple 
from 11 million barrels per day (MMBD) to over 31 MMBD by 
2035, growing annually by 4.2%.
Control over Asia’s oil supply has steadily shifted toward 
Middle East suppliers. In 1990, 33% of developing Asia’s oil 
imports came from the Middle East; by 2010, this figure had 
risen by half to 48%. As this accelerating trend will likely 
continue, Asia’s high and growing dependence on a single 
region poses a risk to adequate and reliable energy supply. 
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Disrupted flow of crude oil from the Middle East for an 
extended period would hit Asia hard. Worse, Asia’s refineries 
are configured to process mostly light Middle Eastern crudes 
and, unlike refineries in other regions, cannot immediately 
handle very heavy crudes. If the Middle East tap closed, Asia 
would be poorly equipped to switch to heavy crudes available 
from elsewhere. 
Long-term oil security can be enhanced by substituting 
other fuels, but the short run lacks options. Asia uses oil 
largely for transportation (48% in 2010), which almost always 
requires readily portable energy. The convenience of liquid 
fuels for this purpose, the well-developed supply chain, and 
superior economics give petroleum products a huge advantage 
over alternatives. Biofuels offer some potential as substitutes 
for oil products, but they are unlikely to be commercially 
competitive within the forecast horizon. 
Much of the projected surge in oil imports reflects the 
rapid expansion of motor traffic expected in Asia. The PRC’s 
2.1.2 Proven reserves of coal, 2011
 
Anthracite 
and 
bituminous 
Sub-
bituminous 
and lignite Total 
Share 
of Total  
(%) 
Total North America 112.8 132.3 245.1 28.5
Total South and Central 
America 6.9 5.62 12.52 1.5
Total Europe and 
Eurasia 93.0 211.6 304.6 35.4
Total Middle East 
and Africa 32.7 0.17 32.87 3.8
Australia 37.1 39.3 76.4 8.9
PRC 62.2 52.3 114.5 13.3
India 56.1 4.5 60.5 7.0
Indonesia 1.5 4.01 5.51 0.6
Japan 0.34 0.01 0.35 0.04
Kazakhstan 21.5 12.1 33.6 3.9
New Zealand 0.033 0.54 0.573 0.1
North Korea 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.1
Pakistan … 2.07 2.07 0.2
South Korea … 0.13 0.13 0.01
Thailand … 1.24 1.24 0.1
Vietnam 0.15 … 0.15 0.02
Other Asia Pacific 1.58 2.13 3.71 0.4
Total Asia and the 
Pacific 180.8 118.62 299.42 34.8
 of which: Developing 
Asia 143.35 78.77 222.12 25.7
 Developed Asia 37.47 39.85 77.32 9.0
… = data not available.
Notes: Anthracite is hard, high-energy coal; bituminous, sub-bituminous, and 
lignite are progressively softer kinds of coal with progressively less energy. 
Source: British Petroleum 2012.
2.1.4  Undiscovered technically recoverable oil and natural gas 
liquids
Region
Mean
estimate
(MMBO)
Share
(%)
Mean
estimate
(MMBNGL)
Share
(%)
Arctic + former 
Soviet Union
66 12 40 24
Middle East and 
North Africa
111 20 31 18
Asia and Pacific 53 9 25 15
Europe 10 2 3 2
North America 83 15 19 12
South America and 
Caribbean
126 22 21 13
Sub-Saharan Africa 115 20 28 17
Total 565 100 167 100
MMBNGL = million barrels of natural gas liquids, MMBO = million barrels of oil.
Source: US Geological Survey 2012.
2.1.3 Undiscovered technically recoverable gas
Region
Mean estimate 
(trillion cubic meters)
Share 
(%)
Arctic + former Soviet Union 57  29
Middle East and North Africa 33  17
Asia and the Pacific 32  16
Europe  5   3
North America 20  10
South America and Caribbean 24  12
Sub-Saharan Africa 26  13
Total 198 100
Source: US Geological Survey 2012.
2.1.5 Projected Asian oil import requirements
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vehicle fleet for passengers and goods is forecast to grow 
at over 6% annually (Figure 2.1.6). Rapid economic growth 
means that more Asians can now afford cars. Trading public 
transport for private cars is a natural consequence of Asia’s 
growing affluence and middle class, and it will further whet 
the region’s thirst for imported oil. 
In addition to oil supply disruptions, threats to supply 
adequacy arise from potential interruptions of electricity 
and gas supply. Unreliable electric and gas systems can 
leave households without power and stymie industrial 
and commercial activity, causing heavy losses. India has 
experienced serious interruptions to electricity supply, with the 
July 2012 blackout in India affecting some 670 million people. 
In 2009, a dispute between Russia and Ukraine over pricing 
and transit costs for Russia’s gas prompted Russia to cut off 
all gas supplies to and passing through Ukraine, imposing 
wintertime supply disruptions on 18 European countries—and 
this dispute remains unresolved.
By 2035, most Asian countries will produce less than half 
the energy they need, and many will produce only a tiny 
fraction. This means that Asia will remain heavily dependent on 
energy imports, in particular of oil, for the foreseeable future. 
More generally, securing adequate and reliable energy supply 
will persist as a difficult challenge across the region. 
Figure 2.1.7 ranks Asian economies according to an index 
of energy self-sufficiency, in which a value of 1 indicates all 
primary energy demand is met with indigenous resources and 
a value of 0 indicates complete reliance on energy imports. 
The index is calculated based on each country’s projected 
primary energy mix until 2035 (e.g., how much it will use coal 
to generate electricity), its current proved indigenous reserves 
of fossil fuel, and its projected consumption until 2035 (Fueyo, 
Gómez, and Dopazo, forthcoming).
Only three countries in developing Asia—Azerbaijan, 
Brunei Darussalam, and Kazakhstan—are energy self-sufficient. 
Some economies have minimal self-sufficiency. Singapore and 
Hong Kong, China both have high demand for fossil fuels but 
no supply. As their energy sources were entirely imported even 
in 2010, their situation will change little by 2035. The Republic 
of Korea has limited fuel reserves—some coal and nuclear fuels, 
the latter perhaps largely uranium processed from imports. In 
2010, the Republic of Korea imported about 80% of its primary 
energy (IEA 2012a). Indigenous reserves will be depleted by 
2035. The share of hydropower is negligible at 0.02% of primary 
energy consumption, and other renewables’ share is only 2.1%.
Japan’s trends for economic growth and energy demand are 
unique in Asia, reflecting its economic maturity. Its GDP will 
grow very slowly between 2010 and 2035. Its primary energy 
consumption will fall by 15%, but hydropower’s share of primary 
energy will remain more or less constant at 1.5%, while that of 
other renewables will rise substantially from 2.1% to 15.7%. 
2.1.6 Vehicle population forecast for PRC, 2005–2035 
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2.1.7 Asian countries’ energy self-sufficiency, 2035
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Thailand, the Philippines, and Viet Nam will have self-
sufficiency rates in 2035 similar to Japan’s. A major reason is 
that their energy consumption will grow much more quickly 
to fuel their faster economic growth. Country-specific factors 
matter. Thailand has considerable known reserves of coal 
and gas, but they will be depleted by 2035. The share of 
renewables remains constant at about 20%. In the Philippines, 
the contribution of renewables will shrink from 43% in 2010 
to 14% in 2035, by which time proven indigenous gas and coal 
reserves will be depleted. While Viet Nam is endowed with 
significant oil and gas reserves and was a net energy exporter 
in 2010, rapid growth and a shift from traditional to modern 
energy sources will deplete its reserves by 2035. The share of 
renewables is projected to shrink from 43% to 17%.
Focus on environmental sustainability 
If Asia does find the physical energy supply it needs to fuel 
its growth, what would be the impact on the environment? 
Expanding the region’s primary energy mix as currently 
projected would have serious consequences for the 
environment, both in Asia and globally. Local air and water 
quality, water availability, land use, and global climate all 
stand to suffer greatly if projected energy demand is met 
mostly by fossil fuels.
Local impacts on air, water, and land
The current picture of Asia’s energy future entails significant 
damage to the local environment. Toxic emissions from fossil 
fuels are already a serious problem. Air pollution degrades 
human health and drives up hospital admissions, and indoor 
air pollution causes premature death in women and children. 
Air pollution is caused largely by energy production and use. 
The energy and transport sectors generate 70% of nitrogen 
oxide emissions and 80% of emissions of sulfur dioxide and 
particulate matter (PM10, referring to particles that are less 
than 10 microns in diameter and therefore able to penetrate 
deep into the respiratory tract). 
Sulfur dioxide emissions have grown in Asia, even per 
capita. Sulfur dioxide is responsible for the damage acid rain 
does to lakes and forests, and it poses serious human health 
risks. PM10 is an especially problematic air pollutant, its 
inhalation strongly associated with heart and chronic lung 
disease. Roughly half of PM10 pollution comes from power 
plants, 30% from transportation, and most of the remainder 
from wildfires and dust storms. Air pollution is projected 
to cause more than 3.6 million deaths per year by 2030 
throughout the region, mostly in the PRC and India. With 
coal use projected to grow by over 50% during the forecast 
period, air quality problems associated with sulfur dioxide and 
PM10 are likely to continue, absent aggressive limits placed on 
2.1.8 Cities with high particulate concentrations, 2008–2009
PM
10
 = particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter.
Note: Red bars represent cities in Asia.
Source: ADB 2012a.
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toxic emissions. Further, more cars portend ever-deeper concerns about 
air quality, especially in urban areas.
Clean Air Asia, the regional network on air-quality management, 
aggregated data from more than 300 Asian cities in 2012 and found that 
PM10 concentrations were within safe targets in only 16 cities, most of 
them in Japan. This means that more than 94% of the cities sampled have 
air unsafe to breathe. Setting an air quality guideline of 20 micrograms 
of PM10 per cubic meter as safe for long-term exposure (WHO 2008), the 
World Health Organization ranks cities that average 100 micrograms per 
cubic meter or worse and finds 34 of the world’s 57 most polluted cities in 
Asia (Figure 2.1.8).
Like air quality, water availability fares poorly under Asia’s projected 
energy future. Burning fossil fuels to generate electricity requires lots 
of water for cooling. Further, oil, gas, and biofuel all require significant 
quantities of water to produce. Asia is already notably vulnerable to water 
scarcity, second only to Africa. 
Fuelwood and biofuels present additional problems because the 
resulting deforestation causes social dislocation and the loss of natural 
carbon sinks and biodiversity. Present and projected demand for 
fuelwood exceeds the capacity of the natural ecosystem to supply it. 
Biofuels derived from corn, oil palm, and other crops displace food 
crops on farmland. Forests harvested for fuelwood or cleared to cultivate 
biofuels account for much of current change in land use.
Consequences for global climate change
The damage inflicted by Asia’s projected energy future affects 
not only the local environment but the global climate. If 
developing Asia continues to rely on fossil fuels, its energy-
related carbon emissions (ignoring other greenhouse gas 
emissions) will more than double over the forecast period. 
By 2035 Asia will contribute nearly half of global carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions (IEA 2012a). The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) calls the pathway under current worldwide 
policies unsustainable and emphasizes the need to build an 
energy pathway to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius 
above preindustrial levels, the target agreed under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 
World Energy Outlook, published annually by the IEA, refers to 
three scenarios of energy growth: the current policies scenario, 
with no change to policies in place; the new policies scenario, 
which includes countries’ commitments and plans even if 
specific measures are not yet announced; and the so-called 
450 scenario, which the IEA proposes as the threshold for 
preventing dangerous climate change. The 450 scenario calls for limiting 
CO2 emissions in the atmosphere to 450 parts per million. Figure 2.1.9 
shows that under current forecasts developing Asia alone would emit 
more CO2 than is sustainable for the entire world. 
This would have very serious consequences for Asia’s many 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. Geography, 
climatology, low per capita income, and patterns of urbanization put 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam at risk of losing 6.7% 
2.1.9  Projected energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 
from developing Asia 
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of their combined GDP by 2100 if temperatures 
change as the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change predicts. This is more than 
twice the global average of losses linked to 
climate change. Cambodia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (PDR), the Philippines, the 
Mekong Delta, central Thailand, and Sumatra 
and Java in Indonesia are more at risk than 
wealthier countries such as Brunei Darussalam 
and Singapore. The PRC and India could use up 
1%–12% of their annual GDP coping with climate 
refugees, altered disease vectors, and failing crops. 
Bangladesh, where 15% of the population 
lives within 1 meter of sea level at high tide, is 
prone to flooding, tropical cyclones, and storm 
surges—not to mention drought. In Cambodia, 
substantial human and crop losses are attributed 
to worsening drought and flooding that are likely 
only preludes to more extreme weather. 
According to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (2010), 7 of the 
world’s 10 cities most exposed to climate change 
are in developing Asia (Table 2.1.5).
Cities are not the only places under threat. 
Large swathes of rural coastal areas in Asia are 
vulnerable to climate change. Parts of South Asia, 
including virtually all of Bangladesh and large 
parts of Nepal, are at very high risk from climate change.
The imperative of affordable access
Assuming Asia can secure adequate physical energy supply to power 
growth and safeguard the environment, the challenge remains 
to ensure that energy is accessible and affordable. Energy is 
one of the most basic human needs, and therefore true energy 
security necessarily entails universal access to affordable 
energy. Affordable access to energy is a prerequisite for 
inclusive growth and the political support that makes policy 
effective. 
Asia has the unfortunate distinction of harboring most of 
the world’s energy poor. Energy poverty perpetuates hunger 
by forcing women and children to gather fuel for hours 
on end that they would rather spend earning incomes or 
studying. Nearly half of the world’s people without electricity 
live in Asia, as do the majority of people who rely on 
traditional fuels such as wood, charcoal, and dung. In 2010, 
2.8 billion Asians, or 79% of the world population, relied on 
such traditional fuels, which provide low-quality energy while 
often destroying natural ecosystems (Figure 2.1.10).
Affordable access to modern energy is shockingly 
deficient in Asia. In 2010, some 18% of Asians, or 628 million 
2.1.5 Cities most exposed to climate change
Rank Country City
Current assets
exposed
($ billion)
Future assets
exposed
($ billion)
1 USA Miami 416 3,513
2 PRC Guangzhou 84 3,357
3 USA New York–Newark 320 2,147
4 India Kolkata 32 1,961
5 PRC Shanghai 73 1,771
6 India Mumbai 46 1,598
7 PRC Tianjin 30 1,231
8 Japan Tokyo 174 1,207
9 PRC Hong Kong, China 36 1,163
10 Thailand Bangkok 39 1,117
11 PRC Ningbo 9 1,074
12 USA New Orleans 234 1,013
13 Japan Osaka–Kobe 216 969
14 Netherlands Amsterdam 128 843
15 Netherlands Rotterdam 115 826
16 Viet Nam Ho Chi Minh City 27 653
17 Japan Nagoya 109 623
18 PRC Qingdao 3 602
PRC = People’s Republic of China, USA = United States of America.
Source: OECD 2010.
2.1.10 Asian proportion of those in energy poverty
Rest of the world
Asia
Without basic energy service Dependent on traditional fuelsa
50% 50%
21%
79%
a The traditional fuels category includes all types of solid fuels and kerosene, not 
just biomass.
Notes: Electrification numbers for Asia taken from 2012 Rapid Assessment 
and Gap Analyses and United Nations Development Programme Energy 
Country Briefs supplemented with World Bank population data for 2011. Global 
electrification and solid fuels numbers for non-Asian countries taken from 
IEA (2011a).
Sources: IEA 2012a, Sovacool 2012. 
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2.1.6 Number and share of population without modern energy services, 2010
 
Without Access 
to Electricity 
Dependent on biomass 
for cooking
 
Population 
(million)
Share of total 
population 
(%)
Population 
(million)
Share of total 
population 
(%)
Africa  590 57 698 68
Congo 58 85 63 93
  Ethiopia 65 77 82 96
Kenya 33 82 33 80
  Nigeria 79 50 117 74
Tanzania 38 85 42 94
  Uganda 29 92 31 96
Other sub-Saharan Africa 286 66 328 75
  North Africa 1 1 2  1
Developing Asia 628 18 1,814 51
  Bangladesh 88 54 149 91
People’s Republic of China 4 0 387 29
  India 293 25 772 66
Indonesia 63 27 128 55
  Pakistan 56 33 111 64
Philippines 16 17 47 50
  Viet Nam 2 2 49 56
Rest of developing Asia 106 34 171 54
Latin America 29 6 65 14
Middle East 18 9 10  5
Developing Countries 1,265 24 2,588 49
World  1,267 19 2,588 38
Source: IEA 2012a.
individuals, had no electricity. In that year, 
the percentage of population continent-
wide without electricity and reliant on 
biomass for cooking was higher in Africa 
than in Asia, but some Asian countries 
such as Bangladesh approached the 
African average (Table 2.1.6). 
Energy is a basic human need. It is 
required to heat and cool, prepare and 
preserve food, provide light, communicate, 
and operate modern conveniences, as well 
as to enable the delivery of social services 
like education, health, and recreation. 
Expanding access to energy for Asia’s 
legions of energy poor is a priority made 
all the more urgent because failure would 
perpetuate substantial public health 
hazards. Yet traditional fuels like kerosene, 
fuelwood, dung, charcoal, and coal still 
supply much of the energy used in Asia. 
Solid fuels dominate, with fuelwood 
claiming the largest share in most Asian 
countries (Figure 2.1.11).
Rapid growth can make the future 
better than the present. The IEA’s new 
policies scenario (including countries’ 
commitments and plans regarding energy 
use) projects that developing Asia’s 
population without electricity will decline 
substantially to 334 million by 2030, which 
translates into a decline from 18% to 8%. 
The IEA is more pessimistic about movement away from traditional fuels, 
estimating that the number of people without clean cooking facilities in 
India in 2030 will still be more than twice the population of the United 
States today (IEA 2012a). It further estimates that achieving its vision of 
Energy for All, or universal access to modern energy by 2030, will require 
3.5 times more investment to this end than is contemplated in the new 
policy scenario and 5.3 times investment in 2009. The current outlay 
is less than $10 billion globally. The additional investment will extend 
supply to heretofore unserved populations and build capacity to meet the 
additional demand.
ADB projections show every Asian subregion having to spend less 
of its income on electricity in 2035 than in 2012. Figure 2.1.12 shows that 
electricity expenditure as a fraction of GDP per capita (wealth per capita) 
will be lower in 2035 (vertical axis) than it was in 2012 (horizontal axis) 
for all subregions because they all lie below the solid line that indicates 
equal shares of income spent on electricity in both years (expenditure 
will be unchanged but low in developed Asia). While this analysis does 
not directly indicate that all energy sources will be more affordable 
or accessible, it does show a key component of energy becoming more 
affordable for the poor. Importantly, however, improved energy access 
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2.1.11  Traditional fuel use by type for selected Asian countries
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and affordability is not preordained, as these projections assume that 
the cost of electricity reflects the forecast mix of primary energy used 
to generate it. As we have seen, this mix creates a number of thorny 
environmental problems, as well as broadly worsening energy security 
(Box 2.1.2). 
The less-optimistic scenario for Asia’s energy future, based on current 
trends, paints a stark picture. It suggests that Asia will be hard pressed 
to secure enough energy supply to achieve the rapid growth required for 
widespread poverty reduction. Further, high growth in energy supply 
needs to be accompanied by significant quality changes to protect the 
environment and ensure affordable access. This threefold challenge of 
energy supply adequacy, environmental sustainability, and affordable 
access requires a multipronged approach. The region needs to aggressively 
explore all options by which to curb its burgeoning energy demand, tap 
new energy supply, and foster regional market synergies that maximize 
the gains achieved on both sides of the demand–supply equation. 
2.1.12 Projected energy affordability in Asia
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2.1.2 Recent trends in energy security: some evidence from an index
Sovacool et al. (2011) ominously points to stagnant or 
declining energy security in Asia and the Pacific. The study 
assessed the performance of 18 countries in the region 
on energy security based on 20 indicators spread broadly 
across energy supply, affordability, efficiency and innovation, 
environmental stewardship, and governance. The assessment 
informed an energy security index that included all 
Southeast Asian nations, as well as the PRC, India, Japan, 
and the Republic of Korea. Australia, the European Union, 
the US, and New Zealand were included as benchmarks. 
This study then assessed national progress in 5-year 
increments from 1990 to 2010 in two ways: The first rated 
the country’s average overall or absolute performance for 
1990–2000. The second took a temporal perspective that 
looked at how each country improved or regressed. 
Box figure 1 shows that the top three performers 
were Japan, Brunei Darussalam, and the US. The worst 
were Viet Nam, India, and Myanmar. Higher score 
refers to better energy security performance. The bar 
shows the energy security index for each country and 
the value ranges from 0 to 100. Box figure 2 shows that 
Myanmar suffered the largest deterioration of energy and 
environmental security, a 63% decline, between 1990 and 
2010. The best improvers were Malaysia, Australia, and 
Brunei Darussalam. 
This study raises three main points. First, most countries 
have improved their energy security only marginally or 
else regressed. Interestingly, even the best performers 
fell far short of a perfect score of 100. Japan and Brunei 
Darussalam scored favorably on barely more than half of 
the metrics, and the fourth-placed US scored favorably on 
only one-third. This conclusion is discouraging in light 
of all the apparent progress that has been made since 
the 1970s: the creation of the IEA, the rapid growth of 
renewable energy, the rise of energy efficiency and demand 
management, and research on cutting-edge technologies. 
Despite these frenetic efforts, the index suggests that energy 
security in most countries has stagnated or even weakened. 
Second, the index reveals great disparity. Japan, a strong 
leader, did not leave improving energy security to the 
marketplace. Its experience underscores the importance of 
government intervention. The success of Japanese energy 
policy arose from coordinated and consistent political 
support for policy and aggressive investments to achieve 
ambitious targets. 
Third, the study reveals the difficult tradeoffs among 
components of energy security. Japan achieved its low 
energy intensity, advanced technology, and mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions only with large government 
subsidies and comparatively high prices for energy 
services. The Lao PDR has a small carbon footprint and 
high penetration of hydroelectricity but has prioritized 
exporting energy rather than expanding domestic access, 
though it is now seeking to expand hydropower supply 
to the domestic market. Dam construction continues to 
erode environmental quality, and the country remains 
completely dependent on imported oil to fuel transport. 
Myanmar’s extreme export-oriented energy strategy can 
leave its population literally in the dark, its favorable score 
on environmental indicators reflecting only limited capacity 
and poor access. The fundamental problem is that some 
elements of energy security, such as affordability, apparently 
come only at the expense of others, such as sustainability 
and efficiency. Perhaps in recognition of this, Myanmar is 
beginning to change its export-oriented strategy.
1  Energy and environmental performance absolute score 
for selected countries, 1990–2010 
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Containing burgeoning energy demand 
Asia enjoys an array of promising options to check its energy appetite. 
Regional governments do not have to look far for a compelling example of 
the potential for demand management. Japan depends almost entirely on 
imported energy, especially oil but also coal and liquefied natural gas, to 
power its huge economy, the third largest in the world. Yet Japan’s energy 
intensity is low—the lowest in the world, lower than in the European 
Union, the US, Latin America, or the developing world. Spurred by the 
oil shocks of the 1970s, Japan has worked hard to improve its economic 
output per unit of energy. Despite temporary bumps perversely enabled 
by the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s, Japan’s energy 
intensity in 2010 was 25% lower than in 1980. 
The broader lesson that developing Asia can draw from the Japanese 
experience is that managing energy demand more efficiently can make a 
big difference to the energy pathway, and there is every reason for others 
to try to emulate Japan’s success. Effective government leadership can 
mobilize behavior change in firms and households. The lesson for Asian 
governments is that they must take the lead in changing the mindset and 
culture of their citizens so that they use energy more efficiently and thus 
do their part to promote Asia’s energy security.
Several strategies offer promise toward more efficient demand 
management even in the short term. Broadly speaking, these strategies 
can be grouped into three groups. First, eliminating consumer subsidies 
and taxing greenhouse gas emissions will move the price of energy 
toward its true cost. Second, green innovation such as smart cities and 
clean transportation will improve energy efficiency and environmental 
sustainability. Third, changing behavior can curtail wasteful energy 
consumption. Demand management strategies are promising but presents 
various challenges. Tackling outmoded subsidies requires political will, 
green innovation takes investment in technology, and changing behavior 
entails instilling fundamentally new attitudes.
Energy prices that reflect true costs
One obvious channel for managing demand more efficiently is to remove 
distortions that artificially reduce the price of energy to below its true 
cost. Sometimes government policy such as consumer subsidies are the 
source of such distortions, which encourage energy overconsumption. 
In other cases, government intervention such as greenhouse gas taxes are 
required to bridge the gap between the true cost of energy, including its 
environmental cost, and its purchase price. 
Eliminating consumer subsidies
Consumer subsidies designed to guarantee affordability and protect 
households from the potentially large shocks of fuel price increases 
end up artificially reducing the price of energy and thus encouraging 
overconsumption. Simulation results from Del Granado et al. (2012) show 
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that a $0.25 per liter increase in 
fuel prices causes a 4.5% decline 
in household real incomes in Asia 
and Pacific (Table 2.2.1). This 
impact is partly direct, forcing 
households to spend more on fuel, 
and partly indirect, as prices paid 
for goods and services swell with 
higher embedded energy costs. 
Most Asian countries provide 
some form of subsidy to offset 
harm to welfare, with subsidies 
varying widely from country 
to country (Figure 2.2.1). Subsidies in developing Asia are 
larger than elsewhere except the Middle East, and they are 
increasing (Table 2.2.2). 
A lot of attention has been paid to fossil fuel subsidies 
globally, as overconsumption damages energy supply 
adequacy and the environment. Member countries of the 
Group of 20 and Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation have 
declared that such subsidies will be phased out. According 
to the IEA (2012a), oil-exporting countries offer the highest 
subsidies in terms of their share of GDP. Among non-oil 
exporting countries in Asia, Bangladesh and Pakistan have 
the highest GDP shares—though estimates vary from year 
to year with fluctuations in international prices for liquefied 
petroleum gas, natural gas, and oil.
Such subsidies are well-intentioned, or at least popular, 
but they increase energy consumption, distort energy 
development planning, and, when applied unevenly, provide 
incentives for adulteration and illegal cross-border sales. 
Worse, the main beneficiaries of energy subsidies are not the 
poor. If the intent is to make energy more affordable to the 
poor, only the poorest 20 percentile should benefit from the 
subsidy. In fact, the poor in Asia benefit little from subsidized 
fuel prices because many lack electricity and gas connections, 
few own vehicles, and most transport sparingly. The IEA 
(2011a) surveyed nine Asian countries with the highest fossil 
fuel subsidies, along with two countries in Africa, and found 
that only 15% of the benefit of kerosene subsidies—and a paltry 
5% of subsides for liquefied petroleum gas—went to the poorest 
20th percentile (Figure 2.2.2). 
As the stated intent of energy subsidies is to provide 
affordable energy to the disadvantaged, the better solution 
would be to give the target populations direct cash benefits or 
energy coupons. Poor households are identified for benefits 
like food distribution, education support, and medical 
treatment. The energy subsidy could be similarly targeted. 
For example, a cash payment scaled for the energy used by 
a typical energy-poor household, not tied to the household’s 
energy consumption, would extend access without encouraging wasteful 
2.2.1 Fossil-fuel subsidy
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2.2.1 Direct and indirect welfare impacts of fuel price increases (%)
  Direct Impact, by Product Direct 
Impact
Indirect 
Impact
Total 
Impact  Gasoline Kerosene LPG Electricity
Africa 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.1 1.7 3.7 5.4
South and Central America 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.8 2.4 3.3
Asia and the Pacific 0.3 1.6 0.3 0.3 2.5 2.0 4.5
Middle East and Central Asia 1.4 0.7 1.0 0.5 3.6 3.7 7.4
All regions 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.2 2.0 3.3 5.4
LPG = liquefied petroleum gas.
Note: Welfare impacts are caused by increasing the price of fuels by $0.25 per liter. 
Source: Del Granado et al. 2012.
2.2.2 Fossil fuel consumption subsidies ($ billion)
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Developing Asia 90.6 177.0 94.6 113.7 161.7
Latin America 51.7 71.0 25.5 40.2 59.5
Middle East 124.0 193.9 124.7 170.4 204.2
Africa 36.5 51.5 26.7 41.2 48.1
Eastern Europe 39.4 61.3 39.7 46.9 49.5
Note: Countries surveyed were Angola, Bangladesh, the People’s 
Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
Source: IEA 2011a.
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2.2.1 Replacing general price subsidies with targeted transfers in Indonesia
A fuel subsidy puts pressure on the budget and external 
account. The Government of Indonesia still administers 
fuels prices, which lag far behind international price 
increases and cause unsustainably high fiscal spending 
(box figure). In 2012, the government spent $22 billion on 
fuel subsides—at 2.6% of GDP, they were 0.6 percentage 
points higher than the government’s infrastructure 
spending. As Indonesia now imports fuel, the policy 
weighs on the country’s external account. 
Although reducing the fuel subsidy will remain 
politically difficult, domestic debate is moving in the right 
direction. Cutting the fuel subsidy increases prices and 
is thus politically very unpopular. However, the public 
recognizes that the general fuel subsidy disproportionately 
benefits the rich and middle class, disregarding any 
question of need. A household survey found the richest 
10% of households consuming 40% of all subsidized 
gasoline (World Bank 2011). In addition, the policy 
encourages overconsumption. As reallocating fiscal 
resources to infrastructure, health, and education would 
spur growth and make it more inclusive, the government 
and parliament agreed in the 2013 budget to allow higher 
fuel prices.
Switching from general price subsidies to targeted 
transfers is the best option. The government is planning to 
establish in 2014 a national social security system through 
which the government will pay insurance premiums for 
poor families. Discussion is under way to use the new social 
security system to target energy subsidy transfers to the poor.
2.2.2  Share of fossil-fuel subsidies received by the poorest 
20th percentile, 2010
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use. In fact, a beneficiary household would have incentive to 
use less energy and keep the surplus from the payout to pay 
for other needs. This achieves the objective of restraining 
energy use without creating the perverse incentives that so 
frequently drive energy systems off track. 
Replacing general energy subsidies with subsidies 
targeting the energy poor can immediately restrain energy 
demand without denying those in need. It can go a long way 
toward laying the foundation for Asian energy security. The 
Indonesian experience explains the government’s efforts to 
reduce subsidies despite political difficulties (Box 2.2.1).
Taxing greenhouse gas emissions
Market energy prices rarely reflect the true price of energy 
when such negative externalities as pollution are factored in. 
A widely touted option is the so-called carbon tax on 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). The argument in 
favor of such a tax is that the price of energy should cover 
such externalities as GHG emissions. This real price would 
create incentives to reduce energy consumption and develop 
new clean technologies, which would strengthen two of 
the three pillars of Asian energy security: energy supply adequacy and 
environmental sustainability. However, carbon taxes face two primary 
difficulties.
First, the so-called “free rider” problem is that countries benefit from 
others’ adoption of a carbon tax whether or not they themselves adopt 
Fossil-fuel consumption subsidy (% of GDP), 2010
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one and shoulder the competitive trade disadvantage it imposes through 
higher costs. Second, a carbon tax raises energy prices and thus undercuts 
affordability, compromising that pillar of Asian energy security. It also 
slows economic activity. 
Addressing the free rider problem requires international policy 
coordination, but little progress has been made in international dialogue 
to impose a carbon tax. Some countries with caps on GHG emissions 
have considered imposing a duty on import of goods from countries that 
do not have caps. Consensus has so far been elusive, even for extending 
the Clean Development Mechanism toward capping emissions from fossil 
fuels mostly in developed economies and encouraging clean energy use 
in developing economies. This reflects failure to evaluate the impact of 
a carbon tax beyond the short term. In the long run, a carbon tax will 
encourage new technologies for tapping clean and renewable energy 
sources, lowering fossil fuel use in transportation, and developing other 
ways to mitigate GHG emissions. Developing countries in Asia could 
direct the revenues raised from a carbon tax toward accelerating clean 
energy technologies. In the long run, innovators would outperform 
free riders. 
In addition, ways exist to mitigate the harm done by carbon taxes 
to energy affordability and economic growth. Tax proceeds can fund 
targeted subsidies to make affordable energy available to the poor, as 
described above. Keeping a carbon tax from inhibiting economic activity 
is trickier but possible. One solution is for governments to use tax 
proceeds to reduce the cost of another production input to offset firms’ 
higher energy costs. The European Commission has evaluated this kind 
of revenue recycling (Kouvaritakis et al. 2005).
The United Kingdom introduced its similar “climate change levy,” 
which compensated corporate payers of a carbon tax by reducing their 
contributions to employees’ social insurance, essentially giving firms a 
break on their payroll taxes to offset increased energy costs. However, 
the government reneged on the promised reduction a few years later by 
returning social insurance contributions to the previous rate. 
A general lesson from this experience is that governments can be 
tempted to use proceeds from a carbon tax and similar schemes for 
unintended purposes when a fiscal shortfall arises. But it also shows that 
such a program can be implemented if the political will exists. In 2003, 
the Council of Ministers of the European Union issued a directive that 
allowed member states to “offer companies tax incentives in return for 
specific undertakings to reduce emissions” (European Commission 2004). 
Such initiatives are voluntary at the moment, but the decision points to a 
growing perception that GHG taxation with revenue recycling may offer a 
powerful tool for policy makers.
Gains from green innovation
There is a lot of scope for technological innovation that can promote 
energy efficiency as well as environmental sustainability. Good city 
planning and design can lower individual and aggregate energy 
requirements by, for example, expanding the role of public transport. 
Gaseous transportation fuels such as compressed natural gas can mitigate 
the environmental impact of urban transportation. Substituting gas for 
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electricity in end-use applications saves gas and displaces coal and other 
dirtier types of energy. Green innovation requires large investments in 
new technology and infrastructure, but the benefits are potentially huge. 
Smart cities that save energy
A fast-growing body of research supports the idea that clever planning 
and design can enable new urban centers to deliver significant 
environmental and energy savings. As Asia grows, new cities will emerge, 
and this relatively clean slate provides the opportunity to substantially 
redefine urban design. Industrialized countries in which rural-to-urban 
migration has largely run its course lack this opportunity.
Urbanization itself offers evident benefits in energy efficiency and 
environmental protection. In the industrialized world, residents of 
compact urban centers individually consume less energy and water 
than their suburban and rural counterparts. They live in smaller 
spaces, consume less, discard less trash, and rely far less on cars 
for transportation, as walking, cycling, or public transportation are 
practical options that use energy far more efficient than do private cars 
(Owen 2009).
The benefits can be multiplied. Careful urban design can 
apply knowledge of mobility patterns to create compact, walkable 
neighborhoods. Shared-use mobility and thoughtfully agglomerated office 
buildings can reduce transportation energy demands. Well-designed 
communication and control systems can provide real-time information 
on energy, water, and other resource use that can help consumers alter 
consumption and movement patterns to maximize their efficient use. 
Asian urban centers are taking the form of megacity hubs with suburban 
satellite cities. Rapid transportation systems like bus mass transit systems 
in the PRC and subways in India help lower energy use and improve the 
environment and quality of life (ADB 2012a). 
Careful urban planning can take advantage of cogeneration 
opportunities, in which waste heat from power generation can serve 
the heating and cooling needs of commercial buildings and households 
if the geographic configuration is compact enough. Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia, is procuring a combined heat-and-power plant to replace aging 
counterparts. Similarly, several cities in Central Asia have rehabilitated 
and upgraded their heating supply systems to be fed by combined 
heat-and-power plants. Large waste collection and disposal systems in 
urban centers can generate electricity from waste, as is done in Incheon, 
Republic of Korea. Malaysia has installed gas district cooling systems 
that boast system efficiency at 75%, or almost double the 40% for systems 
driven by electric motors. 
Smart cities may rely on telecommuting and telepresence to minimize 
travel costs, design work flows that allow teams to work asynchronously 
toward flexible work hours, provide real-time information to enable 
more efficient consumption and travel patterns, establish on-demand 
and real-time control of materials and energy flows to residences and 
businesses, and remotely control industrial and commercial processes.
In Asia, moving toward this new growth paradigm is a matter of 
considerable urgency if its promise is to be realized. Whereas Europe 
needed 150 years from the beginning of serious urbanization to shift a 
majority of its population into urban centers, North America took only 
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105 years and Asia will need only 95 years (ADB 2012a). From 1980 to 
2010, Asia added more than a billion people to its cities, pushing urban 
densities higher than in the rest of the world. Asia has 8 of the 10 most 
densely populated large cities in the world, including the top three: 
Mumbai, Kolkata, and Karachi, in that order. In 2010, Asia was home to 
12 of the world’s 23 megacities, or just over half. This rapid urbanization 
is expected to continue, bringing Asia’s urban population from the 
current 43% to 50% in 2025. Considering Asia’s large population, the 
strong urbanization trend will continue thereafter, opening the door to a 
new growth paradigm if the process is properly managed.
Canada has established the Green Municipal Fund to support green 
cities studies and pilot projects through grants and low-cost loans. It 
has so far committed to disbursing $613 million to support 934 green 
initiatives in more than 460 communities across Canada. The benefits 
from 70 completed projects include reduced GHG emissions and water 
consumption. 
The implementation of green and smart cities in Asia will require a 
major shift in urban planning. Additional public finance will be needed 
for the higher upfront capital and maintenance costs. 
Clean, green transportation
Compressed natural gas (CNG) and other gaseous fuels have been 
introduced into urban transport mainly to address the pollution caused 
by gasoline and diesel internal combustion engines. Recognizing the 
contribution natural gas can make to better air quality and other benefits, 
the Republic of Korea and India, among others, have stepped up efforts 
to promote transport using CNG (Box 2.2.2). Two studies in California 
modeled the lifecycle impacts of this use of gaseous fuel, including its 
preparation, distribution, and use in various types of light- and heavy-
duty vehicles. The main findings were that it would reduce energy 
use and GHG emissions by 6%–11%, local pollution by 20%–80%, and 
petroleum use by more than 90%. The model pertains to Californian 
patterns of vehicle use and processes of fuel delivery and electricity 
generation, and the magnitude of savings will vary across countries, but 
petroleum would undoubtedly be saved and local pollution reduced. Both 
reductions would make using CNG and other gaseous fuels beneficial 
in Asia, especially toward the goals of energy supply adequacy and local 
environmental sustainability. 
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and battery electric vehicles 
(BEVs) both reduce local air pollution. PHEVs run on a combination of 
conventional fossil fuels and a battery that is recharged by regenerative 
braking, which captures the energy otherwise lost when the vehicle 
slows. This allows PHEVs to use about 35% less fuel than a conventional 
vehicle. BEVs rely exclusively on the grid power supply to recharge their 
batteries, so their lifecycle energy and GHG savings depend on the mix of 
the sources powering the grid. The result is primarily a shift of pollution 
away from where the vehicles are operated to where the electricity is 
generated. If the grid electricity is generated using coal, both lifecycle 
energy use and GHG emissions are higher from BEVs than from PHEVs. 
If the electricity is primarily from hydropower, however, emissions are 
very low. 
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Both options shift pollution out of urban centers. The PRC is 
aggressively deploying electric vehicles in line with a strategy of 
co-evolution between electric vehicles and the development of grid 
generation using renewable energy (IEA 2011b,c). The country has begun 
with a three-stage pilot project dubbed the Ten Cities Ten-Thousand 
Vehicles Program, though it actually covers 25 cities, 12 in the first stage: 
Beijing, Changchun, Changsha, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Heifei, Jinan, 
Kunming, Nanchang, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Shenzhen. 
Most electric vehicles currently in use in the pilot cities are public 
buses, taxis, official vehicles, and service vehicles, but five of the cities 
offer support for private electric vehicles. According to the IEA, Beijing 
delivered 1,000 neighborhood electric vehicles in 2009 and planned 
to develop 30,000 electric vehicles by 2012, 23,000 of them BEVs and 
7,000 PHEVs. The Shanghai government set a target of 20,000 private 
electric vehicle purchases by the end of 2012, and Shenzhen expects 
to have 100,000 electric vehicles by 2015. The cities have invested in 
charging stations and other infrastructure and have enlisted major auto 
manufacturers in the program (IEA 2011b). 
The IEA cites the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
as reporting that the plan includes promoting the widespread 
commercialization of BEVs, with vehicle batteries either recharged or 
swapped out. Personal BEV and PHEV ownership is slated to reach 
500,000, as the deployment of medium and heavy PHEVs reaches 
2.2.2 Compressed natural gas transporting Koreans 
Motor vehicles are responsible for 23% of energy-related 
carbon dioxide emissions (IEA 2010a). Using natural gas 
for transport can play an important role in reducing these 
emissions. Compressed or liquefied natural gas can power 
transport by land, sea, or air. The benefits of using natural 
gas range from immediate cost, noise, and emissions 
reduction to longer-term improvements in local air quality 
and energy security. Studies show emissions reduction 
in carbon dioxide equivalent averaging 25% when CNG 
replaces gasoline in passenger cars and light commercial 
vehicles. In more heavily used vehicles such as buses 
and trucks, CNG offers even more significant emissions 
reduction (IEA 2010b).
The use of natural gas for transport in the Republic of 
Korea became significant with the introduction in 2000 
of CNG buses to replace diesel-powered city buses, as 
mandated by the country’s Clean Air Conservation Act. 
The government provides financial assistance for the 
purchase of natural gas vehicles and part of their fuel. In 
2006, the government planned to set aside $100 million 
to support the program and provide bus operators with 
$24,000 for every CNG bus (The Green Car Congress 
2006). In Seoul, the city government restricted buses 
operating in the city to CNG, starting in 2010. The city 
government provided subsidies to bus operators for each 
CNG bus purchased to cover part of the cost differential. 
In other major cities, diesel buses at the end of their 
useful life (9 years by law) are being replaced by CNG 
buses. The use of CNG buses accelerated in the country in 
2006–2010, when over 3,000 CNG buses were added each 
year (box figure). As of 2010, the country had 25,996 CNG 
buses in operation. One-third of them are in Seoul, where 
improved air quality is convincing proof that government 
support was a wise investment.
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1 million, all by 2015. Thereafter, the plan calls for BEV and PHEV 
ownership by 2020 to reach 5 million, accounting for 5% of total vehicle 
ownership (IEA 2011b).
This strategy is rightly called “co-evolution” as the development 
of electric vehicle fleets and power generation using renewable energy 
reinforce each other. The introduction to the power grid of intermittently 
available renewables creates challenges to reliability and stability, which 
can be mitigated by connecting a fleet of electric vehicles through a 
“smart grid” (a technological advance discussed in the next section). 
Batteries in electric vehicles can store renewable power that is produced 
in excess of system load. Two-way charging infrastructure can allow 
electric vehicle batteries to feed back into the grid during peak demand. 
Such “spinning reserves” for power systems provide backup power that 
is immediately available and potentially reduce the cost of investment in 
generating capacity, strengthen the stability of the system, and provide 
backup against system failures. Meanwhile, electric vehicle owners can 
earn rebates by providing these services to the grid, thus reducing their 
operating costs.
Clean transport requires a major shift in services. Mass road transit 
systems can operate fleets with gaseous fuels, and private ownership 
can move toward electric vehicles. Close collaboration and partnership 
between municipal governments, carmakers, and fuel suppliers is 
essential. Initially, public finance can promote research and development 
and help build the critical mass of vehicles that brings the cost of gas 
and electricity distribution per vehicle down to manageable levels. Clean 
transport becomes more competitive as it grows.
Switching electricity for gas
Energy efficiency can be improved by replacing electricity with gas for 
end use. Consider using a cubic meter of gas two ways for cooking. One 
option is to burn the gas in a gas-fired power plant, which converts about 
40% of the energy in the gas into electric energy (EIA 2013a) that a family 
can use to power an electric cooktop. If that same cubic meter of gas 
were instead delivered directly to power a gas cooktop, the same cooking 
energy would require only 40% of the original cubic meter of gas. The 
family would still have 60% of the cubic meter with which to prepare the 
next meal and half of the meal after that. 
It is apparent that the energy supply system is better used if 
households purchase gas cooktops instead of electric ones. It makes little 
sense to burn gas in a power plant to boil water to generate electricity 
with which to boil water on an electric cooktop, when, instead, you 
can burn gas to boil water right in your kitchen. Replacing electricity 
with gas in many households and businesses would extend the useful 
life of natural gas reserves, thus enhancing energy supply adequacy by 
conserving gas resources. Further, using gas instead of electricity for 
cooking substantially reduces emissions. 
The story is even more compelling if the power plant uses coal instead 
of gas. Coal is a much dirtier fuel for power generation than is natural 
gas, producing more emissions that are more problematic. To the extent 
that electric power is generated with coal, replacing electricity with gas 
for end uses offers even greater emissions benefits (Figure 2.2.3). 
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Much of the industrialized world is locked into existing 
electric and natural gas transmission and distribution systems. 
These systems are highly developed but shaped more by 
historical happenstance than by comprehensive planning to 
minimize investment cost and maximize energy efficiency. 
By contrast, as Asian societies expand their gas and electricity 
systems into new areas—as they will with urbanization and 
efforts to serve the energy poor—they will often build from 
scratch. 
Asians will therefore enjoy more freedom of choice and 
potential for investment savings. Electricity generation, 
transmission, and distribution infrastructure is much more 
expensive to build than gas delivery infrastructure. While it 
may not be possible to replace electricity with gas for all new 
end uses in the foreseeable future, it is possible to reshape 
electricity and gas delivery systems in new ways that minimize 
redundancies and save capital costs. 
And Asians will have more freedom to be energy efficient. 
Electricity and gas systems in the industrialized world arose 
at a time when energy efficiency was a low priority and 
utility regulators had little incentive to work with energy 
suppliers to find efficiency measures that could benefit from 
careful coordination between gas and electricity delivery. In 
contrast, Asia has the advantage of being able to pursue such 
coordination for future benefit. 
If gas supplies become more abundant in Asia through, for example, 
the aggressive development of unconventional sources, the natural and 
immediate inclination is to use it as much as possible to replace dirty coal 
in generating electricity. This strategy seems obvious, but a broader view 
points a different direction. Natural gas has more value for environmental 
protection and energy conservation if it is used instead to replace 
electricity in end uses—2.5 times the value as the cooking illustration 
showed. 
Such replacement may be practical only where energy supply 
systems expand into newly built-up areas. In the meantime, using gas to 
generate electricity may be the sensible alternative in established cities, 
at least for the time being. And, in a few countries, notably Bhutan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan, most electricity supplied to end users 
is generated from clean hydropower. In these cases—or where small, 
isolated grids are supplied by solar or wind power—switching from 
electricity to gas would be ill-advised as the electricity is from cleaner, 
renewable sources. These caveats do not apply, however, in most Asian 
locations that will experience dramatic economic and infrastructure 
expansion in the coming years and decades.
Gas can replace electricity for a number of end uses, among 
them certain industrial processes; space heating and cooling; and 
powering kitchen appliances such as cooktops, ovens, and refrigerators. 
Manufacturers of appliances, home heating and cooling equipment, and 
industrial capital equipment can be encouraged to promote gas over 
electric designs. Doing so will gradually reshape the fuel demand profile. 
If end users demand gas, energy providers will respond. In any case, the 
2.2.3 The benefits of replacing electricity with gas
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future development of gas and electricity transmission and distribution 
systems should be coordinated. Gas and electric utilities generally 
operate within regulatory frameworks, but sometimes the frameworks 
are only loosely coordinated. The economic advantages of minimizing 
infrastructure duplication combine with energy savings and emissions 
reduction to provide strong motivation for better coordinating gas and 
electricity systems in new infrastructure. Low international gas prices 
and investment in liquefied natural gas terminals mean that even energy-
importing countries can benefit. Coordinated planning of new electricity 
and gas infrastructure should be augmented by building local firms’ 
capacity to successfully enter the gas supply business, which has relatively 
few players in most of developing Asia. 
Changing energy consumer behavior
Energy prices that reflect the true cost of energy will induce Asian 
households and firms to use energy more efficiently. But there is much 
more that can and should be done to promote more efficient energy 
use. Above all, there is a need to change the general public’s energy use 
behavior by instilling a recognition that energy is a scarce, valuable 
resource. The impact of new energy efficiency technologies will depend 
on the scale and speed of their uptake. Conservation programs can 
induce individuals to refrain from purely wasteful energy consumption. 
Changing behavior ultimately requires a fundamental shift in the 
general public’s attitudes. The government should act as a catalyst in this 
endeavor, as the Japanese experience shows.
Energy efficiency available on demand
Asian governments must take the lead in changing Asians’ energy 
use behavior. More aggressive policies to promote to consumers cost-
effective energy efficiency will enhance Asia’s economic growth, private 
consumption, government expenditure, and investment. Further, energy 
efficiency gains reduce the effective price of energy, thus advancing the 
cause of affordability and access. Similarly, lower energy consumption 
reduces emissions, thus furthering environmental sustainability. 
In addition, if programs encouraging investment in improved energy 
efficiency make energy services more economical, they will likely be 
accompanied by net increases in productive labor employment. Especially 
during times of economic slowdown, programs that improve energy 
efficiency by, for example, retrofitting buildings can employ otherwise 
idle labor to add value to the economy. 
Other benefits flow from how energy efficiency gains expand 
producer and consumer surpluses and strengthen economic welfare. 
Evidence from Europe shows such gains directly improving public 
budgets when firms hire workers to retrofit aging, energy-inefficient 
buildings and pay associated payroll taxes, and when workers pay income 
and social insurance taxes rather than claim unemployment benefits 
(Copenhagen Economics 2012). The IEA has recognized and identified 
how energy efficiency gains help alleviate poverty. 
Several technologies to improve energy efficiency are now in use 
and well-established in developed economies but lack penetration 
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across Asia. For example, consumers’ use of compact fluorescent lamps 
and light-emitting diodes can save up to 70% of the electricity used by 
incandescent, sodium vapor, or halogen lamps. Active solar thermal 
systems to heat water and interiors are popular in the PRC, which has 
39% more active solar thermal systems installed than the rest of the world 
combined (IEA 2011a). 
Solar tubes can bring daylight into rooms without windows, and 
special solar paints can reflect most heat from the sun to lower the energy 
needed for cooling. Similarly, proper building insulation conserves heat 
during the winter. Hybrid electric vehicles reduce fuel consumption 
with brakes that capture energy from a decelerating vehicle for charging 
batteries that run the motor. High-efficiency electric motors are used 
extensively in industry. Such new technologies entail high upfront fixed 
costs, however, because their developers need to recoup research and 
development investments. Further, they initially may not be as reliable 
as existing efficient technologies. Encouraging more investment would 
accelerate their commercialization. 
A very large market like Asia is conducive to the rapid deployment 
and commercialization of new technologies. Establishing and supervising 
efficiency standards can reinforce consumer demand for energy-efficient 
technologies, and the ready availability of loans can expand their 
adoption in firms and households. Government programs that create 
incentive for developing better technologies and designs in a concerted 
way can accelerate the progress of innovation.
The proposition that more aggressive policies toward energy efficiency 
can strengthen all three pillars of Asian energy security is extremely 
seductive. Unfortunately, though, the seduction of energy efficiency cuts 
both ways. 
On the lookout for rebound effects
A large and growing body of research has shown that energy efficiency 
gains do not bring one-for-one reductions in energy consumption 
because of the so-called “rebound effect.” In extreme cases, improved 
efficiency can backfire, spurring outright increases in energy 
consumption. It appears that energy efficiency improvements act much 
as energy price reductions or energy subsidies, encouraging higher 
energy use (Box 2.2.3). 
What is particularly troublesome for Asia is that rebound effects 
appear to be larger in developing economies than in industrialized 
economies. Even with rebound effects, energy efficiency gains advance 
the cause of affordable access by reducing the effective cost of energy 
and spur economic growth by making energy cheaper for producers. If 
rebound falls short of backfire, efficiency gains improve environmental 
sustainability and energy supply adequacy by reducing energy use. 
Careful attention paid to managing rebound effects can ensure that 
investments in energy efficiency strengthen all pillars of Asian energy 
security. 
Awareness and conservation programs
Potential exists to reduce energy use that is purely wasteful by altering 
individual behavior. Lights that burn when no one is present, trains 
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that run on schedule but without passengers, individual car trips where 
pooling is possible, machinery idled instead of shut down during a 
production stoppage—all are examples of energy used for no constructive 
purpose. Programs designed to raise public awareness of the social 
value of eliminating energy waste can have positive impact despite their 
reliance on altruism and social pressure rather than proven market 
signals. 
As with demand management generally, Japan provides a good 
example of the potential of conservation programs in its Setsuden 
(“saving electricity”) movement (Box 2.2.4). The movement, which 
emerged following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, helped 
lower peak usage by 15% during the summer of 2012. The success of 
the Setsuden movement in preventing power outages in post-tsunami 
Japan attests to the potential of media awareness campaigns to change 
the behavior of firms and households. Though, in light of the extreme 
circumstances under which the program was initiated, the jury is out 
on the degree to which Japan’s experience can be replicated elsewhere. 
Although the exact magnitude of energy savings obtainable by 
eliminating purely wasteful energy use is uncertain, they would come at 
virtually no cost. 
2.2.3 Energy efficiency rebound effects: technical background
Measuring rebound effects compares the technical potential 
for energy savings from energy efficiency improvements 
with the energy savings actually realized. Formally, rebound 
magnitude is defined according to the following equation: 
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where ESA is the actual energy savings realized and ESP is 
the potential energy savings as estimated from engineering 
calculations. 
If actual energy savings equal potential savings, rebound 
is zero. If there are no actual savings, rebound is unity, or 
100%. If energy use rises, rebound is greater than 100%—a 
backfire.
Potential energy savings are calculated assuming that 
energy efficiency gains reduce energy use, in households 
and businesses alike, in direct proportion to the magnitude 
of the energy efficiency improvement. If every light bulb, 
television, refrigerator, or air conditioner were replaced by a 
more efficient counterpart, whether existing or new, energy 
use would be reduced correspondingly while the same end 
uses are served—perhaps even better served. Production 
using new energy-efficient technologies would reduce the 
energy required to produce and transport any given good or 
service, correspondingly reducing energy use—with outsized 
potential benefits, as the production side of the economy 
uses two-thirds of energy globally (ExxonMobil 2009). 
However, energy efficiency gains lower the effective 
cost of energy, so users respond by using more. The 
magnitude of these effects depends on how flexibly 
consumers can adjust their consumption and how 
flexibly producers can substitute cheaper energy for 
other production inputs that have become relatively more 
expensive for lack of their own efficiency improvements. 
Accordingly, actual energy savings will fall short of 
potential energy savings.
Energy intensity can be favorably reduced despite large 
rebound effects because energy efficiency is only one 
factor affecting energy intensity. 
A large and growing empirical literature pioneered 
by Brookes (1979) and Khazzoom (1980) assesses the 
magnitude of the rebound effect. Recent studies include 
Saunders (1992, 2008, forthcoming), Sorrell (2007, 2009), 
Turner (forthcoming), Tsao et al. (2010), and Jenkins et al. 
(2011). 
Roy (2000) first suggested that rebound effects in 
developing countries may be larger than in industrialized 
countries. Li and Yonglei (2012) showed energy efficiency 
rebound in the PRC to have been very large from 1997 to 
2008, backfiring in 3 of those years. Lin and Liu (2013) 
analyzed passenger transportation in the PRC from 1994 
to 2010 and found rebound at 107%—another backfire. 
Chakravarty et al. (2013) provide a good survey of the 
literature. 
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In sum, better demand management can bring Asia significantly 
closer to the goal of energy security. It can do so by reducing the risk 
of inadequate supply and promoting environmental sustainability. But 
while better demand management is absolutely necessary for energy 
security, it cannot cover the whole distance. The journey requires solving 
the supply side of the equation, by augmenting the supply of clean, 
affordable energy. Fortunately, like the demand side, the supply side is as 
full of promising options.
2.2.4 Japan’s Setsuden initiative post-Fukushima
The Setsuden (“saving electricity”) movement dramatically 
highlights Japan’s ability to promote energy security 
through demand management. Nuclear power supplied 
27% of Tokyo’s energy needs before the March 2011 
earthquake and tsunami that crippled the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant. The meltdown at Fukushima 
prompted stress tests and safety checks at other plants, 
mandating further shutdowns. Japanese firms and 
households consequently faced looming power shortages, 
and Setsuden arose as an unofficial, grassroots national 
movement to conserve electricity in response. Media 
campaigns encouraged firms and households to cut 
back. Workers moved their shifts to off-peak hours and 
weekends. Commercial establishments turned off air-
conditioning. The movement became official on 1 July 
2011, when the government mandated reduced electricity 
use by large firms and prescribed reduction targets for 
households and small businesses. The restrictions were 
rescinded in September 2011, but only after the Setsuden 
movement succeeded in helping to prevent blackouts 
during the summer, when electricity use typically surges. 
Japan’s peak usage fell by 15% from a year earlier.
The Setsuden movement built on earlier success. 
Throughout the last half century, the Government of Japan 
has catalyzed and led energy conservation. Its efforts have 
been rewarded with widespread voluntary compliance, the 
efforts of firms and households creating a virtuous cycle 
of energy efficiency improvements. The government’s 
initiatives entail both regulation and support. Regulations 
based on the Law Concerning the Rational Use of Energy, 
1979 set out energy efficiency standards for buildings, 
appliances, and other equipment. Government support 
consists of budgetary, tax, and financial measures. In 
addition to setting aside a budget for energy efficiency 
measures, the government provides tax breaks and 
subsidies.
Sources: EIA Country Analysis (updated 4 June 2012), IEEJ 2011, TEPCO 2012.
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Tapping cleaner energy supply
Asia’s current energy picture contemplates some degree of energy supply 
enhancement: introducing new unconventional gas supplies, deploying 
renewable energy supplies, and modestly expanding nuclear power. As 
noted, however, meeting the needs of the Asian Century scenario would 
mean a tremendous increase in energy imports based on current plans to 
enhance indigenous supplies. Expanding its energy supply in a way that 
is environmentally sustainable will require Asia to pursue a combination 
of renewable energy, cleaner nonrenewable sources, and technologies to 
make carbon-based fuels cleaner to use.
Expansion of renewables 
The current forecast shows the use of renewables increasing by half 
over the forecast period. Hydropower more than quadruples, but all 
renewables together still account for only 13% of the power generation mix 
in 2035. Is there an opportunity to substantially strengthen the role of 
renewables beyond forecasts?
Wind, solar, and other renewable energy technologies directly 
harness naturally available energy sources. They thus help to insulate the 
energy price from the ups and downs of fossil fuel production, thereby 
strengthening future energy security. These technologies can substitute 
for the fossil fuels used to generate electricity, reducing harmful emissions 
and improving environmental sustainability. Biofuels can potentially 
substitute for oil-based transportation fuels and so reduce the need for oil 
imports and enhance energy supply adequacy.
However, several difficulties prevent expanding renewables enough to 
make a major difference in Asia’s energy future any time soon. Perhaps 
most fundamental is the need for renewable sources to be cost-competitive 
with the fuels they seek to replace. While various renewables have enjoyed 
significant cost reductions and are already economic in certain locales 
and remote areas, renewable energy generally remains too costly to be 
competitive. This is likely to change but how quickly is unclear.
Uncompetitive cost is not the only difficulty. Biofuels pose the risk 
of usurping agricultural land used to grow food if their production is to 
expand by the magnitude required to make a significant contribution. 
Using solar and wind to replace coal or oil in power generation 
is technically tricky, primarily owing to their intermittency. This 
complicates integrating large-scale solar and wind generation into power 
systems in a way that maintains system reliability, stability, and ability to 
quickly adjust output to minute-by-minute changes in system demand. 
Many argue that being cost-competitive should be understood as 
factoring in environmental and other social costs that are external to 
the standard equations of microeconomics. However, capturing these 
“externalities” with subsidies or the imposition of taxes and mandates 
runs up energy prices and cramps economic activity. Also, the more 
expensive electricity derived from renewables undermines affordability, 
Asia’s energy challenge  79
the third pillar of energy security. Policymakers have to consider such 
tradeoffs.
Nonetheless, one can argue that the long-term economic benefits 
garnered from the large-scale use of renewable energy outweigh short-
term costs. Instruments such as feed-in tariffs during the introductory 
years of high-cost renewable technologies assure suppliers a reasonable 
price per kilowatt-hour to mitigate their commercial risk and thereby 
stimulate investment in larger capacity. Some policies directly promote 
renewables. One such is the renewable portfolio standard, which requires 
electricity distributors to source an increasing share of their primary 
energy from renewables. Renewable energy certificates create marketable 
instruments that producers can sell to distribution companies toward 
meeting the target renewable portfolio standard. Tax incentives like 
investment allowances and accelerated depreciation also help compensate 
for initially higher costs.
Pushing up capacity to generate electricity using renewables, by 
whatever means, accelerates the learning process and starts to bring down 
costs so that the longer-term economic benefits of cleaner energy supply 
can be realized sooner. The costs consequent of climate change could be 
very large, and public health costs associated with burning fossil fuels are 
bound to grow with their expanded use. There is economic benefit to be 
had by avoiding these costs sooner rather than later. Further, the massive 
energy market in Asia provides opportunity and room to introduce and 
develop new energy technologies that can be profitably sold to other 
countries wanting to expand their renewable energy sectors. Asia is 
already a world leader in the manufacture of state-of-the-art equipment 
for renewable technologies. The PRC, the Republic of Korea, and 
Taipei,China together produce most of the world’s photovoltaic equipment 
for solar generation.
Wind power
Wind power has been rapidly expanding throughout the world, including 
in India and the PRC. The potential in Asia is enormous. According to 
one study (Shah 2012), Mongolia and the PRC could each install over 
1 terawatt (1 million megawatts or 1,000 gigawatts) of wind capacity, 
which together would generate more than 3,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) 
annually. This is over 60% of the PRC’s total electricity consumption of 
4,937 TWh in 2012. Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, and Viet Nam could each 
install over 100 gigawatts (GW). The only country currently exploiting 
more than 5% of its potential is India, its 30% exploitation driven largely 
by an accelerated depreciation allowance. However, the wind resource is 
distributed unevenly across Asia, endowing a handful of countries with 
huge potential but leaving many with little. 
According to World Wind Energy Council, a leading industry 
association, the installed capacity of wind power in Asia in 2011 was 82.0 
GW, or 36% of the total world capacity of 237.5 GW and comparable to 
Europe’s 96.5 GW. By the end of 2012, global capacity had increased by 
19% to 282.5 GW. With 75.5 GW, the PRC leads the world, and India is 
ranked fifth with 18.5 GW.
Figure 2.3.1 shows the distribution of wind resources and installed 
capacity across Asia. Unlike the solar resource, variance is large, 
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leaving wind turbines becalmed or unable to safely absorb 
wind energy during storms. Sites need to have a mean wind 
velocity of at least 6 meters per second (22 kilometers per 
hour) to be viable. Improvements in design allow modern 
wind turbines to start generating power at a wind speed of 3 
meters per second and cut off at 25 meters per second. Larger 
rotor diameters to 127 meters and higher hub heights to 135 
meters enable turbines to absorb more of the wind energy and 
improve the economics, particularly if installed offshore. 
Wind is commercially more competitive than photovoltaic 
generation but not yet competitive enough to compete 
commercially with conventional forms of generation because 
it is too intermittent, hobbling wind with low capacity factors. 
Forecasts show the levelized cost of wind power falling by 
20%–30% from current levels by 2030, making it nearly 
competitive with other forms of generation (Figure 2.3.2). 
The levelized cost is determined considering all operational 
costs, using a discount rate to spread the capital and financing 
cost over the life of the project, and including a reasonable 
return on investment.
If coal and gas prices were to escalate over this time frame, 
the relative economics of wind would improve accordingly. 
Challenges remain, however, to integrating this intermittent 
resource into the power grid. These challenges are complicated 
by wind resources’ often being most bountiful in locations 
distant from demand centers, requiring lengthy connections 
with power grids. 
In sum, wind power has numerous advantages over 
conventional power. Renewable resources are naturally 
available, so the primary energy resource costs nothing. Wind 
is virtually free of GHG emissions and emits no other air 
pollutants. Yet the prospects of wind power becoming cost 
effective within the forecast horizon is uncertain. If wind 
technologies are further developed at an accelerated pace, the 
day they become cost competitive can be brought forward. 
Small wind turbines are available that can provide electricity 
to small communities in remote locations cost-effectively 
because the locale makes other options expensive. They can 
thus help expand access to energy, but making it affordable to 
poor households requires public financing. As wind turbines 
require regular maintenance, this option also requires skilled 
maintenance staff.
Solar power
Solar power has been developed in two main directions, one using 
photovoltaic (PV) technology and the other concentrating the sun’s rays 
to heat water directly.
PV cells convert solar energy into electricity using semiconductors 
of two types. The more common crystalline silicone type is 14%–20% 
efficient. The other type, which uses a thin film, is less than 12% efficient 
but is cheaper to make and more suitable for places with sunlight 
2.3.1 Installed capacity and technical potential for wind
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broken up and reflected by, for example, clouds and nearby structures. 
A panel’s capacity factor is a measure of its effective utilization. A solar 
panel rated for 1 kilowatt (kW) can theoretically produce 8,760 kilowatt-
hours (kWh) annually. However, actual output depends on the amount 
of energy in the sunlight, which depends on the location, daylight 
hours, cloud cover and how it reflects light, and ambient temperature. 
Considering these uncontrollable nature-linked parameters, the actual 
output of a 1 kW solar panel may be only 1,300 kWh in a year. That works 
out to a capacity factor of 15%, which is typical.
Concentrated solar power uses an array of mirrors to cause the sun’s 
rays to converge on a central tower to heat fluid and raise steam to run a 
turbine, much as in a conventional thermal power plant. This technology 
has the option, with added cost, to store solar energy in salt solution and 
use it to generate electricity at night. Several configurations are used to 
concentrate the solar energy, their efficiencies ranging from about 10% for 
flat mirrors to over 30% for centralized towers and parabolic dishes. 
Photovoltaic technology has been applied various ways since the 
1960s. Despite being safe, clean, and extremely reliable, and its requiring 
no fuel and little maintenance, it has always been too expensive to achieve 
grid parity, or the ability compete commercially on the grid without 
subsidies. This drawback may be changing, however, as the decades-long 
decline in PV module prices has accelerated in the last 5 years, leading 
some to speculate that grid parity is likely by the mid-2010s. 
Should grid parity be achieved, it will have immense implications for 
all Asian countries, as they all need more power sources and have solar 
resources ranging from good to excellent. However, availability only 
during daylight hours, combined with the challenges of finding large 
tracts of land to accommodate large PV capacity, may limit penetration 
unless cheaper storage is developed. Meanwhile, PV is already the 
cheapest way to electrify small communities remote from the grid and 
thus has a potential role in providing electricity to hundreds of millions 
of Asians currently without power.
Asia’s solar resource is shown in Figure 2.3.3. Lighter, more energetic 
colors indicate areas with more sunlight. Places close to the Equator 
have more hours of sunshine annually, but islands and coastal areas have 
more cloudy days that diffuse the sunlight. The sun is weaker at higher 
latitudes and never directly overhead, requiring that PV panels be fixed at 
an incline to capture the most solar energy. PV panels that track the sun 
as it rises and sets every day capture more sunlight than do fixed ones but 
with higher capital and maintenance costs for the tracking device. 
Tilting and tracking even out spatial variation in the solar resource. 
From the worst site to the best site in Asia, the capacity factor for fixed 
arrays varies from 10% to 20%, and most sites across the continent can 
achieve at least a capacity factor close to 16%. Thus, tilting and tracking 
makes solar energy accessible virtually anywhere in Asia. 
PV technology has become cheaper over the decades it has been 
commercially available, and recently at an accelerated pace. The cost 
of crystalline silicon modules fell from about $80/watt in 1977 to less 
than $10/watt by the late 1980s and $4/watt in early 2008 (Economist 
2012). At this point the price dropped off a cliff, halving in 2008-2009. 
Suppliers ramped up production to obtain subsidies offered to renewable 
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energy installations in Canada, Germany, and Spain, and they shifted 
manufacturing to lower-cost producers in the PRC that already had 
the skills for manufacturing semiconductors. Rapid cost declines have 
continued since then—recently reaching $0.70/watt—with radical 
implications for the PV industry. Module manufacturers have expressed 
some concern about overcapacity and low price, but production continues 
to expand as they find new ways to cut costs and learn from experience. 
By the end of 2011, the global installed capacity of grid-connected PV 
systems was over 69 GW, which could annually produce 85 terawatt-hours 
(TWh), enough to power more than 20 million households (European 
Photovoltaic Industry Association 2013a). Preliminary estimates indicate 
that the installed capacity crossed the 100 GW threshold by the beginning 
of 2013, assuming additions in 2012 at the same pace as in 2011 (EPIA 
2013b). Notably, six countries in Asia and the Pacific have over 100 MW 
of grid-connected PV systems: the PRC with 7,000 MW, Japan 6,914 MW, 
Australia 2,200 MW, India 1,461 MW, the Republic of Korea 963 MW, and 
Thailand 360 MW.
How will PV prices evolve over time? Figure 2.3.4 compares the 
levelized cost of solar power from utility-scale plants (generally with 
capacity above 10 MW) with some conventional technologies. It suggests 
2.3.3 Solar resource in Asia
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that even by 2030 PV-generated electricity will struggle to 
compete with large hydropower, cheap coal, nuclear, and cheap 
gas at today’s prices. However, if coal and gas prices were 
to escalate significantly over this time horizon, solar could 
become more competitive.
PV installations can be integrated into the grid from a 
central plant, as with conventional power plants, or distributed 
around many locations on the grid. Distributed systems can 
be mounted on roofs and facades, minimizing land use and 
providing power close to where it is consumed, which reduces 
losses in transmission. 
Concentrated solar power also has potential to contribute. 
Investment costs for concentrated solar power systems range 
from $3,800/kW without storage to $7,700/kW with storage, for 
an estimated levelized cost of electricity in 2009 ranging from 
$0.18–$0.27/kWh. Continued development is expected to halve 
the cost by 2025. US and European research and development 
programs envision even more dramatic cost reductions, 
targeting $0.05–$0.06/kWh by 2020 (Arvizu et al. 2011), which 
is cost-competitive with conventional alternatives. 
In the meantime, governments have offered subsidies to spur the 
development of solar power by the private sector. Many governments 
hope that such subsidies, while costly in the short run, will accelerate the 
development of cost-competitive technologies and provide net economic 
and environmental gains over the long term. 
In sum, solar power has numerous advantages over conventional 
power. The solar PV system is modular, so little technological change 
is needed for fitting individual homes, including even PV lanterns. It 
is virtually free of GHG emissions, and the primary energy source—
sunlight—is freely available and widely distributed, notably in remote 
locales with no access to the grid. 
PV is already cost competitive in many remote areas where the cost 
of extending electricity grids would be prohibitive: remote islands in 
the Pacific, the Philippines, and Indonesia; in the mountains of Bhutan 
and the PRC; and the sparsely populated plains of Mongolia. These 
installations use public finance and international aid, but, as PV system 
costs decline, so will the need for subsidies. Improvements in battery 
technology will enable households to tap PV systems at night, making it 
an attractive investment. The Energy and Resources Institute in India has 
led the global distribution of solar lanterns that provide basic but clean 
light to poor households.
However, the prospects of utility-scale solar power becoming 
cost effective within the forecast horizon are uncertain unless 
more investment is forthcoming to further develop the technology. 
Satellites can assist evaluation of solar potential in a particular region, 
but assessments of capacity factor at specific locations, and thus of 
commercial solar potential, requires gathering data on the ground. 
Hydropower
Hydropower has a number of attractive attributes. It is a clean resource 
with few GHG emissions and virtually no other pollutants emitted during 
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operation. It is renewable, and once initial capital costs have been borne it 
provides energy extremely cheaply. In addition, large hydropower projects 
are commercially viable and do not require financial support from 
governments. Hydropower plants that reliably store energy behind a dam 
complement intermittent solar and wind energy and can respond quickly 
to variations in power demand to help maintain reliable electricity supply.
Hydropower technology is well established, and projects can be 
flexibly designed for an array of conditions. Some tap high volumes of 
water flow with little difference in height between the turbine intake 
and outlet, while others tap low volume falling greater distances. Some 
use reservoirs with several months of storage to allow power generation 
during dry seasons, while others depend on continuous water flow. Some 
pump water up to the higher reservoir when power demand is low to use 
it to generate electricity during peak demand hours. Micro hydro can 
serve the needs of a small community. A cascade of several dams can 
be built on a single watershed to generate power from the same water 
repeatedly. 
Asia has substantial undeveloped hydro resources, only 20% of 
which have been developed (IEA 2013). As Asia’s developed hydropower 
capacity in 2010 was 337 GW (EIA 2011d), total hydro potential 
approaches 1,700 GW (Table 2.3.1).
The aggressive expansion of hydro would entail some 
problems. Local opposition to hydropower development can 
be strong, as is clear in India. Conflicts often arise over the 
loss of agriculturally productive land and the need to resettle 
communities. Further, the communities that lose their land 
and homes to a new reservoir often do not benefit when water 
is diverted into canals for irrigation downstream. Tensions 
run higher when rivers cross international frontiers or even 
provincial boundaries. Environmental concerns extend to 
the loss of scenic valleys, habitat destruction, and fishery 
disruption. 
A wild card is climate change. It may alter precipitation 
and thus river flows in a developed catchment, rendering 
reservoir storage capacity far from optional. Interestingly, 
the more violent storms and extended droughts that global 
warming is expected to cause will require greater water storage 
capacity for irrigation and flood prevention. This could make 
building dams for hydropower simultaneously part of a larger 
strategy to address climate change. 
The capital cost of a hydropower project is site-specific and varies 
a lot depending on the civil works needed to build the dam and the 
reservoir. The levelized cost of energy similarly varies a lot but is 
generally $0.04–$0.10/kWH, which makes it very cost-competitive. 
In the end, all renewables escape the fate common to oil, gas, 
coal, and fission-based nuclear—the potential of being consumed to 
exhaustion. In the long run, absent the successful development of 
truly breakthrough technologies, only renewables can sustain future 
generations indefinitely. Therefore, the question is not whether Asia 
should invest in renewable energy but how quickly and how much. The 
primary obstacle to renewables—that they are for the most part not yet 
2.3.1 Top ten hydropower producers
Country
Hydro electricity 
(TWh)
Share of electricity 
generation (%)
PRC 694 14.8
Brazil 403 80.2
Canada 376 62.0
United States 328  7.6
Russia• ••• • • ••••• • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••65 15.7
India 132 13.1
Norway 122 95.3
Japan  85  7.8
Venezuela  84 68.0
Sweden  67 42.2
PRC = People’s Republic of China, TWh = terwatt-hour.
Note: These numbers do include electricity imports such as those 
from the Itaipu hydropowerplant side of Paraguay to Brazil, which 
represent almost half of this hydropower plant generation (36Twh).
Source: IEA 2012d.
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cost-competitive with alternative sources—will inevitably diminish with 
time and technological progress. 
Biofuels
Biofuels emit greenhouse gases, as do such conventional fuels as gasoline 
and diesel. However, they are produced from biomass, 
which sequester carbon dioxide from the atmosphere for 
photosynthesis while growing. Therefore, in principle, burning 
such fuels does not cause a net increase in atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide. Accordingly, their 
development and use can, in principle, advance environmental 
sustainability. Further, biofuels are liquids and therefore a 
convenient substitute for oil-based transportation fuels that 
can reduce the need for oil imports and enhance energy supply 
adequacy. 
World production of biofuels in 2011 was mostly 
concentrated in the US and Brazil. Asia accounted for only 
6% of total biofuel production, though it accounted for 13% of 
biodiesel production (Table 2.3.2).
The technical process for transforming biomass to biofuels 
is shown in Figure 2.3.5. The first generation of biofuels were 
made from the oil, starch, and sugar contained in cultivated 
crops. More recently, the technology improved to extract 
cellulose from non-edible vegetation—a second generation 
of biofuels—which minimizes competition with food 
production. The latest, third-generation technology, still at a 
pilot stage, uses algae grown in water bodies to avoid land-use 
competition. Ethanol and biodiesel are the main biofuels and 
can be added to gasoline and diesel. 
It has been about 10 years since the US and Europe 
implemented various policies and incentives to promote 
biofuel production. According to Agriculture Outlook 2012, 
co-published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, 65% of EU vegetable oil, 50% of 
Brazilian sugarcane, and about 40% of US maize production 
is used as feedstock for biofuel production. During 2009–2011, 
global production of ethanol averaged 98.2 billion liters (equal 
to 8.6% of gasoline use by volume) and of biodiesel 21.3 billion 
liters (3.1% of diesel). High global oil prices have been a major 
factor behind such high production, which is projected to 
double by 2021. The leading Asian producers of ethanol are the 
PRC at 8,094 million liters, India at 1,976 million liters, and 
Thailand at 777 million liters, and of biodiesel Thailand at 664 
million liters, Malaysia at 563 million liters, and Indonesia at 
397 million liters. 
However, the current generation of biofuels has three significant 
problems. First, biomass cultivation, transportation, and processing 
requires energy that must be subtracted from biofuel energy content to 
arrive at net energy output. The net energy ratio, or energy available 
in biofuel per unit of energy used to produce it, is lowest converting 
2.3.2 Global biofuel production, 2011
 
Percent of world production, 
2011
 
Fuel 
ethanol Biodiesel
Total 
biofuels
North America 62.9 16.3 53.0
United States 60.8 15.6 51.2
Central and South America 27.8 25.6 27.4
Brazil 26.2 11.4 23.1
Europe  4.9 44.0 13.2
Asia and Oceania  4.3 13.2  6.2
People’s Republic of China  2.6  1.9  2.5
India  0.4  0.5  0.4
Thailand  0.6  2.5  1.0
Indonesia  0.0  5.0  1.1
Source: EIA 2011d.
2.3.5  Technology pathways to transform biomass into biofuel
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maize to ethanol. Depending on the production process, the ratio is 
four times or more for cellulosic biomass and biodiesel. Second, the 
first-generation biofuels compete with food production by directly using 
food crops or land used to grow them. With its large poor population, 
Asia already faces challenges producing enough affordable food. Food 
security could be jeopardized if too many farmers chose to switch to 
biofuel crops. Third, biofuels are not yet cost-competitive with traditional 
transportation fuels, typically requiring significant subsidies.
Research is under way worldwide to address the first two issues 
by producing biofuels from materials that do not compete with food 
production, using the so-called “cellulosics” in crop residues, plants with 
high-energy content that grow well on degraded land, and algae. At this 
point these technologies are not yet cost-competitive, but if they reach 
fruition they could make a substantial contribution. In the meantime, 
according to the IEA, ethanol from sugarcane currently being produced 
in Brazil and Thailand, shows significant potential to mitigate GHG 
emission, if no indirect land-use change occurs (IEA 2011c). The analysis 
shows lifecycle net GHG gains from using biofuels made from palm 
oil produced in Indonesia and Malaysia, the world’s largest producers. 
However, other analyses conclude that net gains from biofuel production 
are illusory owing to land-use changes to support their production 
(EPA 2012).
As with solar and wind, biofuels other than ethanol are not yet cost-
competitive. The IEA shows the cost of producing conventional biodiesel 
in 2011 at nearly double that of gasoline and projects it remaining 
more expensive than gasoline for the foreseeable future. On the other 
hand, the IEA projects ethanol costs falling below gasoline costs before 
2020 because of scale expansion and efficiency improvements. Third-
generation biofuels from cellulosics, both ethanol and biodiesel, are 
not projected to become cost-competitive with gasoline until sometime 
around 2030 (IEA 2011c).
In lieu of cost-competitiveness, the rapid growth of biofuel production 
in Asia and elsewhere has been driven by biofuel subsidies. In Asia, the 
governments of the PRC, Indonesia, and Malaysia in particular provide 
subsidies. One study estimated that biofuels subsidies in the PRC in 2006 
amounted to $115 million, or roughly $0.40/liter, and projected that such 
subsidies would reach about $1.8 billion by 2020 (International Institute 
for Sustainable Development 2008). The study found comparably large 
biofuels subsidies for Indonesia in 2006–2008.
In sum, the prospects of biofuels improving energy supply adequacy 
and environmental sustainability depend heavily, as with solar and wind, 
on aggressive investment in new technologies that will reduce their cost 
and overcome land-use conflicts. 
Other renewables
Other renewable energy sources will supply clean energy in locales where 
natural conditions enable their deployment. While their contribution to 
Asian energy supply will be limited, geothermal energy and perhaps the 
expanded use of tidal and ocean current power will bring advantages 
where they can be implemented cost-effectively, helping to leave no stone 
unturned in Asia’s quest for clean energy (Box 2.3.1). 
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Expansion of non-renewables
While renewables offer considerable promise, fossil fuels will continue to 
play a key role in the time horizon considered here. The current forecast 
shows natural gas use increasing over the forecast period along with coal, 
and a modest increase in nuclear power. But is there an opportunity to 
expand these fuels in a way that is clean and safe? Gas is cleaner than 
coal, and existing and emerging technologies may enable the use of 
coal in a more environmentally sustainable way. These questions are 
examined next.
Unconventional gas 
The current forecast shows natural gas production more than tripling over 
the forecast period, increasing its share of supply from about 10% to 16%. 
But might this picture be improved with more aggressive development of 
unconventional gas supplies? Recent experience in the industrialized world 
shows that unconventional gas has the potential to come online quickly 
and to significantly change the energy supply picture. 
The appeal of this idea is great. Unconventional gas resources such 
as shale gas and coal bed methane offer the promise of replacing coal 
in power generation and oil in producing certain petrochemicals. Shale 
gas and coal bed methane are chemically equivalent to conventional 
natural gas. 
The conventional way to produce natural gas is to drill and extract it 
out of “traps,” or folds and pockets in underground sedimentary layers. 
Natural gas also exists in deeper layers, typically shales, from which the gas 
found today in the shallower traps migrated in geologic time (Figure 2.3.6). 
This “source rock” is much easier to find than traps and contains much 
larger quantities of gas. Traps are sparsely distributed compared with the 
source rock that extends over large areas in a basin. This resource has 
2.3.1 Other emerging technologies
Geothermal energy. The installed capacity of geothermal 
plants in the Philippines is second only to the US, 
contributing 17% of the country’s electricity supply 
(Philippine Department of Energy 2011). Further, the 
Philippines plans to expand geothermal capacity by 75% 
by 2027 (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2011). It is also used in 
Indonesia.
Geothermal has minor and manageable environmental 
impacts (Goldstein et al. 2011). Some consider geothermal 
a renewable resource, but if production exceeds rates of 
heat replenishment, geothermal reservoirs deplete much 
as do conventional oil and gas reserves. As these resources 
are exploitable only where the earth’s mantle has intruded 
far enough into the crust to allow access—normally at the 
boundaries of tectonic plates—their general potential is 
limited. 
Tidal and ocean current power. Ocean currents are used 
to drive turbines similar to wind turbines, or small dams 
are constructed to take advantage of tidal rise and fall. 
Without major policy changes, worldwide generation is 
forecast at around 12 TWh/year in 2030 and 25 TWh/
year in 2050. This is less than 0.1% of developing Asia’s 
projected electricity requirement. When it is commercially 
available, this technology can be used to provide cheap 
and clean energy needed by communities living on small 
islands in the Pacific, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 
Landfill gas. Organic matter in municipal solid waste 
produces this gas, largely methane, as it decomposes. 
Capturing landfill gas for use in homes or power plants 
converts waste into energy and reduces emissions of 
this methane, a potent GHG emissions. While capturing 
landfill gas is logical, environmentally sound, and in many 
cases economically attractive, it is a very small source that 
cannot contribute greatly to Asia’s energy requirements. 
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long been known to be large, but 
it was harder to exploit because 
the rock is impermeable and thus 
resistant to fluid flows. Further, the 
productive sedimentary layers span 
a thin vertical distance, meaning a 
vertical well cannot access much of 
the formation’s resource. The recent 
revolution in shale gas production 
arose as two technologies came 
together. Horizontal drilling 
allows operators to drill down to 
the deeper shale and then drill 
horizontally across the formation to 
efficiently access a rich vein of the 
shale. In hydraulic fracturing, or 
“fracking,” explosive charges first 
fracture the shale seam and then 
hydraulic fluid is pumped in to 
expand the fractures and allow gas 
to flow freely to the surface when the fluid is removed. These technologies 
have rendered accessible large volumes of gas. In the US, the shale gas share 
of all gas production exploded from 8% in 2007 to 30% in 2011 (EIA 2013b).
Many coal seams and surrounding rocks are also rich in methane, 
the main constituent of natural gas. As with shale gas, horizontal drilling 
provides access to rich underground coal seams, and the methane flows 
out because it is under pressure. 
Other types of unconventional gas are not yet technically viable or 
commercially competitive. “Deep gas” existing in deposits at depths 
of 5 kilometers or more is exploitable with current technology but 
more expensive than conventional gas. Gas under extreme pressure in 
geopressurized zones may be abundant but is technically difficult to 
extract owing to these zones’ extreme depth and pressure. Methane 
hydrates are icy materials containing gas that are found in marine 
sediments and Arctic regions. The United States Geological Survey (2013) 
conservatively estimates the carbon bound in gas hydrates globally to 
be twice as abundant as in all other known fossil fuels. They are highly 
volatile, however, and the technology to exploit them safely is not yet 
developed.
To the degree that natural gas, whether from a conventional or 
unconventional source, can replace coal in power generation, GHG 
emissions will fall because gas burns more cleanly than coal. Distributed 
directly for end use, its impact on GHG emissions is even higher. What 
is more, to the extent that gas can replace electricity in end uses, it can 
multiply its benefits in terms of energy efficiency and environmental 
protection compared with any fossil fuel used to produce electricity—
including itself. To the degree gas can replace oil, it can enhance energy 
supply adequacy. The significant quantities of unconventional gas 
coming online can keep prices low, thus advancing affordability. But 
realizing any of these benefits requires more gas than is foreseen in the 
current forecast.
2.3.6  Natural gas formations: conventional versus unconventional gas
Source: Ross, forthcoming. Reprinted from Department of Mines and Petroleum 2013, 
with permission of the Department of Mines and Petroleum of Western Australia.
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Asia’s unconventional gas potential
Asia almost certainly has significant reserves of unconventional gas. 
What is uncertain is where it is and how much of it is technically 
recoverable (IEA 2012a,b, Rogner 1997, McGlade et al. 2012). Regional 
assessments of unconventional gas have existed for over a decade, but 
there is only one publicly available basin-by-basin study for shale gas 
using a consistent methodology across countries (EIA 2011c). The study 
is based on work performed by Advanced Resources International 
(Kuuskraa 2009). Within Asia, the EIA study identified three promising 
countries—the PRC, India, and Pakistan—and compared the estimate 
of their technically recoverable shale gas resource with their proven 
conventional natural gas resources (Table 2.3.3). The PRC has the largest 
shale gas resources in the world, nearly 20% of the global total. The US, 
Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa complete the top five. 
The PRC’s coal bed methane resources are likely the largest in Asia 
outside of the Russian Federation, with gas “in place” (i.e., identified 
but not necessarily technically or economically recoverable) at depths 
within 2 kilometers measuring 34 gigatons of oil equivalent (GToe); this is 
comparable to the PRC’s conventional gas resources and places it second 
not only in Asia but in the world. These resources are spread widely 
throughout the country (Figure 2.3.7).
Shale gas resources in India and Pakistan have received less 
attention than those in the PRC and, in the light of conflicting studies, 
are less certain. The EIA–Advanced Resources International study 
identified five priority basins (in orange in Figure 2.3.7), including one 
in Pakistan, and identified several other basins (in yellow) that were 
either unsuitable for gas production or lacked the data required for a 
resource assessment (EIA 2011b). The gas in place is estimated to be 
7,536 MToe in basins in India, 1,653 MToe of it technically recoverable, 
and 5,346 MToe in basins in Pakistan, 1,323 MToe of it technically 
recoverable. Uncertainty points to the need to better characterize these 
resources. 
India’s coal bed methane in place has been estimated to be as high as 
4.2 GToe (Ojha et al. 2011) or even 5.2 GToe (Dart Energy 2013). The most 
promising area is the Damodar Basin (Figure 2.3.8), particularly the Jharia 
Coalfield (Ojha et al. 2011).
Shale gas resources in Indonesia may be substantial but have not been 
subject to much independent assessment. One study by the Bandung 
Technical University estimated the country’s “resource” at 26 GToe 
(Wah 2011). The Indonesian government Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources advertises 8.7 GToe of “shale gas potential” (Focus 
Reports 2012). Indonesia’s coal bed methane resources appear to be large, 
exceeding those of the PRC, but have seen little development because 
of policy restrictions and are surrounded by uncertainty. One study 
suggests that the technically recoverable resource spread throughout the 
archipelago might be 1,300 GToe, an amount equal to one-third of the 
country’s conventional gas reserves. The most promising area is South 
Sumatra, where 4,800 MToe of gas in place was estimated to exist in 
coal bed seams at depths of 300–1,000 meters. The Barito and Kutei coal 
beds of Kalimantan are estimated to contain similar quantities of gas 
(Figure 2.3.9). 
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2.3.3 Shale gas resources for 34 countries
Proved conventional 
gas reserves
Technically recoverable shale gas 
resources
Fraction of total shale 
resources of 34 countries 
studieda
Shale gas rank 
among 34 countries 
studieda
TCF Gtoe TCF Gtoe %
Europe
France 0.2 0.01 180 4.67 2.7 12
Germany 6.2 0.16 8 0.21 0.1 31
Netherlands 49 1.27 17 0.44 0.3 27
Norway 72 1.87 83 2.15 1.3 13
U.K. 9 0.23 20 0.52 0.3 23
Denmark 2.1 0.05 23 0.6 0.3 21
Sweden 41 1.06 0.6 20
Poland 5.8 0.15 187 4.85 2.8 11
Turkey 0.2 0.01 15 0.39 0.2 28
Ukraine 39 1.01 42 1.09 0.6 19
Lithuania 4 0.1 0.1 33
Others 2.71 0.07 19 0.49 0.3 24
North America
United States 272.5 7.07 862 22.37 13 2
Canada 62 1.61 388 10.07 5.9 7
Mexico 12 0.31 681 17.67 10.3 4
Asia
PRC 107 2.78 1,275 33.09 19.3 1
India 37.9 0.98 63 1.63 1 15
Pakistan 29.7 0.77 51 1.32 0.8 17
Australia 110 2.85 396 10.28 6 6
Africa
South Africa - 485 12.59 7.3 5
Libya 54.7 1.42 290 7.53 4.4 8
Tunisia 2.3 0.06 18 0.47 0.3 26
Algeria 159 4.13 231 5.99 3.5 9
Morocco 0.1 0 11 0.29 0.2 29
Western Sahara - 7 0.18 0.1 0.32
Mauritania 1 0.03 0 0 0 34
South America
Venezuela 178.9 4.64 11 0.29 0.2 30
Colombia 4 0.1 19 0.49 0.3 25
Argentina 13.4 0.35 774 20.09 11.7 3
Brazil 12.9 0.33 226 5.86 3.4 10
Chile 3.5 0.09 64 1.66 1 14
Uruguay 21 0.54 0.3 22
Paraguay 62 1.61 0.9 16
Bolivia 26.5 0.69 48 1.25 0.7 18
a Includes Western Sahara and a grouping of countries in Europe (Others: Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria).
Gtoe = giga ton of oil equivalent, TCF = trillion cubic feet.
Source: EIA 2011a.
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2.3.7 The PRC’s unconventional gas resources
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Were Indonesia to achieve a reserves-to-production ratio comparable 
to the PRC’s, it would be producing about 50 Mtoe/year of coal bed 
methane gas by 2030.
Challenges to shale gas production
The rapid expansion of shale gas production in the US prompted 
predictions that the country would become a net exporter of liquefied 
natural gas by 2016 and a net exporter of natural gas overall by 2020 
(EIA 2012c). This prediction is contentious. 
Uncertainty is even greater for Asia. The ambitious shale gas targets 
set by the Government of the PRC and the interest expressed by the 
governments of India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan in exploiting 
their shale gas resources reflect the enthusiasm of the last several years. 
Many in government and industry expect to see an Asian echo of the 
North American shale gas boom. 
But the North American shale gas revolution may not be easy to 
repeat in Asia. The Asian situation differs from that in North America 
in a number of ways that may challenge shale gas production. And the 
cost of extracting shale gas may be higher in Asia than in North America, 
compromising its ability to supplant other fuels or sources of gas.
The challenges facing Asian shale gas development include the 
following: 
•	 More challenging geological conditions. Relative to gas shales in 
North America, many in the PRC appear to be smaller, deeper, 
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2.3.8 India and Pakistan’s unconventional gas resources
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more complex, and higher in clay content, which makes fracturing 
difficult (Lelyveld 2012, Kim et al. 2012, Katakey et al. 2012).
•	 Lack of geological data. Successfully producing shale gas requires 
a good understanding of regional geology. In North America, 
good data covering large prospective areas has accumulated 
through decades of conventional drilling and seismic surveys 
(Butkiewicz 2012). Not so in Asia.
•	 Development on densely populated land. Unlike in North 
America, many prospective shale gas production areas in the 
PRC, India, and other parts of Asia are heavily populated. This 
means more involuntary resettlement and environmental impact 
in Asia. Even when the required land area is minimized by 
drilling only one wellhead, from which sprout multiple horizontal 
wells, each wellhead may require a thousand truck trips over a 
period of several weeks to transport water and equipment for the 
drilling. Pipelines for collecting the gas from wellheads and roads 
for moving heavy vehicles will require space. 
Exporting the shale gas revolution to Asia will require creative policy 
approaches that attend to these challenges.
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2.3.9 Indonesia’s unconventional gas resources
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While natural gas produces lower GHG emissions than coal when 
burned to generate electricity, it is not as clean as nuclear or most 
renewables. A concern is that leakage of methane, a powerful GHG, can 
occur during production, separation, transmission, and distribution. 
A further concern is that shale gas development risks groundwater 
contamination if not prudently undertaken, including the proper 
treatment and disposal of water and debris from boreholes. The land 
used for drilling and surface works needs to be restored after drilling, 
which could become a contentious issue with the local populations 
who see restoration as incomplete. High disclosure standards and 
effective enforcement capacity will have to be built before the large-scale 
production of shale gas can start. 
Moreover, current shale gas production technology uses copious 
amounts of water. Competition for water to meet local agricultural and 
domestic needs may place serious constraints on the rate at which shale 
gas can be developed. 
In 2012, the IEA published its golden rules for a golden age of gas, 
outlining the standards and protocols they believe will permit the 
environmentally sustainable development of unconventional gas. 
If available in sufficient quantities, natural gas from shale and 
coal bed methane could replace a certain portion of naphtha used for 
petrochemicals, thus reducing the need for oil imports and advancing 
energy supply adequacy. However, unless these supplies also contain 
sufficient quantities of readily separable natural gas liquids—heavier 
substances extracted from “wet” gas prior to transmission—totally 
displacing oil-derived petrochemicals is technically impossible.
On the whole, the aggressive development of unconventional gas 
has the potential to enhance supply adequacy, affordability, economic 
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growth, and environmental sustainability, if environmental impacts 
can be carefully managed. But the magnitude of the resource that can 
be developed is uncertain, as is the rate at which it can be produced in 
Asia. Serious issues of environmental and population disruption need to 
be tackled. While not a truly clean resource, unconventional gas could 
provide a cleaner bridge to a future less dependent on fossil fuels.
Nuclear power
The proposition that nuclear power should be expanded in Asia is fraught 
with contention. But a responsible accounting of Asia’s energy challenge 
is incomplete without a discussion of the pros and cons of initiating or 
extending a nuclear energy program, and of the challenges facing policy 
makers who must grapple with this thorny issue. Countries will reach 
their own conclusions based on their individual situations.
There are 437 reactors in commercial operation worldwide with a total 
installed capacity of 372,325 MW (IAEA 2012a). The installed capacity 
share of Asia and the Pacific is 23.6%, and actual generation share is 
18.6%. Asian countries with installed nuclear power capacity are Armenia 
with 375 MW, the PRC 12,816 MW, India 4,391 MW, Japan 44,215 MW, 
the Republic of Korea 20,754 MW, Pakistan 725 MW, and Taipei,China 
5,018 MW. 
As of the end of 2012, the construction of new nuclear capacity had 
swung heavily toward Asia, with over 57.5% of new generating capacity 
in developing Asia (Figure 2.3.10). Despite some Asian countries’ 
reevaluating their nuclear programs in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
disaster, most current construction of nuclear plants is in Asia. 
Nuclear power compares favorably with other options by measures 
of GHG gas emission and air pollution. While nuclear is not completely 
without GHG emission, it ranks with hydro and wind power as a low 
emitter (Figure 2.3.11). Nuclear power plants, like renewables, emit during 
operation virtually no air pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, sulfur 
dioxide, or particulates.
Nuclear is cost-competitive with fossil fuels and cheaper than 
present-day renewables. The major financial impediment is the 
typically very large upfront capital cost. This is often 
exacerbated by extended schedules for clearing regulatory 
and permit hurdles. Yet, when evaluated on a lifecycle basis 
that incorporates the costs of construction, interest during 
construction, fuel, operation, maintenance, waste management, 
and decommissioning, nuclear compares favorably with 
conventional power plants (Figure 2.3.12).
This evaluation sidesteps widespread public concerns 
about nuclear safety, especially in the wake of the Fukushima 
meltdown. Additional public concerns exist over the handling 
and disposal of radioactive waste and associated risks. Finally, 
the expansion of nuclear power creates worry about the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Historically, the nuclear industry saw huge growth until 
the 1970s, when interest dampened because of mounting 
safety concerns in response to two serious accidents, Three 
Mile Island in the US in 1979 and Chernobyl in what was then 
2.3.10  Distribution of nuclear power in major world regions 
(as of 31 December 2012)
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2.3.11  Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of electricity generating options
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the Soviet Union in 1986. Interest in nuclear revived with the growing 
need to expand energy supply while limiting GHG emissions. Fukushima 
recently raised fresh concerns regarding safety, prompting Japan to 
conduct a full safety review of its nuclear plants, which continues today. 
The current situation is mixed, with some countries continuing to build 
nuclear plants, while others are more hesitant, and a few are pulling 
the plug on the nuclear option altogether. Germany, for one, plans to 
decommission all its nuclear power plants by 2022.
Phasing out existing nuclear power plants and not building new plants 
would necessarily create a power generation gap to fill. Without nuclear 
energy it would be more difficult for Asia to secure adequate, reliable 
energy supplies as it would remove one of today’s commercially viable 
energy source from the energy equation. Just as importantly, removing 
nuclear power would raise environmental sustainability issues, as it is a 
relatively clean energy source (Box 2.3.2).
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s action plan on nuclear 
safety, developed in response to the Fukushima disaster, aims to further 
strengthen the safety of nuclear operations globally; improve transparency 
and accountability along the entire nuclear chain; and enhance regulatory 
effectiveness, emergency preparedness, and the management of extreme 
accidents (IAEA 2011).
A contentious issue in nuclear power is how to manage radioactive 
waste. A number of planned repository projects have been assessed for 
potential radiation leakage for periods of up to 10 million years. These 
studies have shown low risk of serious radiation exposure. The design of 
nuclear reactors is also improving in terms of fuel cycling, which reduces 
the amount of waste needing disposal, and in terms of operational safety 
upgrades that alleviate the risk of accidents. Greater transparency and 
closer scrutiny of licensing and operating procedures are additional 
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safety-enhancing measures along with closer attention paid to disposal 
and decommissioning costs.
Completing the nuclear picture is the observation that experimental 
technologies have potential to overcome the difficulties of nuclear fission 
in the distant future (Box 2.3.3).
In sum, nuclear power holds the promise of minimizing GHG 
emissions and air pollution. It is cost-effective and becomes even 
more cost-effective if construction lead times can be shortened. Small 
modular reactors present a promising new development for speeding up 
construction. Safety risks arise from the possibility of nuclear accidents, 
and nuclear materials must be carefully handled and disposed of. There 
are some concerns about nuclear proliferation. Public opinion and 
geopolitical considerations will undoubtedly be key to determining the 
future of nuclear power in Asia.
Cleaner coal
Truly significant reductions in GHG emissions could be obtained by 
technologies that remove carbon and other GHG components from the 
emissions of coal- and gas-fired power plants. Asia’s energy future would 
have far different GHG consequences if the coal used for generation were 
made more benign regarding GHGs within the forecast horizon. 
GHG-benign coal requires carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technology, which is at an early stage of development for power plants 
and thus very expensive. The CCS process has three key steps: carbon 
dioxide (CO2) must first be captured from the furnace exhaust or from 
fuel during preparation, then transported, and finally safely stored so 
it never leaks back into the atmosphere. The natural gas industry has 
used CCS for some time, routinely separating CO2 when treating natural 
gas. Norway has successfully stored CO2 separated from its natural 
gas in subsea aquifers since 1996. This technology has to be scaled up 
considerably before it becomes available for power plants. 
Several experimental projects have been announced in Australia, 
the PRC, Europe, the United Kingdom, and the US. However, progress 
has been very slow. Some Asian countries have shown interest and are 
studying the status of the technology, how CCS could be used to reduce 
2.3.12 Levelized cost of energy of generation options
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2.3.2 Greenhouse gas impact of phasing out nuclear power
Nuclear power plays a substantial role in Asia’s energy 
sector, especially in Armenia, the PRC, India, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, and Taipei,China. The 
continent had 116 nuclear power reactors in operation 
at the end of 2012 (IAEA 2012a). Furthermore, nuclear 
power is expanding at a healthy pace throughout the 
region, which has 44 of the 67 reactors now under 
construction worldwide.
But the disaster at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power 
plant in March 2011 has called into question the future 
of nuclear expansion in Asia and elsewhere. It prompted 
the authorities in Japan and elsewhere to reconsider new 
projects and to review the design and safety systems 
of all nuclear power reactors. This will likely delay 
nuclear expansion in Asia, affecting those plants already 
commissioned for construction or in the approval pipeline. 
This slowdown and a possible phasing out of nuclear 
power programs in some countries could compromise the 
adequacy of the region’s energy supply.
In response, governments need to accelerate the use 
of renewable sources, go back to fossil fuels, or both. 
However, renewable energy may not be an option in the 
short run, as it requires huge investments before it is 
ready for large-scale cost-competitive use. Issues regarding 
resource intermittency have to be resolved as well. Using 
fossil fuels to make up the shortfall would exacerbate Asia’s 
high dependence on imported oil, force up Asian energy 
bills, and heighten Asia’s exposure to supply disruptions. 
A hypothetical phasing out of nuclear power over the 
forecast period would cause a significant increase in fossil 
fuel use for power generation. If no new nuclear plants 
were built and existing plants were retired, the capacity 
lost by 2035 would be offset mostly by coal and gas. 
Renewables would make at best a modest contribution.
This phaseout is assumed to follow the pattern shown 
in the box figure.
If the nuclear phaseout were compensated using only 
one fossil fuel—coal, oil, or gas—the added emissions 
would be as shown in Box Table 1.
According to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2012, 
the actual mix of fossil fuel-based power generation was 
as follows in 2010: coal 78%, oil 4%, and gas 17.5%. 
Based on this mix, the range of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emission from the three sources are 523.7–891.5 million 
tons of coal equivalent (MTCE) in 2025, 711.2–1,210.5 
MCTE in 2035, and 9,898.8–16,849.6 MTCE in  
2010–2035. By comparison, power generation in 2010 
emitted 3,625 MTCE in the PRC and 872 MTCE in  
India (IEA 2012a). Therefore, a nuclear phaseout in Asia 
from 2010 to 2035 would increase carbon emissions by  
220%–375% more than the combined emissions of the 
PRC and India in 2010. 
It is worthwhile to look at the impact of a nuclear 
phaseout on CO2 emissions from only the energy 
sector. World CO2 emissions from power generation in 
2010 amounted to 12,495 MTCE. Asia emitted 6,084 
MTCE and thus accounted for 49% of the global total 
(Box Table 2). Based on the World Energy Outlook’s new 
policy scenario, phasing out nuclear would increase the 
world power sector’s CO2 emissions by 3.6%–6.1% in 
2025 and by 4.8%–8.1% in 2035. And it would increase 
the Asian power sector’s emissions by 8.6%–10.8% in 2025 
and 7.8%–13.3% in 2035. The region’s ability to achieve 
sustainable growth with low GHG emissions would be 
uncertain without nuclear power. 
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1  Estimates of increased carbon dioxide emissions 
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2  Carbon dioxide emissions from power generation 
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industrial CO2 emissions, and what types of geological options 
exist for sequestering CO2. The Global CCS Institute in 
Australia has provided grants to several countries to undertake 
initial geological investigations. In 2012, the Republic of Korea 
opened the Carbon Capture and Sequestration Research 
Center to develop new CCS technologies (Korea Times 2012). 
Asia can be envisioned becoming a hub of technological 
leadership in developing CCS. After all, Asia is the world’s 
biggest user of coal, and CCS technology will help address its 
main drawback. 
International cooperation between technology leaders 
and Asian utilities and research centers can allow the 
implementation of multiple experimental CCS projects, and 
international financial assistance can help lower the cost burden 
of initial projects. Early development and deployment is a global 
public good, and burden sharing will reduce the time—and 
very likely the cost—of switching to this new, cleaner coal 
technology.
Carbon taxes or a market-based carbon pricing mechanism 
can provide the incentive to accelerate the development of CCS 
technology. Because technologies to economically store CO2 released 
by the burning of coal and gas would greatly curtail GHG emissions, 
promoting research, development, and demonstration projects that 
improve both the technology and its economics would present a major 
opportunity. IEA projects the existence of 22 GW of CCS capacity 
worldwide by 2020, growing to 1,140 GW by 2050. Of this, the IEA 
projects 2.5 GW in the PRC and India by 2020, rising to 365 GW by 2050 
(IEA 2009). 
CCS technology, when available commercially, will have potential to 
eliminate nearly all CO2 emissions from power plants using fossil fuel. 
In the meantime, ongoing incremental design improvements reduce such 
emissions. Designing boilers and steam turbines to operate at higher 
temperature and pressure packs more energy into the steam, improves 
efficiency, and thus reduces the amount of coal burned. These are known 
as “supercritical” and “ultra-supercritical” boilers, “critical” referring to 
the temperature and pressure above which steam will not turn back into 
liquid water. 
Supercritical and ultra-supercritical power plants have been in 
operation for some time in Japan and the PRC. Countries in Asia that 
plan a larger share of coal in their primary energy mix or have the 
capability to use related technologies include India, Indonesia, Viet Nam, 
Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, and Malaysia. These countries can 
lower their GHG emissions by using supercritical and ultra-supercritical 
technology for all new coal-fired power plants. Capital costs would 
increase marginally, by about 2%, but coal use and thus CO2 emissions 
would decline by 10%–15%. And lower fuel cost improves the economic 
viability of such projects. 
Considering the large and growing role of coal in Asia’s energy mix, 
the need to progress toward cleaner coal technologies is clear. Unlike in 
developed economies where electricity demand has flattened out, Asia 
will require expanded power generation. Given Asia’s needs and technical 
2.3.3 Nuclear fusion in the distant future
Nuclear fusion is far from ready for 
commercialization and, barring a spectacular 
technological breakthrough, will not play a role 
in the time horizon considered here. But nuclear 
fusion could eventually redraw the entire energy 
picture. Nuclear fusion would make possible 
clean electricity production without hazardous 
radiation. Clean fusion-based electric power 
would enable the clean operation of electric 
vehicles. It would also enable the production 
of hydrogen from seawater, creating a clean 
fuel to replace natural gas in all its uses. Huge 
investments have been made in the US and 
Europe to explore the feasibility of nuclear fusion. 
The potential of this technology is colossal, but 
the technical challenges are similarly daunting. 
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capabilities, the development of clean coal technology potentially offers 
immense environmental benefits—and commensurately large commercial 
opportunities. 
Summary: improved energy supply
The foregoing analysis lays out the opportunities and challenges associated 
with a wide range of energy supply sources—most of them depending on 
new technologies—that can help Asia achieve energy security. 
Each new energy source has its merits and shortcomings. Individually, 
their contribution to improving Asia’s energy security will be limited, but 
collectively the various sources can make a big difference, especially when 
combined with better demand management. Asia must therefore strive 
on all fronts to secure ample, affordable, and clean energy supplies. More 
specifically, Asian countries must aggressively explore and invest in a 
good mix of supply sources and technologies, in line with each country’s 
specific needs and comparative advantage. Developing these future 
technologies will often require government support in the early stages 
when they are a long way from commercial viability. While each source 
has its limits, every drop—every watt—counts. 
The different endowments—different comparative advantages—across 
the region suggest scope for gains from trade, if arrangements for cross-
border energy trade can be devised. Coordination across the region 
can make the most of individual countries’ efforts to boost their energy 
security.
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Fostering regional market synergies
Aggressive action to both manage demand and promote new, clean supply 
technologies can advance the cause of Asian energy security. But these 
advantages will not be fully realized without measures to bring demand 
and supply together more efficiently. Achieving Asia’s energy security will 
thus require cooperative programs that integrate energy delivery systems 
on a regional scale. 
Such programs have precedents, notably in Europe. And regional 
cooperation and integration is on the rise in Asia, as countries respond to 
a multitude of common challenges by pursuing closer links. This is true 
especially within Asian subregions. Growing regional ties are most visible 
in trade. East and Southeast Asian countries have formed a regional 
production network that has transformed the two subregions into Factory 
Asia. This brought the share of trade between member states of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to 21% of ASEAN’s total 
trade in 1998 and to 25% by 2010. Finance and labor market integration is 
more limited but also growing. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 
governments of ASEAN+3 (adding the PRC, the Republic of Korea, and 
Japan) joined forces in the Chiang Mai Initiative, a multilateral currency 
swap arrangement with a foreign exchange reserve pool of $240 billion. 
Subregional transport connectivity is also intensifying, as evident in 
transport initiatives in the Greater Mekong Subregion and Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation.
But cross-border energy markets and infrastructure connectivity have 
so far been largely ignored in regional cooperation and integration. This 
is unfortunate in light of rapidly rising energy demand in Asia, which 
makes energy security a region-wide challenge that would benefit greatly 
from a collective regional response. The lack of regional cooperation and 
integration is all the more glaring as jointly promoting energy savings 
and energy security would not require new technology or pose the high 
cost and financial risk developing it might entail. But it does require 
the political will to cooperate and the mutual confidence that makes 
cooperation possible.
Connected electricity and gas grids can create large regional energy 
markets whose economies of scale enable improved efficiency. Closer 
energy links can deliver a lot of gains even in the short term. Demand 
management and the expansion of clean, affordable energy supply become 
more effective with regional cooperation and integration. Asian countries’ 
complementary comparative advantages in the energy sector mean that 
the construction of energy trade infrastructure such as pipelines offers 
potentially huge benefits. This is evident in cooperation already achieved. 
Hydropower resources in the uplands of Bhutan, the Lao PDR, and 
Myanmar have been developed to provide clean, inexpensive energy to 
energy markets downstream in South and Southeast Asia. A natural gas 
pipeline supplies energy to Singapore from Indonesia. These regional 
projects have benefited energy buyers and sellers alike and have helped to 
constrain dependence on fossil fuels. Central Asia still benefits from the 
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interconnected power grid it inherited from the Soviet Union in terms of 
system reliability. 
Realizing cross-border synergy is technologically and commercially 
viable. What is missing is political commitment in Asian countries to 
cooperate in energy markets and build the necessary infrastructure. 
Integrating electricity and gas delivery systems
The potential benefits from cross-border coordination of electricity and 
natural gas networks are immense. Power system failures and gas supply 
disruptions have major consequences that can be mitigated by properly 
designing collective electricity and gas delivery systems. Designing 
them from the outset to optimize delivery without undue concern about 
borders enables cost minimization and energy efficiency gains.
Interconnected electricity systems
The incentives to interconnect electric power systems are strong in terms 
of improved reliability, more effective fuel conservation, and broader 
economic benefits. Larger systems typically deliver power at lower cost 
per kilowatt-hour than do smaller ones, owing to economies of scale and 
diversified generation mix. Interconnected systems reduce capital costs by 
sharing backup generation capacity. And larger systems generally use less 
primary energy per kilowatt-hour of electricity delivered.
Similarly, interconnection advances the cause of energy efficiency. 
Larger systems can generally accommodate larger baseload-generation 
units, which typically enjoy greater fuel-conversion efficiency than do 
smaller units. The larger and more interconnected the power systems, 
the greater the energy-efficiency gains. Large interconnected systems 
make it practical to implement large hydropower projects, as is evident 
in Central Asia, where building large dams for power generation in the 
Kyrgyz Republic or Tajikistan could not be justified if only for a small 
national system. 
Cross-border connections enable high-voltage transmission lines and 
direct connections that improve energy efficiency. Less electricity is lost 
in transit when it is transmitted at higher voltage. However, high-voltage 
lines are expensive to build and therefore economic only for transmitting 
large loads over long distances—often larger and longer than an isolated 
market can accommodate. High-voltage direct current connections 
improve grid stability and, by minimizing transmission losses, energy 
efficiency (Box 2.4.1). 
Regional cooperation and integration is already under way but has 
scope for expansion. Asia is a long way from having unified region-wide 
power grid as in Europe, but there is no reason why it cannot entertain 
this ambition. In the short run, most cooperation and integration is 
taking place in Asia’s subregions and among close neighbors. 
Bhutan’s exports of hydroelectric power are an example of win–win 
regional cooperation and integration. By virtue of its upstream location 
in the Himalayas, with rivers plunging rapidly down deep gorges between 
towering mountains, Bhutan has abundant hydroelectric potential. That 
the large and fast-growing neighboring Indian economy has a robust 
appetite for energy provides plenty of scope for mutually beneficial energy 
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cooperation and integration. In fact, India started helping Bhutan develop 
its hydropower potential in the early 1960s. India financed through a mix 
of grants and loans several large hydropower projects such as at Chukha 
with 336 megawatts (MW), Tala with 1,020 MW, and Kurichu with 60 MW. 
Much of the power generated by these hydroelectric projects was 
exported to India, providing India with much-needed energy and Bhutan 
with much-needed revenues. When northern India was hit by its worst 
power outage in a decade in July 2012, the Indian government turned to 
Bhutan for assistance. Bhutan responded by releasing additional power 
from its hydroelectric stations to kick-start India’s fossil fuel-based power 
plants. Today, Bhutan meets 1% of India’s electricity needs, and it entered 
into a deal to sell India 5.48 billion kilowatt-hours in the year from 
April 2012 to March 2013. Bhutan has 30,000 megawatts of hydropower 
potential, equal to about a fifth of India’s hydropower potential.
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) is an illustrative example of 
large scope for cooperation and integration. The sheer diversity of the 
subregion’s resource base multiplies the huge potential gains achievable 
from regional energy integration. The GMS has enormous energy 
resource endowments. Realizing just half of its hydropower potential 
would generate 450 terawatt-hours, or almost double the subregion’s total 
electricity generation from all sources in 2010. In addition, the region is 
endowed with abundant coal deposits and promising gas and petroleum 
reserves. However, these energy resources are unevenly distributed across 
the subregion. Hydropower potential is abundant in the PRC’s Yunnan 
and Guangxi provinces, Myanmar, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam, which 
together control 94% of hydropower resources in the GMS. Hydropower 
potential in Myanmar and the Lao PDR is huge relative to the countries’ 
populations and expected electricity needs. Myanmar, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam have natural gas; Viet Nam has most of the subregion’s oil; and 
Yunnan has the main coal deposits. 
2.4.1  Efficient transmission in interconnecting power grids
Most electricity worldwide is transmitted as alternating 
current (AC), the form of power produced by all electric 
generators and needed by end users for lighting, appliances, 
industrial processes, and other uses. The catch is that AC 
suffers high technical losses in transmission, making it a 
poor choice for maximizing energy efficiency. High-voltage 
direct current (HVDC) transmission loses less power in 
transit and has other technical advantages. The downside is 
that it has high capital costs because of the need to convert 
the original AC power into DC power for transmission 
and then back again to AC for distribution to customers. 
The high price tag on converters—called “rectifiers” for 
converting AC to DC and “inverters” for converting DC 
back to AC—can be justified economically only if the 
potential technical loses incurred transmitting large AC 
loads over long distances are high enough to cover the 
investment. That requires a big grid.
Other technical considerations can tilt the field in 
favor of HVDC transmission. In addition to lower 
transmission losses, HVDC transmission significantly 
improves the stability to the grid because energy 
flow over an HVDC interconnection can be precisely 
regulated. Further, the two AC systems at either end of an 
HVDC interconnection need not be synchronized with 
matching alternating frequency. This flexibility allows 
interconnection between countries using 60 alternating 
cycles per second (measured in hertz)—as in the Republic 
of Korea, the Philippines, Taipei,China, and parts of 
Japan—to neighbors using 50 hertz, as in the rest of Asia. 
Flexibility is further valuable in light of utility operators’ 
need to match supply to ever-changing and sometimes 
unpredictable demand.
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Cambodia, Thailand, and the PRC are net energy importers, while 
the Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam are net exporters. In the GMS, 
regional cooperation and integration in energy have seen the most 
concrete progress in expanded hydropower trade among member 
economies. Thailand purchases hydropower that the Lao PDR generates 
at its Nam Theun 2, Nam Leuk, Nam Ngnum 2, and Theun Hinboun 1 
and 2 power plants. The Lao PDR has more plants under construction or 
in the pipeline. 
However, the growth of trade has been constrained by the failure 
to allow third party access to the transmission lines. One option is 
to develop a publicly owned high-voltage backbone line that various 
independent power producers could use to transfer power in exchange for 
paying so-called wheeling fees to the transmission owner. An example 
would be to construct a 500 kilovolt line in the Lao PDR connected with 
Thailand and Viet Nam toward optimizing the power systems of the 
three countries. To illustrate the advantages with an example outside the 
GMS, the 275 kilovolt transmission line on Borneo enables the export of 
230 MW of hydropower generated in the Malaysian state of Sarawak to 
the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan, where generation largely 
uses far more expensive and polluting oil. The arrangement improves 
the environment in West Kalimantan and mitigates greenhouse gas 
emissions. Cheaper electricity supply reduces central government power 
subsidies to West Kalimantan by $100 million/year. 
If GMS members similarly invested in regional energy infrastructure 
and institutionalized and systematized subregional cooperation and 
integration, they would be able to reap even greater benefits from their 
energy synergies and interdependence. A recent GMS study toward 
drawing up an energy master plan estimated that integrating power 
transmission in the subregion would save $14 billion over 20 years by 
substituting hydropower for power generation using fossil fuels. Further, 
it would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 14 million tons per year by 
2020 (ADB 2012a).
Interconnected gas systems
Similar economies and efficiencies are realizable by connecting natural 
gas systems. Where gas endowments exceed domestic energy demand, 
interconnected energy markets would allow idle natural resources to be 
used like any other exportable commodity to create a revenue stream to 
help meet developmental needs. Cross-border gas pipelines also offer the 
opportunity to create gas distribution networks that economically serve 
the needs of communities along the route—communities that might 
otherwise not be served. As seen in the section on demand management, 
cooktops and furnaces can run on gas to avoid losing energy in electricity 
generation. Large pipeline networks operating at high pressure also 
provide storage capacity to help maintain a reliable supply during small 
technical interruptions. 
One prominent example of mutual benefit through regional 
interconnection is the gas pipeline running from Turkmenistan to the 
PRC, which was completed in December 2009. For the PRC, imports 
of Turkmen gas have augmented supply by an amount equal to half 
of domestic production, boosting the share of gas in PRC energy 
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consumption by 2 percentage points. This has replaced domestic coal 
and its higher emissions of greenhouse gases and pollutants, so the 
environmental benefits are sizable. For Turkmenistan, the pipeline has 
diversified its export market away from overly heavy dependence on the 
Russian Federation. More broadly, the pipeline will help to quench the 
PRC’s fast-growing thirst for energy while giving gas-rich Turkmenistan 
access to a large and growing energy market. 
Another example is the pipeline supplying gas from South Sumatra 
in Indonesia to Singapore for power generation. Singapore’s economy 
relies on services and high-tech industry, both of which place very high 
value on the reliability of power supply. Its diversification of suppliers to 
include Indonesia improved the city state’s supply security, and Indonesia 
acquired an assured revenue stream to use for development. Interestingly, 
before this arrangement the gas was used only to enhance oil recovery 
in the Indonesian state of Aceh, which imposed a higher transportation 
cost for a use with lower economic value. Gaining access to the Singapore 
energy market thus allowed Indonesia to boost the value of its natural 
endowment. Myanmar is similarly reaping benefit from a gas line 
connection to Yunnan Province in the PRC.
‘Smart grids’ to integrate renewables
As renewable energy sources grow, so-called “smart grids” that 
integrate renewables into the electricity network will play a bigger role 
in regional cooperation and integration. The fundamental reason is 
that renewable energy endowments are often remote from demand 
centers with lots of people and economic activity. Meanwhile, there is 
no reason to expect readily paired supply and demand centers to be in 
the same country. Wind power from thinly populated Mongolia can 
provide electricity to the PRC. Similarly, hydropower from Myanmar 
can provide electricity to the Bangkok metropolitan area of Thailand. 
Cost-effectively linking areas that offer ample renewable supply potential 
with populous, economically active markets through smart grids can 
catalyze the development of renewable energy in Asia. Without smart 
grids, renewable potential in thinly populated areas of Asia would be 
unexploited and wasted. 
As an energy system comes to depend more on renewables, it needs 
to become more intelligent. Solar and wind are intermittent resources 
that cannot be relied on to deliver power on demand. Solar is available 
only by day, and then unpredictably, depending on cloud cover. Wind 
is highly variable and likewise unpredictable. Wind barely correlates 
with times of high system demand, and solar correlates only somewhat 
better, so integrating these unpredictable renewables into the power grid 
poses significant technical challenges. Large intelligent systems can take 
advantage of time-of-day demand differences across time zones and 
swing power across large areas as solar systems’ output rises and falls. 
Attendant to this problem is the need to incorporate distributed 
generating systems, which generate electricity not in centralized power 
plants but from small local sources such as solar panels on buildings, 
small on-site generators and co-generators, and local biomass- and waste-
based power systems. Sometimes local sources are joined together in 
micro grids that operate locally for the most part but with a connection 
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to the main grid. Integration challenges the central grid operator to 
maintain appropriate voltage and phase synchronization—and, ultimately, 
system stability. 
Intelligent systems that can adjust to accommodate decentralized 
generation and renewable generation can optimize the system toward 
maximizing generation from renewables, minimizing costs, and 
improving the reliability of service. This requires that smart grids in 
different countries be able to communicate with one another toward 
operating together seamlessly. System optimization in the service of Asian 
energy consumers depends on strong regional cooperation. 
A promising cross-border smart grid application would be to install 
very large wind farms in Mongolia and connect them to transmission 
networks in the PRC or even the Republic of Korea and Japan. Mongolia 
has enough wind resources for 1 terawatt of installed capacity collected 
by about 200,000 wind turbines, each with 5 MW of capacity. Tapping 
these excellent year-round resources on such a scale would push the 
price of wind energy down. Domestic demand would not justify the 
investment, but regional interconnection would transform its economic 
viability. Such a large renewable energy system would require smart 
grid technology to optimize resource use while ensuring grid reliability. 
A similarly tricky job for a smart grid is to manage a cascade of 
hydropower dams along a single river in the mountains to supply 
electricity to neighboring countries. 
The widespread use of electric-powered transport will introduce 
challenges along with opportunities. Smart interconnected power grids 
that tie together electric vehicles in interconnected markets can charge 
the vehicles when surplus renewable energy is available, store electricity 
in the vehicles’ batteries, and, during high grid demand, draw power back 
from any idle vehicles that are plugged into the grid. 
Obstacles to regional cooperation 
and integration 
Interconnecting energy systems across international frontiers requires 
that participating states adopt compatible technical standards and 
regulatory regimes. The unified European electricity and gas markets 
illustrate how standardization can progress. Cooperation in Europe 
started in late 1980s with the liberalization of the British electricity 
industry, which broke up the state-owned electricity monopoly and 
replaced it with a competitive electricity market that allowed neighboring 
France to sell its surplus production of low-cost electricity in the 
United Kingdom. Several other Western European countries pursued 
similar liberalization toward diminishing the role of the state in utility 
service delivery. A green paper and European directive issued by the 
European Parliament in 1996 regarding electricity, and others for 
gas in 1998, set common rules for domestic electricity markets as the 
foundation for an energy market spanning the European Union (EU). 
The Lisbon Strategy, 2000 combined the electricity and gas markets and 
recognized that being competitive in energy was essential for promoting 
European competitiveness and knowledge-based leadership globally. A 
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mandate later in 2003 provided third-party access to all existing energy 
infrastructure, and another in 2009 integrated the EU’s energy and 
environmental objectives.
Already well interconnected, the EU recognized the value of 
interconnecting its electricity and gas networks more completely. 
The European Commission stated in 2006 that efficient energy 
infrastructure was essential to allow the EU to achieve its targets for 
sustainable development, competitiveness, and secure energy supplies. 
The commission added that “improved efficiency required considerable 
investment in upgrading gas and electricity networks and in developing 
their interconnections” (European Commission 2007). It pointed 
out in particular that interconnected networks prevented the risk of 
short supply by diversifying sources and facilitating the introduction 
of a “green network” carrying electricity generated from renewable 
sources. This prompted the promulgation of a system-wide priority 
interconnection plan. As the EU already had well-established regulatory 
frameworks and contractual and pricing standards, the EU directive is 
strong indication that more could be done to make the most of its energy 
infrastructure. 
How much more so will Asia be challenged by energy market 
integration? Yet, from purely technical and commercial perspectives, 
Asian countries have every reason to pursue wider and deeper regional 
cooperation and integration in the energy sector. Unlike new technologies 
developed in pursuit of uncertain, long-term payoffs, fostering closer 
energy ties promises concrete payoffs even in the short run. 
Technical challenges to integration
Interconnecting electricity and gas grids requires standardized 
regulations, pricing practices, and contracts. Especially for electricity, 
technical standards need to be uniform, or at least compatible, for 
systems to work (though, as noted in Box 2.4.1, local grids using different 
frequencies of alternating current can draw supply from a common grid 
that transmits using high-voltage direct current). 
Similarly, the smooth operation of a unified regional oil market 
requires standardized oil product specifications to ensure that 
suppliers compete on a level playing field. Common environmental 
standards eliminate distortions in production costs. In the longer 
term, the expansion of fleets of vehicles powered by electricity and 
compressed natural gas will require that filling and recharging stations 
be standardized so that cross-border transportation systems function 
smoothly. 
Countries with established or planned nuclear energy programs stand 
to benefit from common standards for nuclear licensing, operation, and 
supervision. This would make the best use of available human resource 
capacity, shorten any delays, and contain costs. Because radioactive 
contamination respects no borders, coordination can buttress public 
confidence. 
As the European experience of integrating power systems illustrates, 
the technical barriers to integration are readily surmountable. The larger 
challenge inhibiting energy integration in Asia is summoning the political 
will to coordinate policy.
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Policy challenges to integration
Asian leaders, like others around the world, tend to view energy security 
as a vital component of national security, which makes them reluctant to 
relinquish control. Further, Asian governments intervene heavily in their 
energy markets, notably with consumer subsidies, which reinforces the 
reflex to retain full control. Because energy is a basic necessity of human 
life, it is to some extent a public good, which is why Asian governments 
subsidize prices for basic fuels. Any trade in energy, let alone free trade, 
challenges such extensive government involvement. 
Bundled up with issues of national security is a strong element of 
international competition for energy that is often intense because energy 
resources are limited. Countries are willing to pay a premium to secure 
access that is reliable, long term, and exclusive. International competition 
can poison the well of regional cooperation, as when the operation of a 
cross-border oil or natural gas pipeline is complicated by disputes over 
transit fees. Narrow national self-interest often stands in the way of 
advancing region-wide public goods in the energy sector.
Within individual countries, powerful vested interests in the energy 
sector may stand in the way of regional cooperation and integration. To 
enjoy economies of scale, many Asian countries operate electric utilities 
as either state-owned monopolies or private monopolies heavily regulated 
by the government. Either way, utility firms and other sector players exert 
a great deal of political influence and are likely to view regional initiatives 
as potential threats to their accustomed dominant positions in their home 
markets. They may resist harmonized standards, regulations, and pricing 
for reasons of narrow institutional interest without regard for the broader 
national interest that regional efforts promote.
The integration of subregions is likely the first step along the 
path leading ultimately to a pan-Asian energy market. Even in the 
highly integrated EU energy market, competition is healthiest at the 
subregional level.
And, certainly, the integration of subregional energy markets in 
Asia has not lacked international support and expertise. All major 
development partners that work in the region see immense benefit from 
regional energy trade and have provided grants and expertise to advance 
the agenda. One recurrent obstacle is failure to liberalize energy markets 
sufficiently for energy to be competitively priced and for new investments 
to respond to market signals. Asian countries need to understand the EU 
experience better and become convinced that regional energy markets 
serve their strategic interests, not least because energy security is difficult 
for most individual countries to secure for themselves. 
Regional leaders meet often to discuss regional trade, but these 
discussions have yet to include energy. Even though individual countries 
struggle to meet their energy demand, confidence in partnership with 
neighboring countries remains low, and transparency in the energy sector 
has not been possible because governments see it as compromising their 
national strategic interest. A broader view shows regional energy trade 
strengthening Asian countries’ energy security.
A good point of departure would be to establish a ministerial-level 
pan-Asian task force on energy cooperation and integration. Moving 
regional integration forward requires authoritative political commitment. 
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A brighter Asian energy future: every watt counts
The foregoing analysis makes clear that developing Asia must urgently 
take aggressive policy action to turn away from the path leading to a 
decidedly stark energy future and toward a future in which Asians enjoy 
secure access to adequate supplies of clean energy that is affordable to 
all. To realize the vision of the Clean Asian Century, with its promise 
of robust economic growth and substantially rising incomes, Asia must 
adopt a broad program of policy prescriptions on several fronts. 
A unified Asian energy market
Asia must aspire to create a pan-Asian energy market by 2030. When 
it comes to regionally integrated electricity and gas markets, thinking 
big maximizes benefits. Asia must aspire to the degree of regional 
cooperation and integration in energy that currently prevails in 
Europe. The first step is to set up a ministerial task force to study the 
European experience and promote the political will to share more openly 
information on national power sectors, toward better harmonizing 
regulations, standards, and pricing policies. 
This will require that Asian countries make a concerted effort 
to repeat, with regional energy cooperation, the success they have 
achieved with regional cooperation in other areas. While Asia’s regional 
cooperation and integration is moving ahead rapidly in trade and other 
areas, progress on regional energy markets and infrastructure lags far 
behind despite large potential synergies. 
Even where the scope for, and gains from, closer energy links are 
clear, such as in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)—linkages remain 
limited at best. The GMS is well endowed with energy resources. Its 
hydropower potential amounts to 900 terawatt-hours, or four times 
the subregion’s total electricity generation in 2010. Integrating power 
transmission in the GMS would save $14 billion over 20 years by 
substituting hydropower for electricity generated using fossil fuels. 
To achieve a pan-Asian energy market, Asian countries need to muster 
the political will to look beyond narrow self-interest and clear the political 
hurdles that stand in the way of energy integration that is technically 
feasible and commercially viable. Overcoming technical obstacles, 
such as differences in standards, regulations, and energy pricing, requires 
participating countries to build goodwill in their political relations. 
Goodwill lends countries the confidence to be open and equitable about 
sharing benefits. It enables neighbors to share information and allay one 
another’s concerns about the reliability of supply.
Short of comprehensive energy cooperation, there is plenty that 
individual national governments can do in the meantime to curb 
demand, expand the supply of clean energy, ensure affordable access for 
the poor, and develop capacity for future innovation.
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Containing burgeoning energy demand
Asia must immediately take concrete steps to curb demand. Replacing 
inefficient general fuel subsidies with targeted subsidies can be a 
politically acceptable approach to eliminating broad inefficiencies without 
leaving the poor out in the cold. Second-generation greenhouse gas 
emission taxes recycle tax proceeds to help reduce the cost of cleaner 
inputs, thereby limiting their adverse impact on economic activity while 
mitigating global warming. Planning for “green cities” is crucial for an 
increasingly urban Asia. Reducing demand not only reduces the risk of 
supply bottlenecks but also promotes a cleaner environment.
A good place to start with energy is getting the price right. Countries 
in developing Asia must eliminate or rationalize distortionary subsidies 
as rapidly as practical to reduce energy overuse and waste. Subsidies 
impose a tremendous burden on public budgets, exceeding 2% of GDP in 
India, Indonesia, and Viet Nam and 4% in Bangladesh and Pakistan. If 
countries around the world eliminated wasteful subsidies, global carbon 
dioxide emissions would be an estimated 2.6 billion tons lower in 2035. 
To cushion the impact on the poor, governments should replace general 
subsidies with programs targeting the poor. 
Failure to factor in environmental impact artificially discounts 
energy use below its true cost and thus encourages consumption. 
However, environmental taxes increase the cost of production and 
constrain economic activity. One policy solution is to combine domestic 
carbon taxes with revenue recycling, by which the government uses 
tax proceeds to reduce the cost of other productive inputs. This would 
mitigate the impact of carbon taxes on total production costs and thus 
on economic activity. 
Asian governments must take the lead in changing the public’s 
attitude toward energy use. The value of behavioral change is underscored 
by Japan’s success in curbing demand since the oil shocks of the 1970s 
and again following the Fukushima disaster. Japan’s energy intensity has 
improved by 25% since 1980, such that the country leads the world in 
the value of output per unit of energy. More recently, in the wake of the 
Fukushima accident and the resulting temporary shutdown of nuclear 
power plants, the grassroots Setsuden (“save electricity”) campaign 
dramatically deployed energy conservation to stave off power outages. 
Further, behavioral change can limit rebound effects that occur when 
improved energy efficiency perversely increases consumption.
Green, smart urbanization and new transportation technologies are 
great ways to improve energy efficiency. Many Asian cities have already 
begun to move forward toward more intelligent urbanization. A large 
waste collection and disposal system of Incheon, Republic of Korea, 
generates electricity from waste. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, is deploying 
a combined heat-and-power plant that allows homes and commercial 
buildings to be cooled and heated using waste heat from power generation.
Massive rural–urban migration in developing Asia gives the region 
opportunities to design new urban areas for extremely efficient energy 
use. Asia is well placed to become the global leader in such design, as 
most advanced countries now have more static populations. Satellite cities 
built from scratch allow planners to design electricity and gas delivery 
systems with minimal overlap and maximal orientation toward energy 
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savings. Similar opportunities exist, albeit on a more modest scale, as 
electricity and gas utilities connect rural areas previously devoid of 
modern power infrastructure. Applying gas directly to end uses such as 
cooking, for example, avoids loses incurred when gas is used to generate 
electricity. Programs to replace diesel city buses with buses that run 
on cleaner natural gas are already demonstrating their worth through 
improved urban air quality.
Notwithstanding considerable progress, plenty of scope remains 
for developing the technological bases for green, smart urbanization. 
Additional programs are needed to research, develop, and demonstrate 
clean and cost-competitive electric- and gas-powered cars and other 
energy-saving technologies applicable to urban settings.
Tapping cleaner energy supply
Asia should strive to diversify and optimize its energy mix in the medium 
and long term. In particular, it should rein in its disturbingly heavy 
dependence on imported oil. The share of Asia’s imports supplied from 
the Middle East rose from 33% in 1990 to 48% in 2010. Such deepening 
dependence on a single region, combined with the lack of close substitutes 
for oil in transportation and industrial uses, undermines the reliability 
and adequacy of Asia’s energy supply. 
Securing adequate and reliable supplies of clean, affordable energy 
is challenging but achievable. As energy sources vary across the region, 
each country’s options to augment its energy supplies depend on its 
endowments and needs. Potential energy sources have their own merits 
and shortcomings, but every drop—every watt—counts! Developing 
future technologies requires government support in the beginning. 
Effort is required on all fronts, from each country according to its 
comparative advantages. 
Because of their strong environmental and energy security 
advantages, renewable energy sources merit close examination from 
the start. Asia is fortunate to have rich renewable energy potential. The 
region has substantial endowments of hydro, solar, and wind power. 
Already, 542 gigawatts (GW) of hydropower capacity are installed or 
under construction, with potential to quadruple it to 2,204 GW. Wind 
and solar have made remarkable strides. In less than a decade, generating 
capacity rose from negligible to 82 GW for wind and to 20 GW for solar, 
and great potential exists to further expand both. Asian countries are 
among the world leaders in the manufacture of renewable energy plants. 
However, while wind and solar power are becoming cheaper, and are 
expected to reach grid parity in some countries in a few years, they 
currently require favorable policy and financial incentives like feed-in 
tariffs and tax credits. Hydropower, on the other hand, is highly cost-
competitive, especially when constructed on a large scale, but projects 
pose environmental and social challenges commensurate with their size. 
Biofuels hold promise to replace substantial quantities of gasoline and 
diesel in transportation, reducing net GHG emissions with fuels that 
are secure because they are homegrown. However, like wind and solar, 
biofuels have a way to go before they become cost-competitive with the 
fossil fuels they are being developed to replace.
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Asia’s energy future needs renewable sources, but renewables are 
not enough. For this reason, Asia must make good use of its substantial 
nonrenewable resources, favoring cleaner options and refinements. 
The energy mix will evolve slowly as older investments in plant and 
equipment are retired, but Asia’s environmental needs urgently require 
that nonrenewable energy sources be made cleaner and safer. 
Asia needs to take stock of its substantial reserves of shale gas, 
which have potential to offset coal use. Asia’s geology is incompletely 
investigated, but indications are that the PRC has as much as 20% of 
global reserves of shale gas, ranking it first in the world. Technically 
recoverable reserves in India are estimated at a more modest 1% of global 
reserves but still equivalent to 1.6 billion tons of oil. As shale gas recovery 
uses emergent technology, the environmental impacts of drilling and 
production need to be evaluated for potential risks. 
Asia should also look at emerging technologies that make carbon-
based fuels cleaner to use. In light of Asia’s relative abundance of coal, 
these technologies hold a lot of promise for the region. Carbon capture 
and storage has potential to lower carbon dioxide emissions, and Asia is 
already investing heavily in this technology. 
And then there is nuclear energy. While the Fukushima incident 
underscored the need to strengthen reactor safety, nuclear appears to 
have a permanent place in Asia’s energy mix. Phasing nuclear power out 
would require Asia to increase its use of fossil fuels, at least in the short 
to medium term. Powering Asia’s more prosperous future without nuclear 
energy in the mix would increase the region’s carbon dioxide emissions 
by 8%–13% annually in 2035. 
Ensuring affordable access
True energy security is not possible without addressing the energy needs 
of the poor and residents of low-income countries. Concrete steps to 
support Energy for All include establishing income policies to secure an 
adequate energy floor for the poor, selecting appropriate technologies for 
distributed and off-grid power generation, and promoting community 
participation. Narrowing differences between countries is critical. 
Low-income countries need international aid to help them build equitable 
energy infrastructure that protects the poor. Extending affordable access 
to the entire population and narrowing the wide gaps between Asian 
countries will promote inclusive growth across Asia. 
A high priority should be expanding the delivery of affordable energy 
to the poor. Despite Asia’s rising affluence, in 2012 almost 700 million 
Asians, or 18% of all Asians, still lacked access to basic energy services 
such as electricity or modern fuels. Further, some 2.8 billion Asians, 
or about 74% of the total, still relied for some uses such as cooking 
on traditional fuels that are dirty and unreliable. Most of the world’s 
energy poor live in Asia. Energy is both a basic human need and a tool 
that empowers the poor to be more productive and make their own 
contribution to inclusive growth. Developing Asia must strive to achieve 
universal access to affordable energy as soon as possible. 
This necessarily entails special programs that support the energy 
consumption of the poor. Unlike general energy subsidies, which 
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disproportionately benefit the non-poor, means-tested assistance 
that targets the poor extends energy access without jeopardizing 
fiscal sustainability. Support needs to be carefully designed to avoid 
encouraging wasteful energy use. It may offer low-tariff lifelines only to 
households that use very little electricity or cover only to the first small 
tranche of consumption. Careful design will ensure better targeting.
Also important is exploring how to adapt new technologies to the 
energy needs of the poor. To reach the isolated rural poor beyond the 
reach of the grid, electricity can be generated on micro scales using 
locally available renewable sources such as hydro, solar, biomass, and 
wind. Gas captured from livestock manure can provide clean cooking 
fuel. Low-income countries need to innovatively adapt imported 
technology to suit local conditions and meet local needs. They will find 
some imported technologies more appropriate than others. 
Just as it behooves comfortable citizens to bridge the energy divide 
by helping the poor among them gain access to affordable energy, 
richer Asian countries must help their poorer neighbors. Wide gaps in 
energy access within a country jeopardize inclusive growth, and wide 
gaps between Asian countries at different stages of development do the 
same. Assistance to energy-poor countries should transfer funding and 
technology. Globally, advanced countries share responsibility for helping 
developing countries, including those in Asia, as all stand to benefit from 
reduced GHG emissions wherever they occur. Asian countries rich and 
poor have equal incentive to contribute energetically to global efforts to 
mitigate climate change. After all, climate change affects everyone.
Building capacity for future innovation
Asia must broaden and deepen its intellectual capital to better support its 
physical investments in energy. A modern energy sector will come about 
only if the knowledge base is there to support it. As the biggest energy 
user, Asia must acknowledge its role as the lynchpin of climate change 
mitigation and strive to marshal research and development capacity equal 
to the task. Technology transfer from developed countries can accelerate 
the deployment of new technologies, but the region must aggressively 
invest more on researching and developing new energy technologies. 
At the same time, Asia needs to engender an institutional and policy 
environment conducive to creating and adopting new technologies. A 
policy priority for the whole region is to invest more in educating and 
training energy specialists, scientists, and engineers. Asian countries 
should allocate more funds to education, especially at the tertiary level, to 
develop the human capital required to meet the energy challenge. 
Individually, each new energy technology makes only a limited 
contribution to Asia’s energy security. Collectively, though, they have 
the potential to make a big positive difference. Linking the contributions 
together intelligently and coherently—through, for example, smart grids 
that accept energy from distributed generation using renewables—is the 
top priority. Each technology may offer only a drop in the bucket, but 
together they flow as a river to power the Clean Asian Century. 
Every drop and every watt count! 
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This chapter was written by Grigor Gyurjyan of the Armenia Resident Mission, ADB, 
Yerevan.
Armenia
The economy grew strongly in 2012. Prudent fiscal and monetary policies helped control inflation, narrow 
deficits in the budget and current account, and keep the ratio of external public debt to GDP manageable. 
Growth will likely continue over the medium term if the government implements plans to accelerate 
structural reform and mobilize revenues essential for prudent social and development expenditures.
Economic performance
Government estimates showed economic growth accelerating to 7.2% 
in 2012 from 4.7% in 2011, with all supply-side sectors of the economy 
expanding (Figure 3.1.1). 
Industry (excluding construction) grew by 5.7%, reflecting favorable 
conditions in foreign markets and the government’s efforts to stimulate 
exports. Growth in industry came mainly from mining, beverages, and 
building materials. Good weather and government programs offering 
farmers free seed and subsidized fuel, fertilizer, and credit helped 
agriculture expand by 9.3%. The construction sector, still reeling from 
the 2009 recession, inched up by a mere 0.5%, mainly reflecting renewed 
construction in the energy and transport sectors. Services, accounting for 
45% of GDP, gained further steam and expanded by 8.4%, with the fastest 
growth rates in finance, insurance, entertainment, and recreation. 
On the demand side, growth was driven mostly by higher private 
consumption, while total investment and net exports reduced growth. 
The negative effect of net exports eased somewhat, as exports grew 
more quickly than imports because of the relatively favorable external 
environment. Private consumption rose by an estimated 10.1%, fuelled by 
remittances, continued rapid growth in lending, and moderate growth 
in domestic earnings. Public consumption was flat in line with the 
government’s conservative fiscal stance. Gross fixed capital formation 
contracted by 4.2% because of sluggish public and private investment.
Average annual inflation plunged by two-thirds, to 2.6% from 7.7% 
in 2011, mainly because of smaller price rises for food and services 
(Figure 3.1.2). Aided by higher food production, favorable global prices, 
and continued tight monetary conditions, the 12-month inflation rate 
(comparing December to December) declined to 3.6% in 2012 from 4.7% 
in 2011, within the central bank’s target band of 2.5%–5.5%. 
Fiscal policy was generally tight, aimed at gradually shrinking the 
deficit without derailing economic growth. As expenditures rose less 
than planned, the budget deficit narrowed to 1.5% in 2012, less than the 
programmed 2.6% (Figure 3.1.3). 
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Fiscal consolidation combined with economic growth and some 
improvements in tax collection lifted total government revenue by 6.6% 
in 2012. Expenditures grew by 1.5% in absolute terms—mostly to cover 
higher public spending on the social safety net, education, and health, 
which together claim nearly half of government expenditure—but edged 
down as a percentage of GDP. Meanwhile, undefined “other expenditures” 
and outlays for nonfinancial assets declined. 
Despite rapid growth, careful debt management, and the government’s 
conservative policy on external borrowing, public debt as a share of GDP 
expanded from 40.7% in 2011 to 44.1% at the end of 2012, still below the 
50% ceiling that would trigger a deficit limit of 3% according to the Public 
Debt Law (Figure 3.1.4). In nominal terms, public external debt increased 
by $170 million to $3.7 billion, or 37.7% of GDP. Domestic public debt 
climbed by $70 million to $630 million, or 6.4% of GDP. Although total 
public debt is considerable, debt service remains manageable because 
most debt is on concessional terms. 
Having peaked in 2009, the current account again declined to an 
estimated 10.4% of GDP in 2012 from 10.9% in 2011 (Figure 3.1.5). 
Exports surged by an estimated 7.0% to $1.7 billion, benefitting from 
generally benign global commodity prices, which boosted export values 
for the mining sector, and the strong performance of the food-processing 
industry. Imports climbed by 1.7% to $3.7 billion, boosted by domestic 
demand that was powered by higher remittances. Despite robust export 
growth, imports still dwarfed exports. The large trade imbalance was 
covered by growing remittances and official grants and loans. Net 
inflows of foreign direct investment, concentrated in mining and 
telecommunications, remained subdued at an estimated $420 million, 
down 6% from 2011. Remittance inflows from workers abroad, mainly 
in the Russian Federation, rose by 8.8% to $1.4 billion, returning to their 
2008 peak (Figure 3.1.6).
Despite higher domestic demand, the refinancing rate has been 
kept at 8.0% since September 2011. Pushed by increased lending and a 
continued buildup in net domestic assets, the money supply (M2) rose 
by 19.5% in 2012. The central bank’s efforts to dampen exchange rate 
volatility lowered foreign exchange reserves, despite strong remittances, 
by $108 million to $1.8 billion at the end of December 2012 (Figure 3.1.7).
Over the year, the dram depreciated by 4.4% in nominal effective 
terms and by 6.7% in real effective terms. While exports benefited 
from depreciation, they remained constrained by weak productivity 
and competitiveness and persistently high concentration in mining 
and metals.
Economic outlook
With the outcome of the February 2013 presidential elections signaling 
the maintenance of current policies, continued but more moderate growth 
is expected in 2013 and 2014. Assuming continued structural reform and 
no further worsening of global economic conditions, GDP growth is 
projected at 4.5% in 2013 and 4.6% in 2014 (Figure 3.1.8). Growth could be 
slower if external risks, including a further slowdown of growth in the 
Russian Federation and possible recession in the euro area, materialize. 
3.1.3 Fiscal balance
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Agriculture is expected to continue growing as productivity improves 
and the area under irrigation expands. Industrial expansion, led by mining 
and food processing, will further buttress growth. Services should also 
expand as higher remittances drive consumption. Lagging construction 
growth will be supported by the building of the North–South Road 
Corridor and other large infrastructure projects. Continued structural 
and public sector reform aiming to improve the business environment and 
private sector development could further strengthen the economic outlook 
and promote growth.
In the short run, service payments on the external debt of the 
government and central bank are expected to peak in 2013 at $423 million, 
including both principal and interest. This sum will pose a major drain 
on financial resources, equal to 15% of the value of exported goods and 
services, and could put pressure on the overall balance of payments. 
The government’s share of this debt service is $225 million, which will 
equal 10% of government revenues in 2013, though this burden is projected 
to ease thereafter. 
In the long run, the introduction of a mandatory funded pension 
system in January 2014 is expected to create a pool of long-term assets 
to help finance investment, which should foster growth and promote job 
creation. With continued tight monetary conditions and an assumed 
gradual upswing in agriculture, average annual inflation is projected at 
3.6% in 2013 and 3.2% in 2014. During these 2 years, the 12-month inflation 
rate (December to December) is expected to remain within the central 
bank’s target band of 2.5%–5.5%. Smaller price rises for food will reduce the 
impact of the higher price for imported natural gas planned in 2013.
The government is likely to maintain its policy of gradual fiscal 
consolidation, to allay concerns about the buildup of public and 
external debt. The fiscal deficit is projected to narrow further 
without constraining economic recovery. The 2013 budget aims for 
an overall deficit equal to 2.6% of GDP, as was programmed for 2012. 
The government’s medium-term fiscal objective is to narrow this deficit 
to 2.3% of GDP in 2014 and 2.0% in 2015. Spending will continue to 
focus on strengthening social infrastructure and the social safety net. 
Sustained tax and customs reform and efforts to enhance economic 
competitiveness are expected to raise the tax-to-GDP ratio over time. 
Monetary policy is expected to return gradually to a neutral stance 
over the medium term, to sustain growth while ensuring price stability. 
However, the financial sector remains highly dollarized in terms of both 
assets and liabilities, leaving the country vulnerable to exchange rate 
shocks and making monetary policy less effective. The authorities have 
discouraged further dollarization by imposing higher risk weights and 
provisions on foreign currency assets and higher reserve requirements on 
foreign currency deposits. 
The trade deficit is expected to narrow moderately. Assuming no 
downward pressure on commodity prices, export growth should continue. 
The government’s strategy to diversify exports, approved in 2011, is 
to develop 11 industrial subsectors selected for their export potential. 
This strategy is expected to help expand exports by 8.5% in 2013 and 9.0% 
in 2014, but lower world demand or prices for key commodity exports 
such as copper and other metals would constrain export growth. 
3.1.7 Effective exchange rates and reserves
0
60
120
180
0
1
2
3
Gross international reserves
Real 
Nominal
DecJulJan
2012
JulJan
2011
JulJan
2010
JulJan
2009
JulJan
2008
2005 = 100 $ billion
Source: Central Bank of Armenia. http://www.cba.am 
(accessed 12 March 2013).
3.1.8 GDP growth
–16
–8
0
8
16
2014201320122011201020092008
%
Forecast
5-year moving average
Sources: National Statistical Service of the Republic of 
Armenia. http://www.armstat.am (accessed 12 March 2013); 
ADB estimates.
3.1.6 Sources of remittance inflows
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3.1.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
GDP growth  4.5  4.6
Inflation  3.6  3.2
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
–9.8 –9.1
Source: ADB estimates. 
Recent trends in domestic demand and investment—and large 
infrastructure projects that are seen as boosting domestic demand for 
imports—suggest that imports will grow by 6.5% in 2013 and 5.0% in 2014, 
which is somewhat less than projected export growth.
Backed by robust remittance inflows, the current account deficit is 
projected to narrow to 9.8% of GDP in 2013 and 9.1% in 2014 (Figure 3.1.9). 
Continued loan inflows and a modest rise in foreign direct investment are 
expected to help finance the current account deficit. Total external debt 
is expected to rise in the forecast period, but economic expansion will 
probably mean that external debt declines slightly as a percentage of GDP.
Policy challenge—promoting poverty reduction
Despite impressive growth, much remains to be done to combat the rise in 
poverty that occurred after the sharp economic contraction experienced 
in 2009. Accelerating structural reform to develop the private sector, 
implement an export-oriented diversification strategy, and mobilize 
resources for higher outlays on social sectors could enhance growth, 
thereby facilitating job creation and poverty reduction.
While Armenia scores well in many international comparisons, further 
improvements in tax collection, contract enforcement, competitiveness, 
legal and judicial reform, governance, and anti-corruption measures are 
essential for the economy to achieve and sustain its growth potential. 
Pursuing structural reform will enhance Armenia’s attractiveness 
to foreign investors and eventually improve the job market and 
living standards. 
Disparity between the capital and the regions in incomes and 
economic development risks undermining long-term, inclusive growth. 
Promoting private sector development, especially of small and medium-
sized enterprises outside the capital, is critical to narrowing the gap in 
living standards between the capital and the rest of the country.
Armenia’s overreliance on mining and construction are emblematic 
of the lack of economic diversification that the economic crisis in 2009 
revealed as a major vulnerability. Seriously implementing measures 
to advance the export diversification strategy approved in 2011—and 
programs designed to build a knowledge-based economy, enhance 
productivity, and promote technological modernization—can diversify 
growth, strengthen competitiveness, and eventually stimulate sustainable 
growth in employment and incomes. 
In this regard, government plans to establish an export lending 
agency and an industrial development fund in 2013 are encouraging, as 
are its commitments to earnestly enforce a law on free economic zones 
and a “regulatory guillotine” initiative adopted in 2011 toward eliminating 
excessive regulation. As evidenced by strong growth in information 
and communication technology since the early 2000s, investment in 
infrastructure and technology to support industries with high returns can 
catalyze economic growth.
Over time, expanding public infrastructure and targeted social 
spending should promote inclusive economic growth. Financing these 
outlays without worsening the ratio of public debt to GDP will require 
further increases in the tax-to-GDP ratio and curbs on other expenditure. 
3.1.9 Current account balance
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This chapter was written by Nail Valiyev of the Azerbaijan Resident Mission, ADB, Baku.
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Growth reached 2.2% from near stagnation in 2011, as the oil sector contracted less and activity outside 
of the oil sector accelerated. Smaller oil exports narrowed the current account surplus, but foreign direct 
investment, mainly in oil and gas projects, rose by more than 20%. Higher public investment spending, 
supported by transfers from the State Oil Fund, is expected to help spur growth to 3.1% in 2013 and, as 
oil production increases, to 4.8% in 2014. 
Economic performance
Growth improved to 2.2%, following near-zero growth in 2011. Oil output 
declined less, contracting by 5.0%, and expansion continued in the other 
sectors of the economy, which grew by 9.7% (Figure 3.2.1).
On the supply side, industry contracted by 1.9%, following the 3.4% 
increase in 2011 (Figure 3.2.2). The 2012 contraction mainly reflected 
poor performance in the oil sector, where output fell by 5.3% because of 
repairs at the main Azeri-Chirag-Ginashli oil platform. Other industrial 
output rose by 7.8%. Construction continued to grow, rising 18.8% on 
the back of the government investment program and private initiatives, 
including the construction of infrastructure linked to hosting the 
Eurovision Song Contest and the rehabilitation program following a 
major earthquake early in 2012. Government subsidies and concessional 
lending programs helped agriculture grow by 3.7%, with increases in both 
crop and livestock production. Through its agricultural leasing agency, 
the government continued to support farmers with machinery, imported 
breeding stock, and other agricultural inputs.
Services were a major source of growth, rising by 9.9%, with 
wholesale and retail trade growing by 9.6%. Growth also reflected 
strong performances in oil transportation, which grew by 5.0%, and in 
communications, which grew by 16.8%.
On the demand side, consumption and investment were the main 
sources of growth. Consumption rose by 2.9%. This was driven mainly 
by private consumption, which provides about 40% of GDP and grew by 
2.5%, reflecting higher domestic bank lending and increased activity and 
incomes outside the oil sector. Total investment, at about 23% of GDP, 
grew by 20.9%, with most of the growth in public investment.
Inflation fell to 1.1% from the 7.9% recorded in 2011 and 4.8% at the start 
of the year, mainly reflecting slower food price increases. Government-
managed food markets helped control food prices while providing farmers 
direct access to retail food markets. Continuing exchange rate stability 
helped limit price increases for imported goods (Figure 3.2.3). 
3.2.2 Sectoral GDP growth (supply)
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Fiscal policy turned more supportive in 2012 but remained hugely 
dependent on the oil sector. The surplus in the consolidated budget 
rose to 3.0% of GDP from 0.6% in 2011, because rising revenue greatly 
outpaced rising expenditure. Revenue grew by nearly 35%, to 29.0% of 
GDP, mainly reflecting increases in sovereign fund transfers and profits 
taxes. Transfers from the State Oil Fund—the sovereign wealth fund and 
a key source of revenue since 2009—provided 60% of budget revenues. 
Expenditures grew by 22% and totaled 25.8% of GDP. Public investment 
projects were the major driver of expenditures and absorbed 43% of 
total spending. The decision to begin repaying savings lost at the Soviet 
Depositary Bank after the collapse of the Soviet system helped increase 
social expenditures. 
The central bank relaxed monetary policy in 2012 for the first time 
since May 2011, lowering the refinancing rate from 5.25% to 5.00% as 
inflation declined. To offset the impact of capital inflows and reflect lower 
demand for foreign currency, the central bank sold securities to banks to 
sterilize $1.5 billion of their foreign exchange inflows, prevent significant 
appreciation of the Azerbaijan manat, and make producers outside of the 
oil economy more competitive. These moves helped limit the appreciation 
of the manat against the US dollar to 0.19% in the year to the end of 2012 
(Figure 3.2.4). 
To strengthen the banking sector, the central bank continued its 
efforts to formulate a risk-based prudential supervision framework 
adhering to Basel III standards for banking supervision. In addition, 
following the bankruptcy of one bank, the central bank announced 
a fivefold increase in aggregate required capital, both core and 
supplementary, to AZN50 million, effective 1 January 2014. New banks 
must have this amount as paid-in capital. 
Broad money (M3) grew by 20.7%, reflecting higher economic activity 
and bank loans to the private sector. Credit extended to the economy, 
primarily loans to the private sector, rose in 2012 by 24.1%, reflecting 
personal loans and trade finance. Credit quality improved, as the 
percentage of nonperforming loans fell to 6.3% in January–November 2012. 
Foreign currency savings and deposits dropped by 1.2%, while local 
currency holdings rose.
The current account surplus decreased to 22.6% of GDP from 25.7% in 
2011, as exports declined more quickly than imports. Exports fell by 7.5% 
during first 9 months of 2012 as oil exports, which account for 94% of all 
exports, declined by 8.8%, mainly because lower oil production reduced 
export volume. Other exports, mainly of fruits and vegetables, chemical 
products, and metal, rose by 21.6% during January–September 2012. 
In addition, exports of services grew by 51.9% with a significant jump 
in tourism. Imports grew slightly, by 1.0% during January–September 
2012, reflecting less need to import most kinds of food in light of higher 
domestic production, as well as lower demand for equipment and 
machinery at the early stage of new hydrocarbon projects. However, 
wheat imports rose sharply, as did imports of vegetable oil. Furniture 
imports also increased. Foreign direct investment rose by 23.4% in 2012 
from 3.2% in 2011, mainly reflecting investments in the second phase of 
the Shahdeniz gas field and in new oil field exploration.
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3.2.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
GDP growth  3.1  4.8
Inflation  6.0  7.0
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
13.0 17.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
Official reserves at the end of 2012 totaled $12.0 billion (Figure 3.2.5). 
Assets of the State Oil Fund totaled another $34.1 billion. Looking ahead, 
the government adopted a policy to limit external public and publicly 
guaranteed debt to 10.0% of GDP, which is well above the 6.0% of GDP 
reported by the Economist Intelligence Unit for end of 2012 (Figure 3.2.6). 
All external debt amounts to one-eighth of total official reserves. 
Economic prospects 
The major driver of growth in 2013 and the next few years is expected to 
be activity outside the oil sector. Energy output will grow little through 
2015 but is expected to expand more once gas field development is 
completed and the exploration of new oil fields proves successful, most 
likely after 2015. Planned public spending will boost public investment, 
while ongoing energy projects will increase foreign direct investment. 
New regulations on capital adequacy may allow increased lending to 
boost private investment.
Growth is forecast to accelerate to 3.1% in 2013 and climb further to 
4.8% in 2014, mainly because of public spending outside the oil sector 
and, in 2014, some increase in oil production (Figure 3.2.7).
On the supply side, industry will contract slightly in 2013 as oil output 
falls, before it revives in 2014. The 2013 fiscal budget includes support 
for regional development diversifying away from oil. Higher public 
spending and private investment are forecast to drive annual construction 
growth of 18.0%. Agriculture is expected to grow by 5.0%–6.0% annually 
as irrigation projects and reclamation progress. The government’s food 
security program aims to eliminate the need for wheat imports by 2015. 
Inflation is projected to accelerate to 6.0% in 2013 and 7.0% in 2014, 
reflecting public investment programs and large increases in current 
public expenditures, as salaries increase and social spending expands. 
However, moderate food inflation will help offset price increases 
elsewhere (Figure 3.2.8). 
Fiscal policy is expected to be more expansionary, with the budget 
recording small deficits of 1.1% of GDP in 2013 and 1.3% in 2014. Revenues 
are expected to grow each year by 20% and expenditures by 27%. State Oil 
Fund transfers should continue to provide about 60% of budget revenue. 
Salary increases, social development spending to support minimum living 
standards, the payment of pension plans inherited from the Soviet Union, 
and public investment outlays will be the main drivers of government 
expenditure. The 2013 presidential election may also raise spending. 
Monetary policy will adjust to reflect how inflation develops. Open 
market operations and changes in the refinancing rate will guide broad 
money growth. New regulations on capital adequacy are expected 
to stimulate the consolidation of some smaller banks or else foreign 
investment in them. Regulations may require successful banks to diversify 
their portfolios. However, delays in privatizing the one state-owned 
bank—the International Bank of Azerbaijan, which holds at least 40% of 
all bank assets—will continue to constrain the banking sector, signaling a 
lack of progress in stimulating private sector activity. 
The current account balance is forecast to decline to 13.0% of GDP in 
2013, reflecting rising imports of wheat, automobiles, home appliances, 
3.2.7 Annual GDP
0
8
16
24
2014201320122011201020092008
%
Forecast
5-year moving average
Sources: Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  
http://www.cbar.az (accessed 27 March 2013); ADB 
estimates.
3.2.6 External debt
0
2
4
6
8
20122011201020092008
% of GDP
Estimate
Sources: Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  
http://www.cbar.az (accessed 27 March 2013); ADB 
estimates.
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Central Asia  Azerbaijan  129
and equipment for ongoing energy projects. The services deficit may 
widen, reflecting rising demand for imported services in the hydrocarbons 
sector. In 2014, the current account surplus is expected to rise to 17.0% of 
GDP (Figure 3.2.9), as output in the main Azeri-Chirag-Ginashli oilfield 
is expected to increase slightly. In sum, exports, led by hydrocarbons, are 
expected to contract by 2.1% in 2013 before reversing direction to grow by 
1.7% in 2014. Development in the hydrocarbons sector and investment will 
boost imports of machinery and equipment and keep inflows of foreign 
direct investment high, though lower than in peak years. Reserves are 
expected to grow further, reaching $42 billion. External debt is forecast to 
show little change, remaining at 7.0% of GDP. 
Policy challenge—diversifying the economy 
The recent slowdown caused by declining oil production illustrates the 
risks arising from the economy’s continued dependence on petroleum. 
Economic diversification is critical to maintaining stable growth. The 
government’s recently issued Strategy 2020 aims to double growth in 
GDP per capita, mainly by expanding activity beyond oil, which is 
expected to grow at least 7% annually. 
Achieving these targets will be difficult without improving the 
business environment and private sector initiatives. Although Azerbaijan 
ranks well in terms of starting businesses and registering property, 
according to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2013, it ranks only 169th of 
185 countries in dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, and 
trading across borders. Structural reforms in these and other areas, such 
as simplifying taxpaying and easing access to credit, will be important to 
encourage investment outside of the oil sector. 
The new strategy is designed to promote regional development, 
mainly through government projects to improve regional infrastructure. 
Such intensive regional development programs will require careful 
public expenditure management and improved budget formulation. 
Private initiatives, including public–private partnerships, can help 
contain budget expenditures on public infrastructure and ensure their 
long-term sustainability if well managed. Securing such private initiatives 
will require an appropriate regulatory framework for public–private 
partnership, better investment climate, and a more effective finance sector 
with deeper capital markets and more extensive banking services.  
The new strategy targets diversifying the economy by encouraging 
innovation and expanding advanced technical facilities to enable a 
shift toward knowledge-based industries. Since 2008, growth in the 
information, communications, and technology sector has averaged 20% 
a year, reflecting the government’s strong commitment to improve its 
products and e-services. Further development of the knowledge-based 
economy may encourage additional investments in human capital and 
capacity building.
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This chapter was written by George Luarsabishvili of the Georgia Resident Mission, 
ADB, Tbilisi.
Georgia
Growth slowed to 6.1% from 7.2% in 2011, reflecting uncertainties in an election year that brought in a 
new government. Planned fiscal consolidation and continuing uncertainty in the political and investment 
climate are expected to limit growth to 5.5% in 2013, but growth should rise to 6.0% in 2014. The current 
account deficit is expected to narrow as fiscal consolidation reduces imports and as structural reforms 
gradually raise exports.
Economic developments 
Another year of strong growth nevertheless saw the rate decrease to 
6.1% from the 7.2% of 2011, reflecting uncertainties surrounding the 
October 2012 parliamentary elections and the subsequent transition 
to a new government administration. Unemployment remains very 
high, at 15.1% as of 2011, with two-thirds of the labor force engaged in 
low-productivity subsistence farming. Youth unemployment, at 35%, is 
particularly high. 
Georgia experienced a peaceful political transition in 2012. The new 
government has committed to promoting more inclusive growth with 
additional support for agricultural, rural, and small town development 
and increased social spending. The government aims to improve trade 
ties with the Russian Federation. While differences remain, a resumption 
of these ties should increase Georgia’s exports in agriculture, light 
manufacturing, and services. 
On the supply side, industry expanded by 9.9%, up from the 9.4% rise 
in 2011, led by construction and manufacturing (Figure 3.3.1). Agriculture 
contracted sharply in 2012, shrinking by 3.3% after the 8.0% growth 
in 2011 and reflecting smaller harvests of crops and livestock. Services 
grew by 5.8%, up from 5.7% in 2011, because of better performance in the 
finance sector, tourism, transport and communications, and wholesale 
and retail trade. 
On the demand side, consumption expanded by 5.5%, less than half 
the 12.8% rise in 2011. Private consumption grew by 4.3%, versus 16.0% 
in 2011, possibly reflecting consumer uncertainty in the run-up to the 
October 2012 parliamentary elections. Public consumption rose by 
10.8%, eight times the 1.4% rate in 2011. Spending on public salaries and 
social expenditure increased somewhat but still comprised only 42% of 
total outlays. Investment expanded by 28.8%, compared with 42.2% in 
2011, driven by public spending on infrastructure in the run-up to the 
elections. Net exports declined by 22.0% from the 2011 figure. 
Consumer prices fell by 0.9% in 2012, reversing the 8.5% rise in 2011 
(Figure 3.3.2). Deflation reflected a 2.0% decline in prices for imported 
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food and fuel and efforts to contain price increases for certain utilities, 
along with slower credit growth. Deflation was greatest for food and fuel 
but also affected other items such as clothing and footwear, furnishings, 
and recreational and cultural activities. Inflation during the 12 months 
ending in December was –1.4%, down from 2.0% in 2011.
Fiscal policy remained expansionary (Figure 3.3.3). The consolidated 
budget deficit narrowed to 3.0% of GDP from 3.6% in 2011. Revenues totaled 
28.9% of GDP, slightly above the 28.2% of 2011, as larger nontax revenues 
supplemented higher receipts from value-added and corporate profits taxes. 
Total expenditure was 31.9% of GDP, up from 31.8% in 2011, despite higher 
public investment spending and continuing large outlays on untargeted 
subsidies, including the general food and energy voucher program initiated 
in 2011. Total government debt, mainly concessional external borrowing, 
declined marginally to 33.8% of GDP from 33.9% in 2011.
Monetary policy was relaxed, to combat deflation and support growth, 
as the authorities lowered the policy rate from 6.50% in January to 5.25% 
by the end of December and again in February 2013 to 4.75%, the lowest 
rate since 2008. However, the banking system remains highly dollarized, 
with foreign exchange deposits exceeding 60% of all deposits in 2012, so 
the decline in the policy rate had little impact on market rates. Average 
aggregate lending and deposit rates slipped only marginally, to 18.6% and 
8.6%, respectively. The spread remained among the highest in the South 
Caucasus because of a shallow financial market, low saving, and lack 
of confidence in the domestic currency (Figure 3.3.4). Moreover, credit 
growth slowed from 20.5% in 2011 to 13.3% in 2012, reflecting a pre- and 
post-election slowdown in loan demand. The finance sector weakened, 
as bank profits fell by more than two-thirds, reflecting losses at several 
smaller, less-competitive banks. Nonperforming loans rose by about 1% to 
9.3% at the end of 2012. 
Given excess liquidity in banks, demand for refinancing loans fell in 
early 2012, weakening the interest rate transmission mechanism. Broad 
money growth slowed to 11.4% in 2012 from 14.5% in 2011, reflecting slow 
growth in domestic currency deposits that offset higher growth in foreign 
currency deposits (Figure 3.3.5). The exchange rate remained steady at 
about GEL1.7 = $1, but the real exchange rate saw the lari depreciate 
slightly because of deflation (Figure 3.3.6).
The current account deficit rose to 13.5% of GDP from 12.8% in 2011, 
reflecting a worsening trade deficit that was partly offset by a rise in 
net services (Figure 3.3.7). Exports grew by 8.1%, versus 32.2% in 2011, 
reflecting increases in vehicle re-exports, ferroalloys, minerals, and 
mineral fertilizers. Imports grew by 15.0%, versus 33.6% in 2011, fueled 
by heavy public spending on infrastructure and continued strong 
remittances. Services rose by 37.9%, following growth of 45.6% in 2011, as 
weaker performance in transportation, insurance, finance, and computer 
services offset strong gains in tourism. The deficit in the income account 
narrowed, reflecting lower interest payments and profit repatriation. 
Current transfers remained steady, with workers’ remittances rising by 
8.8% to $0.6 billion. Transfers from the Russian Federation, comprising 
58.1% of all transfers, increased by 14.3%. 
Portfolio inflows rose nearly sixfold to $847 million due to Eurobond 
issues, which helped finance the current account deficit. Foreign direct 
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investment amounted to an estimated $865.2 million, about 23% less than 
that in 2011, as inflows slowed, particularly in latter half of 2012, deterred 
by pre- and post-election uncertainties. Gross reserves rose to $2.9 billion. 
Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast to decelerate to 5.5% in 2013 and then increase to 6.0% 
in 2014, as planned fiscal consolidation and uncertainty in the political 
and investment climate slow domestic demand, despite anticipated 
growth in private consumption (Figure 3.3.8).
On the supply side, industry is forecast to expand, as structural 
reforms designed to achieve higher-quality public investment are expected 
over time to boost productivity, catalyzing growth in manufacturing and 
other tradable goods. Agriculture is expected to grow, reflecting improved 
expectations for key crops and livestock, assuming normal weather 
conditions. Services are projected to expand, with strong growth in 
transport, communication, and financial intermediation. On the demand 
side, investment, net exports, and to a lesser extent consumption are all 
expected to expand in both years.
Inflation is projected to accelerate to 3.0% in 2013 and rise further to 
4.0% in 2014, as higher social expenditure, including growth in pensions 
and teachers’ salaries, create demand-side inflationary pressures.
Over the next 2 years fiscal policy is expected to tighten. The 
consolidated budget deficit is projected to shrink to 2.8% of GDP in 2013 
and 2.5% in 2014. This reflects further cuts in government expenditure 
alongside a shift in spending toward social programs. Revenues are 
forecast to decline slightly as a share of GDP to 26.6% in 2013 before 
rising again to 27.4% in 2014. Total expenditure is forecast at 29.4% of 
GDP in 2013 and 29.9% in 2014, as the government implements measures 
intended to improve the quality of fiscal spending. Total government 
debt is projected to decrease to 32.1% of GDP in 2013 and 32.0% in 2014 as 
external debt declines (Figure 3.3.9). 
Over the next 2 years, monetary policy is expected to support growth 
while achieving the central bank’s medium-term inflation target. Broad 
money growth is projected to rise sharply, to 21.2% in 2013, and then fall 
again to 18.5% in 2014, reflecting higher growth in credit to the private 
sector. Exchange rate policy, while allowing some flexibility, is expected to 
focus on the stability of the national currency. 
The current account deficit is forecast to narrow to 11.9% of GDP 
in 2013 and 10.7% in 2014, as slower growth resulting from fiscal 
consolidation and other factors reduce demand for imports, and exports 
rise as structural reforms in agriculture and other sectors begin to take 
hold. Exports are projected to grow by 11.5% in 2013 and 14.8% in 2014, 
while imports expand by 7.0% in 2013 and 7.5% in 2014. Services should 
be in surplus due to the continued strong performance of financial and 
computer services. The income account deficit is expected to narrow, 
reflecting a decline in profit transfers and higher portfolio investment 
income. Current transfers are forecast to increase to $1.3 billion in 2013 and 
$1.4 billion in 2014 on the back of higher worker remittances. Expected 
strong inflows of foreign direct investment, in excess of $1 billion each 
year, will help finance the current account deficit. Gross reserves are 
3.3.6  Effective exchange rates and 
GEL/$ nominal exchange rate
75
150
225
300
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Nominal
Nominal eective
Real eective
DecJan
2012
Jan
2011
Jan
2010
Jan
2009
Jan
2008
Dec 1995 = 100 GEL/$
Source: National Bank of Georgia. http://www.nbg.gov.ge 
(accessed 20 March 2013).
3.3.7 Current account components
–12
–8
–4
0
4
8
–24
–16
–8
0
8
16
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% of GDP$ billion
Current account
balance
Exports
Imports
Net services 
Net transfers
Net income
Source: National Bank of Georgia. http://www.nbg.gov.ge 
(accessed 20 March 2013).
3.3.8 Annual GDP growth
–6
–3
0
3
6
9
2014201320122011201020092008
5-year moving average%
Forecast
Source: ADB estimates.
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Central Asia Georgia  133
projected to decline slightly to $2.6 billion in 2013 before recovering to 
$2.7 billion in 2014 (Figure 3.3.10).  
Risks to the projections include slackening activity in the Russian 
Federation and the euro area, and possible problems in managing quasi-
sovereign funds outside the state budget. Moreover, the high current 
account deficit remains a source of vulnerability and a risk to growth, 
given large external financing needs in a sluggish global environment.
Policy challenge—inclusive growth
Georgia’s impressive growth has fallen short in achieving poverty 
alleviation, job creation, and balanced regional development. A key 
development challenge is to make growth more inclusive, which would 
generate productive employment opportunities of particular benefit to 
subsistence farmers and others in Georgia’s poorer rural regions. Inclusive 
growth could also ease the current account deficit if it boosted domestic 
savings and exports. Future policies should tackle Georgia’s infrastructure 
deficit, improve connectivity, make basic services more widely available 
and sustainable, and enhance the productivity and skills of labor. 
Ultimately, raising domestic savings is essential to address external 
imbalances. Policies that reduce tensions between Georgia and the 
Russian Federation may boost investor confidence and respond to 
perceptions of country risk. Better protection of property rights through 
fair and impartial judicial processes is also essential, as are measures 
that discourage dollarization and reduce financial market risks. Despite 
Georgia’s overall progress in various business climate surveys, progress 
in sectoral reform has lagged. Agricultural policies can be improved to 
promote economies of scale, enhance productivity, and spur value-chain 
development. Policy reform in the power sector is essential to foster the 
sustainable exploitation of Georgia’s hydropower potential, enable efficient 
cross-border power trade, improve energy security, and generate sufficient 
government resources. Education policies should address pronounced 
skills gaps in key job-generating sectors.
The government aims to enhance development by instilling stronger 
planning and results orientation, including monitoring progress toward 
achieving targets. The government plans to increase investment in 
agriculture and industry, partly by establishing investment funds to 
attract private sector financing. Planned higher investment in social 
capital includes doubling the health-care budget, extending health 
insurance to uninsured citizens, and raising teachers’ salaries. 
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This chapter was written by Manshuk Nurseitova of the Kazakhstan Resident Mission, 
ADB, Astana.
Kazakhstan
Growth slowed to 5.0% from 7.5% in 2011, as industry largely stagnated and severe drought cut 
agricultural output by nearly 18%. Inflation also slowed. Rapid import growth, linked partly to public 
investment programs, narrowed the current account surplus to 4.3% of GDP from 7.2% in 2011, but assets 
in the country’s sovereign wealth fund again increased. Growth is expected to recover slowly, to 5.2% in 
2013 and 5.6% in 2014, as continued government investment spending boosts domestic demand.
Economic performance
After 2 years of strong recovery, economic growth slowed to 5.0% from 
7.3% in 2010 and 7.5% in 2011 (Figure 3.4.1). The service sector was again 
the main source of growth, while the contributions of agriculture and 
industry fell to their lowest levels in 15 years. 
Services, which generate more than half of GDP, rose by 9.8%, 
reflecting more than 14% growth in retail and wholesale trade and 
smaller gains in communications, transport, and hotels and restaurants. 
Professional services rose by 16.2% and public services by 12.2%. 
Agriculture contracted by 17.8%, mostly from poor harvests. Severe 
drought almost halved grain output from the record high harvest in 2011, 
despite major investments and producer subsidies. Industrial production 
grew only marginally, by 0.5%, compared with 3.7% in 2011, reflecting 
weak growth in mining (0.2% versus 1.3% in 2011) and manufacturing 
(0.7% versus 6.2% in 2011), the latter reflecting a decline in metallurgical 
production. In the broad mining sector, crude oil output declined by 
1.4%, while coal extraction grew by only 1.7% and natural gas by 3.1%. 
Construction expanded by 2.9% (about the same as in 2010 and 2011), 
again benefiting from state-led projects under a program to accelerate 
industrial and innovative development and incentives for residential 
construction.
On the demand side, consumption expanded by 11.4%, with 
public consumption growing more quickly than private consumption 
(Figure 3.4.2). Growth in net exports slowed to 10.0%, as imports grew 
much more rapidly than exports. Fixed capital investment grew by 3.8%, 
up from 2.8% in 2011, reflecting faster growth in investments by small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
Inflation slowed from 8.3% in 2011 to a post-independence low of 5.1%, 
reflecting a dramatic slowdown in food prices, mainly for grain products, 
to 4.5% from 11.9% in 2011, and a smaller decline in inflation for nonfood 
goods, to 4.3% from 5.4% in 2011. Prices for services rose by 6.8%, as in 
2011, including double-digit increases for transport, telecommunications, 
and postal services. Inflation accelerated somewhat beginning in August 
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but remained moderate over the full year. The 12-month (December 
over December) rate decelerated to 6.0% from 7.4% in December 2011 
(Figure 3.4.3).
Fiscal policy was more expansionary in 2012, as the deficit in the 
republican budget expanded to 3.0% of GDP from 2.1% in 2011. Receipts 
reached 15.5% of GDP, including 4.6% ($9.2 billion) in transfers from 
the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK, the sovereign 
wealth fund), down somewhat from total receipts of 16.1% of GDP in 
2011. Expenditure amounted 18.5% of GDP, up from the 18.2% recorded 
in 2011. The adoption of several new social programs, including measures 
to develop small towns and build affordable housing, helped boost 
expenditures. 
At the end of September 2012, public external debt stood at 
$30 billion, or 15% of GDP, 3 percentage points of which was government 
and government-guaranteed debt, the other 12 points being the debts 
of state-owned enterprises. Including the domestic debt of state-owned 
enterprises, estimated at 10%–12% of GDP, and that of the government 
and central bank, estimated at 12.2% of GDP, total public sector debt 
approached 37%–39% of GDP. 
Monetary policy was eased in 2012, reflecting slower inflation. 
The central bank gradually reduced the policy interest rate from 7.5% in 
February to a post-independence low of 5.5% in August of 2012. Broad 
money growth slowed to 7.9% from the 15.0% in 2011, reflecting slower 
currency expansion and a decline in corporate deposits. The increased 
need for budget financing raised interest rates on short-term government 
notes to 2.14% from 1.63% in 2011. The tenge exchange rate fluctuated 
within the range of T147.8–T150.5 per $1, with an average rate of T149.1 
for the year, depreciating from T146.6 in 2011 as the central bank 
avoided major interventions in the market (Figure 3.4.4). However, the 
real effective exchange rate against a basket of 34 currencies appreciated 
by 5.2%.
The banking sector is still beset by problems, despite efforts by the 
government and the central bank to improve the situation. The percentage 
of nonperforming loans has been growing since 2009, climbing to 37% 
by the end of 2012 from 35% a year earlier. A fifth of banks are losing 
money, with the largest losses at BTA Bank, which was nationalized in 
2009 and underwent a second restructuring of its external debt in 2012. 
Several banks applied for assistance from the central bank’s distressed 
assets fund established in April 2012. Some of the largest created 
subsidiaries to deal with nonperforming loans, which have made many 
banks risk averse, prompting them to invest excess liquidity in short-term 
government securities and central bank notes. This has suppressed rates 
on these assets. 
The current account surplus diminished to 4.3% of estimated GDP 
from 7.2% in 2011, as faster growth in imports shrank the trade surplus 
(Figure 3.4.5). The services deficit expanded by $1.3 billion, or 20%, while 
outward transfers tripled to $1 billion from $0.3 billion in 2011. The deficit 
in the capital and financial account, including errors and omissions, 
narrowed to about $11.5 billion from $13.3 billion in 2011, largely reflecting 
a better position for short-term capital. Net foreign direct investment 
grew by 40% to $12.7 billion from $9.1 billion in 2011, as investments 
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abroad contracted from $4.6 billion to $1.4 billion and inward foreign 
direct investment rose modestly, from $13.7 billion to $14.2 billion. A net 
$16.7 billion outflow on portfolio investments was largely explained by 
the $14 billion rise in the NFRK’s foreign assets and the almost $1 billion 
decline in Kazakh banks debt liabilities—and possibly a significantly 
greater decline with BTA Bank debt amortization. 
The central bank’s gross international reserves rose during the first 
half of the year but fell from August, as the central bank used part of 
its reserves to replenish the NFRK, ending the year at $28.3 billion, or 
$1.1 billion less than a year earlier. NFRK assets grew steadily, totaling 
$57.8 billion at the end of 2012 (Figure 3.4.6).
Total external debt—more than half owed by local subsidiaries to their 
parent multinational firms—was estimated at 67.3% of GDP at the end of 
September 2012, marginally down from 70% a year earlier. The country’s 
net foreign position, including balances in the NFRK, contracted by 
$1.7 billion and stood on 1 January 2013 at $11.9 billion. 
Economic prospects 
GDP is forecast to grow by 5.2% in 2013 and 5.6% in 2014, largely 
reflecting higher domestic demand, including investment spending under 
the industrialization program and the more active investment of NFRK 
assets (Figure 3.4.7). Some $1.5 billion of NFRK assets will be lent to the 
national oil company KazMunaiGas in 2013, and $2.5 billion more in 2014. 
Economic performance will also depend on demand from Kazakhstan’s 
major trading partners: the European Union, Russian Federation, and 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Production from the Kashagan project, 
postponed again in 2012, is now expected to begin in the second half of 
2013 with limited scope before expanding in 2014 to boost oil exports. 
Construction and development for Kazakhstan’s Expo 2017 will 
expand government investment but may also raise public debt unless 
the private sector participates. The adoption in February 2013 of a 
program to develop agribusiness will require a substantial $20 billion of 
public support during 2013–2020, potentially attracting three times as 
much in private investment. The government is initiating a new law on 
public–private partnerships to finance and implement large social and 
infrastructure programs. 
Inflation is expected to remain moderate but toward the middle 
of the central bank’s 6%–8% target range, reflecting the continued 
administration of prices, the use of special food stabilization funds in the 
regions, and a conservative monetary policy. Tariffs for services, including 
transport and communal utilities, will continue to rise in 2013, affecting 
the cost of all goods. 
Fiscal policy is expected to remain somewhat expansionary, with 
a bias towards spending for industrialization, social modernization 
programs, and social safety nets. However, the republican budget 
deficit is forecast to narrow to 2.1% of GDP in 2013 and 1.8% in 2014 
(Figure 3.4.8). The budget deficit will be covered through internal and 
external borrowing, including about $1 billion in sovereign Eurobonds in 
2013—$500 million in the first half of the year.
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Republican budget revenues, including transfers from the NFRK, are 
forecast to slide from 15.5% of GDP in 2012 to 14.8% in 2013 and 13.5% 
in 2014 (Figure 3.4.9). Tax receipts should gradually rise from 62% of 
revenue in 2012 to 74% in 2014, while transfers from the NFRK should 
remain unchanged in 2013 and decline in 2014. Revenue could be higher 
if the Kashagan and Karachaganak projects start operations in 2013. In 
addition, a new feature called “conditional financing,” limited to 4% of 
republican budget expenditure, will be introduced in 2013, to fund more 
regional programs if current revenue improves. 
Total expenditure is forecast to fall to 16.9% of GDP in 2013 and 15.3% 
in 2014. The planned reform of the pension system will merge 11 funds 
into one asset management fund and gradually align pension ages for 
women and men, which may help reduce outlays beginning in 2014.
Monetary policy is expected to remain conservative, with the central 
bank adjusting its policy rate as needed to contain inflation. Moderate 
inflation is anticipated, along with a low policy interest rate to encourage 
commercial banks to cut their interest rates. The central bank is expected 
to regulate the financial sector in a strong but low-profile manner, 
focusing in 2013 on cleaning the balances of commercial banks and 
improving access to finance for priority sectors of economy. As part of 
this policy the national holding company SamrukKazyna must dispose 
of its shares in three nationalized banks by the end of 2013. The central 
bank has enough capacity to keep the exchange rate relatively stable but 
is not expected to intervene against major trends in the exchange market, 
having lost over $6 billion in reserves during 2007–2008. 
The current account balance could achieve surpluses of 2.5% of GDP 
in 2013 and 4.0% in 2014, if oil prices are stable (Figure 3.4.10). However, 
current forecasts anticipate some oil price declines in 2013 and no 
improvement in metals prices, so surpluses may be smaller. Exports in 
2013 and 2014 are forecast to increase by 1%–2% of GDP, reflecting higher 
oil production. Imports are expected to grow much more quickly to 
maintain outlays for the program to accelerate industrial and innovative 
development. This will narrow the current account balance.
Ongoing projects to resolve transport bottlenecks, expand oil fields, 
and improve infrastructure will not take full effect in 2013 or 2014, 
possibly meaning further outflows in services and remittances. Reserves 
are expected to remain largely unchanged from the end 2012, while higher 
oil prices further build NFRK assets, now projected to reach $75 billion, 
or 30% of GDP, in 2014. 
Policy challenge—energy efficiency
Although its primary energy reserves are among the largest in the world, 
Kazakhstan does not meet its domestic energy needs. In 2011 Kazakhstan 
had the world’s third most energy-intensive economy, in terms of energy 
consumption per unit of GDP. Its emissions of greenhouse gases per 
unit of GDP are also very high. In addition, the energy system and its 
regional distribution companies face major risks from limited network 
capacity, outdated equipment, high losses, and inadequate or absent 
control systems, while tariffs set too low for cost recovery preclude 
network reconstruction or modernization. The current electricity market 
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and legislative and regulatory frameworks make constructing new power 
plants unattractive. The government has pursued several programs in 
recent years to involve the private sector in developing and operating 
energy facilities, but with mixed results. 
High energy intensity reflects the predominance of energy-intensive 
industries and outdated energy infrastructure. Some 30 industrial 
enterprises consume over 70% of electricity, and comparisons with the 
European Union show that more than two-thirds of them could reduce 
their energy intensity. Moreover, almost 90% of electricity is generated 
by coal-fired plants with barely one-third of the efficiency of similar 
plants in advanced economies. Over 70% of the population gets district 
heating from 40 solid-fuel combined heat and power plants operating in 
29 cities. These plants date from the 1960s to the 1980s, and almost all 
are past their service lives, as evidenced by network distribution losses 
and frequent failures. High energy intensity defeats coping with demand 
surges. Additional generation capacity could reduce the supply deficit, 
which would require new investment. 
The government considers energy efficiency a critical pillar of its 
energy policy. A law on energy saving and energy efficiency came into 
effect in July 2012, to be followed by supporting legislation. The goal is 
to reduce energy intensity by 10% in 2015 from the 2008 level and by 25% 
in 2020. In addition, the government has launched its Green Economy 
Initiative, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 15% in 2020 from the 
1992 level and by 25% in 2050. 
Kazakhstan could benefit from revived energy trading within 
Central Asia, which would enable it to draw on its neighbors’ hydropower 
through the regional electrical system that connects Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Drawing 
from pooled transnational assets would reduce the need for reserve 
power and allow the export of seasonal excess energy supplies to the 
PRC, India, Iran, and Pakistan. While transnational energy and water 
resources would need coordinated management, a study conducted under 
the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation estimates the potential 
regional economic benefits of energy trading in 2013–2015 could be 
$2 billion without major infrastructure or system investments. 
This chapter was written by Gulkayr Tentieva of the Kyrgyz Resident Mission, ADB, Bishkek.
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Kyrgyz Republic
While the peaceful transfer of power in 2011 and the swift formation of a new government in 2012 laid 
the foundation for growth, low gold production nevertheless caused GDP to contract by 0.9%. In 2013 
growth is expected to rebound to 5.5%. Meanwhile, the government will begin implementing its new 
Sustainable Development Strategy, 2013–2017, a blueprint for building a stable society, strengthening the 
rule of law, and improving the investment climate.  
Economic performance
GDP declined during 2012 as adverse geological factors affected gold 
production. Despite some recovery in gold output toward the end of 
the year and 5.0% growth in other sectors, real GDP contracted by 0.9% 
(Figure 3.5.1). All sectors except gold and agriculture showed robust gains, 
reflecting growing public confidence. Agricultural growth was hurt by a 
poor grain harvest. 
Industrial output fell by 13.8%, reflecting a 27.2% drop in 
manufacturing, which reflected in turn the decline in gold output and 
lower production of machinery and equipment. Growth in other key 
manufacturing subsectors averaged a robust 6.1%, driven by higher 
domestic consumption. Output of textiles grew by 12.5%, and chemical 
production by 22.7%, to supply growing trade with the Russian Federation 
and Kazakhstan. Mining output grew by 22.5%, reflecting higher 
extraction of coal, basalt, and other minerals. Construction grew by 17.3%, 
following the sluggish 2.5% growth of 2011, because of large investments 
in new buildings and repairs to existing structures.  
Agriculture grew by only 1.2%, less than the 1.9% rise in 2011. Lower 
productivity and adverse weather caused a 10.0% decline in the grain 
harvest, which was offset by 2.4% growth in livestock production. 
Services, which provide half of GDP, grew strongly for the second 
consecutive year, by 6.2%. The strongest gains were in transportation, 
at 8.9%; trade, 10.5%; and hotels and restaurants, 11.7%, reflecting higher 
consumer demand and improved cross-border trade. 
On the demand side, private consumption is estimated to have grown 
by more than 6%, as higher employment, wage increases averaging 16.5%, 
and a rise in remittances exceeding 17.0% fueled an 11.0% increase in 
retail sales. 
Investment expanded by 21.5%, including a 30.2% rise in gross 
fixed capital formation, following the 3.1% investment decline in 2011. 
The increases, all in the private sector, reflected gains in energy, 
mining, processing, and trade but were partly offset by declines in 
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communications, transport infrastructure, and housing. Government 
investment shrank by 4.8%, as austerity measures aimed to reduce lower-
priority spending. Net exports declined, as export volumes fell by 13.1% 
while import volumes grew by 26.2%.
Measured as a year average, inflation slowed significantly to 2.8% 
from 16.6% in 2011, with a 3.9% decline in food prices largely offsetting 
a 10.1% rise in other prices. Inflation rose slightly during the second half 
of the year led by higher prices for wheat, which caused the 12-month 
(December over December) inflation rate to reach 7.5%, above the 
comparable rate of 5.7% for 2011 (Figure 3.5.2). 
Despite improved tax collection, rapid growth in social expenditures 
caused the budget deficit to widen to 6.6% of GDP from 4.8% in 2011 
(Figure 3.5.3). Government revenue rose to 28.6% of GDP from 27.2% in 
2011, reflecting growth aside from gold and improved tax administration. 
However, higher wages, pensions, and spending on energy infrastructure 
caused expenditures to rise to 35.2% of GDP from 31.9% in 2011. 
Public debt, equivalent to 47.9% of GDP at the end of 2012, rose 
slightly from 45.6% of GDP in 2011 but was far below the 55.2% of 2010 
(Figure 3.5.4), partly because of agreements reached with Turkey and the 
Russian Federation to write off debt. The agreement with the Russian 
Federation, ratified in November 2012, provided for the immediate 
write-off of $189 million in debt and the phased write-off of the 
remaining $300 million over 10 years starting in 2016.
Extensive dollarization in the Kyrgyz Republic and a shallow financial 
sector limit the impact of monetary policy. During 2012 the central bank 
relaxed monetary policy as inflation slowed, steadily lowering the policy 
rate over the year from 13.6% at the beginning to 2.6% at year-end, in 
line with declining core inflation and growing confidence in the banking 
sector. The average deposit rate rose slightly, to 5.4% from 4.9% in 2011, 
while the lending rate fell to 23.0% from 23.8% in 2011.
During 2012, the deposit base grew by 36.1% and credit to the 
economy grew by 26.2%. The share of nonperforming loans at year-end 
fell again to 7.2% in 2012 from 10.2% in 2011 and 15.8% in 2010. The value 
of the Kyrgyz som remained relatively stable against the US dollar but 
depreciated slightly during the second half of the year, sliding from 
Som46.69 to the dollar in January to Som47.40 by 31 December 2012 
(Figure 3.5.5). The central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market 
only to smooth short-term fluctuations. 
The external current account deficit is estimated to have widened to 
20.9% of GDP from 6.1% in 2011, reflecting lower export volumes and a 
slight fall in gold prices.
The trade deficit is estimated to have increased significantly, to 
$3.0 billion, as higher purchases of gasoline and diesel fuel caused 
imports to rise by 26.2%, while exports fell by 13.1%, mainly reflecting 
lower gold exports. Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
remained the Kyrgyz Republic’s largest trading partners. Remittances rose 
to $1.8 billion from $1.5 billion in 2011 (Figure 3.5.6), reflecting positive 
developments in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. Investment 
inflows rose by 26.7%, largely reflecting new investments in the energy 
sector and elsewhere. Gross international reserves climbed by 12.7% to 
$2.1 billion. 
3.5.2 Monthly inflation
–20
0
20
40
60
Nonfood 
Food
Overall 
DecJan
2012
Jan
2011
Jan
2010
Jan
2009
Jan
2008
Jan
2007
%
Source: National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
http://www.stat.kg (accessed 15 March 2013).
3.5.3 Budget indicators
–15
0
15
30
45
Capital expenditure
Grants
Current expenditure
Current revenue
Budget decit
20122011201020092008
% of GDP
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2009. Country Report 
No. 09/209. July; 2010. Country Report No. 10/336. October; 
2011. Country Report No. 11-354. December; 2012. Country 
Report No. 12/111. May; 2012. Country Report No. 12/329. 
December. http://www.imf.org; Ministry of Finance.
3.5.4 External debt
0
20
40
60
80
100
Private 
Government 
20122011201020092008
% of GDP
Note: Government debt refers to both government and 
government-guaranteed debt.
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2009. Country Report 
No. 09/209. July; 2010. Country Report No. 10/336. October; 
2011. Country Report No. 11-354. December; 2012. Country 
Report No. 12/111. May; 2012. Country Report No. 12/329. 
December. http://www.imf.org; Ministry of Finance.
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Central Asia  Kyrgyz Republic  141
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to rebound to 5.5% in 2013 and 4.5% in 2014 
(Figure 3.5.7) on the back of higher gold production and investments, 
mainly from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, in 
energy and transport infrastructure projects. However, gold output could 
fall below expectations if the political environment deteriorates, weakening 
investment incentives. The restoration of public confidence and greater 
political stability should raise domestic demand, spurring growth in the 
private sector apart from gold. Good economic conditions in the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan will likely promote growth by generating 
higher remittances and external demand. Reform in state governance also 
holds promise.
The service sector will remain the major source of economic 
expansion, with growth expected at 5.0% each year. Transportation 
and communications should perform well, as major road networks and 
energy infrastructure are rehabilitated and communication networks are 
expanded. Industry is expected to grow by 10.0% each year, with metals 
and metallurgy the main drivers, gold remaining the principal output, 
and gold and energy showing the highest growth rates. 
Inflation is expected to rise to 7.5% in 2013 with the rebound in gold 
output and infrastructure investments in the energy sector, and then ease 
to 5.5% in 2014. Substantial price hikes are not expected for food, which 
occupies 45% of the consumer price index, given current forecasts for 
declining global food prices.
The fiscal deficit should narrow to 5.5% of GDP in 2013 and 4.0% in 
2014 as gold-related tax revenues rise. The government is committed 
to fiscal consolidation in the medium term and will be guided by 
conservative revenue forecasts, restrained expenditure on low priority 
items, and social considerations. Total revenue is expected to increase 
to 33.0% of GDP, as improving tax administration remains high on the 
government’s agenda. Total expenditure is expected to rise to 38.3% of 
GDP, reflecting lower current expenditure but higher capital spending. 
Future pension increases will continue to be tied to changes in the 
income officially deemed necessary for subsistence. 
Monetary policy is expected to remain cautious as the central bank 
works to absorb any excess liquidity caused by government spending. 
The central bank will likely raise the policy interest rate if inflation rises, 
as expected. Nominal interest rates are expected to stay in the 13.0%–
15.0% range, helping the som to appreciate during 2013. 
The current account balance is forecast to improve, with rapid 
export growth narrowing the deficit to 7.0% of GDP in 2013 and further 
to 5.0% in 2014 (Figure 3.5.8). Exports are forecast to grow by 20.0% 
in 2013 and 15.0% in 2014, mainly due to a rebound in gold exports 
during 2013 and higher exports of textiles and agricultural produce in 
2013 and 2014. These exports should benefit from anticipated accession 
into the customs union with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian 
Federation in 2014, though trade may fall initially with countries 
outside the union. Imports are expected to grow steadily at 15.0% both 
in 2013 and 2014 because imported equipment, machinery, and fuel are 
needed for new infrastructure projects in energy, transport, and other 
sectors. External reserves are forecast to climb to $2.2 billion in 2013 
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and $2.4 billion in 2014. Foreign direct investment inflows will depend 
largely on the government implementing its proposed structural reform 
and improvements to the investment climate. External government and 
government-guaranteed debt is forecast to subside to about 44% of GDP. 
Policy challenges—energy security and reform 
Increasingly unreliable electricity supply is among the binding constraints 
on growth that pose major risks to economic development. 
The Kyrgyz Republic has the potential to expand hydropower 
capacity, which supplies more than 80% of all locally generated electricity. 
However, the sector is plagued by high commercial and technical losses, 
poor corporate governance, corruption, aging assets in serious need of 
rehabilitation and upgrading, and artificially low tariffs. 
Energy security remains a primary concern. The country is a net 
energy importer, with 70% of its energy needs supplied by imported coal, 
oil, and gas. While Central Asia is rich in fossil fuels, the delivery of fuel 
imports, particularly of gas, is not always reliable. Because electricity 
generation exceeds domestic needs, the Kyrgyz Republic is a net electricity 
exporter. However, the seasonal nature of hydropower generation means 
that the country suffers from winter electricity shortages. Whether the 
Central Asian electricity grid, a legacy of the Soviet era, will continue to 
link countries in the region adds to uncertainty about energy security.
To resolve these challenges, in 2012 the government adopted a new 
energy sector strategy and developed its energy sector reform action plan. 
The plan aims to improve state regulation, strengthen the management of 
energy companies, make corporate activities more transparent, gradually 
raise tariffs, and expand production to increase exports of electricity 
and stabilize domestic electricity supply. To improve energy security in 
the short term, the government plans to complete a 500 kilowatt power 
substation and the 410 kilometer Datka–Kemin electricity grid. Over 
the longer term, the government has begun feasibility studies for two 
electricity grids connecting the country’s system with that of Kazakhstan 
(Kemin–Almaty) and the People’s Republic of China (Datka–Hudjent). 
Important but aging assets, especially the Toktogul hydropower plant, 
urgently need rehabilitation.
The government is negotiating several energy projects, including 
Kambar–Ata II and a cascade of smaller hydropower stations on the 
Naryn River. However, sustaining the energy system will require billions 
of dollars of investment in new projects and the rehabilitation of existing 
assets. Thus, improving the investment climate, protecting investor rights, 
and developing a new tariff policy remain as challenges to achieving a 
more secure energy supply that contributes to economic development.
3.5.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
GDP growth  5.5  4.5
Inflation  7.5  5.5
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
–7.0 –5.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
3.5.8 Current account balance
–21
–14
–7
0
2014201320122011201020092008
Forecast
% of GDP
Sources: National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic. http://www.
nbkr.kg (accessed 15 March 2013); ADB estimates.
This chapter was written by Kakhorjon Aminov of the Tajikistan Resident Mission, ADB, 
Dushanbe.
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Tajikistan 
Growth accelerated slightly to 7.5% in 2012 as remittances hit record highs, but slightly slower growth is 
forecast for 2013 and 2014. Domestic income and investment remain low. Reforms promised to permit 
Tajikistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization will be important to improve the business climate, 
increase foreign investment, and reduce excessive reliance on remittances.
Economic developments
Tajikistan achieved robust growth of 7.5%, slightly above the 7.4% 
recorded in 2011, mainly reflecting strong domestic demand from 
record-high remittances, which equal about half of GDP (Figure 3.6.1). 
Meanwhile, domestic income and investment remained critically low. 
On the supply side, services remained the main driver of 
economic growth, expanding by 14.5% and led by retail trade, which 
grew by 17.1%. Construction, industry, and agriculture also grew, but at 
more modest rates. Industry expanded by 10.4%, backed by continued 
growth in mining and light processing. Textiles grew by 30%, as weak 
external demand and lower international prices for cotton prompted 
firms to focus on local processing. Aluminum production grew by a 
modest 0.7%, constrained by aging technology and a reduced supply of 
natural gas from Uzbekistan, and discouraged by lower international 
prices. Agriculture grew by 10.4%, largely because of strong growth 
in agricultural processing. However, cotton production grew by only 
0.5%, as sharp fluctuations in cotton prices discouraged farmers from 
following through on initial expansions in planted area. Despite slow 
growth, aluminum and cotton still represented 58% of total output, 
down from 70% in 2008.
On the demand side, consumption was the main driver of growth. 
Higher spending for social services, human development, and social 
protection raised private consumption, while increased outlays for 
education and health care boosted public consumption. However, public 
investment including outlays by state enterprises declined as investment 
in energy, transport, and communication fell by 20.2%. Private investment 
grew by only 1.0%, and the share of private investment in GDP remained 
below 5%. Despite the government’s continued efforts to improve the 
investment climate, serious impediments such as an inefficient tax system, 
the high cost of financing, and weak property rights have kept private 
investment and income low. 
Inflation slowed to 5.8% from 12.5% in 2011 (Figure 3.6.2). Food prices 
rose by only 3.5%, despite a sharp jump in wheat and flour prices caused 
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by a drought in Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. Inflationary 
pressures came mainly from services, where prices rose by 12.9%. 
Fiscal policy tightened, leaving an overall budget surplus 
(including all investment spending) of 0.1% of GDP that reversed 
the 2.5% deficit in 2011 (Figure 3.6.3). The state budget surplus, which 
excludes foreign-financed investment, rose to 1.8% of GDP from 0.5% 
in 2011. Revenue performance was on track, reflecting a 22.6% rise 
in tax revenue and a more than 7.3% increase in nontax revenue as 
the restructuring of the government’s tax committee and better tax 
administration improved collection. Total expenditure rose by 21.9%, 
reflecting a 21% increase in spending for social protection. Pensions 
increased by 30% and social sector wages by 30%–40%, reflecting 
the government’s commitment to improve social services. However, 
infrastructure spending fell by 10.1% following the completion 
of projects commissioned to celebrate Tajikistan’s 20 years of 
independence. Public and publicly guaranteed debt declined to 33.9% of 
GDP from 34.3% at the end of 2011. 
Lower inflationary pressures allowed the central bank to pursue a 
more accommodative monetary policy. The refinancing rate was reduced 
repeatedly in 2012, from 9.8% to 8.0% in March, 6.8% in July, and 6.5% 
in September. Bank credit expanded by 9.2%, mainly driven by a 14% 
increase in short-term credit. However, the share of long-term credit 
diminished slightly, by 0.5%, particularly for local currency lending. 
Overall, the banking system remains prone to risks from low 
profitability and a significant percentage of nonperforming loans, as 9.5% 
are 30+ days overdue. The microfinance sector, on the other hand, 
continued to expand. In 2012, the average somoni exchange rate remained 
stable at TJS4.8 = $1 (Figure 3.6.4), which helped moderate inflationary 
expectations through its impact on import prices. 
The current account balance worsened, recording a deficit of 3.5% of 
GDP after the surplus of 2.3% in 2011, as the trade balance deteriorated. 
Exports rose by 8.2%, to an estimated $1.4 billion, while high remittances 
helped boost imports by 18.6% to $3.8 billion. Export growth reflected 
significant gains of 13.5% for cotton fiber and 11.6% for textiles. 
In addition, the expanding mining sector has made mineral exports 
increasingly important, with export earnings doubling in 2012. 
Electricity exports, though relatively small, grew nearly fourfold in 2012 
as the supply of electricity to Afghanistan was sustained through the 
winter despite severe domestic electricity shortages, partly to keep the 
transmission system functional. Purchases of consumer goods were 
behind the 18.6% rise in imports. However, remittances, mainly from the 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, rose by more than 28% to a record of 
$3.6 billion, or more than 47% of GDP. 
Continued government borrowing for investment projects helped 
boost capital inflows. Foreign direct investment edged up to an estimated 
$50 million in 2012 after hitting a trough in 2010 of less than $10 million. 
However, foreign direct investment remains very low at only 0.5% of GDP. 
Official reserves rose to $662 million at the end of 2012, equivalent to 
2.2 months of imports, from $572 million a year earlier. Public and 
publicly guaranteed external debt was 31.2% of GDP, little changed from 
the 32.1% a year earlier (Figure 3.6.5).
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Economic prospects
The economic outlook is cautiously optimistic, as healthy remittance 
inflows will continue to support Tajikistan’s growth in 2013 and 2014, 
stimulating private consumption, imports, and budget revenues. More 
diversified industry and agriculture will result in more sustainable 
economic growth, which is forecast at 6.5% in 2013 and 6.0% in 2014 
(Figure 3.6.6). However, the economy remains vulnerable because of heavy 
dependence on remittances.
Although continuing growth is expected, several factors heighten 
uncertainty or limit growth prospects. The aluminum industry is likely 
to slow further as production facilities continue to deteriorate and power 
problems and input restrictions persist. Moreover, the volume of cotton 
and aluminum exports will remain sensitive to international prices. 
Growth will also depend on four factors: projected growth in 
the Russian Federation; stability in regional trade and cargo transit; 
the amount of precipitation, which is essential for agriculture and 
hydroelectric generation; and political and social stability.
In addition, Tajikistan suffers from a poor investment climate and 
a weak financial sector. Despite improvement in some areas, Tajikistan 
ranks among the bottom fourth of all countries worldwide in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business 2013, with exceptionally low scores for 
dealing with construction permits, getting electricity and credit, ease of 
paying taxes, and trading across borders. When joining the World Trade 
Organization in March 2013, Tajikistan agreed to improve its trade regime 
and accelerate reforms to create a more transparent and predictable 
environment for trade and foreign investment. Implementing these 
reforms is essential to boost private investment. 
Inflation is expected to stay relatively moderate in 2013 and 2014, 
in line with declining international food prices, though inflation could be 
higher if food and fuel prices exceed projections. The inflation rate is 
forecast to remain at 6.5% in 2013 and reach 7.0% in 2014 (Figure 3.6.7).
Tajikistan’s fiscal stance will be somewhat more expansionary 
with planned higher expenditure, mainly for social spending and 
infrastructure. The budget deficit is expected to widen to 2.5% of GDP in 
2013 and then narrow again to 2.0% in 2014, while the state budget deficit 
is projected at 0.5% of GDP in 2013 and 2014. Despite somewhat elevated 
public debt, the government is likely to continue borrowing externally for 
large infrastructure projects, mainly in energy and transport. The Public 
Debt Management Strategy for 2012–2014 reaffirms the government’s 
commitment to keep public and publicly guaranteed debt below 40% of 
GDP, to ensure that new loans have a minimum grant element of 35%, 
and to undertake cost–benefit analyses of large investments.
Monetary policy will need to strike a balance between supporting 
Tajikistan’s economic recovery and ensuring price stability. The refinancing 
rate is expected to remain between 6.5% and 7.5% in 2013 and 2014. 
Money growth is projected to slow moderately, from 23.2% in 2012 to 
about 18% a year in 2013 and 2014. The exchange rate is forecast to remain 
relatively stable, supported by remittances, despite downward pressure 
from weak export performance. Continued exchange rate flexibility and 
close coordination with monetary and fiscal policies will be important to 
maintain competitiveness and avoid shocks. 
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The current account deficit is expected to widen to 5.0% in 2013 
and then narrow slightly to 4.8% in 2014 (Figure 3.6.8). Despite declines 
in aluminum and cotton, total exports should rise because of gains in 
agricultural products, electricity, and textiles. Imports should also increase, 
because of rising remittances (Figure 3.6.9). Foreign direct investment 
inflows should continue to rise gradually, in line with ongoing reform. Most 
investments will likely involve several large infrastructure projects. External 
debt is forecast to reach 32.5% of GDP at the end of 2013 and 32.8% a year 
later. Reserves are expected to rise to $762 million by the end of 2013 and 
$862 million a year later, equivalent to less than 3 months of imports. 
Policy challenge—addressing severe winter 
energy shortages 
Persistent shortages of electricity in winter, causing severe blackouts for 
70% of the population and most firms outside the capital, are Tajikistan’s 
biggest growth constraint. These shortages, estimated at a quarter of winter 
electricity demand, create economic losses equivalent to 3% of GDP and 
cause significant hardship, especially in rural areas. The problem results 
from Tajikistan’s overwhelming dependence on hydropower and limited 
flows during the cold winter months. Deteriorating generation plants, high 
transmission and distribution system losses, and poor operational and 
financial management in the sector compound the problem. 
Reliable power supply is critical to sustained growth. Current 
disruptions deter investment and job creation, keep hospitals and schools 
from functioning properly, and create health hazards from wood burned 
for heating and cooking; most regions get only 5–8 hours of electricity 
per day from November to March. Increasing demand for fuelwood has 
caused extensive deforestation and loss of biomass, creating soil erosion, 
landslides, and other forms of land degradation. Currently, electricity is 
the cheapest and sometimes the only source of power for heating. Thus, 
homes and businesses depend heavily on electricity for heat, as well as 
for lighting and industrial processes. Electricity powers the production of 
Tajikistan’s two largest exports, aluminum and cotton. 
Despite seasonal shortages and other problems, Tajikistan was a key 
summertime power supplier in Central Asia before the 1990s and could 
produce more electricity now, both for domestic needs and to export to 
new markets such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Achieving energy security 
is thus important for both domestic and regional economic growth and 
development. Improving governance in the energy sector can substantially 
enhance sector efficiency, and comprehensive reform is needed for energy 
sustainability and independence. Priorities for the government and 
development partners should include reforming Barqi Tajik, the national 
electricity monopoly, to strengthen its commercial viability; implementing 
national programs to help households and large industrial consumers use 
electricity more efficiently; rehabilitating existing capacity and creating 
new capacity; promoting regional power trade initiatives and investment 
in necessary infrastructure; exploring renewable energy sources such as 
solar and wind power; and designing and implementing programs to 
improve public understanding and garner support for energy reform. 
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This chapter was written by Jennet Hojanazarova of the Turkmenistan Resident Mission, 
ADB, Ashgabat.
Turkmenistan 
Growth remained robust at 11.1%, led by strong gas exports and high public spending on infrastructure, 
with rising imports limiting the current account surplus to 1.5% of GDP. Even higher oil and gas production 
and exports are expected in 2013 and 2014, providing continued funding for the large public sector. 
However, growth is forecast to moderate to 9% in 2013 and 8% in 2014. 
Economic performance
The economy grew by a strong 11.1%, a bit less than the 14.7% recorded in 
2011 (Figure 3.7.1). With growth averaging 11% since 2007, Turkmenistan 
was reclassified by the World Bank in July 2012 as an upper-middle-
income country. 
On the demand side, strong gas exports and public investment in 
infrastructure were the main growth drivers. Gas exports, comprising 
70% of total exports, have continued to rise because of long-term 
contracts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has steadily 
increased its purchases since 2009. Other importers, notably the Russian 
Federation and Iran, have continued to purchase gas in more moderate 
volumes. Investment, mainly in hydrocarbons and various public sector 
projects, surged by 38% over 2011 levels, reflecting programs guided by the 
National Program of Socioeconomic Development (NPSED), 2011–2030, 
which aims to diversify and modernize the country’s industrial base, 
develop rural areas, and raise living standards. 
On the supply side, the government reported all sectors growing 
in 2012. Industry contributed more than half of all growth, with the 
hydrocarbon subsector, which provides 75% of industrial output and 40% 
of GDP, growing by an estimated 19%. Government investment projects 
and social programs boosted construction, while growth in services came 
mainly from wholesale and retail trade, transport, and communications. 
Agricultural growth came from higher crop and livestock production, 
reflecting government subsidies and lending programs and improvements 
to grain and cotton cultivation. Larger harvests of cotton (up by 12.6% 
over 2011) and wheat (up by 2.7%) helped reduce agricultural imports. 
Liberalized prices for certain items put upward pressure on consumer 
prices. However, officially measured inflation was limited to 5.3% with 
the help of government subsidies for utilities; low prices for gasoline 
and public transportation; and price controls on major foodstuffs 
(Figure 3.7.2). 
Fiscal policy aimed to support growth through public investment. 
The state budget, which excludes what are believed to be substantial 
extrabudgetary expenditures, recorded a large budget surplus equal to 
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6.0% of GDP, well above the surplus of 3.6% in 2011, as revenue grew 
much more quickly than expenditure (Figure 3.7.3). Rising hydrocarbon 
exports contributed to a 40% increase in revenue. Budget expenditure 
rose by 20.6% from 2011, reflecting greater spending for public investment 
projects, with socially oriented projects constituting over 70% of state 
budget allocations. As in previous years, the state budget surplus was 
transferred to a stabilization fund set up in 2008 to finance the country’s 
development needs. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated 
total public debt, all of it external, at 14.4% of GDP at the end of 2012. 
Monetary policy remained broadly neutral in 2012, with the central 
bank’s main instruments largely unchanged. Directed lending by the 
central bank slowed somewhat, as more liquidity from the stabilization 
fund became available through commercial banks and the recently 
established state development bank. Bank lending to state-owned 
enterprises—comprising 80% of total lending—rose by 32.6%, while 
lending to entities and individuals outside the public sector increased by 
41.8%. The IMF estimates that broad money grew by 16.6% during 2012. 
Since the 2009 currency reform, the exchange rate has remained stable 
at TMM2.85 to $1. Rapid growth in reserves since 2011 has enabled the 
authorities to maintain this rate. 
The current account surplus is believed to have slid from 2.0% of GDP 
in 2011 to 1.5% in 2012. Exports grew by 19.3%, according to government 
reports, reflecting higher exports of gas, crude oil, and oil products. 
However, export growth was offset by rising imports, reflecting growing 
demand for machinery and other equipment, and for foreign services 
in the hydrocarbon sector and construction. Turkmenistan received 
$12.6 billion in foreign direct investment during 2008–2011, including 
$3.2 billion in 2011, according to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, which listed Turkmenistan among the world’s 
top 10 recipients of foreign direct investment (Figure 3.7.4). The Economist 
Intelligence Unit estimated that international reserves rose by 7% to 
$20.2 billion at the end of 2012.  
Economic prospects 
Growth is expected to slow somewhat, to 9% in 2013 and 8% in 2014. 
The drivers of growth will continue to be expansion in extractive 
industry and higher exports of gas and oil products. Rising earnings from 
hydrocarbon exports will support large public investments.
The government intends to expand hydrocarbon production (Box 3.7.1). 
The expansion is expected to stimulate output in power generation, oil 
refining, and chemicals, while the government’s investment program 
should promote construction, transportation, and wholesale and retail 
trade. Government support for agriculture is expected to boost farm 
output and textile production, while support for private firms should 
promote agro-industrial processing. 
Consumer price inflation is expected to rise to 6.0% in 2013 and 6.5% 
in 2014, despite price controls. The increases will reflect expanded public 
investment and rising consumption, both public and private, fueled by 
higher domestic credit, public sector salary increases of 10% and pension 
increases of 15% in 2013, and similar increases likely in 2014.
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Fiscal policy is expected to be more expansionary. The recently 
adopted budget for 2013 envisages a small deficit, with spending up by 
29.8%, and revenues conservatively forecast to rise by only 18.7%. The IMF 
estimates that government gross debt will decline to 13.3% of GDP in 2013 
and 11.9% in 2014. 
The current account is expected to show surpluses of 2.0% of GDP 
in 2013 and 3.0% of GDP in 2014, based on anticipated growth in energy 
exports (Figure 3.7.5). With gross reserves expected to rise, Turkmenistan’s 
external position should remain comfortable over the medium term. 
Policy challenge—promoting diversification
The economy depends heavily on hydrocarbon exports, which provide 
more than 90% of exports. While the expansion of the energy sector 
is expected to substantially boost export earnings, energy price 
swings can create large fluctuations in export revenues, posing a 
risk to macroeconomic stability and financing for public investment. 
A stabilization fund created in 2008 has helped mitigate the adverse 
effects of external shocks. In the coming period of booming exports, the 
government will need to implement policies designed to contain inflation 
and avoid real exchange rate appreciation and excessive growth in the 
money supply, while promoting a more diversified economy.
The experience of the mid-1990s and 2009, when sharp declines in 
demand for gas caused growth rates to plunge, has prompted efforts to 
reduce reliance on hydrocarbon exports. The NPSED highlights the need 
to diversify the economy beyond hydrocarbons and to add more value 
by shifting to high-technology and processed goods. The program aims 
to increase to 70% in 2020 the private sector’s share of GDP not tied 
to hydrocarbons. Attaining this objective will require, however, many 
structural reforms and substantial investments in human capital and 
institutional capacity as well as clear supporting legislation. 
Ensuring the efficient and rational spending of export revenues is also 
important. Much of the hydrocarbon wealth has accrued to the public 
sector through taxes and production-sharing mechanisms. Such inflows 
require highly developed institutional capacity to spend revenue wisely. 
The government aims to use the additional resources from hydrocarbon 
exports to spur growth, modernization, and economic diversification. 
Successful diversification will require that investments are prioritized 
and that support goes to competitive industries that can thrive without 
continued subsidies in the future. 
The authorities would do well to use the current favorable outlook 
and strong external position to deepen structural reforms and finance 
productive investment that promote diversification and encourage private 
sector development. They could support these measures by strengthening 
public financial management, developing the financial sector, and 
enhancing macroeconomic surveillance through further improvements in 
statistics and data collection. 
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3.7.1  Turkmenistan and 
global energy security
Turkmenistan is becoming an 
important energy hub. Its gas 
reserves are the second-largest in 
the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and the fourth-largest in the 
world, conservatively estimated by the 
petroleum transnational BP in 2011 
at 24.3 trillion cubic meters (m3), or 
11.7% of the world total. 
The Turkmen government has 
ambitious plans to develop the 
country’s abundant oil and gas 
resources, and leading oil and gas 
companies have concluded long-term 
agreements. Targets set by the NPSED 
see gas production rising fourfold 
to 230 billion m3 per year by 2030, 
70% of it exported. Oil production is 
planned to rise sixfold to 66.6 million 
tons in the same period. During 2012–
2016, annual average gas output is 
expected to rise to 90 billion m3, 50% 
above current output. 
The 7,000 kilometer pipeline across 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the 
PRC, built with PRC assistance in 
2009, has annual capacity of 30 billion 
m3, which will be expanded to 65 
billion m3 by 2020, raising Turkmen 
gas exports to a record high. According 
to government plans, the existing 
pipelines to the PRC, the Russian 
Federation, and Iran will be augmented 
with additional pipelines, including the 
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–
India natural gas pipeline and the 
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline across the 
Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and on to 
Europe. 
This chapter was written by Iskandar Gulamov of the Uzbekistan Resident Mission, ADB, 
Tashkent.
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Uzbekistan
The economy grew by 8.2%, nearly as quickly as in 2011, driven by strong performance in all production 
sectors, continuing public investment, and high remittances and public sector wage increases, which 
boosted private consumption. Growth is forecast to slow only slightly in 2013 and 2014, while the current 
account remains in surplus. A more sophisticated and diversified industrial and export base is needed to 
sustain growth and expand employment over the longer term.
Economic performance
Despite weaker external demand, the economy again performed strongly. 
GDP grew by 8.2%, according to official data, driven by public investment 
and private consumption. The main supply-side contributors to growth 
were services, which grew by 10.4%, and industry including construction, 
which grew by 8.0% (Figure 3.8.1).
Industry growth was driven mainly by machinery, fuel, and 
light industry. Services played a larger economic role, due to strong 
performances by information and communication technology, finance, 
and trade and catering. Agriculture grew by 7%, primarily reflecting a 
larger cotton harvest and expanded livestock breeding.
On the demand side, private consumption rose by 6.0%, as a result 
of higher public sector wages and pensions, expanded remittances, and 
increased domestic lending. Gross fixed capital formation increased by 
11.6%. (Data for total investment are not available, because there is no 
information on changes in stock inventories.) Public investment rose by 
16.7%, improving on the 11.3% increase in 2011, as the government further 
expanded investment to support ongoing industrial modernization and 
infrastructure development. Most public investment was to overhaul key 
industrial sectors and construct new housing. 
The government reported that inflation in 2012 remained within 
the official target of 7%. An alternative estimate by the International 
Monetary Fund is 12.9%. Inflationary pressures mainly reflected currency 
depreciation, wage and pension increases, and higher administrative 
prices for fuel, utilities, and bread, which were instituted toward achieving 
cost recovery. The central bank responded by tightening monetary policy, 
especially in the second half of the year, through sales of certificates of 
deposit on the open market, though the policy rate remained unchanged. 
An increase in net foreign assets was offset by accumulating government 
deposits, including in the Fund for Reconstruction and Development 
(FRD), a sovereign wealth fund. As a result, broad money growth slowed 
to 25.0% from 32.3% in 2011 (Figure 3.8.2). 
3.8.2 Inflation and broad money
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The central bank continued to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market with the aim of depreciating the local currency—the sum—to 
promote competitiveness. By year-end the sum had depreciated by almost 
10% against the dollar.
Fiscal policy remained broadly unchanged in 2012. The consolidated 
budget, including large surpluses from the FRD, is again estimated 
to have recorded an overall surplus, equal to 3.1% of GDP. Revenue 
gains from historically high prices for key export commodities (mainly 
precious metals) and improved tax administration offset expenditures 
to cover wage and pension increases and higher social outlays. Revenues 
equaled 36.7% of GDP and expenditures 33.6% (Figure 3.8.3).
The current account surplus narrowed to an estimated 4.7% of GDP 
from 8.1% in 2011 as the trade surplus decreased (Figure 3.8.4). 
Exports of goods and services declined by 5.1%, reflecting weaker 
external demand and declines in international prices for Uzbekistan’s 
major export commodities: cotton, copper, and natural gas. Exports 
of cotton, foodstuffs, chemical, metals, and machinery all fell in 2012. 
However, an 81% rise in exports of energy products, primarily natural gas, 
limited the overall decline in exports. 
Imports of goods and services rose by 9%, as continued state-led 
infrastructure development and industrial modernization required more 
imports of capital goods and services. Remittances and compensation 
from abroad, included in the income account, grew sharply, particularly 
from the Russian Federation, which totaled $5.6 billion. This was the 
highest amount since independence, reflecting strong demand for 
construction labor (Figure 3.8.5).
The government reported foreign investment inflows of $2.5 billion, 
mainly into oil and gas, petrochemicals, and automobile manufacturing. 
External debt is estimated to have increased modestly to 17.8% of 
GDP at the end of 2012 from 17.4% at the end of 2011, as the public 
investment program is increasingly being financed by foreign loans 
(Figure 3.8.6).
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast at 7.5% in 2013 and 8.0% in 2014, driven by 
state-led investment and domestic consumption. Industry and services 
will continue to be the main supply-side drivers of economic growth. 
Industrial output will be supported by higher domestic lending and 
foreign investment, while services will be driven by higher domestic 
demand, especially from the public sector. Agriculture is projected to 
post healthy growth, albeit less than the 8-year high observed in 2012.
Backed by a large FRD surplus, the government is expected to 
continue increasing public investment in infrastructure development, 
industrial modernization, and housing. The government investment 
program for 2013 envisages projects equal to 24.7% of GDP. Gross fixed 
capital formation is forecast to rise by 10% in 2013 and 11% in 2014.
The 2013 program will be implemented under the framework of the 
$47.3 billion Industrial Modernization and Infrastructure Development 
Program for 2011–2015, financed through a combination of external 
financing, domestic investment, and FRD resources. The program 
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aims to add more value in manufacturing and raise exports of oil, 
gas, petrochemicals, and other chemicals. In addition to the ongoing 
$4.0 billion Surgill Natural Gas Chemicals Project, the program 
includes developing a $4.0 billion facility to liquefy natural gas in the 
Kashkadarya region.
As in 2012, the government is expected to implement measures in 2013 
and 2014 to augment consumption, most likely by raising public sector 
wages, welfare payments, and pensions. Private consumption is forecast 
to rise by 7.0% in 2013 and 8.0% in 2014, reflecting these developments, 
planned expansion of retail credit from banks, and the expectation of 
sustained remittances.
Inflation is forecast at 9.5% in 2013 and 9.0% in 2014. Anticipated 
declines in global food prices, lower import costs, the lagged effect of 
monetary tightening in 2012, and continued tight monetary policy are 
expected to slow inflation, despite planned wage and pension increases 
and further growth in net foreign assets.
Fiscal policy is expected to relax slightly in coming years, with 
the augmented budget surplus expected to decline to 2.9% of GDP in 
2013 and 2.6% of GDP in 2014. Revenues from commodity exports will 
likely remain robust, albeit growing less rapidly than in 2011 and 2012. 
Revenues are forecast to equal 31.0% of GDP in 2013 and 30.2% in 2014. 
Supplementing these revenues will be FRD transfers projected at 5.5% 
of GDP in 2013 and 5.2% in 2014. On the expenditure side, the budget 
strongly emphasizes welfare and social development. Almost 60% of all 
expenditure is allocated to social security, welfare, health care, education, 
and culture. Augmented budget expenditure is forecast at 33.6% of GDP 
in 2013 and 32.9% in 2014. 
Money supply growth is expected to remain at 25% in 2013 and 24% in 
2014, as the government increases wages and pensions. Further build-up 
in the central bank’s net foreign assets, at least to mid-2013, and continued 
foreign exchange intervention to depreciate the local currency will tend 
to raise foreign reserves. Nevertheless, the authorities are expected to 
keep monetary policy tight and continue the accumulation of government 
deposits and liquidity-mopping operations.
The current account surplus is forecast to shrink further, to 4.3% of 
GDP in 2013 and 3.2% of GDP in 2014, as the trade surplus dwindles 
(Figure 3.8.7). 
Falling external demand and international prices for the country’s 
main export commodities will adversely affect export performance. 
The key downside risks are economic slowdown in the European Union 
or the Russian Federation and, in the PRC, uncertain demand for 
imports. Weaker consumer demand in these countries would suppress 
trade and remittances. Merchandise exports should rise moderately, by 
6.9% in 2013, before declining by 1.0% in 2014. 
Merchandise imports are projected to rise gradually, by 9.1% in 2013 
and 4.2% in 2014. Demand will come mostly from public infrastructure 
spending and the industrial modernization program. Lower global 
commodity prices will reduce import payments, as will greater import 
controls. Early in 2013 the government adopted a decree that effectively 
restricted imports by imposing additional procedures and controls on a 
number of consumer goods. 
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Reflecting higher foreign borrowing for industrial modernization 
and infrastructure development, external debt is forecast to reach 19.3% 
of GDP at the end of 2013 and 20.8% at the end of 2014—still modest by 
international standards.
Policy challenge—diversifying exports and 
liberalizing external trade
Although continued government investment in infrastructure and 
industrialization will promote growth, Uzbekistan needs to develop a 
more sophisticated and diversified industrial and export base to sustain 
growth and expand employment over the longer term. Moreover, 
infrastructure development and industrial modernization programs 
are themselves influenced in the long run by exports, as government 
investment is funded mainly by earnings from export industries, 
converted into FRD savings. Therefore, export diversity is crucial to the 
long-term sustainability of investment. 
While export diversification has progressed, Uzbekistan’s exports 
remain more concentrated and less sophisticated than those of 
other Asian countries. Figure 3.8.8 above shows that, although the 
sophistication of Uzbekistan’s export basket has improved notably, it 
remains far less sophisticated than that of middle-income Asian countries 
such as Malaysia and the PRC. The sophistication of Uzbekistan’s exports 
also lags behind the norm for countries with similar per capita income 
(Figure 3.8.9). 
Uzbekistan’s export diversification is also very constricted 
(Figure 3.8.10), especially for sophisticated products in the core areas of 
metals, machineries, and chemicals. While the economy has expanded 
into somewhat more sophisticated products such as motor vehicles, 
they are still exported only to a few destinations, mostly to the Russian 
Federation. Uzbekistan therefore needs to expand its export markets 
for industrial products, as well as lift its product lines to those with 
higher value.
Policies and investments that improve the business environment, 
encourage private sector expansion, and strengthen infrastructure and 
logistics would promote a more diversified and sophisticated export 
sector. Uzbekistan is ranked last of 185 economies in the Trading Across 
Borders category of the World Bank’s Doing Business 2013 report. Costs of 
exporting from and importing into the country average more than twice 
those of regional competitors. Liberalizing external trade through lower 
compliance costs, improved access to finance and foreign exchange, and 
simplified customs procedures would assist the private sector, which 
would in turn transform the economic landscape and promote growth. 
Structural reforms are especially important in view of continuing global 
uncertainty and the consequences for Uzbekistan’s export prospects of 
advancing regional trade integration, as evidenced by the recent customs 
union involving the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
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People’s Republic of China
High growth and low inflation in 2012 are expected to continue in 2013. Growth slowed but continued to 
shine among large economies. Consumption outpaced investment to contribute the most to expansion. 
In  line with the emphasis on domestic demand, the current account surplus continued to decline relative 
to GDP in a trend expected to continue in 2013 and 2014. The challenge is to implement ambitious 
reforms to restructure the economy toward domestic demand and inclusive growth. 
Economic performance
Beset by a deteriorated external environment and a cooled real estate 
sector, economic growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) slowed 
from 9.3% in 2011 to 7.8% in 2012, the lowest rate in the past 13 years but 
still higher than the government’s target of 7.5%. Growth picked up late 
in 2012, boosted by stimulus measures adopted earlier in the year that 
included higher public spending, especially on infrastructure, and fiscal 
incentives. Economic activity—particularly manufacturing and other 
industry—started to rebound in September in a trend that has continued 
uninterrupted. Higher growth at 7.9% in the fourth quarter of 2012 ended 
deceleration that had persisted for seven consecutive quarters. Higher 
salary and pension increases fueled real income growth—up by 9.5% in 
urban areas and by 10.7% in rural areas—lifting per capita income to 
$6,080 at the market exchange rate prevailing at the end of December. 
Consumption expenditure growth slowed in 2012, reflecting lower 
economic dynamism, but nevertheless its contribution to growth 
surpassed that of investment (Figure 3.9.1). The slowdown in investment 
was due mainly to less-brisk growth of fixed asset investment, a major 
component of total investment (Figure 3.9.2), which in turn resulted from 
falling investment in real estate triggered by government restrictions on 
the purchase of investment property. A rebound in apartment sales since 
July 2012, driven by higher incomes and stable prices, suggests improved 
momentum in a key sector of the economy, which augurs well for higher 
growth in 2013. 
Growth by economic sector varied from 8.1% in industry and services 
to 4.5% in agriculture. Growth in the industry sector—by far the largest 
component of GDP—declined by 2.2 percentage points year on year, 
contributing the most to GDP deceleration (Figure 3.9.3). Growth in 
services suffered less than industry, and growth in several high-end 
services including information, design, and creative industry outperformed 
traditional services, suggesting upward sophistication in the sector. 
Improved weather and government support to agro-services contributed to 
making agriculture the only sector in which growth accelerated.
3.9.1 Demand-side contributions to growth
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Measured by the consumer price index (CPI), inflation gradually 
slowed in 2012 from 4.5% year on year in January to 2.5% in December 
(Figure 3.9.4). For the year as a whole, the CPI declined to 2.6% from 
5.4% in 2011. Improved supplies of food, mainly pork, and better 
weather contained the rise in food prices, the largest category in the 
CPI basket. The stabilization of housing prices also contributed to the 
moderating trend.
Fiscal policy supported growth through consumption subsidies 
and more favorable fiscal treatment of the service sector and small and 
medium-sized enterprises. In 2012 the consolidated fiscal deficit was 
modest at 1.6% of GDP, and bank borrowing to cover it raised total 
domestic public debt, including local government debt, to 54% of GDP. 
Fiscal expenditure grew by 15.1% and revenue by 12.8%. A gradual 
shift in focus toward social expenditure was reflected in higher support 
to education, up by 28.3%. On the revenue side, corporate income 
tax collection increased by 17.2% in line with improved enterprise 
profitability, while individual income tax revenue declined by about 4% 
following the late 2011 raise in the income threshold at which individuals 
pay taxes. 
With taxation at the forefront of the reform agenda, the government 
announced plans to expand property taxes piloted in Shanghai and 
Chongqing to other cities and gradually establish a nationwide property 
tax system to keep real estate from overheating and provide a steady 
income to local governments. Similarly, the trial replacement of the 
business tax with a value-added tax was extended to new provinces 
and municipalities. The program covers telecommunications, rail 
transportation, construction, and business services. 
Monetary stance was accommodative in 2012. Lower inflation and 
declining growth prompted the central bank to cut both the 1-year 
benchmark interest rate and the reserve requirement ratio twice in 2012 
(Figure 3.9.5). Nevertheless, money supply (M2) grew by 13.8%, in line 
with the government’s target of 14.0%. Total social financing, a measure 
of liquidity outside M2, rose by 22.8% to CNY15.8 trillion at year-end, 
which is almost double the CNY8.2 trillion in new bank lending. 
The rise highlights the rapid development of such untraditional sources 
of liquidity as trust loans, bond issuances, entrusted loans, and bank 
acceptance bills, which do not fall easily under central bank control. 
In 2012, the central bank began implementing a multiyear financial 
reform plan to liberalize exchange and interest rates, gradually open 
the capital account, and move from quantity-based to price-based tools 
of monetary policy. A deposit insurance scheme will complement plans 
to liberalize interest rates. Moreover, a special zone in Shenzhen will 
pioneer a direct cross-border yuan-denominated lending pilot with 
Hong Kong, China. Terms and interest rates will be set independently 
in line with efforts toward instituting greater interest rate flexibility 
and full convertibility. This measure—together with the doubling 
of the currency trading band to 1% in 2012, which introduced more 
flexibility in the country’s exchange rate regime—will further boost the 
internationalization of the currency.
Reflecting the added flexibility, the renminbi appreciated in 2012 by an 
annual average of 2.4% against the US dollar and 10.6% against the euro. 
3.9.3 Supply-side contributions to growth
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In real effective terms the currency appreciated by 5.9% in 2012 and by 9% 
since 2010, which may have implications for competitiveness (Box 3.9.1).
Trade flows grew more slowly in 2012, registering for the first time 
a slower increase than the government’s target: 6.2% vis-à-vis 10.0%. 
Weaker demand from major trading partners depressed export growth 
to 7.9% based on customs data, down from 20.3% in 2011 (Figure 3.9.6). 
Exports nevertheless performed better than imports—which grew by 
only 4.4%, compared with 24.9% in 2011—widening the trade surplus to 
$233 billion from $158 billion in 2011, or below 3% of GDP. The services 
account remained in deficit as payments for tourism, transportation, 
and insurance exceeded receipts. These developments shrank the current 
account surplus to 2.6% of GDP in 2012 from 2.8% in 2011 (Figure 3.9.7).
Owing to the attractiveness of the Chinese market, foreign direct 
investment inflows were less affected than trade by the unfavorable 
external environment, declining by only 3.7% from a year earlier and 
reaching $112 billion. Gross foreign exchange reserves grew by 3.1% to 
CNY3.3 trillion in 2012.
Economic prospects
The baseline outlook assumes that the US economy will continue its slow 
recovery, the euro area will avoid a worsening of the current crisis, and 
increased public spending in the PRC will improve living standards and 
boost consumption. Against this backdrop, and following the rebound in 
economic activity since September 2012, growth is expected to continue 
picking up in the first half of 2013 and stabilize for the remainder of the 
year, as the impact of stimulus implemented in mid-2012 fades. 
Looking ahead, fixed asset investment will continue to drive growth, 
boosted by efforts to accelerate large infrastructure projects earmarked 
in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 2011–2015. Rising wages and pensions will 
support private consumption growth. The expected slow recovery of 
external demand suggests the contribution of net exports to growth will 
remain marginally negative in 2013 but turn modestly positive in 2014 as 
global trade picks up.
Export growth is projected at 10% in 2013, and import growth will 
reach 9% as domestic demand strengthens, commodity prices rebound, 
and the national currency continues to appreciate. The trade surplus will 
nevertheless be slimmer, narrowing the current account surplus to 2.5% of 
GDP in 2013 and 2.1% in 2014. 
The accompanying policy stance will likely be supportive. Fiscal 
policy is expected to be more expansionary, with the overall fiscal deficit 
projected to widen to 2.2% of GDP in 2013 from 1.6% in 2012. The bias 
toward social expenditure will continue in accordance with government 
intentions to reduce the income gap and improve living standards 
through tax reform. Monetary policy will remain accommodative with 
broad money supply set to grow by 13% in 2013.
Under these assumptions, GDP growth is forecast at 8.2% in 2013. 
Greater efforts to comply with more stringent environmental targets, 
coupled with reforms to make growth more inclusive, will push growth 
down slightly to 8% in 2014 (Figure 3.9.8). Stable commodity prices will 
contain inflationary pressures in 2013, leaving the CPI up 3.2% on average, 
3.9.6 Trade indicators, (year-on-year growth)
–20
0
20
40
60
ImportsExports
Feb
2013
 
JulJan
2012
JulJan
2011
%
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 11 March 2013).
3.9.7 Current account balance
0
100
200
300
400
500
0
3
6
9
12
15
2014201320122011201020092008
$ billion % of GDP
Forecast
Sources: CEIC Data Company (accessed 4 February 2013); 
ADB estimates.
3.9.8 GDP growth
6
8
10
12
2014201320122011201020092008
%
Forecast
5-year moving average
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, People’s Republic 
of China. http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ (accessed 
4 February 2013); ADB estimates.
158  Asian Development Outlook 2013
3.9.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
GDP growth 8.2 8.0
Inflation 3.2 3.5
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
2.5 2.1
Source: ADB estimates. 
slightly below the government target of 3.5%. However, higher labor costs 
and likely rises in food prices can be expected to drive the CPI up to 3.5% 
in 2014 (Figure 3.9.9).
The outlook is subject to several downside risks. First, in 2013 the 
economy will remain vulnerable to the sluggish global recovery, which 
could exacerbate weakness in external demand and hamper exports and 
employment. The main risk stems from the fragile economic outlook 
in the European Union, the PRC’s largest trading partner and the only 
major market to which PRC exports shrank in 2012 (Figure 3.9.10). 
Second, weather-induced food-price volatility, higher labor costs 
arising from tight market conditions, and planned measures to liberalize 
administered prices for utilities may generate inflationary pressures, albeit 
within government targets.
Third, local governments are under growing pressure to embark 
on large infrastructure projects to foster growth and employment. 
The trend may intensify as there is a historic pattern of investment 
growth accelerating during the second and third years of 5-year plans. 
This pattern, if repeated now, could rapidly expand local government 
indebtedness. Moreover, over half of the debt contracted by local 
government through investment platforms under the fiscal stimulus 
in 2009–2010 will mature in 2013. These factors could undermine 
debt sustainability for local governments and saddle banks with more 
nonperforming loans. However, systemic risk is unlikely to emerge in the 
banking sector. Not only is the current volume of nonperforming loans 
manageable at 1% (Figure 3.9.11), but overall loan-to-deposit and capital-
adequacy ratios are within regulatory requirements. Further, effective 
banking supervision and more stringent regulations on nontraditional 
lending channels are expected to be implemented as needed.
Fourth, the rapid aging of the population is taking its toll on the 
labor market, causing the size of the working-age population to decline 
in 2012 for the first time. Diminishing labor supply could create pressure 
to raise wages. Unless compensated by labor productivity growth, higher 
wages would erode the economy’s competitiveness and growth potential, 
hampering government development plans (Box 3.9.1).
These downside risks make 2013 a challenging year of transition for 
the new leadership. The new leaders have indicated their intention to 
focus on quality, efficiency, and the sustainability of economic growth, 
replacing the previous pursuit of fast-track growth. This welcome 
approach will help to rebalance over time the PRC’s sources of growth 
in favor of domestic demand and shrink the income gap. However, in 
implementing its program, the new government will be challenged by the 
risks enumerated above and by the complexity of the reforms needed for 
the PRC to successfully raise incomes, as highlighted in the next section.
Policy challenge—fiscal reform for 
inclusive growth
The greatest challenge arising from the new leaders’ reform agenda is 
stepping up efforts to restructure the economy toward domestic demand 
and making growth more inclusive. Against this background, the new 
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leadership has announced a reform plan with three pillars: financial market 
reform to liberalize interest rates and accelerate bond market developments, 
fiscal reform to support economic restructuring and narrow the income 
gap, and deregulation to support greater private sector participation in the 
economy. Among the three, the fiscal component stands as the most crucial 
and challenging reform to be addressed in the coming years. 
In its transition toward a market-oriented economy, the PRC 
introduced only limited taxation, and central government transfers for 
education, health, housing, and pensions declined. A wide income gap 
and low consumption resulted, constraining the enormous potential of 
domestic demand as an engine of growth. In recent years, the government 
has adopted a range of measures to reverse the trend. In particular, 
social spending has increased. Even so, it remains low, with government 
expenditure on education and health care amounting to only 5.5% of GDP 
(Figure 3.9.12), less than half of the average of 12.5% allocated by countries 
in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Moreover, reforms have focused on expanding benefit coverage rather than 
revamping the benefits themselves. 
Recent income tax changes have reduced the number of individual tax 
payers to less than 3% of the population and their payments to 6% of fiscal 
revenue. The narrow base leaves policy makers with no powerful tool with 
which to improve income distribution. The direct income tax base can 
be broadened by shifting the informal sector into the formal economy, 
strengthening tax administration, and curtailing tax evasion.
The regressive bias of the taxation system needs to be corrected. 
It would be more equitable to move away from the current emphasis on 
indirect taxation, which is highly regressive, toward a progressive tax 
system that shifts the tax burden from low-income households to high 
earners. Taxing capital gains and property would also help to improve 
income distribution. Property tax is a potentially significant source of 
stable tax revenue for local governments, allowing them to mitigate their 
heavy reliance on revenue from land sales and improve their provision of 
basic social services.
 A shift in public spending away from investment and toward social 
transfers would allow people to save less against an uncertain future 
and consume more now. Similarly, higher provisions for education and 
pensions would reduce life-cycle savings and free up household resources 
for consumption. Improving tax collection, further liberalizing energy 
and resource prices, introducing environmental taxes, and channeling 
state-owned enterprises’ dividends into social expenditure would allow 
higher spending without straining public finances. 
Also needed are reforms to make central government transfers to 
poorer provinces larger and more effective toward achieving more equitable 
delivery of local public services. Although transfer payments from the 
central government have increased, the capacity of local governments 
to provide public services has not improved in tandem, and fiscal and 
institutional capacity disparities remain large in governments at the 
sub-provincial level. In this context, revenue and expenditure responsibilities 
need to be better shared between the central and local governments. 
To ensure fiscal sustainability and efficiency, the PRC should 
further strengthen fiscal management by consolidating central and 
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local government budgets, the social security budget, and income 
and expenditure associated with state-owned assets. It should adopt 
multiyear budgeting to better align longer-term expenditure needs with 
development goals. 
Finally, to highlight the importance of the environmental challenge, 
the PRC should accelerate its introduction of green taxes. The PRC’s rapid 
development has come at significant environmental cost. Notwithstanding 
the authorities’ commendable efforts already undertaken to combat 
climate change, additional actions are required to improve energy 
efficiency and the management of water and land. 
3.9.1 Wages and competitiveness in the PRC
In recent years the spotlight in the PRC has been on 
employment generation and economic competitiveness 
in light of concerns over the rapid increase in unit 
labor costs, stemming partly from dramatic increases in 
minimum wages. A major structural transformation of 
the labor market has amplified wage gains, causing them 
to outstrip labor productivity growth. Higher labor costs 
challenge the PRC’s competitiveness and the ability of its 
economy to generate adequate jobs.
Structural changes in the PRC’s labor market have 
occurred at a speed unprecedented in history. As recently 
as 1990, more than 80% of urban workers were still 
employed by state-owned enterprises and other collectives. 
Today, the private sector is the main provider and creator 
of jobs in urban areas, such that state-owned and collective 
units accounted for only 45% of all urban jobs in 2010. 
In rural areas, the changes are no less striking. Most rural 
employment is no longer agricultural, and legions of rural 
workers have migrated to urban areas. 
During this period of structural transformation, labor 
productivity in the PRC has been growing more quickly 
than in the rest of the world, but it nevertheless remains 
low. In the most recent years for which data are available, 
annual labor productivity in the PRC was $3,700 per 
worker in 2005 dollars adjusted for purchasing power 
parity, far below the Republic of Korea’s $27,800 and 
Singapore’s $51,200. 
At the same time, even after adjusting for inflation, 
average real wages for urban workers more than tripled in 
a decade. Minimum wages grew even more quickly than 
average wages, increasing by an average of 17% across the 
country in 2011 alone. In addition, non-wage costs such as 
for hiring and firing have increased with the introduction 
in 2008 of the Labor Contract Law. The impetus for higher 
wages has also come from the shrinking labor pool. In 
2012, the working-age population aged 15–59 years old 
contracted by 3.5 million. In coastal areas, the decline is 
even more pronounced, as the inflow of migrant workers 
diminishes with rising standards of living and higher 
expectations among potential migrants in areas away 
from the coast. This trend is exacerbated by limitations 
long imposed on workers’ mobility through household 
registration (hukou) restrictions.
There are signs that these developments and the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate have eroded the 
competitiveness of the economy. Low-cost and labor-
intensive manufacturers have been relocating to cheaper 
locales, helping Southeast Asia in particular realize a 
sharply increased share of global investment. Moreover, 
the most recent ranking of global competitiveness reported 
by the World Economic Forum, in September 2012, saw 
the PRC’s ranking slip for the first time in 7 years, from 
the 26th to 29th. According to the report, the PRC has 
become globally less competitive with respect to the goods 
market, firm-level technological readiness, the availability 
of on-the-job training services, flexibility in wage 
determination, hiring and firing practices, and redundancy 
costs. Improved competitiveness in these areas is essential 
to sustaining growth in the future.
Looking ahead, a number of measures are needed 
to keep competitiveness from eroding further. First, 
the authorities should ensure that increases in the 
minimum wage do not outpace productivity growth or, 
to avoid hindering job creation, the absorptive capacity 
of the labor market. Second, the public goal of reducing 
the income gap should entail transfers to low-income 
households. Third, productivity growth should be fostered 
through on-the-job training initiatives and by government 
incentives for firms to invest in new technologies. Finally, 
to improve market flexibility and job matching, steps are 
needed to reduce migration and transaction costs in the 
labor market. Key to reducing labor rigidity is reforming 
the hukou system, coupled with school subsidies in 
areas that are the main sources of migrant workers to 
reduce dropout rates as unskilled wages rise. These steps 
matter most in rural and less-developed areas, where 
improvements in human capital are indispensable to 
future growth.
Source: ADB. 2013. Wages and Competitiveness in the People’s Republic of China. Observations and Suggestions No. 2013-2. Beijing.
This chapter was written by Arief Ramayandi and Aleli Rosario of the Economics and 
Research Department, ADB, Manila.
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Hong Kong, China 
Fragility in the global economy dampened trade, but resilient domestic demand ensured modest growth. 
A rebound is expected in the next 2 years as the global economy gains momentum and trade picks up. 
Inflation will remain at around 4%, fuelled by rising property prices, and the current account surplus will 
widen. A liquidity glut and low interest rates entail the risk of asset price bubbles. Ample fiscal reserves 
provide flexibility to implement corrective measures against shocks. 
Economic performance 
Growth in Hong Kong, China was slow in the beginning of 2012. Global 
trade weakened as the fragile international economy failed to pick up 
because of the unresolved financial crisis in the euro area, lingering fiscal 
uncertainties in the US, and moderating growth in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), strongly affecting this small open economy. Encouraging 
developments in the fourth quarter, however, helped to push economic 
performance for the full year to modest 1.4% growth.
Domestic demand was the main engine of growth, with private 
consumption continuing to make the largest contribution, albeit 
substantially less than a year earlier (Figure 3.10.1). Consumer sentiment 
was cautious, despite low unemployment at 3.3% and increasing wealth 
with rising asset prices and real income, as measured by changes in the 
payroll index. The contribution of government consumption to growth 
improved but remained small.
Stronger investment in 2012 also contributed to growth, as 
construction and the private acquisition of machinery and equipment 
expanded. Net exports declined.
On the supply side, manufacturing contracted, but growth was 
spurred by the service sector, which provided more than 90% of GDP 
and accelerated by 2% in 2012, down from 5.2% a year earlier. Growth 
in the sector was driven by real estate and business services, public 
administration, social and personal services, and information and 
communication services (Figure 3.10.2). The other components of the 
sector posted more subdued growth. Retail sales grew more slowly than 
in 2011, despite the steady stream of visitor arrivals. The number of tourist 
arrivals grew by 16%, about the same as in 2011.
Exports and imports both contracted in the early part of the year but 
recovered somewhat in the second half. Much of the city’s merchandise 
exports are re-exports, which moved in tandem with slower global trade, 
resulting in a larger increase in imports than in exports. Net service 
exports lost some of the dynamism of previous years, growing at 40% 
3.10.2 Components of the services sector
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compared with 192% in 2010 and 62% in 2011 and barely managing to 
overcome the deficit in merchandise trade. 
Reflecting these developments, the current account recorded a small 
surplus of 1.1% of GDP in 2012, down from 4.8% in 2011 (Figure 3.10.3). 
The overall balance of payments was still in surplus, and foreign reserves 
amounted to $317.3 billion, equivalent to over 7.5 months of imports.
Inflation moderated but remained elevated as property prices rose 
on low interest rates. Moderated food prices, electricity subsidies, and 
2 months of free rent for public housing tenants contained the price rise 
to 4.1% in 2012, down from 5.3% in 2011 (Figure 3.10.4).
The budget for FY2012 (ended 31 March 2013) is estimated to have 
recorded a surplus of 3.2% of GDP (Figure 3.10.5). Although only a meager 
2.9% higher than in FY2011, estimated revenues far exceed the budgeted 
amount. Expenditures grew by 3.9% but also fell short of the budgeted 
amount by HK$13.1 billion because of lower social spending. Larger-than-
budgeted surpluses in the past few years have led to the accumulation of 
fiscal reserves equal to 23 months of average government expenditure. The 
ample size of the reserves has prompted calls for the government to spend 
more on social welfare programs.
With the exchange rate pegged to the US dollar under the 
currency board, interest rates in Hong Kong, China track the policies 
of the US Federal Reserve. Accommodative monetary policy in the 
US meant low interest rates and ample liquidity, with broad money 
expanding by 11.1%. Bank credit grew by 9.6% as banks’ exposure 
to the property sector rose to around 30% of loans outstanding. 
Low interest rates fueled demand for real estate and a 26% surge 
in residential property prices. Amid concerns regarding the risk to 
the banking sector posed by overheating in the property market, 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority required banks to tighten 
underwriting criteria for mortgage loans on borrowers who already 
own at least one property. 
The Hong Kong dollar real effective exchange rate rose at a 
moderate pace compared with Asian counterparts, preserving 
export competitiveness (Figure 3.10.6). The expansion of transactions 
denominated in PRC renminbi continued in 2012, with renminbi deposits 
amounting to 9.1% of the all deposits in the banking system. The number 
of banks engaged in the renminbi business is growing, and their services 
are broadening. 
Economic prospects 
Growth in the forecast period is expected to fall short of the 5-year 
average prior to the global financial crisis but will accelerate to 3.5% in 
2013 and 3.8% in 2014, benefiting from expanded trade, robust domestic 
demand, and increased government support for industry and lower-
income groups (Figure 3.10.7). Higher anticipated growth in the PRC will 
benefit Hong Kong, China in particular through increased trade and 
expanded renminbi business and payments. 
Private consumption will grow with rising wages reflecting a tight 
labor market and an increase in the minimum wage to HK$30/hour from 
HK$28/hour on 1 May 2013 (Figure 3.10.8). The wealth effect from rising 
3.10.3 Current account components
–30
–15
0
15
30
–16
–8
0
8
16
Current account
balanceTransfers
Income
Services
Goods
20122011201020092008
$ billion % of GDP
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 25 March 2013).
3.10.4 Sources of inflation
–3
0
3
6
9
Percentage points 
Jan
2010
Jul Jan
2012
Jan
2011
Jul Jul Feb
2013
Housing
Electricity, gas, and water
Transport
Others
Overall
Food
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 25 March 2013).
3.10.5 Government budget
ExpenditureRevenue
0
90
180
270
360
450
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Revised
estimate
2010 2011 2012
HK$ billion
Sources: Hong Kong Monetary Authority; The Government 
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Various 
budgets. http://www.budget.gov.hk/ 
3.10.6  Real effective exchange rates, 
selected economies
90
100
110
120
Hong Kong, China
People’s Republic of China United States
Taipei,China
Singapore
Republic of Korea
Philippines
Feb
2013
JulJan
2012
JulJan
2011
JulJan
2010
Jan 2010 = 100
Source: Bank for International Settlements, http://www.bis.
org/statistics/eer/index.htm (accessed 17 March 2013).
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: East Asia Hong Kong, China  163
property prices is also expected to buoy consumer spending. Investment 
should continue to grow as public construction intensifies further and 
private construction picks up. 
The four industry pillars—financial services, business and professional 
services, tourism, and trading and logistics—are expected to pick up 
during the year with support from the government. The proposed 
doubling of the government bond program from $100 billion to $200 
billion and the lowering of profits tax on the offshore business of 
insurance companies will benefit the financial sector. Other sectors 
will gain from plans to attract large international events and meetings, 
develop Hong Kong’s logistics services, provide additional funding for 
universities to facilitate technology transfer and innovation, and enhance 
special concessions for small and medium-sized enterprises.
With the expansion of external trade, exports are expected to grow 
more quickly, but the trade deficit will remain. Services receipts should 
pick up, supported from vibrant tourism and a recovery in transport 
services. The current account surplus is expected to widen to 4% of GDP 
in 2013 and 5% in 2014.
Inflation is unlikely to moderate substantially during the forecast 
period. It is expected to fall marginally to 3.9% in 2013 from 4.1% in 2012 
as international food prices ease (Figure 3.10.9). However, expected wage 
increases could rekindle inflationary pressure, as could likely food price 
increases in the PRC, from which Hong Kong, China imports much of its 
food. Echoing the policies of the US Federal Reserve, low interest rates 
can be expected to prevail in the next 2 years, pushing up property and 
other asset prices and requiring tighter macroprudential measures to curb 
speculative demand and tame inflation to 4.3% in 2014.
Fiscal policy in FY2013 and FY2014 will be geared toward stimulating 
economic growth and supporting the development of established and 
emerging industries, while maintaining a prudent fiscal stance. A small 
deficit of 0.2% of GDP is projected for this fiscal year. Despite repeated 
revenue outcomes above budget in previous years, revenues for FY2013 
are conservatively projected at HK$435 billion, lower than the revised 
estimate in FY2012. Expenditures are to increase to HK$440 billion on 
both higher capital outlays and increased current expenditure.
The growth scenario will be threatened if the PRC or US economy 
weakens or the euro area financial crisis deepens. Less likely but possible, 
a sudden reversal of the interest rate trend could derail growth prospects 
and adversely affect the health of banks. The availability of ample fiscal 
reserves provides the government with flexibility to implement corrective 
measures if any of these risks materialize.
Policy challenge—providing adequate and 
affordable housing 
The rise of property prices has been a major concern in Hong Kong, 
China. Supply shortages and high and growing demand combine to stir 
up a vibrant property market.  The low interest rate environment and 
improved income prospects have contributed to a widening demand–
supply imbalance. Appetite for investment in housing units in all 
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segments of the market continues to grow in response to abundant 
liquidity and low interest rates, despite the macroprudential measures 
applied to curb speculative demand and protect the stability of the 
financial sector. As the rise in flat prices continues to outpace income 
growth,  the affordability ratio had risen to nearly 50% by December 2012 
(Figure 3.10.10). 
Housing supply has perennially fallen short of demand largely because 
of inadequate land made available for residential use. For the medium 
term, the government has announced that it will make land available for 
the private development of about 20,000 housing units each year and the 
public development of 79,000 rental flats over 5 years starting in FY2012. 
It also plans to build for sale to the public about 17,000 flats over 4 years 
starting in FY2016.  Given the time required for implementing a housing 
project, however, the mismatch between supply and demand can be 
expected to linger at least for the next 2 years. 
The government’s plan to develop a long-term housing strategy to 
promote the development of a healthy and stable property market is 
welcome, especially as land premiums and stamp duties are important 
sources of budgetary revenue. A strong commitment to act as necessary 
to protect the market from the risks of a property bubble is also essential. 
Indeed, policies implemented in 2012 and early 2013 have had some 
success in curbing speculation (Box 3.10.1), though property prices remain 
elevated. Housing prices are unlikely to stabilize as long as excess demand 
prevails and interest rates remain low. The challenge for the authorities 
is to maintain the stability of the property and financial markets, while 
meeting in a timely manner the needs of a changing population for 
affordable housing. 
3.10.1 Selected measures on the property market, 2012
In September 2012, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority tightened 
the maximum loan tenor to 30 years for all new property mortgages and 
reduced the following ratios for borrowers with multiple mortgages:
(i) the  maximum debt servicing ratio from 50% to 40%, 
(ii) the maximum stressed debt servicing ratio limit from 60% to 50%,  
(iii) the loan-to-value ratio to 30% for mortgage loans, based on 
applicants’ net worth, and another 10 percentage points lower for those 
with income derived mainly from outside Hong Kong, China. 
In October 2012, the government enhanced the duty rates and extended 
the holding period in respect of the special stamp duty imposed on 
residential properties resold within 3 years of acquisition. The applicable 
special stamp duty rates are 20% of the property value for resale within 
6 months, 15% for resale within 6–12 months, and 10% for resale 
within 12–36 months. A 15% buyers’ stamp duty was also introduced 
on residential properties acquired by buyers who are not Hong Kong 
permanent residents. 
The measures applied in 2012 helped reduce the transaction volume 
from a high of 14,306 in March 2012 to 9,129 by the end of December 
2012, according to the records of the Land Registry.  
Sources: Financial Secretary’s Office. 2012 Economic Background and 2013 Prospects. February 2013;  
Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
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This chapter was written by Donghyun Park of the Economics and Research Department, 
ADB, Manila.
Republic of Korea
The adverse global outlook took its toll on exports, investment plummeted, and growth disappointed at 
2% in 2012. Meanwhile, inflation abated, and the current account surplus widened. Modest improvement 
in external conditions will sow the seeds of recovery, and growth will pick up gently to 2.8% in 2013, with 
inflation remaining low and the current account surplus narrowing. Fiscal and monetary policy will broadly 
accommodate growth. Preventing and mitigating old-age poverty poses a high-priority policy challenge. 
Economic performance
Last year was greatly challenging, in particular because weaker demand 
from the advanced economies and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
the Republic of Korea’s biggest market, dealt a double blow that knocked 
the wind out of exports and growth momentum. The adverse external 
outlook had knock-on effects on domestic demand, especially plant and 
equipment investment. Mildly accommodative monetary and fiscal policy 
provided some relief, but growth slowed significantly from 3.7% in 2011 
to 2.0% in 2012. In parallel with global outlook trends, in particular the 
evolution of the euro area crisis, growth momentum weakened from the 
first quarter to the second and third quarters before picking up somewhat 
in the fourth quarter (Figure 3.11.1). 
Feeble domestic demand provided little relief from the fragile external 
environment. Plant and equipment investment, heavily dependent on 
exports and sensitive to the global business cycle, contracted by 1.9% 
after expanding by 3.6% in 2011. Construction also contracted because of 
the stagnant housing market and feeble private sector demand overall. 
Private consumption growth moderated from 2.4% in 2011 to 1.7% in 2012, 
as large household debt and the stagnant housing market combined to 
outweigh the influence of a healthy employment gain of 440,000, which 
kept the unemployment rate at 3.2%.
Except for government consumption, all components of aggregate 
demand made smaller contributions to growth in 2012 than in 2011 
(Figure 3.11.2). The contribution of net exports fell by half from 
1.8 percentage points in 2011, and that of investment plummeted into 
negative territory from 0.4 percentage points in 2011. In short, the 
uncertain global outlook precipitated slower exports and an outright 
contraction of investment. Disappointing performance in 2012 marks a 
further deceleration from the 6.3% growth of 2010 and is fueling broader 
concerns about growth prospects over the medium and long term.
The persistent softness of demand from advanced economies, 
combined with the palpable slowdown of the PRC economy, made 2012 
especially difficult for exporters. Year on year, merchandise exports grew 
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by a mere 0.1% in 2012, a sharp decline from the 19.6% of 2011. Export 
growth was muted throughout the year (Figure 3.11.3). The one bright spot 
in an otherwise grim export environment was the robust market in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Figure 3.11.4).
Mirroring the fragility of domestic demand, imports of goods 
plummeted by 1.1% in 2012 from the 23.4% growth in 2011, leaving 
a yawning trade surplus. At the same time a sizeable surplus in 
construction services combined with smaller deficits in tourism and 
business services to reverse the chronic services trade deficit to a record 
surplus. These developments added up to a record current account surplus 
of $43.1 billion, or 3.8% of GDP, even though the won strengthened 
somewhat, rising from 1,146 to the dollar in January to 1,077 in December.
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index averaged 2.2%, 
down sharply from the 4.0% of 2011 but remaining within the central 
bank’s inflation target band of 3.0% ±1 percentage point. Inflation 
decelerated during the course of the year as aggregate demand 
progressively softened (Figure 3.11.5). The lack of inflationary pressures 
and concerns about growth prodded the central bank to gradually loosen 
monetary policy during 2012, cutting its benchmark policy rate from 
3.25% to 3.00% in July and further to 2.75% in October. 
Fiscal policy was also mildly expansionary but well short of a full-
fledged stimulus. The fiscal deficit was 2.9% of GDP, somewhat similar to 
the previous 2 years, and the ratio of public debt to GDP edged up slightly 
to 34.8% from 34.0%. Reflecting positive fiscal developments, all three 
major credit rating agencies—Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard and Poor’s—
upgraded the Republic of Korea’s sovereign credit rating in 2012.
Economic prospects
Looking forward, 2013 will see the beginning of a recovery, which 
will gain traction as the global recovery finds its footing in 2014. GDP 
growth is likely to improve modestly to 2.8% in 2013 from 2.0% in 2012. 
A full-fledged recovery will have to wait until 2014, when GDP growth 
will strengthen to 3.7% (Figure 3.11.6). While domestic demand will 
contribute to growth in 2013, it will be nowhere near robust enough to 
qualitatively change the gradual and limited nature of recovery in 2013. 
Uncertainties in the global outlook regarding the advanced economies 
will continue to cast a dark cloud over global trade during the first half. 
But those uncertainties are expected to ease during the second half. The 
Republic of Korea’s performance will mirror the expected trajectory of 
the world economy, with growth in the second half of the year slightly 
outperforming expansion in the first half. 
Merchandise export growth is set to rise modestly from 0.1% in 2012 
to above 7% in 2013, as factors contributing to faster growth are likely to 
outweigh those depressing it. Stronger export growth since the fourth 
quarter of 2012 buttresses such cautious optimism. Exports to the PRC 
stand to benefit from that country’s widely expected stronger growth. 
On the other hand, limited fiscal stimulus in developing countries and 
fiscal austerity in the advanced economies will firmly cap aggregate 
export demand (Figure 3.11.7). Export growth will thus be muted overall—
unlike the V-shaped rebound after the global financial crisis—but will 
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mark an exit from the export distress of 2012. Meanwhile, imports are 
likely to rise in 2013 and 2014, reflecting strengthening domestic demand, 
and shrink the current account surplus to 3.0% of GDP in 2013 and 2.5% 
of GDP in 2014. 
In line with the trajectory of the global outlook, investment will 
contract in the first half but grow at a healthy pace of 3.0% or better 
in the second half, on the back of growing outlays in export-oriented 
industries and sectors. The effect of exports on equipment investment, 
traditionally high for this export-dependent country, is likely to be acute. 
Uncertainty in the post-crisis period encouraged firms to base their 
investment decisions more on visible short-term export trends than on 
highly uncertain long-term prospects. Looking forward, while business 
confidence remains fragile, low interest rates, the strong won, and 
tightening capacity utilization in recent months will provide impetus to 
investment (Figure 3.11.8). As a result, plant and equipment investment 
is likely to bounce back gradually in tandem with export recovery. 
Construction investment, which has contracted for 3 consecutive years, is 
set to grow by 2.0%. The modest turnaround will center on public works 
and nonresidential buildings, while the sluggish housing market will 
continue to stymie residential construction. Private consumption growth 
is projected to strengthen from 1.7% in 2012 to close to 3.0% in 2013, in 
light of the expected pickup in exports, relative price stability, healthy 
employment gains, and moderating uncertainties.
In line with the modest pickup of growth, consumer price index 
inflation will rise slightly from 2.2% in 2012 to 2.5% in 2013 and 2.8% 
in 2014. This outcome reflects the evolution of several factors affecting 
prices. Since the Republic of Korea’s potential GDP growth rate is 
estimated to be between 3.5% and 4.0%, a deflationary gap, which 
emerged during the second quarter of 2012, will persist well into 2013 
(Figure 3.11.9). Feeble domestic demand, fierce competition among 
recently proliferating self-employed service providers, the projected 
moderation of global oil prices, and the appreciation of the won will all 
alleviate inflationary pressures. On the other hand, an exceptionally cold 
winter may trigger higher food prices, and long-frozen fees for some 
public services are due to be raised this year. In addition, incomes will 
grow as employment rises by an estimated 300,000 jobs. This employment 
expansion, while less than in 2012, continues a long-term trend of healthy 
employment growth. 
Monetary policy aims to lower inflation to a rate like those 
experienced in advance countries. To this end, the central bank lowered 
and tightened the inflation target band from 3.0% ±1 percentage point 
to 2.5%–3.5%. However, this policy is likely to be tempered by a desire to 
support growth, so the central bank is likely to cut interest rates in the 
first half of 2013. 
The basic stance of fiscal policy in 2013 and 2014 will be to support 
economic growth in the face of feeble aggregate demand. To this end, the 
budget will continue to record a deficit of 0.3% of GDP in 2013. This is less 
than the 2.9% of 2012 and shrinks the ratio of public debt to GDP from 
34.8% to 34.3%, but the government will nevertheless adopt a concerted 
countercyclical fiscal approach in the short run by frontloading 60% 
of its budget during the first half of the year, gearing the composition 
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of expenditures toward maximizing support for growth. In particular, 
budget items targeted for significant expansion are social overhead capital 
investment, assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises, and job 
creation programs. 
This baseline economic outlook is subject to a number of risks. GDP 
forecasts are fraught with uncertainty arising from persistent uncertainty 
in the global outlook. The upside and downside risks are finely balanced, 
however, with the short-term performance of the US and euro area 
economies constituting the main sources of both upside and downside 
risk for the Republic of Korea. 
Protectionism, including competitive depreciation stemming from 
quantitative easing, is another potential risk. In this context, the sharp 
depreciation of the yen is of special concern because Japan and the 
Republic of Korea compete in many export industries (Figure 3.11.10). 
However, this concern is tempered by the likely positive impact of the 
weaker yen on the economy’s competitiveness, as the Republic of Korea 
imports large amounts of capital and intermediate goods from Japan. 
There is also political risk arising from the unpredictability of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Korea, which can shake the financial 
markets and have spillover effects on the economy in the south.
On the domestic front, the high and growing household debt—the 
perennial domestic risk—continues to weigh on private consumption even 
as it becomes less of a systemic financial and economic risk. There has 
been no noticeable uptick in consumer confidence. The average propensity 
to consume—the ratio of consumption to disposable income—fell from 
78% before the crisis to 76% in 2012. For low-income groups, anxieties 
about possible unemployment in a weak economy seem to constrain 
consumption. For higher-income groups, their deleveraging to reduce 
household debt burdens, compounded by stagnant housing prices, limit 
the propensity to consume (Figure 3.11.11). These risks suggest that private 
consumption may not grow as assumed under the baseline outlook. 
More broadly, the economy’s visibly slower and more volatile growth 
during the past 5 years has raised concerns about growth prospects over 
the medium and long term.
On the positive side, there are no major, high-probability systematic 
risks to financial stability. Even worst-case estimates of the impact of 
large household debt on banks’ balance sheets are deemed manageable. 
The risk from the mounting bad loans of savings banks—second-tier 
financial institutions—has also been addressed through extensive 
restructuring. Moreover, prudent fiscal policy has created sufficient fiscal 
space should there be a crisis that demands a large stimulus. Indeed, 
rating agencies’ sovereign credit rating upgrades reflect a market vote of 
confidence in the government’s ability to tackle a crisis without sacrificing 
fiscal sustainability.
Policy challenge—mitigating old-age poverty
The Republic of Korea needs to find ways to deliver affordable, adequate, 
and sustainable income support for its elderly population, which is one of 
the fastest growing in the world (Figure 3.11.12). The country introduced 
a public national pension system only in 1988, and, among members of 
3.11.9  Deflationary gap
–0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
Deflationary gap Estimate
Forecast
Oct Jan
2013
JulJan
2012
JulJan
2011
JulJan
2010
Percentage points
Source: LG Economic Research Institute. 2012. LG Business 
Insight. September.
3.11.10  Won–yen exchange rate
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
Feb
2013
 
OctJulAprJan
2012
OctJulAprJan
2011
Won/100 yen
Source: Bank of Korea. Economics Statistics System. http://
ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp (accessed 8 March 2013).
3.11.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
GDP growth 2.8 3.7
Inflation 2.5 2.8
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
3.0 2.5
Source: ADB estimates. 
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: East Asia Republic of Korea  169
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, it ranks 
second, after Mexico, for its meager share of GDP devoted to social 
spending. At the same time, traditional reliance on families is being 
eroded by extensive socioeconomic change. Most worryingly, rates of 
poverty and extreme poverty among the elderly rose from 2006 to 2011. 
The risk of widespread old-age poverty has thus emerged as a major 
social and economic concern in recent years (Table 3.11.2). This issue 
was arguably the hottest subject of debate during the December 2012 
presidential election, in which all candidates promised to devote more 
resources to mitigating old-age poverty.
The Basic Old-Age Pension (BOAP) is a noncontributory social 
scheme introduced in 2008 that uses general revenues to pay pensions to 
the elderly poor. Its central objective was to provide a safety net for many 
elderly who were at risk of falling into poverty because they were not 
covered by either the national pension system or the anti-poverty social 
security system unrelated to age. This coverage gap, while narrowing, is 
expected to remain substantial for years to come. 
As designed, the BOAP suffers some serious flaws that ill-suit it to 
mitigating old-age poverty. First, as 30%–40% of the elderly live with 
their children, a lot of the assistance ends up in the hands of relatively 
well-to-do elderly who live with well-to-do children. According to KDI, 
an autonomous development institute set up by the Republic of Korea, 
54.2% of the households in the wealthiest 10% of households with elderly 
members received BOAP benefits, suggesting that a substantial share 
of benefits flow to the better off. Second, the BOAP targets the poorest 
70% of the elderly, which includes many higher-income elderly who do 
not actually need support. Third, many elderly poor, especially those 
not living with their children, fail to apply for the BOAP for lack of 
information. Fourth, owing to its noncontributory nature, the BOAP can 
blunt incentives to join the national pension system because it requires a 
contribution, thereby raising budgetary costs.
In February 2013, the incoming administration announced a plan to 
extend BOAP coverage to the entire elderly population and double the 
benefits paid out to the poorest 70%. Among other equity concerns, the 
proposed plan favors non-contributors over contributors, thereby making 
it very controversial, throwing its passage by the legislature into doubt, 
and undermining its efficacy in mitigating old-age poverty.
To reduce inequities and budgetary costs and make the BOAP more 
effective, benefit amounts and eligibility should be carefully designed 
to minimize disincentives to joining the national pension system. In 
particular, BOAP eligibility should depend on a well-defined measure 
of poverty, rather than on an arbitrary percentage of poor elderly. For 
the elderly living with their children, eligibility should take into account 
children’s income. The primary, longer-term objective of pension reform 
must be to extend coverage under the main national pension system to 
the entire population.
3.11.2  Poverty rates among the 
elderly, 2006 and 2011 (%)
Age 2006 2011
65–69  38.0 (9.4) 40.0 (15.2)
70–74 45.2 (13.0) 52.3 (21.4)
75–79 53.7 (22.6) 57.8 (27.6)
80+ 45.4 (18.3) 51.4 (28.8)
60+ 43.8 (14.0) 48.8 (21.4) 
Note: Numbers inside parentheses indicate 
extreme poverty rate. Poverty rate refers to the 
share of the population with income below 50% 
of the median income. Extreme poverty rate refers 
to the share of the population with income below 
25% of the median income.
Source: Korea Development Institute.
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This chapter was written by Jan Hansen and Amar Lkhagvasuren of the Mongolia 
Resident Mission, ADB, Ulaanbaatar.
Mongolia
Continuing economic trends feature high growth and inflation, procyclical fiscal policy, and large current 
account deficits. GDP growth decelerated to 12.3% in 2012 from 17.5% in 2011, and inflation accelerated. 
Overly expansionary policies, including substantial off-budget spending, have caused internal and external 
macroeconomic imbalances. Over the longer term, sound public resource management and effective 
cooperation with private investors are needed to develop Mongolia’s energy sector in a sustainable and 
environmentally friendly way.
Economic performance 
Economic growth slowed to 12.3% in 2012, falling from 20.2% year on year 
in the fourth quarter of 2011 to 10.5% in the third quarter of 2012, after 
a slowdown in growth in the PRC curbed demand for coal, Mongolia’s 
biggest export. A driver of growth was infrastructure spending related 
to the mining boom, albeit to a lesser extent than in 2011, as the first 
phase of the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine—among the five largest 
in the world—neared completion. As a result, gross capital formation, 
including equipment, buildings, and intermediate goods, increased 
by 24.0%, markedly down from the 69.9% of 2011 but still the largest 
contributor to GDP growth, followed by consumption (Figure 3.12.1).
While economic growth in 2012 originated in the mining sector, it 
was quite broadly based (Figure 3.12.2). Construction continued to boom, 
raising concerns about another bubble as in 2004–2008. Mining grew by 
8.9% to generate 89.2% of exports, 17% of government revenue, and 18.6% 
of GDP, while employing less than 2% of the workforce. Agriculture, 
which provides more than one-third of employment, finally emerged 
from the devastating winter of 2009/10 that had decimated the country’s 
livestock by nearly a fifth. However, growth in wholesale and retail 
trade slowed to 10.3% from 38.3% in 2011, as spending on investment and 
intermediate goods decelerated. 
Inflation has remained high in Mongolia while declining in other 
Asian countries, owing mainly to rapidly rising government spending and 
higher food prices. In 2012, headline inflation increased to 14.3%, but core 
inflation (excluding food and energy prices) was more stable and averaged 
10.5% (Figure 3.12.3). 
Fiscal policy in 2012 continued to be procyclical, with the overall cash 
budget deficit rising to 7.7% of GDP from 4.8% in 2011 and the structural 
budget deficit rising to 8.3% from 6.9% in 2011. The initial government 
budget for 2012 projected revenue growth equal to 40% of GDP, 
expenditure growth of about 32%, and a cash budget deficit of 1%. But cash 
3.12.1 Demand-side contributions to growth
–23
0
23
46
2010 2011
Percentage points 
2012
Total consumption
Total investments
Net exports
GDP
Source: National Statistics Office of Mongolia. 2012. Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin. December. http://www.nso.mn
3.12.2 Supply-side contributions to growth
–5
0
5
10
15
20
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Percentage points 
Agriculture
Other Industry
Mining
Services
GDP
Source: National Statistics Office of Mongolia. 2012. Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin. December. http://www.nso.mn
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: East Asia  Mongolia  171
revenues rose by only 11.2%, as value-added taxes and customs duties did 
not grow as expected. The government plans to issue $5 billion in bonds 
on the international market, of which $1.5 billion was sold in November 
2012. The proceeds are expected to be transferred to the Development 
Bank of Mongolia (DBM), which is becoming a major source of public 
financing for infrastructure projects, corresponding to 3.6% of GDP in 
2012. The Fiscal Stability Fund, mandated under the 2010 Fiscal Stability 
Law (FSL), held MNT328 billion in December 2012, which corresponds 
to 2.4% of GDP and is likely insufficient in case of a substantial shock 
(Figure 3.12.4).
Monetary policy has been mildly countercyclical in recent years. 
Mandated by law to pursue price stability, the central bank raised the 
policy rate in 2012 by 1 percentage point to 13.25%, as inflation rose 
substantially above the official target ceiling of 10%. This measure and a 
three-step increase in the reserve requirement ratio to 12% in April 2012 
from 5% in February 2011 have contributed to a significant slowdown in 
money and credit growth. Broad money (M2) growth slowed from 37.0% in 
2011 to 18.8% in 2012, and growth in bank credit almost halved in the same 
period. Although inflation remained above target, in January 2013 the 
central bank lowered the policy rate by 0.75 percentage points to 12.50%, 
citing a drop in inflation. Negative real interest rates and the recent cut in 
the policy interest rate indicate an expansionary monetary policy.
External trade slowed in 2012. The value of merchandise exports 
(mainly minerals) fell by 9% in response to a slowdown in PRC growth, 
while imports increased by 2.1%, widening the trade deficit. Meanwhile, 
a narrower deficit in the services account helped trim the current 
account deficit to 31.3% of GDP in 2012 from 31.5% in 2011. Foreign 
direct investment, largely in mining, decreased to 37.8% of GDP from 
53.8% in 2011 (Figure 3.12.5). The resulting basic balance—the current 
account balance plus foreign direct investment—remained positive but 
smaller. At year-end, gross international reserves had accumulated to 
$4.09 billion, equal to 7 months of imports. These reserves included 
drawdowns from a swap line with the PRC, central bank deposit taking 
from the DBM, and the recent international bond issuance, such that the 
share of borrowed reserves rose significantly.
In response to the 2008/09 crisis, the government adopted a broadly 
floating exchange rate regime toward instituting inflation targeting. 
However, during 2012, the central bank occasionally intervened to limit 
the togrog’s depreciation. This eroded how effectively monetary policy 
could control inflation and the adverse effects of the Dutch disease. 
The official exchange rate of the togrog against the dollar has fallen by 
8% since April 2012, while the real exchange rate continues its trend 
appreciation caused by high domestic inflation (Figure 3.12.6). 
Economic prospects
Mongolia’s medium-term economic prospects are favourable. The mining 
sector is expected to continue to be the main engine of growth in 2013 
and 2014, with commercial production at the Oyu Tolgoi copper and 
gold mine starting in mid-2013. Growth is expected to accelerate to 16.5% 
in 2013, before being trimmed to 14% in 2014 by capacity constraints in 
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public investment planning and project management, a tight labor market 
and skill shortages, and some tightening of monetary and fiscal policies 
including lower off-budget spending financed by the DBM (Figure 3.12.7). 
Until that tightening takes place, inflation is expected to remain well 
into double digits, reaching about 13% in 2013 (Figure 3.12.8). Assuming 
more prudent fiscal policy and some tightening of monetary policy in 
2014, inflation could be brought down to 10%.
The 2013 government budget is the first prepared under the full 
effect of the FSL, which sets ceilings on the structural deficit, debt, and 
expenditure growth. These ceilings function as fiscal circuit breakers and 
work together to ensure fiscal discipline.
The 2013 budget foresees overall revenue growth at 28.9%; expenditure 
growth at 17.9%, mainly reflecting a sharp increase in capital expenditure; 
and an overall budget deficit of 1.1% in cash terms and 2% structural, 
which is the maximum allowed under the FSL. The revenue projections 
are overly optimistic, however, as they are not based on actual revenue 
outcome in 2012, but on the much higher revenue projections of the 2012 
supplementary budget, setting the stage for a significant revenue shortfall 
and a deficit violating the FSL ceiling. The government is expected, 
however, to tighten public expenditure as needed in 2013 to comply with 
the FSL and constrain lending by the DBM. 
Under the assumption of stable global commodity prices and 
continued high economic growth in the PRC, Mongolia’s mineral-
dominated exports will likely show very strong growth over the next 
2 years, while imports grow moderately in line with a slowdown in 
mining investments partly compensated by high growth in public 
investments, especially infrastructure (Figure 3.12.9). These developments 
are expected to drive the current account deficit down to 22% of GDP this 
year and 15% in 2014. The net effect of the start of Oyu Tolgoi operations 
on the balance of payments will be limited in 2013, as gross export 
proceeds will go mostly to repaying investment costs.
The outlook for 2013 and 2014 is subject to substantial risks. A renewed 
slowdown in the PRC, which absorbs almost all of Mongolia’s exports 
(92.6% in 2012), is the biggest external risk. A worsening of the global 
economy, in particular in the euro area, could also be damaging. Internal 
risks are expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, including off-budget 
expenditure, and the possibility of renewed problems in the banking 
sector. The price stabilization program announced in October 2012, 
through which the central bank provides loans at subsidized interest rates 
through the commercial banks to specified industries, aims to contain 
supply-side inflationary pressure but may intensify those from the demand 
side and create macroeconomic risks and distortions. The program 
amounts to about 14% of GDP over a three-year period. The DBM’s 
operations undermine the integrity of the FSL and should be taken into 
account when judging the short- to medium-term macroeconomic impact 
and long-term sustainability of government spending. Without strong 
fiscal retrenchment, adherence to FSL requirements, and appropriate 
monetary management, inflation in the forecast period could be higher.
The fragile banking system has been reinforced, but vulnerabilities 
remain. Nonperforming loans fell to 4.3% of all loans in November 2012, 
and the capital adequacy ratio for systemically important banks was 
3.12.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
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raised to 14%, among other measures. However, the banking system 
continues to suffer structural weakness related to corporate governance 
and risk management. Moreover, the rapid acceleration of bank lending 
in 2011 has masked growing problems in asset quality that can leave 
banks exposed. 
Policy challenge—energy security
Mongolia’s growing demand for energy, heavy dependence on coal as 
its major energy source, and reliance on two big neighbors—the PRC 
and the Russian Federation—for increasingly important oil challenge its 
economic development. Rising demand for energy reflects rapid economic 
growth, the development of the mining industry, and the doubling of 
Ulaanbaatar’s population since 1995. Oil imports—more than 90% from 
the Russian Federation—have risen by 44% since 2003 (Figure 3.12.10).
Mongolia has vast proven reserves of coal and some oil, but their 
exploitation has been either delayed or inefficient (Figure 3.12.11). Coal 
fuels 70% of electricity generation and 90% of heating but with poor 
energy efficiency. Facilities are old, and electricity tariffs below market 
rates put proper maintenance and investment in new plants beyond the 
reach of undercapitalized plant operators. Ulaanbaatar has no spare 
capacity for power and heat. Many households unconnected to the grid 
use coal stoves, polluting the air in Ulaanbaatar and other urban areas.
The government has a two-pronged approach to energy vulnerability. 
In the short-term, it attempts to stabilize energy prices to protect 
consumers. To this end, oil imports have been exempted from custom 
duties and excise taxes in autumn and spring. 
Over the longer term, the government is considering using public–
private partnership to expand electricity generating capacity. It is 
preparing an energy master plan that defines long-term priorities 
and intends to build a 450 megawatt combined heat and power plant 
in Ulaanbaatar. This project, if successfully implemented, will show 
the government to be a credible partner of the private sector, which 
is important for developing energy resources. The government has 
announced plans to finish constructing its first oil refinery by 2015. 
Meanwhile, Mongolia has huge potential for renewable energy resources. 
The country’s first wind farm, at Salkhit, is expected to add 5% of 
national electricity supply while reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Solar 
resources are substantial, and there is potential for hydropower. Tapping 
these resources requires sound public planning and resource management 
and effective cooperation with private investors.
3.12.11 Coal production and use
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Taipei,China
Economic activity picked up in the second half of 2012, compensating for the slump in the first half 
to record growth at 1.3%. As external conditions improve, this tepid economic expansion is giving way 
to more robust growth in 2013 and 2014 without igniting inflation. The authorities should continue to 
maintain adequate policy flexibility to respond to economic challenges that may be posed by a slowdown 
in the PRC or a weaker yen.
Economic performance
After registering 4.1% growth in 2011, Taipei,China’s economy slowed 
to 1.3% expansion in 2012 (Figure 3.13.1). Exports of goods and services 
declined in the first half of the year owing to the slowdown in the PRC 
and the continued weakness in major industrialized economies but 
eventually recovered and grew by 3.1% as demand for electronics and 
precision products picked up. Imports of goods and services declined by 
1.9% as domestic demand faltered. Net exports contributed 1.1 percentage 
points to real GDP growth.
Consumer unease caused lower retail sales, curbing growth in private 
consumption that, with a modest rise in government consumption, saw 
total consumption increase by only 1.3%. This narrowed consumption’s 
contribution to growth to 0.84 percentage points. Total investments 
contracted by 4.2%, as the government stimulus measures had waned 
since 2009, and as the private enterprises trimmed their investment 
outlays (Figure 3.13.2). 
Growth was highly variable across sectors (Figure 3.13.3). Industry, 
the largest sector, contributed about a quarter of GDP growth, despite 
rising by a meager 0.9% owing to a slow 1% rise in manufacturing output. 
Mining and quarrying increased by a hefty 10.4% in 2012 but contributed 
little to growth because of their small share in GDP. Construction 
declined, and typhoons left agricultural output down by 5.8%. The service 
sector grew by a modest 1.0%, as the information, communications, 
tourism, and entertainment industries picked up and growth in wholesale 
and retail trade and real estate moderated. Tourist arrivals from the PRC 
increased dramatically in 2012, as visa requirements relaxed.
Average inflation rose to 1.9% from 1.4% in 2011, owing to acceleration 
in food prices and the reduction of fuel subsidies that had been in place 
for 16 months. Rising real estate prices decelerated to 5.7% from 9.9% 
in 2011, reflecting deteriorating economic conditions and central bank 
intervention to cool property speculation, which moderated private 
investments.
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3.13.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
GDP growth  3.5  3.9
Inflation  1.7  1.9
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
11.0 12.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
Consistent with the government’s policy of narrowing the fiscal 
deficit, growth in expenditures slowed to 1.5% despite substantial rises in 
social welfare payments and development spending. Revenues increased 
by 3.5% as tax receipts grew, bringing the fiscal deficit for the year down 
to 1.6% of GDP. 
The central bank kept the rediscount rate unchanged at 1.875% 
(Figure 3.13.4), in the face of the continued downside risks arising from 
the global economic situation and moderating inflation. The money 
supply (M2) grew by 3.5% in 2012, more slowly than in 2011, reflecting 
smaller increases in net foreign assets and in bank credit as lending 
to the private sector grew more slowly and net claims on government 
enterprises contracted. 
Merchandise exports and imports shrank in 2012 (Figure 3.13.5). 
Merchandise exports fell by 2.4%, despite a rebound in the second half 
of the year, when exports increased to the US; the euro area; the PRC; 
Southeast Asia; and Hong Kong, China. The ASEAN-6 trade bloc within 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations took 18% of exports. Imports 
declined by 3.7%, mainly because of subdued investment. 
Buoyed by the tourism boom, services recorded a surplus of 
$6.1 billion, a 58% rise from 2011, and repatriated profits and dividends 
into the country remained elevated. Thus, despite slowing exports, the 
current account surplus climbed to 10.5% of GDP from 8.9% in 2011 
(Figure 3.13.6). The balance of payments surplus reached $15.5 billion, 
triple that of 2011, despite a net capital outflow of $31.6 billion owing to 
greater investment in foreign debt securities.
Economic prospects
Economic growth is projected to rebound to 3.5% in 2013. Industrial 
activity is expected to ramp up as demand recovers in the PRC, with 
which warming ties could boost the service sector through tourism. 
Private investment is expected to be notably stronger in 2013, benefitting 
from government plans to encourage investment in high-technology 
manufacturing and lower barriers to foreign investment, as well as an 
“invest at home” program aimed at local companies that have moved 
production capacity to the PRC over the past 2 decades. An improving 
outlook for information technology exports, indicated by increasing 
orders from developing Asia and the euro area, bodes well for private 
sector investment. Public investment may not grow, however, and current 
expenditure may fall as the government intends to further narrow the 
fiscal deficit to 1.3% in 2013. 
The continued recovery in exports, driven by growing momentum in 
the major industrialized economies including the euro area, could be the 
main engine of economic expansion in 2014. Improved external demand 
should encourage private investment and employment, help sustain 
private consumption, and elevate economic growth to 3.9%. 
Inflation is projected to ease to 1.6% in 2013, as international raw 
material prices stabilize, fruit and vegetable and global commodity prices 
moderate, and a planned increase in electricity prices is postponed. 
A tighter labor market may create upward pressure on inflation, mainly 
in 2014, when inflation will likely edge up to 1.8% on the average.
3.13.3 Supply-side contributions to growth
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3.13.1 Impact of developments in trade partners 
The impact of slowing external demand and the weakening 
of yen on Taipei,China’s growth outlook were analyzed 
using the global projection model (GPM) as detailed in 
Carabenciov et al. (2013)1 and a small open economy 
model (SOE). The GPM posits six regional blocks: the US, 
the euro area excluding Estonia, Japan, Latin America, 
emerging Asia, and a block of other countries. The SOE 
uses equations on output gap, inflation, real exchange 
rate, unemployment, and interest rates and links with the 
GPM through output gap and exchange rate equations. 
Two scenario analyses were done using the GPM model, 
and the results were used as parameters for the SOE to 
determine impact on the Taipei,China economy. The results 
show output gap as the strongest channel for transmitting 
spillover effects and spillover effects strongest from 
emerging Asia (box table), with which the island has the 
strongest trade ties. 
The first scenario looks at the impact of a shock that 
reduces GDP growth in the euro area by 1 percentage 
point below its baselines of –0.3 in 2013 and 1.2% in 2014 
and compares it with the effect of the same development 
in emerging Asia (setting growth in emerging Asia 
1 percentage point lower than the baselines for 2013 and 
2014). GDP growth for other blocks remains at their 
baselines. A simulation is then conducted to see how other 
macroeconomic variables—output gap, inflation, interest 
rate, real exchange rate, and unemployment—respond to 
the assumed scenario. 
The results suggest that a 1 percentage point 
slowdown in the rest of emerging Asia would shave 
Taipei,China’s growth by 0.2 percentage points in 2013 
and 0.4 percentage points in 2014. This is twice as large 
as the impact of the same developments in the euro 
area (box figure). There may be secondary and indirect 
spillover effects of the euro area slowdown, transmitted 
to Taipei,China through emerging Asia, but they would 
materialize only in later years and not substantially change 
the results for 2013 and 2014. 
The second scenario looks at the impact of the 
Japanese yen depreciating to an average of ¥100 per 
US dollar in 2013 and 2014 from the average 2012 
rate of ¥79. Japan is the fourth-largest destination for 
Taipei,China exports, with a share of 7%, and it supplies 
more than 20% of imports, mainly capital goods for 
manufacturing. Therefore, other things being equal, 
a weaker yen would make Japanese products more 
competitive in Taipei,China’s export markets, but it would 
also lower the cost of producing exports, with the net 
effect on the economy uncertain. 
The simulation results suggest that Taipei,China’s 
growth would not be affected by a weakened yen in 2013, 
but might decline marginally by about 0.05 percentage 
points in 2014. The growth rate would rise initially as 
manufacturing output increases owing to the lower 
cost of imported inputs, but decline marginally later as 
competitiveness marginally weakens. The real effective 
exchange rate would gradually strengthen, but only 
minimally. Factors that could amplify the impacts are the 
substitutability of products from Japan and Taipei,China 
and potential changes in the competitive landscape, 
such as the acquisition of Japanese brands by firms in the 
Republic of Korea. 
1  Carabenciov, I., C. Freedman, R. Garcia-Saltos, O. Kamenik, D. Laxton, and P. Manchev. 2013. “ GPM6—The Global Projection Model with 6 Regions,” IMF Working Paper 
(forthcoming).
Spillover from shocks in the euro area, emerging Asia, and Japan
Scenarios
Impact on GDP growth in Taipei,China 
(percentage points)
2013 2014
Scenario 1: 
1 percentage point reduction in 2013 and 2014 GDP growth forecasts 
for the euro area and emerging Asia
Euro area –0.1 –0.2
Emerging Asia –0.2 –0.4
Scenario 2: 
Japanese yen depreciation from ¥79 = $1 in 2012 to ¥100 = $1 in 2013 
and 2014
Japan 0.0 –0.05
Source: Staff calculations using GPM and a small open economy model.
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The central bank has not changed its policy rate since September 2011. 
Continuing weakness in global demand and the likelihood that the gap 
between actual and potential output will narrow only slowly will likely 
keep monetary policy accommodative.
Exports remain competitive as indicated by the real effective exchange 
rate (Figure 3.13.7), and yen depreciation is likely to have minimal effect, 
as suggested by the scenario analysis in Box 3.13.1. Exports are projected 
to improve in 2013 and 2014 with higher growth in the PRC and more 
geographically diverse export markets. Imports are also expected to 
increase, especially as tariffs on imported equipment and machinery are 
cut. The trade account will likely improve and tourist arrivals from the 
PRC rise. Taipei,China’s current account surplus is expected to remain at 
about 12% of GDP during the forecast period, generating large surpluses 
in the balance of payments.
As a highly open economy, Taipei,China is vulnerable to fluctuations 
in external demand, all the more so because of its heavy reliance 
on electronics exports. Economic prospects in the euro area remain 
lackluster, and the PRC may tighten policy to rein in property prices 
and air pollution, constraining growth in Taipei,China. Exchange rate 
fluctuations, notably with Japan, could also affect economic prospects.
Policy challenge—response to external shocks 
Taipei,China is affected by the global economy through changes in 
foreign demand, which affects its output gap, movements in foreign 
exchange rates, and the effect of interest rates overseas on the NT dollar. 
As regional supply chains have developed over the past decade, the 
economy of Taipei,China has become more interdependent with those 
of the rest of emerging Asia, which absorb 66% of its exports, the lion’s 
share going to the PRC (Figure 3.13.8).
Simulations were conducted to gauge the impact of slowing external 
demand and the weakening of yen on Taipei,China’s growth outlook 
(Box 3.13.1). They showed a much larger effect from a slowdown if it 
occurred in emerging Asia than in the euro area and little sensitivity to 
yen depreciation. These results, while indicative, point to the need for 
Taipei,China to continue to maintain enough policy flexibility to respond 
to the changing external environment, especially through monetary and 
fiscal initiatives. 
3.13.6 Current account components
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Afghanistan
The next 2 years before the government assumes full responsibility for security in 2014 will be critical. 
Security and political uncertainties, including a presidential election, will weigh heavily on the direction 
the country takes. To ensure economic stability and a sound basis for transition, the government will have 
to fulfill commitments made under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and implement various 
policy and institutional reforms agreed under the current International Monetary Fund program. 
Economic performance 
GDP growth is estimated to have accelerated to 11.9% in 2012, following 
7.2% expansion a year earlier, entirely due to the strong performance of 
agriculture, as weather improved from a drought in 2011 (Figure 3.14.1).
Private consumption buoyed by international aid flows, much of 
it related to security, remained the main source of growth. Aid fueled 
most of the demand for goods and services, especially in construction. 
Private investment increased slightly to 8.4% of GDP in 2012, as a 20% 
retrenchment by small and medium-sized enterprises was offset by a 
26% increase in new investments in aviation, industry, agriculture, and 
real estate by large companies that began to shift their business focus 
from internationally funded security projects to enterprises catering to 
local demand. 
Strong growth in agriculture, at 31.5%, reflected favorable weather, 
especially in the north. Wheat production, which accounts for three-
fourths of cereal production, grew by 48%. Growth in industry slowed 
to 7.2% from 9.8% in 2011, mainly because of slower expansion in 
manufacturing and construction caused by protracted power shortages 
and spending cramped by the uncertain political and security situation. 
Growth in services, which accounts for about half of GDP, slowed to 
7.3% from 12.7% in 2011, attributed to reduced spending by international 
security forces and by the local population because of uncertainty in the 
run-up to 2014. 
Opium production fell from the equivalent of 7% of GDP in 2011 to 
4% in 2012 as disease and unfavorable weather afflicted the main growing 
areas. The value of opium production is estimated to have halved from 
$1.4 billion in 2011 to $0.7 billion in 2012. Opium is not counted as part 
of GDP, but earnings generated by its sale that are retained and spent in 
Afghanistan boost domestic demand.
Average consumer price inflation almost halved to 6.2% in 2012 from 
11.8% in 2011, mainly on account of a sharp drop in food prices, as the 
good harvest boosted domestic food supplies. Food inflation slowed to 
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2.4% in August before rising to 4.4% in December, owing to increases 
in prices for imported goods such as milk, cheese, eggs, meat, spices, 
and nonalcoholic beverages (Figure 3.14.2). Nonfood inflation also 
declined over the year to 7.4% in December 2012, mainly reflecting lower 
international fuel prices and domestic transportation costs. 
Fiscal policy in 2012 focused on revenue mobilization and budget 
management. The government was unable to fully achieve the 
domestic revenue target set in the current International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) program. Domestic revenue fell to 10.3% of GDP, mainly 
from a shortfall in custom duties, which account for one-third of total 
revenue (Figure 3.14.3). This took the government further away from 
its fiscal sustainability target, as domestic revenues financed 56% of 
the government’s recurrent operating expenditures in 2012, down from 
68% in the previous year. A number of grants and projects previously 
administered separately by development partners were added to the 
national budget during 2012. This resulted in development partners 
financing 44% of the recurrent expenditure and 65% of development 
expenditure. 
The Da Afghanistan Bank, the central bank, primarily targets price 
stability using foreign exchange auctions and short-term capital notes as 
monetary tools. The monetary authorities succeeded in keeping inflation 
low by pursuing a tighter monetary policy in 2012. The policy slowed 
growth in broad money to 9.3% from 21.3% a year earlier, which, with 
improved domestic food production, succeeded in moderating inflation. 
The Afghani depreciated by about 5% to AF51.8 = $1 in the 12 months 
to January 2013, apparently owing to foreign exchange being in tighter 
supply and higher demand (Figure 3.14.4).
The current account deficit excluding grants is estimated to have 
widened slightly to 42.7% of GDP in 2012, mainly reflecting higher imports 
(Figure 3.14.5). Including grants, the current account surplus improved to 
4.0% of GDP from 3.0%, mainly from increased public transfers. Foreign 
direct investment rose to $405 million, largely on investment to develop 
oil in the Amu Darya Basin. Gross international reserves increased by 
10.6% to $6.9 billion in FY2012 (ending 20 March 2013), enough to cover 
7.3 months of FY2013 projected imports, excluding imports for re-export. 
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast at 3.3% in 2013 and 5.1% in 2014. Unusually slow 
growth in 2013 reflects the expectation that food crop production will be 
substantially lower than in 2012, when weather was unusually favorable, 
this base effect dragging down GDP growth overall. Afghanistan will go 
through a period of political and security uncertainty that is expected to 
weigh heavily on economic growth. Private consumption will slow but 
remain as the main source of growth. Industry and services are expected 
to grow more slowly as smaller international security forces may spend 
less. 
The FY2013 national budget focuses on domestic revenue mobilization, 
sustainable growth, and poverty reduction. The development of the 
extractive industry, social sectors, and agriculture will be top priorities 
alongside security. Total spending will increase by 26.5%, with 
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development partners to finance 60% of the $6.6 billion national budget, 
or 49% of the recurrent budget and 66% of the development budget. 
Domestic revenue will increase by 18.0% but slide to 50.1% of recurrent 
operating expenditure. The planned value-added tax will, if approved 
and implemented by 2014, help bridge the gap between recurrent budget 
and domestic revenues. On-budget grants will increase in 2013 and 
2014, as the budget is extended to cover more external grants heretofore 
administered by development partners and new pledges made at 
conferences in Tokyo and Chicago are realized.
Inflation during 2013 and 2014 is forecasted to be around 6.0% on the 
assumption of good harvests, easing international commodity prices, and 
the maintenance of tight monetary and fiscal policies. Afghanistan will 
continue to manage a floating exchange rate.
The current account deficit excluding grants is projected to widen to 
44.0% of GDP in 2013 as imports rise and exports slip slightly. In 2014, 
the deficit will fall to 42.2% of GDP as the growth in nominal GDP 
continues while the dollar value of imports, the trade deficit, and public 
transfers are broadly unchanged from a year earlier. Including grants, the 
current account surplus will dwindle to 0.3% of GDP in 2014.
Policy challenge—funding the transition
The withdrawal of international security forces by the end of 2014 and 
the transition to Afghans assuming full responsibility for security 
will put pressure on public expenditures and widen fiscal gaps. These 
pressures arise mainly from having to expand security and development 
expenditure that was previously provided by international forces, as well 
as covering the recurrent costs of public assets built by development 
partners. Consequently, IMF projections show public expenditures 
growing significantly to reach 39% of GDP by 2025. Domestic revenues, 
by contrast, are expected to reach only 17% of GDP by 2025, leaving a 
significant financing gap equal to 22% of GDP. To cover this gap initially, 
development partners at the 2012 conference in Tokyo pledged $16 billion 
for development through 2015, conditional on improved governance and 
transparency. They reconfirmed their commitment to channel half of 
aid through the budget and align 80% of their programs with national 
priority programs. In 2012, members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization pledged $4.1 billion a year to fund security costs after 2014. 
Afghanistan has large mineral resources potentially worth about 
$1 trillion, according to the US Geological Survey. If developed, these 
resources could provide a solid base for economic development. The 
government has agreed with international companies to establish large 
projects to mine copper and iron ore. However, implementing these 
projects will require a substantially improved security environment. 
Government revenue from an oil production project in the Amu Darya 
Basin is estimated to be $64 million in 2013 and $90 million in 2014, 
which is an encouraging start. 
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This chapter was written by Mohammad Zahid Hossain, Md. Golam Mortaza, Shamsur 
Rahman, and Barun K. Dey of the Bangladesh Resident Mission, ADB, Dhaka.
Bangladesh
Growth slowed, inflation quickened, and exports weakened, but the current account surplus nearly doubled 
in FY2012 on strong remittances. The authorities began implementing a program of macroeconomic and 
structural reforms to correct emerging imbalances and foster sustained, rapid growth. Weak external and 
domestic demand are projected to slow growth in FY2013 but the current account to stay in surplus. 
Political instability in the run-up to elections is a risk. Improving the business climate and infrastructure, 
deepening the finance sector, and liberalizing trade is needed to boost investment and competitiveness. 
Economic performance 
GDP growth slowed to 6.3% in FY2012 (ended June 2012) from 6.7% in 
the previous year (Figure 3.15.1). Agricultural growth halved to 2.5% from 
5.1% in FY2011, as crop growth dropped to 0.9% from 5.7%. Higher power, 
fuel, and fertilizer prices, and reduced area for the monsoon season 
(aman) rice crop, weakened performance. Industry growth was strong at 
9.5%, up from 8.2% in FY2011, as manufacturing expanded by 9.8% and 
construction and power both turned in somewhat better performances. 
Domestic market-oriented small-scale manufacturing benefited from new 
tax incentives and greater access to financing. Services growth slowed 
slightly to 6.1%, mainly because of lower exports and imports. 
On the demand side, private consumption benefited from a marked 
expansion in workers’ remittances and higher bank credit. Reflecting 
the global economic slowdown, growth in exports and imports alike 
decelerated sharply, with net exports subtracting from growth. At 25.4% 
of GDP, investment was slightly higher than the previous year’s 25.2%. 
Public investment improved to 6.3% of GDP from 5.6% in FY2011 but 
was mostly offset by the decline in private investment to 19.1% of GDP. 
Although new foreign direct investment (FDI) rose to $1.0 billion 
because of larger inflows into the banking, telecommunications, energy, 
and garment industries, FDI was still less than 1% of GDP and 5% of 
total investment.
Year-on-year inflation steadily worsened to 11.6% in January 2012 
because food prices remained elevated while nonfood prices rose in 
response to rapid growth in credit, upward adjustments in government-
administered fuel and power prices, and sharp taka depreciation. 
However, inflation declined from February, reaching 8.6% in June 2012, as 
food prices dropped with improving market supply following the harvest 
and tightened monetary policy (Figure 3.15.2). Inflation averaged 10.6% in 
FY2012, up from 8.8% in FY2011.
3.15.1 Supply-side contributions to growth
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Money supply and credit growth slowed as the year progressed 
(Figure 3.15.3) and the central bank’s mid-year tightening of monetary 
policy took hold. By June 2012, year-on-year growth in broad money was 
brought down to 17.4% from 21.3% a year earlier. Private credit growth 
slowed to 19.7% from 25.8% in the same period of the previous year. 
Expansion in net credit to the government was slashed to 25.2% by June 
2012, down from 73.5% in December 2011, as higher mandated prices for 
fuel and electricity reduced the need to finance subsidies. 
The central bank tightened monetary policy in FY2012, lifting repo and 
reverse-repo policy rates by 100 basis points to 7.75% and 5.75%. Moreover, 
in January 2012, it withdrew the 13.0% interest rate cap on commercial 
bank lending rates and stepped up its monitoring of liquidity conditions 
in the interbank call money market to foster better transmission of its 
policies. Reflecting these steps, short-term rates adjusted rapidly, with the 
weighted average yield on 91-day T-bills climbing to 11.4% by June 2012 
from 6.8% in June 2011. Higher rates on new bank lending were reflected 
in the system’s overall average lending and deposit rates, the former rising 
to 13.8% from 12.4% and the latter to 8.2% from 7.3%. 
Budget revenues rose strongly to 12.5% of GDP from 11.7% in FY2011 
as tax compliance improved (Figure 3.15.4). Income tax receipts rose by 
22.8%, and indirect taxes grew by 22.9%. Current spending advanced 
slightly to 10.0% of GDP in FY2012 from 9.7% the previous year. Despite 
improved utilization of its allocation, annual development program 
spending still fell short of the budget allocation; this helped to limit the 
fiscal deficit to 5.1% of GDP, marginally above the budget target of 5.0%.
Export growth braked sharply to 6.2% in FY2012 from 39.2% in 
FY2011, as demand in the euro area and the United States (US) weakened 
for the mainly low-end garments on offer and per-unit-prices fell. 
Exports of ready-made garments—accounting for nearly four-fifths 
of total earnings—grew by only 6.6%, down from 43.4% a year earlier. 
Exports of other products also slowed. Imports grew by only 5.4% in 
FY2012, markedly slowing from 41.8% in FY2011, which mainly reflected 
moderation in imported inputs for the garment industry, including 
capital equipment, and lower prices for cotton and other raw materials. 
Food grain imports declined because of higher stocks, though imports 
of consumer goods—about 10.0% of total imports, mainly sugar, edible 
oil, and milk—grew rapidly. Remittances strengthened by 10.2% in 
FY2012, up from 6.0% in the previous year, because of a larger number of 
Bangladeshi workers going abroad, taka depreciation since early 2011, and 
better banking services. 
Despite the widened deficit in trade and services, larger workers’ 
remittances raised the FY2012 current account surplus to $1.6 billion, 
or 1.4% of GDP, from $885.0 million (0.8%) in FY2011 (Figure 3.15.5). 
The combined capital and financial accounts recorded a smaller deficit 
of $486.0 million in FY2012, a significant narrowing of the $1.3 billion 
deficit in FY2011 because of higher FDI and much smaller net repayments 
of trade credit. The overall balance of payments showed a surplus 
of $494.0 million in FY2012, a significant rise from the deficit of 
$656.0 million in the previous year. 
Earlier pressure on the exchange rate abated in the second half of 
FY2012, as import demand slowed and remittances rose. In nominal 
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terms, the taka nonetheless depreciated by 9.4% against the dollar in 
FY2012, reflecting developments in the first half (Figure 3.15.6). The real 
effective exchange rate rose by 2.2% year on year at the end of June 2012 
because domestic inflation outpaced that of trading partners, indicating 
some erosion in export competitiveness. In the first 7 months of FY2013, 
the real effective rate rose further by 9.1%, as the nominal exchange rate 
remained broadly stable and an adverse inflation differential persisted.
Economic prospects
Economic forecasts for FY2013 and FY2014 rest on four assumptions: 
First, the central bank’s slight easing in monetary policy announced 
in January 2013 will not stoke inflation, given the declining trend in 
international commodity prices and a favorable domestic crop outlook. 
Second, the government will contain subsidies by continuing to raise fuel 
and electricity prices and thus keep in check its need for bank borrowing. 
Third, though political activity is expected to be volatile, social stability 
will be maintained. And, finally, weather will be favorable. 
GDP growth is projected to edge lower in FY2013 to 5.7% (Figure 3.15.7). 
Export demand, a major contributor to GDP growth, is expected to 
slacken slightly, reflecting the ADO baseline assumptions that the euro 
area economy stagnates and the US recovery remains frail. Despite higher 
remittances, growth in demand for private consumption is expected to 
weaken as households adopt a cautious approach to spending because of 
political uncertainties ahead of parliamentary elections expected by early 
2014, depressing production in industries oriented to domestic markets. 
Lower rice prices will further dampen consumer demand through reduced 
agricultural income. Ongoing decline in imports of capital equipment 
and slow import growth for raw materials indicate lower utilization of 
existing production capacity and a lull in investment. A drop in import 
letters of credit opened for machinery and industrial raw materials signals 
weak economic activity in the coming months. With some strengthening 
of economic activity expected in the euro area and the US in 2014, GDP 
growth is projected to recover moderately to 6.0% in that year on the back 
of gradual rises in exports, consumer spending, and investment. 
Industry growth is expected to slow to 6.5% in FY2013, reflecting slack 
demand externally and domestically. The Monetary Policy Statement 
released in January—which cut repo and reverse-repo rates by 50 basis 
points to 7.25% and 5.25%, effective 1 February 2013, and slightly raised 
private credit growth target—signaled greater emphasis on sustaining 
growth while maintaining the 7.5% target for average inflation for the 
year. However, these measures are unlikely to spur much more private 
borrowing as long as prevailing consumer and investor sentiment remains 
subdued. Headwinds to growth include worsening power shortages as 
new supply lags growing demand, the inability of new industrial units 
to get natural gas connections because of supply limits, increased fuel 
and electricity prices along with wage pressures adding to production 
costs, and sluggish activity in the real estate market and construction. 
With expected improvements in external and domestic demand, industry 
growth is projected at 7.5% in FY2014. 
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Favorable rainfall during planting and expanded acreage sown to 
the winter rice crop should help agricultural output in FY2013 recover 
to 4.2% growth. Greater access to credit resulting from central bank 
initiatives is expected to bolster output from livestock, aquaculture, and 
non-cereal crops. In FY2014, agricultural growth is projected to ease to 
4.0%, returning to trend following the previous year’s high base. Services 
growth in FY2013 is expected to slow to 6.0%, reflecting weaker economic 
activity, and then expand by at least 6.1% in FY2014 on moderate recovery 
in overall demand.
Average annual inflation is projected to slow to 7.8% in FY2013 
(Figure 3.15.8). Inflation decelerated year on year from 11.6% in January 
2012 to 7.9% in February 2013 because of easing nonfood prices in 
conjunction with broadly stable food inflation. Although the January 2013 
increase in various fuel prices by 5.3%–11.5% will put pressure on prices, 
higher crop production and lower international food and commodity 
prices are expected to dampen inflation. The continuation of appropriate 
monetary policies is expected to ease inflation to 7.0% in FY2014. 
Export growth is expected to slow slightly to 6.0% in FY2013, 
reflecting economic doldrums in the euro area and slow recovery in the 
US (Figure 3.15.9). Garment exports rose by 10.1% in the first 8 months 
of the fiscal year but are expected to slow again. Earnings from other 
exports have been mixed, showing little change. Export growth is 
expected to rise to 8.0% in FY2014 on slightly better demand. 
Recent serious fires in garment factories have prompted the 
government, employers, and buyers to consider how to improve worker 
safety and working conditions, and some steps in this direction have 
been announced. Bangladesh’s share of the global garment market 
has been growing. It is the second-largest exporter to the European 
Union, with a 12.0% market share in FY2012, when exports surged by 
21.6%, substantially benefiting from a change in Generalized System 
of Preferences rules of origin that became effective in January 2011. 
Bangladesh also had a significant 4.6% share of the US market. Exports 
of high-end garments are rising, and garment sales to Australia, Canada, 
the People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, Turkey, and other emerging 
markets in Asia and South America are expanding briskly. 
Imports declined by 3.3% in the first 7 months of FY2013, mainly 
reflecting reductions in capital goods, rice, and other food items. Lower 
export growth stemmed imports of inputs to export industries. Although 
the import bill is expected to rise in the remainder of the year, mainly for 
fuel, imports are still expected to decline overall by 2.0% in FY2013, before 
growing again, by 6.0%, in FY2014. 
Remittances grew by 17.3% to $9.9 billion in the first 8 months of 
FY2013. More workers going to the Middle East in 2011, substantial sales 
of government bonds to expatriate Bangladeshis, and better banking 
services contributed to the large gain. Remittance growth is expected to 
decelerate in the remainder of the year and stand at 12.0% in FY2013 and 
10.0% in FY2014 as fewer workers go overseas, their numbers down by 
31.8% in the first 8 months of FY2013 (Figure 3.15.10). 
The current account is projected to show a larger surplus of 2.0% 
of GDP in FY2013 as the trade deficit narrows (Figure 3.15.11). Foreign 
exchange reserves rose to $13.8 billion at the end of February from 
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$10.4 billion at the end of June 2012 (Figure 3.15.12), as the current account 
balance moved from a large deficit in the first 7 months of FY2012 to a 
sizeable surplus in the same period of FY2013 and the combined capital 
and financial account balance also rose slightly from $2.0 billion to $2.1 
billion. Net inflows of foreign assistance rose sharply and FDI inflows 
improved. Pressure on the balance of payments will remain low in 
FY2014, though the current account surplus is expected to shrink to 1.0% 
of GDP as economic recovery revives imports. 
Revenue collection grew by 15.1% in the first 7 months of FY2013, 
probably too slowly to meet the budget’s target improvement of 21.6%. 
The budget set public spending growth at 18.9%. Annual development 
program spending will rise as the government seeks to address 
infrastructure deficits ahead of the elections but will nonetheless remain 
below the budget target. The government is holding current spending on 
subsidies in check by setting fuel and electricity prices higher. The overall 
deficit is expected to stay within the targeted 5.0% of GDP (Figure 3.15.13). 
Domestic financing, mainly from banks, will cover 2.7% of GDP, and 
foreign sources the remaining 2.3%. 
Under the 3-year extended credit facility agreed with the International 
Monetary Fund, the government plans to pursue sound fiscal and debt 
management through reform to tax policy and administration, public 
financial administration, and debt management. Parliament passed 
a value-added tax law in November 2012 for implementation by 2015, 
which will help modernize the tax system and boost revenues to support 
Bangladesh’s medium-term development priorities. To contain subsidy 
costs, a formula to automatically adjust fuel prices will be introduced. 
There are downside risks to projections. Economic developments in 
the euro area and the US may prove to be much weaker than assumed 
in the ADO baseline, materially affecting exports from Bangladesh. 
Another risk is budget revenues weakening if political unrest intensifies 
enough to markedly disrupt economic activity. Extreme spending policies 
to brighten reelection prospects could compromise monetary and fiscal 
discipline. Natural disasters pose perennial risks. 
Development challenge—removing constraints 
on growth
Bangladesh needs to give priority to enhancing its business climate, 
which the World Bank’s Doing Business 2013 shows deteriorating in the 
past year (Figure 3.15.14). The country also lags in South Asia in terms of 
infrastructure quality, as seen from the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2012–13 (Table 3.15.2). In addition to improved 
infrastructure and trade logistics, the trade regime needs to become more 
open to force manufacturers to improve their productivity and global 
competitiveness. This would accelerate economic growth and create more 
and better jobs. The depth and efficiency of the finance sector needs to be 
developed more fully to expand private access to financing and create a 
source of long-term lending for infrastructure. 
Bangladesh’s acute shortage of skills constrains productivity growth 
in manufacturing and limits economic diversification. With 30% of 
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3.15.14  How Bangladesh ranks on 
Doing Business 2013 indicators
1
51
101
151
Starting a business
(95)
Dealing with
construction 
permits (83) 
Getting
electricity
(185)
Registering
property
(175) 
Getting credit
(83)
Protecting investors
(25)
Paying taxes
(97)
Trading across
borders
(119) 
Enforcing
contracts
(182)
Resolving
insolvency
(119) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses show ranking out of 
185 countries worldwide. 1 = best, 185 = worst.
Source: The World Bank. Doing Business database. http://
www.doingbusiness.org/data (accessed 13 March 2013).
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: South Asia Bangladesh  187
the population younger than 15 years old, Bangladesh is poised to reap 
a strong demographic dividend. A major challenge, however, is to 
transform the vast young population into a trained human resource base 
in short order by boosting education quality and developing the specific 
skills industry demands. 
Land shortage is emerging as a major constraint on infrastructure 
and industrial development. Unplanned urbanization is compounding the 
problem of finding suitable locations for enterprises, which are excessively 
concentrated in the capital. Dhaka generates over a third of the country’s 
GDP with less than a tenth of its population, and congestion in Dhaka 
and Chittagong, the country’s second city, hampers international 
competitiveness. The absence of developed connectivity and basic services 
in other cities and towns robs them of favorable production opportunities 
and attractive living conditions. 
Policy makers need to identify new growth drivers, notably promoting 
labor-intensive manufacturing for export and expanding industry to 
serve domestic markets. With the country’s abundant supply of low-cost 
labor and advantageous location, strong potential exists for a number of 
sectors: pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding, electronics, leather, textile home 
furnishings, ceramics, agro-processing, jute, footwear, light engineering, 
plastics, information and communication technology, and business 
processes outsourcing. 
Climate change poses huge risks for this low-lying, flood-prone 
country. An emerging challenge is to expand capacity and mobilize 
financing to cope with and help mitigate climate change. 
3.15.2 Comparison of infrastructure quality, 2012
Country 
rankinga
Overall 
infrastructure
Electricity Roads Railroads Ports Air 
transport
1 = extremely underdeveloped, 7 = extensive and efficient 
by international standards (by international standards)
Bangladesh 131 2.8 1.8 2.8 2.5 3.3 3.5
China, People’s Rep. of  69 4.3 5.2 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.5
India  87 3.8 3.2 3.5 4.4 4.0 4.7
Pakistan 105 3.4 2.3 3.9 2.6 4.4 4.3
Sri Lanka  50 4.8 5.3 4.6 3.8 4.9 5.0
a Ranking out of 142 countries.
Source: 2012 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013.
This chapter was written by Sabyasachi Mitra , Yoko Niimi and Ruzette Mariano of the 
South Asia Department, ADB, Manila.
Bhutan 
Growth moderated last year as the authorities tightened credit to address a rupee liquidity crunch caused 
by both cyclical and structural factors. The Royal Monetary Authority implemented significant monetary 
reforms including the introduction of policy and base rates. Looking ahead, growth is expected to pick-up 
propelled by exports of hydropower and higher tourist arrivals.
Economic performance
Economic growth moderated to 7.5% in FY2012 (ended 30 June 2012) from 
10.0% a year earlier (Figure 3.16.1). The slowdown reflected credit measures 
taken by the Royal Monetary Authority (RMA) to curb an escalating 
balance of payments deficit with India and alleviate the rupee liquidity 
crunch. Both general and specific credit restrictions were implemented to 
constrain imports that are a large component of consumer and investment 
spending. Reflecting the measures, growth in consumption, which accounts 
about three fifths of GDP, slowed to 7.8% in FY2012 from 10.0% in FY2011. 
The measures had their greatest impact on construction and transport 
and communications services. Construction growth slowed to 9.1% from 
17.4% in FY2011, and transport and communications slowed less sharply 
to 12.7% from 16.6%. Hydropower output, which contributes about 20% 
of GDP, grew by 7.6% on better water conditions after being broadly flat 
a year earlier. The construction of large ongoing power projects was not 
subject to tightening.
Consumer price inflation reached an all-time high of 13.6% from a 
year earlier in the fourth quarter of FY2012 (Figure 3.16.2). Food inflation 
was 18.7% and nonfood inflation 10.7%. Local prices broadly follow prices 
in India because the Bhutanese ngultrum is pegged to the Indian rupee. 
However, scarce supplies appear to have bid local prices to a premium in 
the second half of FY2012. Average inflation was 10.2% for the fiscal year.
The average annual growth of broad money (M2) slowed to 5.8% 
in FY2012 from 23.6% in FY2011. Short-term liquidity concerns arising 
from asset–liability mismatches in the banking sector has led the RMA 
to create a short-term liquidity adjustment facility and to reduce its cash 
reserve ratio twice, taking it from 17% to 5%. 
The RMA implemented significant reforms by introducing monetary 
policy rates and a base-rate system for Bhutanese financial institutions. 
The policy rate, set at 6%, will act as the main monetary policy instrument, 
supplemented by the cash reserve ratio. The base rate will set the floor for 
lending by financial institutions and also be the reference rate for floating-
rate products. Bank base rates were set between 10.4% and 12.7%, while a 
uniform base rate of 13% was applied to nonbanking institutions.
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Bhutan aims to diversify economic activity and is expanding and 
upgrading its hotel industry with a target to attract 100,000 tourists 
by the end of 2013. The total revenues of the tourism sector reached 
$52 million in October 2012, improving on the $48 million in earnings 
realized in calendar year 2011.
Labor market conditions have improved with a steady decline in the 
unemployment rate in recent years. Total unemployment fell to 2.1% of the 
labor force in FY2012 from 4.0% in FY2009, while the youth unemployment 
rate was brought down to 7.2% from 9.4% a year earlier, which is much 
lower than 12.9% recorded in FY2009 (Figure 3.16.3). However, youth 
unemployment still accounts for about half of total unemployment, and 
addressing youth unemployment remains a key challenge in Bhutan.
The current account deficit in FY2012 is estimated at 18.9% of GDP, 
down from 23.5% in FY2011 (Figure 3.16.4). The imposition of credit 
measures and foreign exchange restrictions caused a slight narrowing of 
the trade deficit to 26% of GDP from 30%. Exports shrank by 10.6% year 
on year, while imports fell by 9.5%. India continues to be a major trading 
partner, receiving over 80% of all exports from Bhutan and providing 
over 70% of Bhutan’s total imports. 
The overall balance of payments recorded a deficit of 5.9% of GDP, 
down from a surplus of 5.5% in FY2011. This reflected declining capital 
transfers, foreign direct investment, and government loans. Gross 
international reserves fell by $136 million to $770 million in FY2012, 
enough to cover 9.9 months of imports (Figure 3.16.5). External debt 
reached $1.4 billion (73.4% of GDP), down by 1.8 percentage points from 
the previous year. About three fifths of the debt is denominated in Indian 
rupees. Most borrowings from the Government of India were earmarked 
for hydropower development. 
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to recover in FY2013 and reach 8.6%, driven mainly 
by hydropower and tourism. The contribution of the service sector to 
growth is expected to improve as the government develops the country’s 
tourism potential. As this trend is likely to continue, 8.5% growth is 
expected in FY2014. 
Inflation is expected to moderate to 9.3% in FY2013, as the government 
has adopted a tight fiscal stance and clamped down on growth in credit, 
especially for home construction and personal loans, in response to the 
rupee liquidity crunch. Inflation is expected to ease further to 7.4% in 
FY2014 as the foreign exchange position relaxes.
Continued shortage of electricity in India will support Bhutan’s 
hydropower exports. However, a widening of current account deficit is 
likely to persist at about 20% of GDP in FY2013 and FY2014, driven by 
strong demand for imports related to hydropower development.
The government aims to limit the fiscal deficit to 1.5% of GDP in 
FY2013 by cutting capital expenditures, which are expected to contract 
by 22.9% in FY2013 after expanding by 30.8% in FY2012 (Figure 3.16.6). 
Current expenditures are expected to expand by 5.3% in FY2013 
from 17.7% last year. The cutback in fiscal outlay follows the fiscal 
rationalization measures announced in the budget.
3.16.4 Balance of payments
–24
–12
0
12
24
36
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% of GDP
Current account
Capital and nancial account
Errors and ommissions
Overall balance
Source: Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan. 2013. Annual 
Report FY2011/12. http://www.rma.org.bt
3.16.5 Gross international reserves
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
0
3
6
9
12
15
Import cover
Rupee 
Convertible currency 
201220112010200920082007
$ million Months of imports
Source: Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan. 2013. Annual 
Report FY2011/12. http://www.rma.org.bt
3.16.3 Unemployment
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
3
6
9
12
15
Unemployed
adults
Unemployed
youths
Total unemployment rate
Youth unemployment rate
2012201120102009
% %
Source: Ministry of Labor and Human Resources. Various 
years. Labour Force Survey Report. http://www.molhr.gov.bt
190  Asian Development Outlook 2013
Policy challenge—sustaining high 
economic growth
Bhutan has achieved remarkable economic performance and made 
significant progress in reducing poverty and advancing social 
development over the past decade. However, sustaining high and inclusive 
economic growth remains a major challenge. The tight overall balance 
with India has recently placed great pressure on Indian rupee liquidity in 
Bhutan. The RMA’s small rupee working balances over the past few years 
have been maintained by the sale of convertible currencies and borrowing 
on lines of credit with Indian banks; as of June 2012, outstanding net 
liabilities on this account were Rs9.6 billion (about $174 million).
The ongoing rupee liquidity problem has been caused by both 
structural and cyclical factors, which can be attributed to weak economic 
management. The lumpy nature of hydropower-related imports and the 
long gestation between construction and operation make managing the 
trade balance in the medium term a challenge. Lumpy debt payments 
and high seasonality in hydropower generation and electricity exports 
contribute to volatility in net rupee inflows. This highlights the need for 
enhancing capacity to manage debt.
The rupee shortage also reflects the rapid growth of the economy. 
Rising per capita income has fuelled domestic demand for consumption 
goods and launched a housing boom, both of which have contributed 
to the large import bill from India. Limited ability to contain public 
spending has widened trade deficits and put further pressure on the 
balance of payments with India. On the financial side, rapid growth in 
private consumption has been fed by excessive growth in credit. Indeed, 
loans to the private sector grew by 30.1% in FY2012, greatly outpacing 
nominal GDP growth of 17.7%. The limited effectiveness of monetary and 
liquidity management instruments in stabilizing inflation and avoiding 
asset price buildup has also contributed to the problem. 
The Ministry of Finance and the RMA have undertaken a number of 
measures to address the rupee liquidity issue. For instance, the RMA has 
clarified that, while the rupee serves to anchor the nominal value of the 
ngultrum, there should be no presumption of unlimited convertibility. 
The RMA has made it mandatory to use the banking system to settle 
Indian rupee transactions, especially for cross-border purchases between 
India and Bhutan. In addition, it has sought to improve liquidity 
management by introducing policy rates and the base-rate system, as 
well as the liquidity adjustment facility. The Ministry of Finance’s tighter 
fiscal policy, aiming to reduce the fiscal deficit to 1.5% of GDP in FY2013, 
is a welcome step.
While Bhutan has been the fastest-growing economy in South Asia, 
the recent rupee shortage has revealed structural imbalance in the 
economy and Bhutan’s weak economic management. As the large 
spending on hydropower development is expected to continue in the 
medium term, Bhutan must strengthen in a timely way its macro-
financial management to sustain high growth without exacerbating 
domestic and external economic imbalances. 
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This chapter was written by Abhijit Sen Gupta of the India Resident Mission, ADB, 
New Delhi.
India
Growth further decelerated as a slump in industry and investment spread to consumption and exports. 
Though inflation and the fiscal deficit were reined in, the current account deficit rose to a record high. 
Delays in resolving structural impediments to growth were compounded by a global trade slowdown. 
Boosting investment is critical for a return to high growth, but requires reforms to eliminate bottlenecks 
that are stalling projects. Recent steps to address some of these challenges are expected to help growth 
pick up modestly. 
Economic performance 
Economic growth in FY2012 (ended 31 March 2013) decelerated to 5%, 
its lowest in a decade, from 6.2% in FY2011 (Figure 3.17.1). While tepid 
industrial growth and a downdraft in investment continued from FY2011, 
the downturn was exacerbated by a slump in services activity, weakening 
consumption, and contracting exports. 
Growth in consumption expenditure halved from previous years’ 
average to 4.1% as private and public spending both dropped. Subdued 
economic activity, high inflation, a weak currency and steep interest 
rates dented consumer confidence. The slowdown in public consumption 
reflected the containment of government expenditure in the second half 
of FY2012 to restrain the budget deficit. 
Supply bottlenecks such as lack of fuel for power generation, difficulty 
in acquiring land and environmental clearances, contentious tax policies, 
and procedural delays continued to stifle investment, causing growth in 
fixed investment to drop to 2.5% (Figure 3.17.2). 
Industry in FY2012 weakened further, driven by a slump in 
manufacturing and mining. At 1.9%, manufacturing registered one of its 
weakest expansions in the post-1991 reform era as capital goods production 
contracted for a second year in a row. Delays over land and environmental 
clearances continued to hamper mining operations, keeping growth 
tepid at 0.4% despite a low base. Dwindling production of natural gas 
at a large new field caused by pricing and technical issues, and a lack of 
new discoveries in recent years, drove natural gas production down by 
13.3%. Electricity production also moderated as thermal generation was 
hampered by inadequate coal supplies and hydro generation was affected 
by depleted reservoirs following deficient rains. Power shortages have 
raised firms’ costs and hampered production. Construction, helped by a 
delayed monsoon and the resulting long dry spell, expanded by 5.9%.
The late onset of the southwest monsoon and its subsequent unfavorable 
progress cut agriculture growth by half to 1.8% in FY2012. Grain production 
is estimated to be 3.5% lower than in the previous year, reflecting a drop in 
the production of rice, wheat, pulses, and coarse cereals. 
3.17.1 GDP growth by sector
0
3
6
9
12
Services
Industry
Agriculture
GDP
201220112010200920082007
%
9.3
5.0
6.2
9.38.6
6.7
Source: CIEC Data Company (accessed 23 March 2013).
3.17.2 Fixed investment growth
0
6
12
18
20122011201020092008200720062005
%
Source: CIEC Data Company (accessed 23 March 2013).
192  Asian Development Outlook 2013
Services, which had largely held out against the slowdown in FY2011, 
decelerated sharply to 6.6% in FY2012, its lowest growth rate in more than 
a decade. This weak performance reflected the effect of the downturn on 
incomes, confidence, and consumer spending. 
While wholesale price inflation moderated from highs in previous years, 
it remained elevated averaging 7.4% in FY2012. Tight monetary policy and a 
slowing economy brought down inflation in nonfood manufactured goods 
to below 5% as the year progressed (Figure 3.17.3). However, food inflation 
persisted near double digits from the impact of a deficient monsoon on 
production and a weak farm supply response for high-protein items. 
Inflation based on consumer prices continued to trend at a higher level of 
about 10%, since food prices have a much greater weight in the index.
After maintaining a tight monetary stance to contain high inflation 
and inflation expectations, the Reserve Bank of India, the central bank, 
cut policy interest rates by 100 basis points in FY2012 to promote growth 
with the expectation of a less expansive fiscal policy and steps to remove 
impediments that have stifled a supply-side response (Figure 3.17.4). 
However, it cautioned against inflation risks emanating from the delayed 
monsoon, weak currency, and sustained wage pressures. Further, since 
September, the central bank has cut the cash reserve ratio by 75 basis 
points to 4% to alleviate liquidity shortfalls in the banking system. 
High interest rates, slackening economic activity, and slowing business 
and consumer demand combined to decelerate credit growth. At the same 
time, there was a deterioration in credit quality. Nonperforming and 
restructured loans are estimated to have increased to 9.5% of total loans 
and advances in September 2012 from 5.5% in March 2011 (Figure 3.17.5). 
The fall in asset quality increased banks’ risk aversion and prompted 
portfolio switching from credit creation to investments in government 
securities, facilitated by large market borrowing by the government. 
Despite the economic slowdown, the central government budget 
deficit for FY2012 was contained at 5.2% of GDP, well below the deficit of 
5.7% in FY2011 but marginally above the 5.1% target. However, the quality 
of the fiscal consolidation is a concern. In a bid to rein in the deficit, 
capital expenditure was compressed and grew by only 5.8%, against the 
original target of 29.2%. Thus, even though the overall deficit nearly 
reached its target, the revenue deficit—the excess in current expenditure 
over tax and nontax revenue—exceeded the budgeted target by 0.5% of 
GDP. This reflected slippage in meeting budgeted objectives for higher tax 
revenues and lower subsidies.
Despite several increases in diesel prices and a cap on the number of 
subsidized cooking gas cylinders, petroleum subsidies were more than 
double the original estimates. Even food and fertilizer subsidies exceeded 
their budgeted targets as a weak currency increased import costs and 
minimum support prices for grains were raised. Consequently, subsidy 
payments were estimated at 2.5% of GDP, well above the target of bringing 
them below 2% of GDP.
On the revenue side, tepid industrial activity and stagnant imports 
left corporate tax and customs and excise duty collections short of their 
targets, though this was partly offset by higher personal income and 
service tax collections. Moreover, revenue from disinvestment in public 
sector corporations was lower than planned. 
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The current account deficit for FY2012 is estimated at 5% of GDP, 
significantly higher than last year’s record, driven by a deteriorating 
trade balance (Figure 3.17.6). Despite a weak currency, merchandise 
exports contracted by 4%, because of weak global demand, down to 
$297.4 billion. However, imports remained nearly static, declining by 
only 1% to $494 billion despite the slowdown in growth, largely due to 
inelastic oil demand and large gold imports. While in previous years 
the worsening trade deficit was cushioned by improvement in invisibles, 
FY2012 witnessed moderation in the invisibles’ surplus, driven by anemic 
expansion in software and business services exports and remittances, and 
higher investment income payments.
Spurred by announcements of various reform initiatives, portfolio 
flows picked up in the second half of the year to reach an estimated 
$26 billion in FY2012. This helped the Indian rupee to strengthen after 
June 2012, but it nevertheless depreciated in FY2012 by 7.5% against the 
US dollar, and the real effective exchange rate fell by about 5% (Figure 
3.17.7). The increase in portfolio investment helped to lift stock prices, 
with the Bombay Stock Exchange Sensex up by about 8% for the year 
(Figure 3.17.8). With robust portfolio investment and moderate increases 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) and commercial borrowing covering 
the current account deficit, the central bank refrained from intervening 
much in the foreign exchange market. Foreign exchange reserves 
remained broadly stable over the year at around $295 billion. 
Economic prospects 
The slowdown in domestic investment will need to be reversed for growth 
to trend upward in a sustained manner. However, recent data from the 
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy on planned capital expenditures 
are not encouraging, as they continue to show a downward trend in 
announced new projects and an increase in the number of shelved 
projects (Figure 3.17.9). Clearly, turning this trend around will be a major 
challenge. 
Recent reforms include the creation of the Cabinet Committee on 
Investment to expedite government clearances for large projects and 
cabinet clearance of a land acquisition bill. However, these are only first 
steps toward improving the investment climate, and further measures 
will have to be undertaken for the investment cycle to turn around. These 
would include tough economic and politically difficult policy decisions 
related to delays in environmental clearances, parliamentary approval 
of the land acquisition bill that involves complex issues, improving the 
availability of fuel sources and infrastructure linking fuel sources with 
power generating plants, and attaining fiscal consolidation without 
sacrificing capital expenditure.
Various business survey indices present a mixed picture, indicating 
the need for further action to restore confidence. The central bank’s 
business expectation index in January deteriorated in comparison with 
the previous year, though there was some improvement over the previous 
quarter (Figure 3.17.10). The latest reading of HSBC Markit purchasing 
managers’ index for manufacturing and services is no higher than average 
levels earlier in FY2012 (Figure 3.17.11). 
3.17.6 Trade indicators
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Progress on reforms in FY2013 is expected to improve business and 
consumer confidence sufficiently to underpin a moderate improvement 
in investment and consumer spending. An upturn in global trade volume 
and greater budgeted government spending would further add to total 
demand. With demonstrated results from planned measures to reduce the 
budget deficit, especially progress on reducing fuel subsidies, the central 
bank will further ease monetary policy, which would help to sustain and 
build demand momentum.
A normal monsoon is expected to substantially boost agriculture 
growth from the depressed base a year earlier. This will strengthen rural 
consumer demand and ease price pressures. Industry growth should 
improve on better domestic and external demand, but unresolved 
structural issues will continue to constrain investment, mining, and 
power. Services are expected to see a stronger pickup in activity than 
industry, though growth will continue to be restrained by the limited 
demand. However, community services could see an uptick with 
increased government spending in the run-up to an election.
In this scenario, GDP growth nudges up to 6% in FY2013. Improved 
global prospects, some easing of price pressures, and forward movement 
in resolving structural bottlenecks would allow growth to increase to 6.5% 
in FY2014. 
Core inflation pressures have receded considerably reflecting the 
lagged impact of monetary tightening and the slowdown in economic 
activity. At less than 5%, core inflation is in line with the central bank’s 
target. A normal monsoon, fiscal consolidation, and easing global 
commodity prices will allow some reduction in price pressures. However, 
some elements of wholesale price index inflation will remain sticky. 
Rising input costs, robust agricultural wage growth, higher minimum 
support prices for crops, and continuing undersupply of protein-rich 
products, fruits, and vegetables will keep food inflation elevated. The 
direct and indirect effects of the decision to allow diesel prices to be 
raised in a series of small steps until losses are eliminated will exert 
upward pressure on prices. Consequently, average inflation is expected to 
decline only slightly in FY2013 to 7.2%. 
Inflation in FY2014 is expected to moderate to 6.8% with the effort to 
raise diesel prices completed and having worked through the economy, 
and with some forward movement in addressing supply-side bottlenecks 
affecting agriculture. 
While monetary policy is likely to be eased further in FY2013 and 
beyond, as progress is made on bringing down inflation, the extent of 
easing will be conditioned on progress in reducing the current account 
and budget deficits.
The central government plans for its budget deficit to fall to 4.8% 
of GDP in FY2013, mainly through enhanced revenue collection 
(Figure 3.17.12). However, with the tax structure remaining largely 
unchanged, apart from higher surcharges on earnings above a 
threshold and higher excise and custom duties on select items, revenue 
targets depend heavily on growth picking up. Similarly, revenue from 
disinvestment and spectrum allocation is set well above the average of 
previous years. Meeting these magnitudes would depend on favorable 
market conditions.
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Budget expenditure is set to rise sharply by 16.4% in FY2013, while 
subsidies are expected to fall by 10.4%. Th e adequacy of the allocation 
for subsidies depends critically on the government’s willingness to 
continue regular revisions of diesel prices and to adjust the price of urea 
(Figure 3.17.13). Adverse developments from baseline assumptions on global 
prices of crude oil and fertilizers are risks, as is the exchange rate. Similarly, 
the actual requirement for food subsidies will be determined by the extent 
of increases in minimum support prices, the timing of the introduction of 
entitlements under the proposed National Food Security Act, and its scope.
Despite sluggish growth in the advanced economies, global trade 
volume is expected to revive and grow by 4% in 2013. Th e fi rst signs of 
this were seen in increases in India’s exports in January and February 
aft er 9 months of declines measured year on year. Given the low base 
and a record of taking advantage of market opportunities, exports are 
projected to grow by 8% in FY2013. Despite economic growth picking up 
marginally in FY2013, import demand will continue to be strong at 6% 
given India’s growing dependence on imports of crude oil, coal, metals, 
and fertilizer. With no major improvement expected in net services and 
remittances, rising income payments will continue to limit the invisibles 
surplus. Accordingly, the current account defi cit is forecast to improve to 
4.4% of GDP in FY2013.
An uptick in domestic growth will boost imports by 16% in FY2014. 
At the same time, stronger growth prospects in the advanced economies 
is expected to support further expansion in exports by 14%, facilitating an 
improvement in the current account defi cit to 3.7% of GDP.
With the current account defi cit estimated to persist signifi cantly 
above trend in FY2013 and FY2014, the sustainability and fi nancing of 
the defi cit is becoming a rising concern. Th e deepening dependence on 
debt and portfolio fl ows to fi nance the defi cit has made the economy 
vulnerable to an oscillating risk of an on/off  global macro environment 
and changes in sovereign ratings. Overall, the current account defi cit is 
expected to be adequately fi nanced by capital fl ows with some drawdown 
of reserves in case of a shortfall. 
Th ese forecasts are subject to several risks. Weak monsoons would 
shave agriculture growth and dent rural consumption. Delays in fi scal 
consolidation and slow progress in addressing some of the structural 
bottlenecks would damage confi dence and hamper growth prospects. 
Finally, the global recovery continues to be weak, and signifi cant risks 
arise from unresolved fi scal issues in the US and the possibility of 
fi nancial shocks in euro area.
Policy challenge—fi nancing the 
current account defi cit 
With the current account defi cit breaching 4% of GDP in recent years, 
India has become increasingly reliant on external capital to fi nance the 
defi cit. Th e worsening of the current account defi cit has been mainly on 
account of a deteriorating the trade defi cit, which has exceeded 10% of 
GDP in recent years (Figure 3.17.14). 
With external demand remaining tepid, exports in the near future are 
unlikely to grow at the robust rates experienced during FY2003–FY2007. 
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Further, the supply side constraints and policy disarrays that have stalled 
domestic industrial and investment activity have also hindered exports. 
Fiscal subsidies provide little incentive to ration demand for commodities, 
and structural bottlenecks hamper the production of goods such as coal, 
fertilizers, and iron ore, inducing growth in imports that are relatively 
inelastic in response to price and currency movements. Moreover, high 
inflation in recent years has made gold an attractive form of savings, 
causing imports to surge. 
The invisibles surplus, which previously cushioned the trade deficit, 
is likely to moderate with weak recovery in advanced economies and low 
incremental spending on items such as software and business processing 
services. Investment income outflows, including interest payments, 
profits, and dividends, will remain elevated, reflecting the rising stock of 
FDI, portfolio investments, and external loans. Consequently, the current 
account deficit is expected to remain elevated.
Financing a high current account deficit will be a challenge in an 
environment of global uncertainty and sluggish domestic growth. In fact, 
between FY2008 and FY2012, cumulative net capital flows have fallen 
short of financing the deficit, causing reserves to stagnate (Figure 3.17.15). 
Moreover, there is concern over the pattern of financing the current 
account deficit, as the share of financing occupied by stable FDI inflows 
has fallen below 30% since the global financial crisis, from over 80% 
earlier. Debt flows have become the main source of financing, responding 
to large interest rate differentials and relaxed controls. Relaxation has 
included deregulated interest rates paid on the deposits of nonresident 
Indians, increased limits on external commercial borrowings, higher 
quotas for foreign investment in government and corporate bonds, and 
more types of long-term investors being allowed to participate in the 
market. Buoyed by these measures, the stock of external debt rose from 
$172.3.5 billion in March 2008 to $365 billion in September 2012, as short-
term debt increased from 16.3% to 23.1% of total debt. While short-term 
debt is not excessive by conventional standards, the existence of large 
amounts of nonresident Indian deposits and foreign equity holdings 
would amplify potential damage to the economy in case of a major global 
financial shock or a marked weakening of domestic fundamentals.
The increasing reliance on debt flows has meant that debt service 
payments will rise to an annual average of $24.9 billion during FY2011–
FY2015 from $16.2 billion during FY2006–FY2010. This and a high 
current account deficit have made India susceptible to a sovereign rating 
downgrade. However, recent reforms aimed at rejuvenating investment 
and advancing fiscal consolidation have mitigated this risk. 
The high current account deficit, elevated external debt, and stagnant 
reserve holdings have worsened measures of reserve adequacy, though 
they remain robust by international standards. 
Reverting to a sustainable current account deficit that can be 
financed by a stable mix of capital flows would require resolving the 
structural issues that are limiting investment and preventing a return 
to rapid growth that is needed to foster a dynamic export sector. At the 
same time, cutting the fiscal deficit will help raise domestic savings and 
encourage private investment. Further progress on liberalizing the FDI 
regime would help attract a more stable source of capital. 
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Maldives
A sharp slowdown in tourist arrivals dragged down economic growth. Fiscal and external imbalances 
intensified. The outlook is for a modest recovery on limited improvement in tourism, the economic 
mainstay. Inadequate political backing for implementing decisive fiscal measures in recent years and the 
difficulty of achieving economic diversification and generating employment threaten to restrain rapid and 
inclusive growth. 
Economic performance
GDP growth in 2012 slowed to 3.4% from 7.0% in 2011 as tourism and 
related activities, which directly provides 28% of GDP, sharply decelerated 
(Figure 3.18.1). Other related tertiary sectors such as wholesale and 
retail trade, transportation, and communications are also affected. 
Growth in tourist arrivals slumped to 2.9% in 2012 from 17.6% in 2011, as 
recession in Europe and the slowdown in the global economy combined 
with uncertainty created by domestic events to stymie the industry 
(Figure 3.18.2). The continued influx of visitors from the People’s Republic 
of China, up by 15.6%, was the bright spot in the market, while growth in 
arrivals from other Asian countries slowed to 1.5%. Tourist arrivals from 
Europe fell by 3.7%, slashing the European market share to 54% from over 
70% only 5 years earlier, as the Asian share nearly doubled to 38%. Tourist 
spending edged up a miniscule 0.3% in 2012, stalling from 9% growth a 
year earlier. 
Strong growth in important areas of the economy—manufacturing 
(4.7% of GDP) up by 17.5%, construction (9.3%) up by 16.1%, and fisheries 
(the main employer in the atolls) up by 9.7%—was insufficient to offset the 
headwinds from tourism and related industries. 
The sudden resignation of President Mohamed Nasheed on 7 February 
2012 under disputed circumstances set off major political unrest that 
affected tourism. Since then his Maldives Democratic Party has organized 
protest rallies and blocked Parliament for several weeks. A presidential 
election is scheduled for September 2013, but it is unclear if the former 
president will be qualified to run. If not, political unrest is expected to 
intensify. 
Inflation remained high despite falling global commodity and food 
prices. Inflation eased to an average of 10.9% in 2012 (Figure 3.18.3). 
Upward pressures on prices included the introduction of a general goods 
service tax in the first quarter of 2011 and pressures from limited foreign 
exchange availability and the exchange rate. The rufiyaa, which since 
April 2011 has been allowed to move within a band 20% above and below 
Rf12.8 to $1, has remained near the upper bound. 
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The central bank maintained the reverse repo rate at 7% to curb 
inflation despite the economic slowdown. Net credit to the government 
rose by 12.9% in 2012, much more slowly than the 27% increase in 2011, 
as the government relied heavily on foreign borrowing to finance its 
widening deficit. Credit to the private sector fell by 9.1%, with about half 
of the falloff owing to the tourism sector, mainly on reduction in loans for 
working capital and resort renovation. Broad money growth consequently 
slowed to 5.0% in 2012 from 20% a year earlier. 
The budget deficit in 2012 is estimated to have widened substantially 
to 12.6% of GDP from 7.5% in 2011 (Figure 3.18.4). Government revenue 
fell by 0.7% despite marked increases in goods and service taxes, both 
general and for tourists, because import duties dropped by nearly half, 
owing to the decline in imports for tourism and some duty reductions. 
Total revenue fell to 28.8% of GDP, a drop of 2.7 percentage points from 
a year earlier. This accounted for just over half of the 5.1 percentage 
point increase in the deficit in relation to GDP. Expenditure increased by 
2.4 percentage points to 41.4% of GDP, the rise entirely owing to a 15.9% 
increase in current expenditure to 30.8% of GDP, as there was relatively 
little increase in capital spending or net lending to public enterprises. The 
bulk of the deficit was financed through foreign borrowings and grants, 
with about one-fifth coming from the central bank. Total public external 
debt was 38.2% of GDP in 2012. 
The current account deficit widened to 26.3% of GDP from 21.4% in 
2011 (Figure 3.18.5). The deterioration reflected an increase in the trade 
deficit on weaker exports, stagnation in income from tourism, and higher 
remittances made by expatriate workers. The trade deficit, at 63.6% of 
GDP in 2012, illustrates the country’s substantial reliance on imports, 
especially for the tourist industry. The bulk of the large current account 
deficit was financed by unrecorded financial inflows and the errors and 
omissions item in balance-of-payments accounting, indicating weakness 
in data presently available. The overall balance of payments was in deficit 
by $37.4 million, equivalent to 1.6% of GDP. Gross official reserves at 
the end of 2012 were $304.6 million, enough to cover only 2.1 months of 
projected imports of goods in 2013. 
Economic prospects
The economy is forecast to recover modestly to grow by 4.3% in 2013 
and 5.5% in 2014, as the anticipated gradual global economic recovery 
boosts tourism. Higher spending ahead of the planned August 2013 
national elections is expected to add a fillip to growth. In 2014, the 
new government may initiate the implementation of its intermediate 
macroeconomic policy, and the direction thus provided may improve 
local investment in the tourism sector. 
In light of an expected surge in pre-election expenditures and 
recent experience, the budget deficit is expected to be 7.9% of GDP in 
2013, or more than double the official budget deficit estimate of 3.6%. To 
achieve the official estimate, the government would have to commit to 
fiscal consolidation measures such as streamlining the civil service and 
improving tax administration. In the past, implementing similar policies 
has entailed lengthy administrative and legislative procedures, making 
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these developments unlikely to materialize within the year. Nevertheless, 
stabilizing the huge public debt, which now is near 80% of GDP, will 
become daunting unless forceful measures are quickly adopted. 
Inflation will likely ease to 9.3% in 2013 and 8.5% in 2014 because 
of base effects and the improved availability of foreign exchange—and 
despite spending ahead of the elections sustaining inflation pressure in 
the first half of 2013. The modest pick-up in tourism may improve the 
current account balance somewhat, but the deficit is expected to remain 
wide, even deteriorating slightly to 27.8% of GDP in 2013 before improving 
to 22.0% in 2014. 
Policy challenge—fostering inclusive growth
The Maldives faces a slew of medium-term development challenges. 
Worrisome youth unemployment causes social problems and political 
instability. High unemployment reflects the narrow employment base and 
the mismatch between the youths’ skills and labor market requirements. 
Many jobs are therefore filled by expatriate workers. A substantial 
investment in skills development is a pressing need. Creating jobs 
requires developing new industries beyond fishing that are viable in a 
small, dispersed island nation. A key challenge is lifting the economy’s 
overreliance on tourism and thereby alleviating the country vulnerability 
to external shocks. The 2004 tsunami and 2008–2009 global financial 
crisis devastated tourism and sent the economy into a tailspin. 
The extreme dispersal of population and small size of island 
communities have long been recognized as challenges to sustainable 
social and economic development. Communities must be consolidated to 
foster the creation of new industries and diversify the economy beyond 
tourism. Developing a stronger economic base is essential to cope with 
the country’s heavy reliance on imports and persistently large current 
account deficits.   
The Maldives also faces challenges to the environment and from 
climate change. The pollution caused by the untreated wastes of the 
dispersed population can undermine the archipelago’s blue economy and 
image as a tourist paradise. Overdependence on imported oil for 
segmented and inefficient power generation adds to the challenge of 
the Maldives’ becoming carbon neutral by 2020. The lack of economies 
of scale poses severe challenges to attracting finance for water and 
sanitation, waste treatment, and power projects, as well as for their proper 
operation and maintenance. 
Population consolidation may be a long-term process, but action 
today is critical. The selection of large islands must be based not only 
on geographic convenience but also on business potential in areas 
such as shipping, trade and financial services, fish processing, and 
manufacturing. Islands that will serve as regional centers can be 
developed on a pilot basis to accommodate the scattered surrounding 
islands in that region. Gradually, these islands will become, like Malé, 
significant population centers. 
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Nepal 
Growth picked up with a favorable monsoon and robust services growth. Inflation moderated on declining 
food prices, and the current account posted a large surplus on a surge in remittances and modest 
imports. Political uncertainty intensified with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, affecting budget 
operations and government policies. Growth is expected to slow following a poor monsoon. Improving 
economic performance depends on resolving political uncertainty and creating an enabling environment 
for business and investment. 
Economic performance
GDP growth rebounded to 4.6% in FY2012 (ended 15 July 2012), boosted 
by a favorable monsoon and robust services growth despite a slowdown in 
industry and lingering political uncertainties (Figure 3.19.1). Agricultural 
output grew by 4.9%, the highest rate in 4 years, while the 5.1% advance in 
services reflected a pickup in tourism and remittances-backed consumer 
spending. Industry continued to perform poorly, growing by a mere 1.7%, 
because of an unfavorable business and investment climate caused by 
labor disputes, persistent electricity shortages, and the prolonged and 
disruptive political transition. 
Inflation eased slightly to average 8.3% in FY2012, as food prices 
declined during most of the year because of good harvests in FY2011 and 
FY2012 (Figure 3.19.2). Stubbornly high inflation is increasingly driven 
by rising prices for nonfood items that echo inflation in India, which is 
Nepal’s largest trading partner by far and to whose currency the Nepalese 
rupee is pegged. Other drivers are upward adjustment to administered 
fuel prices, depreciation of the Nepalese rupee against the currencies of 
third countries, rising wages, and persistent supply-side constraints.
The budget deficit narrowed marginally to 2.2% of GDP, owing to 
lower capital expenditure and greater revenue mobilization (Figure 3.19.3). 
Improved efficiency in tax administration and a wider tax base boosted 
tax revenue by an impressive 22.5%, lifting it by a percentage point to 
13.6% of GDP. However, the ratio of total revenues including grants to 
GDP improved by only half a percentage point to 18.3%. Total expenditure 
amounted to 20.4% of GDP, from 20.2% in the previous year. Recurrent 
expenditure jumped by 42.7% to cover large fuel subsidies and ad hoc 
expenditure programs, while capital expenditure contracted sharply from 
a year earlier due to lower project disbursements arising from lack of 
political consensus on a timely budget.
A sharp drop in real estate prices in FY2011 caused a liquidity squeeze 
and credit problems at financial institutions, whose property lending 
had substantially expanded in recent years. Several required emergency 
3.19.1 Supply-side contributions to growth 
5.8
3.9 4.3 3.8
4.6
–2
0
2
4
6
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Percentage points
Agriculture
Industry
Services
GDP
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 2012.
3.19.2 Inflation
0
5
10
15
20
Nonfood and services
Food and beverages
Overall
DecAugFeb
2012
AugFeb
2011
AugFeb
2010
Aug
2009
% change
Source: Nepal Rastra Bank. 2013. Recent Macroeconomic 
Situation. http://www.nrb.org.np
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: South Asia Nepal  201
lending from the central bank, as the amount of nonperforming loans 
rose and depositor confidence eroded. In FY2012, banking stress eased 
as robust remittance inflows boosted deposits and strengthened bank 
liquidity to comfortable levels. Interbank rates dropped to 1.1% from 8.1% 
in FY2011 (Figure 3.19.4). Regulatory lending caps on certain sectors and 
the lack of bankable projects kept credit growth moderate, as the central 
bank intensified its supervision and monitoring.
The current account balance recorded a large surplus of 4.9% of GDP 
in FY2012, mainly reflecting a large gain in worker remittances bolstered 
by an earlier marked increase in workers going abroad (Figure 3.19.5). 
Though merchandise exports grew modestly by 5.4%, to equal 5.2% of 
GDP, import growth of 4.5%—also modest partly because of low demand 
for construction materials and equipment—marginally widened the trade 
deficit to 24.0% of GDP. The overall balance of payments reached a record 
surplus of $1.6 billion, and foreign exchange reserves grew to $4.2 billion, 
equivalent to 7.9 months of imports of goods and services (Figure 3.19.6). 
Economic prospects
The economic outlook hinges on how political uncertainties are resolved, 
the weather, and remittance inflows. Investor confidence is depressed 
by concerns over the political transition, now in its fifth year, following 
the dissolution in May 2012 of the Constituent Assembly, which failed to 
agree on a constitution. Recently, the political parties agreed to form a 
caretaker government led by the Chief Justice, which is expected to hold a 
Constituent Assembly election by 21 June 2013. 
In view of the unfavorable monsoon, the shortage of fertilizers during 
the peak paddy planting season, low business confidence, the lack of a 
parliamentary-approved full budget, and subdued growth in India, GDP 
is projected to slow to 3.5% in FY2013. Production of paddy is projected 
to fall by 11.3%, maize by 8%, and millet by 2%. The lack of a full budget 
is causing funding shortages for ongoing development activities. While 
the industry sector performance is expected to remain weak, services 
growth is expected to continue to grow at around 5.4%. With a favorable 
monsoon, adequate fertilizer supplies, the timely adoption of a budget, 
and moderate expansion of remittances, GDP growth would rebound to 
4.2% in FY2014. 
Prospects for a lower agricultural harvest, wage pressures, further 
upward adjustment of administered fuel prices, continued power 
shortages, and other supply-side constraints are expected to push 
inflation to 10.5% in FY2013, above the central bank’s midyear estimate of 
9.5% but below the inflation average of 10.7% in the first half of the fiscal 
year. Assuming instead a good harvest and cautious monetary policies, 
inflation in FY2014 is projected to ease only slightly to 9.0% as most of the 
underlying pressures of the previous year persist. 
On the external front, the trade deficit is expected to markedly widen 
in FY2013. Given subdued growth in India, sluggish activity in the euro 
area and the US, and the rising cost of domestic production, export 
growth is projected to slow to 0.2% in FY2013. Allowing for the usual 
lag between remittance growth and spending on imports, imports are 
expected to markedly expand by 18.7%. With the large increase in the 
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trade deficit and more moderate remittance growth, the current account 
surplus will likely contract sharply to a deficit of 0.5% of GDP in FY2013 
and then slide more slowly to a 1.8% deficit in FY2014 as high import 
demand moderates and stepped up exports reflect somewhat improved 
economic conditions in trading partners.
Without a budget for FY2013, revenue policy is guided by the 
Finance Act, 2012, meaning that rates of taxes, duties, fees, and other 
charges remain unchanged while actual expenditure should not exceed 
previous levels. With the widened tax base and improved collection 
capacity, revenues will likely be largely sufficient to cover expected total 
expenditure, which will again show low capital spending. The budget 
deficit is expected to be around 2.5% of GDP. 
The budget continues to suffer stress from subsidies, including on 
diesel and liquefied petroleum gas. Prices should be rationalized, making 
provisions for the welfare to the poor. The FY2014 budget needs timely 
passage to allow the revision of tax rates, authorization for domestic 
borrowing, and provision of funding to accelerate development activities. 
Further, legislators need to address the quality of public spending, 
effective utilization of foreign aid, and governance issues. 
Policy challenge—finance sector vulnerability
The sharp drop in real estate and housing prices and slowdown in 
remittances in FY2011 caused a series of problems for banks and other 
financial institutions (BFIs), which fall into three categories: commercial 
banks, development banks, and finance companies. Commercial 
banks dominate these deposit-taking institutions, holding 80% of the 
system’s deposits and loans (Figure 3.19.7). The problems included more 
nonperforming loans and a liquidity squeeze as depositors lost confidence 
in the safety of their deposits. The balance sheet of BFIs deteriorated, and 
a number of development banks and finance companies sought assistance 
from the central bank.
In response to BFIs’ difficulties (apart from offering emergency 
assistance and allowing forbearance), the central bank rolled out a 
number of regulatory and monitoring directives to deal with banking 
sector issues. It directed banks to limit real estate and housing loans 
to 25% of total loans, and it stiffened capital adequacy requirements. 
Commercial banks were able to comply with the directive and brought 
real estate lending down to 16.9% of total lending in FY2012. To diversify 
loan portfolios and direct credit to more productive sectors, the central 
bank directed banks to extend at least 10% of total loans to agriculture 
and/or energy. Moreover, banking institutions were required to publish 
base interest rates to improve transparency and competition in their 
operations and policies. Further, separate departments are being 
established in the central bank to supervise development banks and 
finance companies. 
While prompt central bank action managed to handle the sector’s 
immediate problems, issues that remain unaddressed include structural 
changes needed to shield the banking sector and the economy from 
internal and external shocks. The first unresolved issue is the liberal 
licensing regime that created an excessive number of BFIs—213 BFIs 
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by FY2012—and thereby fomented unhealthy competition and fueled 
the bubble. BFIs need to be significantly consolidated in the coming 
years to ensure a sound finance sector. Second, ensuring sound 
corporate governance should be priority, as many of the troubles 
in development banks and finance companies emanated from their 
managers’ and directors’ misuse of credit, often for personal gain. This 
issue calls for strengthening central bank monitoring, supervision, and 
regulatory capability.
Third, apart from diversifying lending, BFIs need to strengthen 
internal project and loan analysis, innovate loan products, and enhance 
their operational efficiency. At the macro level, the government needs 
to improve the business and investment climate, which would underpin 
loan quality. Fourth, BFIs are still vulnerable to large fluctuations in 
remittance inflows that make deposit and lending flows volatile, which 
points to the need for more effective monitoring and control over 
developments in banking system liquidity. Notably, a recent stress test 
the central bank conducted on 32 commercial banks revealed that a 
routine credit shock would push capital holdings in 20 banks below the 
regulatory minimum.
Fifth, the activities of the largely unregulated cooperatives, which 
fall under the purview of Department of Cooperatives, need to be better 
understood and monitored, as does the nexus between these cooperatives 
and the banking system. Any major shock to the deposit and lending 
practices of cooperatives, whose combined deposits and lending portfolios 
are larger than those of either development banks or finance companies, 
would likely harm the entire banking system and economy. In this 
regard, the International Monetary Fund has estimated that a financial 
crisis in Nepal could cause GDP loss of 30% in the first 4 years before 
growth recovered to the baseline trend; reserves to fall by 50% in the 
first 2 quarters of the crisis; and a fiscal cost as high as 23% of GDP.
This chapter was written by Dawn Elizabeth Rehm and Farzana Noshab of the Pakistan 
Resident Mission, ADB, Islamabad.
Pakistan
Growth picked up slightly, but for the fifth consecutive year low growth, falling investment, excessive fiscal 
deficits, high inflation, and a deteriorating external position weighed on the economy. While problematic 
security and natural disasters are endemic, a difficult political situation stalled effective policy response 
to macroeconomic and structural problems, especially regarding energy. As official reserves are steadily 
declining on low capital inflows and heavy debt repayments, downside risks color the outlook. 
Economic assessment 
Economic performance during the first half of FY2012 (ended June 2012) 
was driven by a rebound from the devastating floods a year earlier that 
was partly offset by record power outages from load shedding in the 
second half. Growth strengthened to 3.7% but again remained well below 
the 7% pace needed to absorb new workforce entrants (Figure 3.20.1).
Agriculture recovered to grow by 3.1%, as better weather favored the 
production of major crops, though minor crops in parts of the country 
were hurt by floods. Industry expanded by 3.4%, mainly from post-flood 
reconstruction. The impact of the higher load shedding was apparent 
as large-scale manufacturing reversed early gains, tapering off to 1.2% 
expansion for the year, even lower than the flood-induced slowdown to 
1.8% in FY2011. Output of intermediate goods declined for the third year 
in a row as Pakistan’s steel, petroleum refining, and fertilizer industries 
continue to operate well below capacity. The large service sector, growing 
by 4.0%, continued to account for most GDP expansion. 
Private consumption expenditure expanded by 11.6% in FY2012 
to provide nearly all GDP growth (Figure 3.20.2). As in past years, it 
benefited from rising remittances and government salary increases. 
Fixed investment fell for the fourth year in a row, to 10.9% of GDP, the 
lowest share since 1974 and the lowest among major Asian countries 
(Figure 3.20.3). This downdraft is being driven by prevailing security 
issues, worsening power shortages, and growing concern over the general 
direction and outlook for the economy. 
Clearly, the steady decline in investment, coupled with reliance 
on consumption for growth, is unsustainable and undermines future 
growth prospects. Investment subtracted 1.4 percentage points from 
growth in FY2012. Net exports subtracted 3.8 percentage points partly 
because energy outages frustrated producers efforts to reliably meet 
export schedules and partly because demand was slack from the global 
slowdown. 
Food inflation eased in FY2012, allowing consumer price inflation 
to slow from the 13.7% average pace of FY2011 to 11.0% in FY2012. 
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The persistence of inflation in nonfood components is evident in the 
observation that core inflation measures, which exclude food and energy, 
accelerated from 9.5% at the beginning of FY2012 to 11.4% by June 2012, as 
more items in the basket experienced double-digit increases. 
The FY2012 budget deficit ballooned to 8.5% of GDP from 6.6% in the 
previous year, well above the 4% target (Figure 3.20.4) The bulk of the 
overrun was from recurrent outlays, mainly higher spending on power 
subsidies and funding to partly settle power sector arrears. Interest 
payments were also over budget, increasing to 4.0% of GDP and 42.2% 
of federal tax revenue, as domestic borrowing drove up the government’s 
domestic debt by 27%. 
Patterns from previous years continued, as outlays for wages and other 
expenses, pensions, subsidies, defense, and interest payments substantially 
exceeded federal tax revenues, leaving the government’s current operations 
to be substantially financed through debt (Figure 3.20.5). Development 
expenditure, restricted by flooding in FY2011, bounced back and met its 
targeted 3.5% of GDP.
Tax revenues collected by the Federal Board of Revenue increased 
to 9.1% of GDP from 8.6% in FY2011 but still fell short of budget targets. 
The 20.8% growth in tax revenue reflected in part receipts from flood-
related emergency measures, higher sales tax receipts on imports 
(particularly oil), and administrative improvements. There was also 
a significant shortfall on nontax revenues as Coalition Support Fund 
receipts and the auction of 3G mobile phone licenses were delayed. 
Collections under the petroleum development levy fell short as it was 
reduced to offset the impact of higher oil prices on consumers. 
The magnitude of recent deficits worked against compliance with the 
Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005. The provisions of 
the act called for a revenue surplus over current expenditure by FY2008 
to ensure adequate capacity for public investment, doubling the share 
of spending allocated to health and education, and debt limits. While 
these goals appear distant at present, achieving them appeared feasible at 
the time, as FY2004–FY2007 fiscal deficits averaged a low 3.6% of GDP, 
there was near revenue balance, and foreign direct investment inflows to 
privatize state-owned enterprises were on the rise.
As external financing covered a scant 10% of the FY2012 deficit, 
the bulk of financing came from domestic markets, including 
PRs505.7 billion in borrowing from the State Bank of Pakistan, the 
central bank. A legal restriction calling for borrowing from the central 
bank to be zero at the end of each quarter fell by the wayside. The 27% 
increase in government domestic debt was mostly in short-term issues 
that eroded the government debt maturity structure and heightened 
rollover risk.
Public debt expanded to PRs1.6 trillion in FY2012, raising the 
government’s ratio of debt to GDP to 62.5% (Figure 3.7.6), which 
substantially exceeded the limit set under the Fiscal Responsibility and 
Debt Limitation Act. External public debt dropped from 27.6% of GDP 
to 25.6%, while domestic public debt including the debt of state-owned 
enterprises increased from 33.3% of GDP to 37.0%. Pakistan’s debt is 
higher than the recommended 30%–40% of GDP for economies at a 
similar stage of development. 
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The central bank policy stance in FY2012 was generally 
accommodative. As inflation eased early in the year, it lowered the 
policy rate by 200 basis points to 12% to stimulate investment and 
strengthen growth. However, surging deficits made government debt 
readily available and more attractive than lending to the private sector 
in a risky business environment, which inhibited commercial banks’ 
financial intermediation. Bank loans to private businesses did increase 
by PRs18.3 billion, or 0.8%, but this amount was dwarfed by banks’ 
PRs692 billion in lending to the government (Figure 3.20.7). 
Broad money growth of 14.1% in FY2012 was somewhat slower than 
in the year earlier, largely reflecting the drawdown of foreign exchange 
reserves, ensuring that money growth came entirely through an 
expansion of net domestic assets. The loss of foreign exchange reserves, 
combined with the large amount of government debt entering the market, 
caused liquidity shortages at banks that were met by weekly injections by 
the central bank of up to PRs600 billion, far larger than in the past.
The current account returned to a deficit of 2.0% of GDP in FY2012, 
after a marginal surplus in FY2011 (Figure 3.20.8). The reversal came 
mainly from an 11.9% increase in imports, as oil payments increased by 
nearly 17% and fertilizer imports doubled because of shortages of natural 
gas. Exports contracted by 2.8%, as textile exports stagnated, cotton prices 
fell, and food exports declined. Remittances continued to grow at a robust 
17.7% pace, somewhat slower than a year earlier, but still providing an 
important cushion for the trade account deficit. 
Inflows in the capital and financial accounts continued to decline, 
while debt amortization payments increased, reducing net liquid foreign 
exchange reserves by about one-quarter in FY2012, to $10.8 billion, or 
2.6 months of import cover. Foreign direct investment fell to $821 million, 
and private portfolio investment recorded net outflow. Sustained inflation 
and pressure on the foreign exchange market induced a 9.1% depreciation 
of the Pakistan rupee against the US dollar. 
Prospects
The end of the government’s 5-year term in mid-March 2013 limited 
political scope for major policy or structural reforms. Economic 
developments in FY2013 are therefore unfolding along broadly similar 
lines as FY2012 but with deepening concerns about sustainability and the 
adequacy of foreign reserves.
The economic situation weakened further in the first half of FY2013 
as official reserves declined markedly, food and general inflation both 
reaccelerated in January following their earlier decline, and exports 
stagnated while imports contracted. Economic growth is expected to slow 
to 3.6% in FY2013, with risks on the downside from possible shortfalls in 
agricultural production, which may offset the modest improvement in 
large-scale manufacturing during the first half of the year. Production 
of petroleum products, iron, and steel picked up, but growth in textiles 
and food, which account for almost half of large-scale manufacturing 
production and the bulk of exports, remained negligible. Manufacturing 
performance for the year will hinge largely on limiting power outages 
during the hot season, when demand peaks. With little prospect for 
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improving energy supply or investment, growth is expected to remain 
weak at 3.5% in FY2014.
Consumer price inflation continued a downward trend during most of 
the first 8 months of FY2013 as food price inflation decelerated. However, 
year-on-year inflation at 7.4% in February 2013 was higher than the year 
low of 6.9% in November 2012 as food prices moved higher (Figure 3.20.9). 
Nevertheless, food inflation in this fiscal year is much slower than a year 
earlier, reflecting improved supply. Core inflation, excluding food and 
energy, also improved but, at 9.6% in February 2013, remains stubbornly 
high with many of its subcomponents staying in double digits, reflecting 
entrenched inflationary pressure in the economy. However, with slower 
growth in food and energy prices, inflation is expected to average 9.0% 
in FY2013, or 2 percentage points lower than in the previous fiscal year. 
On the expectation that there will be no substantive improvement in the 
country’s fiscal and energy imbalances in FY2014, inflation is expected to 
edge up to 9.5%. 
Easing inflation early in FY2013 prompted further reductions in the 
central bank’s main policy rate by a total of 250 basis points, bringing 
it to 9.5% in December 2012 (Figure 3.20.10). While banks’ weighted 
average rate on new loans in this period fell by about 200 basis points 
to 11.3%, overarching constraints coming from energy shortages and 
other uncertainties, such as law and order issues, will limit the impact of 
interest rate reductions on investment and business conditions in general. 
A modest increase in lending to private businesses in the first 7 months of 
FY2013 was mainly for working capital, with the bulk of lending going to 
textile firms. 
A modest surplus in the current account during the first 7 months 
of FY2013, following inflows of $1.8 billion from the Coalition Support 
Fund, reverted to a deficit of $700 million in February 2013. As 
disbursements of the same magnitude are not expected during the 
second half of the year, it is expected that the current account will post 
a deficit on the order of 0.8% of GDP. Exports contracted by 0.9% during 
the first 8 months of FY2013, but a 3.5% contraction in imports was four 
times larger (Figure 3.20.11). Low export growth was largely the result 
of 2.7% lower textile exports, reflecting the impact of sustained energy 
shortages, difficulties in meeting production schedules, and slack global 
demand. The contraction in imports was mostly of food, transportation 
equipment, and petroleum. 
Despite improvement in the current account, net liquid foreign 
exchange reserves declined further, dropping from $10.8 billion at the 
end of June 2012 to $7.9 billion at the end of February (Figure 3.20.12), 
reflecting higher debt amortization payments, including payments to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and lower financial inflows. 
Low reserves adequacy, at less than 2 months of imports cover as of 
February 2013, raises concern over external sector sustainability. Pressure 
on reserves is expected to continue, with an additional $1.7 billion due 
to the IMF before the end of FY2013 and $3.2 billion during FY2014. 
The financial account was in deficit during the first 8 months of FY2013 
(Figure 3.20.13) despite a modest revival in portfolio inflows as foreign 
direct investment stagnated. The nominal exchange rate depreciated by 
4% in the first 8 months of FY2013. 
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Continued weak export prospects, combined with limited import 
demand held down by slow domestic growth and relatively stable global 
prices for oil, support a projection that the current deficit will increase 
marginally to 0.9% of GDP in FY2014. However, weak capital inflows and 
large debt repayments, including to the IMF, will put pressure on the 
official reserves and the exchange rate. 
The fiscal outlook is largely unchanged from FY2012. Revenue 
targets announced with the FY2013 budget are unlikely to be met, as tax 
receipts have grown by only 12.0% in the first 6 months, well below the 
23.7% increase needed to meet budget targets. On the expenditure side, 
overruns on interest outlays and subsidies are again expected, as subsidy 
allocations of PRs120 billion have already been exceeded and will reach at 
least PRs200 billion along with a further buildup of power sector arrears. 
The deficit for the first half of FY2013 is 2.5% of GDP, including the 0.7% 
of GDP from the Coalition Support Fund that is the single payment for 
the year. Given normal quarterly patterns for fiscal balances, the deficit 
for FY2013 is expected to breach the 4.7% target and is likely to come in at 
7.0%–7.5% of GDP, excluding any payments to settle power sector arrears. 
Government bank borrowing continued in the first half of FY2013. 
The government did acknowledge requirements under the State Bank of 
Pakistan Act by retiring PRs399 billion of the PRs505 billion borrowed 
from the central bank during the first quarter of FY2013, before 
borrowing back PRs183 billion in the second quarter in response to 
fiscal pressures, thereby breaching the act once again. Large government 
borrowing from commercial banks requires ever-larger injections from 
the central bank on a weekly basis to meet banks’ liquidity requirements 
and keep money market rates anchored within central bank policy 
rates (Figure 3.20.14). Taming inflation would require shrinking these 
injections, which would require in turn lower government borrowing or 
else higher lending rates to further crowd out credit to the private sector.
Development challenge—lifting constraints 
on growth
The economy faces fundamental challenges to growth. The existing 
pattern of consumption-led growth with falling investment is 
unsustainable. In this context, macroeconomic sustainability and 
increasing investment go hand-in-hand with the improved growth 
prospects necessary to provide adequate employment. Unchanged 
policies marked by the lack of structural reform, high fiscal deficits, 
and accommodative monetary policies will mean continued slow 
growth, excessive inflation, and a weakening balance of payments that 
drains official reserves. Some drivers of the current situation, such as 
security challenges, are unlikely to change immediately. However, 
other factors, such as the energy deficit and the losses run up by public 
sector enterprises that drain fiscal resources needed for infrastructure 
development, are more malleable in the near and medium term. 
Deterioration in the power sector is the main physical constraint on 
growth and a major cause of financial and economic instability. Power 
outages are estimated to cut growth by 2 percentage points annually, 
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making it unlikely that Pakistan will be able, without significant 
reform, to move toward the 7% growth rate needed to generate 
adequate employment and meaningful poverty reduction. The current 
environment in the power sector, in which receipts do not cover costs, 
means that for every unit of power sold there is a large loss that is either 
covered by a government subsidy or becomes part of the continuously 
accumulating arrears of the state-owned power companies. Growing 
arrears, which reached PRs450 billion at the end of December 2012, or 
about 2% of GDP, constrain the availability of cash needed to operate 
existing power-generation assets at full capacity. While it will take time 
to move to a more efficient system for generating, transmitting, and 
distributing electricity, improvements to collection, adjustments to pricing 
mechanisms, and improved management could enable higher power 
generation, lift the financial burden on the budget, and motivate private 
investment in the sector. 
Large loss-making public sector enterprises absorb fiscal resources 
without any apparent improvement in their operations or financial 
viability. Explicit subsidies included in the budget for them are limited, as 
most assistance is in the form of sovereign loan guarantees that require 
lump sum payouts from the government at crisis points. The end result is 
the inefficient provision of services at prices that are higher than necessary. 
The framework for economic growth approved by the government in 
FY2011 identifies the restructuring of public sector enterprises as a key 
focus area. Its recently approved corporate governance rules for public 
sector enterprises are a step in the right direction, but the rules will need 
to be rigorously applied in the face of long-standing resistance to change. 
Finally, achieving the major challenge of boosting agricultural 
productivity and strengthening food security requires improving the 
management, storage, and pricing of water for irrigation. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that agricultural productivity could be doubled with 
appropriate reform. Improved water management is critical to deliver 
sufficient water to the 80% of farmland in the country that is irrigated. 
Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, not far 
from being classified as “water scarce,” with less than 1,000 cubic meters 
per person per year. Water demand exceeds supply, which has caused 
maximum withdrawal from reservoirs. At present, Pakistan’s storage 
capacity is limited to a 30-day supply, well below the recommended 
1,000 days for countries with a similar climate. Climate change is 
affecting snowmelt and reducing flows into the Indus River, the main 
supply source. Increases in storage capacity to manage periods of low 
snowmelt and low rainfall are required, as well as the rehabilitation of the 
distribution system to reduce losses. 
This chapter was written by Tadateru Hayashi, Nimali Hasitha Wickremasinghe, and 
Savindi Jayakody of the Sri Lanka Resident Mission, ADB, Colombo.
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Sri Lanka
Policy measures in early 2012, including a tightened monetary stance and exchange rate flexibility, 
addressed emerging domestic and external imbalances. Growth slowed on weak external demand, 
drought, and floods, but the balance of payments improved. Growth is expected to edge up, with 
some reduction in inflation and the current account deficit. Given elevated public debt levels, sustaining 
rapid growth will require determined efforts to eliminate large losses in the energy sector and raise tax 
revenues to reduce budget deficits and borrowing.
Economic performance 
After growing at a robust 7% in the first half of 2012, economic 
growth slowed in the second half to record annual expansion of 6.4% 
(Figure 3.21.1). This was the first time growth fell below 8% since the civil 
conflict ended, largely reflecting weak external demand, tight monetary 
conditions, and bad weather, as 15 of the country’s 25 districts suffered 
drought that affected agriculture and hydropower generation. 
Economic performance was underpinned by a strong showing in 
industry, which provides 30% of GDP and is estimated to have grown by 
10.3%, as in 2011. A doubling of growth in construction accounted for the 
resilient performance, as expansion moderated in mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, electricity, gas, and water. 
In the service sector, which is the largest component of GDP, 
contributing some 59% to GDP, growth slowed to 4.6% in 2012, 
well below 8.6% a year earlier. Marked slowdowns in key subsectors 
such as wholesale and retail trade and transport and communications 
reflected subdued international trade and the impact of policy measures 
implemented in early 2012 for macroeconomic stabilization.
Agriculture, which contributes some 11% to GDP, performed well 
in the first half of 2012, reaching double-digit growth of 10%. However, 
severe drought followed by floods during the second half brought growth 
for the year to 5.8%—still recording a substantial recovery from the weak, 
weather-affected performance in the previous year.
Inflation, measured by the year-on-year increase in the Colombo 
consumer price index, continued to remain in single digits during 2012, 
averaging 7.6% for the year (Figure 3.21.2). However, inflation rose to 
around 9% in the second half with pressure on nonfood prices coming 
from increases in government-administered prices for fuel and electricity 
in February 2012 and the depreciation of the Sri Lankan rupee. Food 
inflation also increased during the year as import duties were increased 
on selected food items and domestic food supplies were disrupted by 
drought and flooding.
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The budget deficit is estimated to be 6.2% of GDP, exactly in line with 
the 2012 target (Figure 3.21.3). This was achieved, despite lower-than-
expected revenues, by reducing budgeted current expenditure; capital 
expenditure was slightly lower than the targeted 6% of GDP. Revenue 
including grants is estimated to equal 14.2% of GDP, slightly lower than 
budgeted and less than in 2011. The shortfall was mainly due to lower 
value-added tax collections owing to slower growth.
The ratio of government debt to GDP rose to 82.6% in September 2012 
from 78.5% at the end of 2011 owing to the impact of rupee depreciation on 
the value of foreign currency-denominated debt and increased borrowings, 
mainly through Treasury bills, to cover the budget deficit (Figure 3.21.4). 
Debt composition has changed with the gradual move toward more 
marketable instruments and foreign investment in government securities.
To counter external and internal imbalances that emerged during 
2011, the central bank tightened monetary policy by raising policy rates 
in February and April 2012, and by imposing an 18% ceiling on licensed 
banks’ credit growth in February. Repurchase and reverse-repurchase 
rates were increased by 75 and 125 basis points in total from those of 
2011 (Figure 3.21.5). Active liquidity management by the central bank 
continued absorbing excess rupee liquidity in the domestic money market 
to underpin the tightened monetary stance. With these measures, banks’ 
average lending rate on new loans rose by 300 basis points to just over 
14%, and growth in credit to the private sector fell from about 35% in 
the first quarter to 17.6% by year-end. To address risks to growth, the 
central bank eased monetary policy in mid-December by reducing policy 
rates by 25 basis points and allowed the ceiling on credit growth to the 
private sector to expire at the end of 2012. 
Exchange rate policy in 2012 moved toward greater flexibility by 
limiting central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
The rupee quickly depreciated by about 15% against the dollar in the first 
half of the year, then slowly moved upward, appreciating by about 3% 
during the second half (Figure 3.21.6). Over 2012, the nominal and real 
effective exchange rates depreciated by about 11% and 6%, respectively. 
Exports and imports both declined from the previous year after the 
second quarter, with exports contracting by 7.4% for the year and imports 
by 5.8%. Weak global demand and lower prices explained most of the 
drop in exports. Earnings from garments, the island’s largest export, 
fell by 2.3%, mainly owing to slack economic conditions in the US and 
EU and the loss in 2010 of the Generalized System of Preferences Plus 
facility previously offered by the EU. The loss of that concession continues 
to cause garment factories to close. Agricultural exports, including tea, 
contracted by 7.8% due to the drought and weaker prices.
The performance of imports reflected currency depreciation, some 
higher tariffs, and central bank measures to restrict credit growth. 
Except fuel, machinery, and building materials, imports of all other 
import subcategories fell from a year earlier. Imports of consumer 
goods contracted by 18% and intermediate goods by 6%, while imports 
of investment goods rose by 5%. Fuel imports also increased by 5% as 
thermal power generation stood in for hydropower output constrained by 
drought. Despite the fall in export earnings, the trade deficit narrowed by 
4% to $9.3 billion. 
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The post-conflict tourism boom continued in 2012, with the 
number of tourists visiting Sri Lanka surpassing 1 million in 2012 and 
earnings from tourism expanding by 25.1% to reach $1 billion. Workers’ 
remittances also expanded rapidly by 16.3% to $6 billion. Increased labor 
migration under the professional category and the expansion of formal 
channels for remitting money were the main factors boosting remittance 
inflows. These earnings held the current account deficit to an estimated 
$3.5 billion, about 5.8% of GDP, a marked improvement from 7.8% a year 
earlier (Figure 3.21.7).
Net foreign investments on the Colombo Stock Exchange increased 
to $305 million, and there was a significant increase in foreign purchases 
of government securities. Net inflows to the government in 2012 grew 
by 20.8%, in part reflecting the disbursement of foreign loans to finance 
major infrastructure development projects. Foreign direct investment of 
around $1 billion was, however, about the same as in 2011. 
The proceeds of the fifth $1 billion sovereign bond issue and the 
final $415 million disbursement under the International Monetary Fund 
standby facility helped to buoy foreign exchange inflows. Gross official 
reserves increased by $0.9 billion to $6.9 billion, equivalent to 4.3 months 
of imports (Figure 3.21.8). In 2012, Fitch Ratings affirmed Sri Lanka’s 
stable sovereign rating, and Standard & Poor’s revised its foreign currency 
rating outlook from positive to stable.
Economic prospects 
Private consumption expenditure, which accounts for about 70% of GDP, 
will remain the main engine of economic expansion, fuelled by rising 
incomes and remittances from Sri Lankans abroad. Investments are 
expected to expand further in 2013, with higher growth in construction 
buoyed by large infrastructure projects. Slow recovery in the euro area, 
Sri Lanka’s largest export market, would continue to constrain growth 
potential somewhat. Exports will have to wait at least another year for a 
stronger recovery because weak external demand will continue in 2013. 
From the supply side, expansion is expected in services, led by the hotels 
and other tourism-related activities, along with growth in external and 
domestic trade. Agriculture is expected to improve with normal weather. 
Economic growth will be subject to constraint from the balance 
of payments. Larger imports associated with high economic growth 
will worsen the trade deficit and—unless financed by exports, workers’ 
remittance, and capital inflow—depreciate the currency. Because of the 
need to address inflation, the monetary policy stance set at the end of 
2012 is not expected to be relaxed, which will restrain economic growth. 
As such, GDP growth is expected to edge up to 6.8% in 2013 and then 
advance by 7.2% in 2014 on better external conditions. 
Fiscal policy will focus on further consolidation and the challenge of 
narrowing the budget deficit. The government projects a budget deficit of 
5.8% of GDP in 2013, down from 6.2% estimated for 2012. The narrowing 
of the deficit is attributable to an expected 18.9% increase in tax revenue 
and grants, against a 15.9% increase in government expenditure. 
Expenditure as a share of GDP will be 20.5%, essentially unchanged from 
2012. The ratio of current expenditure to capital expenditure will fall as 
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the government increases public investments to a planned 6.1% of GDP, in 
line its development policy framework (Mahinda Chintana).
The planned expansion of revenue to 14.7% of GDP is to come mainly 
through higher collection of value-added tax and improved efficiency 
in tax collection, supported by higher economic growth and a better 
external trade performance. Increasing revenue is, however, a difficult 
task. Revenue has been declining as a share of GDP, even in years with 
high economic growth (Figure 3.21.9). To decisively reverse this trend, tax 
efficiency would need to improve substantially and the tax base to widen. 
Average inflation in 2013 is expected to be 7.5%, little improved from 
a year earlier, despite the base effect from the energy price adjustments in 
2012 disappearing in the second quarter 2013, expected declines in global 
commodity and oil prices, and expected exchange rate stabilization at 
current levels. Gas prices were adjusted upward by 2% and diesel by 5% 
in the last week of February 2013. Further price increases are required 
to address the current operating losses of the Ceylon Electricity Board 
(CEB), and to pay down debts to banks that funded previous years’ losses. 
The estimated loss was about Rs89 billion (equal to 1.2% of GDP) for 
Ceylon Petroleum and Rs65 billion (0.9%) for the CEB. An increase in the 
national minimum wage is a risk that could top up inflationary pressures. 
Monetary policy will therefore need to remain tight to limit second-round 
effects and anchor inflation expectations in 2013. 
External demand is expected to recover gradually in 2013. 
Merchandise exports are projected to grow at a slow 4% in 2013 and 5% in 
2014. Meanwhile, worker’s remittances will continue to expand rapidly. 
Services exports are expected to be boosted by growing tourism, the 
further development of business process outsourcing, and higher income 
from trade and shipping services partly derived from the opening of new 
port facilities. 
Revenues from these items will allow imports to expand by 6% in 
2013 and 10% in 2014 without widening the current account deficit as a 
share of GDP (Figure 3.21.10). Normal weather would increase the share 
of hydropower generation and contain the oil bill. The current account 
deficit is thus expected to be 5.0% of GDP in 2013 and 4.5% in 2014, 
both improvements on the estimated 5.8% in 2012. It is assumed that the 
current account deficit will continue to be financed by capital inflows. 
Policy challenge—developing the power sector
Sri Lanka achieved remarkable progress in developing its power sector. 
The national electrification ratio grew from 29% in 1990 to an estimated 
94% in 2012. Power supply is stable, and power cuts are very limited. 
The cost of electricity supply is, however, high. Moreover, tariffs 
do not reflect full costs or adjust according to an automatic mechanism. 
The average cost of electricity generation is currently around SLRs21.0 
per kilowatt-hour while the average selling price is SLRs16.4. The CEB’s 
estimated loss of SLRs65 billion in 2012 occurred even with fuel supplied 
by Ceylon Petroleum at less than full cost. The CEB relies on bank loans 
to cover its operating costs. In January 2013 the regulator for the sector, 
the Public Utilities Commission began preparing an assessment of CEB’s 
costs toward revising electricity tariffs based on a formula. 
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3.21.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
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GDP growth  6.8  7.2
Inflation  7.5  6.5
Current account balance 
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Source: ADB estimates. 
The share of thermal power increased from 6% in 1995 to 60% during 
2008–2012, as demand growth was met by oil-fired generation (Figure 
3.21.11). The growing reliance on oil-fired plants, higher oil prices, and the 
delayed construction of new hydropower plants have significantly pushed 
up the cost of generation. The option now available for generating large 
base loads is traditional coal-fired plants, which are under development 
(Table 3.21.2). At present, unconventional renewable energy sources 
cannot contribute significantly because of their intermittent nature and 
other technical constraints. Another option Sri Lanka has to strengthen 
its energy security is to diversify into other forms of traditional 
generation and to build a cross border connection with India, which is 
being planned.
Disparities still exist in electrification across the provinces. As 
demand grows, particularly in the former conflict areas, the transmission 
network must be continuously improved. The challenge is to obtain 
financial support to implement crucial transmission links.
The government’s 10-year development framework, prepared in 
2006, envisions the sustainable development of energy resources, access 
extended to the entire population, and reliable service delivery at a 
competitive price through commercially viable institutions subjected to 
independent regulation.
3.21.2 Long-term power generation expansion plan, 2011–2018
Year
Renewable additions  
(using hydro)
Thermal additions  
(using coal and furnace oil)
2011 Puttalam coal (stage 1) (315 MW)
2012 Upper Kotmale (150 MW)
2013 Chunnakam furnace oil (24 MW)
2014 Puttalam coal (stages 2 & 3, 2 × 315 MW)
2015 Uma Oya (120 MW)
Gin Ganga (49 MW)
2016 Broadlands (35 MW)
2017
2018 Moragolla (30 MW)
Trincomalee coal (2 × 250 MW)
 MW = megawatt.
Sources: Ceylon Electricity Board. Long-Term Transmission Development Plan 2011; ADB estimates.
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Brunei Darussalam
Lower oil production and exports weighed on economic growth in 2012. Nevertheless, private 
consumption and fixed investment expanded. Growth in sectors unconnected to energy indicated the 
country’s progress in its efforts to broaden its economic base. Modest GDP growth is projected for this 
year and next, accompanied by low inflation and substantial current account surpluses. 
Economic performance
Economic growth slowed to an estimated 1% in 2012 owing to weakness 
in production and exports of crude oil (Figure 3.22.1). The latest official 
data put GDP growth at 0.6% in January–September from the same 
period in 2011. 
Despite slight growth in GDP, private consumption increased by 
4% in January–September, above the average of the past 5 years. Sales 
of new automobiles jumped by 28%. Increases in private consumption 
are underpinned by high employment, low inflation, and—thanks to 
strong government revenue flows from hydrocarbons—no taxes on 
personal incomes, goods and services, or capital gains. GDP per capita at 
$44,000 in 2012 was the highest in developing Asia after Singapore and 
Hong Kong, China.
Fixed investment rose by nearly 3% and government consumption by 
2% in January–September. While domestic demand increased in 2012 a 
decline in exports of hydrocarbons together with a rise in imports meant 
that net exports acted as a drag on GDP growth. 
The oil and gas sector contracted by 2.4% in January–September. Oil 
production fell to 155,000 barrels a day from 166,000 barrels a day in 2011. 
Output has declined by about one-third since 2006, when it was 219,000 
barrels a day (Figure 3.22.2). Natural gas production at mid-2012 showed a 
slight decline from a year earlier.
Encouragingly, economic activity unconnected with energy grew 
by 3.4%, indicating progress in the government’s drive to diversify the 
economy before hydrocarbon reserves dwindle. The sector has gradually 
increased its share of real GDP to 54.4% over recent years (Figure 3.22.3). 
Services grew by 3.3% and agriculture by nearly 9%. Manufacturing and 
construction recorded only slight growth. In a further positive sign, the 
privately owned part of the economy outside the energy sector grew by a 
healthy 4.6% in the third quarter.
Merchandise exports, mostly oil and liquefied natural gas, increased 
by 9.4% to $9.9 billion on a customs basis in January–September, 
supported by higher prices. Exports of methanol were interrupted in 
April 2012 when production was shut down temporarily for maintenance. 
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Imports rose much more quickly than exports, by 21.8% to $2.7 billion, 
on the back of firm domestic demand. Most capital and consumer goods 
are imported, as is most food. A substantial trade surplus produced 
another large current account surplus, estimated at 47% of GDP in 2012. 
International reserves rose by a third to $3.3 billion, cover for 11.9 months 
of imports of goods.
Inflation decelerated from 1.2% year on year at the start of 2012 to 0.4% 
in December (Figure 3.22.4). Prices of food, particularly meat and cooking 
oil, rose but this was mostly countered by lower prices for clothing, 
education, and transport. Price controls and subsidies help to keep 
inflation low. A firm exchange rate contributed by dampening imported 
inflation. The Brunei dollar, which is pegged to the Singapore dollar 
through a currency board arrangement, appreciated by 6.3% against the 
US dollar in 2012.
Income taxes, dividends, and royalties from hydrocarbons provide 
the government with substantial revenue to fund the large public sector, 
invest in public infrastructure, and provide a range of services and 
subsidies. Revenue in FY2011 (ended 31 March 2012) increased by 7.0% and 
government spending by only 1.4%, with the fiscal surplus remaining at 
over 20% of GDP.
Economic prospects
The government aims to extend the productive life of hydrocarbons 
until other pursuits can play a much larger role in the economy. This 
is to be achieved by enhanced recovery and managed production from 
existing oil and gas fields and exploration for new ones. Forecasting 
GDP is hampered by uncertainty over the timing of new production 
and production stoppages for maintenance, as well as by limitations and 
delays affecting economic data. The projections below assume a modest 
recovery in hydrocarbons production and continued growth in the rest 
of the economy in the forecast period. On this basis, GDP is projected to 
increase by 1.8%–2.0% in 2013–2014. 
More important for longer-term development are gains made toward 
broadening the economic base. The government has identified several 
industries for development, principally downstream petrochemicals, 
tourism, Islamic businesses including halal products and financial 
services, and information and communication technology services. 
Infrastructure projects under way to attract these industries include 
the Pulau Muara Besar port and industrial zone supported by a bridge 
and roads to the port, an expanded international airport, upgraded 
power transmission lines, a high-speed broadband network with fiber-
to-the-home connections, and an industrial park to research and develop 
agricultural products including halal food. A joint venture with a foreign 
company is establishing a helicopter and aircraft pilot training center that 
has ambitions to be a regional training facility. 
Given the small size of the domestic market serving a population of 
only about 400,000, the government is pursuing export-oriented projects. 
Since foreign companies completed a $450 million plant to produce 
and export methanol in 2010, the government has approved plans for a 
$2.8 billion petrochemical project using natural gas and a $2.5 billion oil 
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refinery and aromatics cracker, both of which are proposals from foreign 
companies. These projects are in the design and engineering phase. 
Domestic institutions are being brought into play in the push for 
economic diversification. Last year the government established an 
investment holding company—Darussalam Assets—to improve the 
financial performance of government-owned firms and to take a strategic 
role in diversification efforts. The monetary authority started preparations 
to establish a national payment and settlement system, in part to develop 
the Islamic finance industry and promote the country as an Islamic 
finance hub.
Soft global oil prices cloud the outlook for growth in export receipts. 
Merchandise exports are projected to increase slightly in value in 2013–
2014, while imports will likely maintain strong growth. Nevertheless, the 
current account surplus will remain substantial given the relatively large 
export base and income from the country’s overseas investments.
Inflation is seen at about 1% through the forecast period. Subdued 
global food prices and the government’s domestic subsidies and price 
controls should largely counter inflationary pressures that could emerge 
from expansion in domestic demand. 
Policy challenge—attracting new industries
Brunei Darussalam ranks 28th of 144 countries in the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013, better than other 
countries in Southeast Asia except for Singapore and Malaysia. One factor 
that hurts competitiveness is the small market, for which reason the 
country ranks only 130 in the category of domestic market size.
To address this issue, the government is building transport, power, 
and communications infrastructure so that companies can serve foreign 
markets. It has implemented liberal policies on trade, investment, and 
labor—such that, for example, foreign workers comprised 74% of all 
private sector employment in 2010. The country is a member of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, which proposes further liberalization of 
trade and investment between members. Moreover, the government has 
lowered the corporate tax rate to 20% and offers other tax concessions 
and incentives.
Brunei Darussalam moved up four places to 79th of 185 countries 
in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2013 ranking. Moving into this 
ranking’s top 20 is a government ambition that will require intensified 
efforts to, among other actions, upgrade training and labor regulations, 
develop capital markets, and streamline procedures for starting 
businesses. 
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Cambodia
Higher inflows of foreign direct investment contributed to strong economic growth in 2012. Outcomes 
exceeded expectations in agriculture, construction, and tourism. The forecast is for further robust growth, 
with the trajectory expected to steepen slightly in 2014 with recovery in major export markets. Inflation 
subsided in 2012 and is projected to remain modest through the forecast period. Although poverty has 
declined, persistently high child malnutrition remains a critical development challenge.
Economic performance
GDP growth picked up to 7.2% in 2012, driven by robust consumption and 
investment (Figure 3.23.1). Consumption expanded by an estimated 9.5% 
and made the biggest contribution to GDP growth from the demand side. 
Gross fixed investment increased by 30%, spurred by a surge in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and higher bank lending. However, net exports 
dragged on GDP growth as they fell, partly reflecting elevated imports 
needed for power-generation projects. 
The service sector expanded by an estimated 8% and was the main 
source of GDP growth from the production side. Strong growth in tourism 
and resurgence in real estate activity bolstered this sector. Assisted by 
more direct flights, tourist arrivals rose by 24.4% to 3.6 million and 
tourism receipts grew by 15.6% to $2.2 billion (Figure 3.23.2).
Growth in the industry sector moderated from the previous year’s 
pace to just over 9% in 2012. Exports of garments and footwear to the 
US, Cambodia’s top export market, fell by 1.8% to $2.6 billion, though 
those to the European Union (EU) rose by 10.8% to $1.8 billion. Industry 
sector growth was supported by a 5% increase in exports of milled rice 
to 187,000 tons, mostly to the EU. Construction accelerated as building 
project approvals nearly doubled to $2.1 billion last year.
Agricultural production increased by an estimated 4%, despite floods 
in some provinces and dry weather in others. Output of crop production, 
mainly paddy rice, rose by 4.3%, and fishery yields increased by 6%.
A moderation in food prices brought down inflation from 5.8% in 
January 2012 to 2.6% in December (Figure 3.23.3). Food comprises 43% of 
the consumer price index. Year-average inflation decelerated to 2.9%.
The government continued to rein in its fiscal deficit, which had 
widened sharply in 2009 to 8.6% of GDP. The fiscal gap, excluding 
grants, narrowed last year to an estimated 5.2% of GDP. Domestic 
revenue increased to 14.5% of GDP from 13.2% in the previous year, 
thanks to improved revenue collection and buoyant economic activity. 
Government spending was contained at 19.7% of GDP, down from 20.7% 
in 2011. Income from external grants and concessional loans amounted 
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to 5.8% of GDP, so the government was able to replenish its savings by 
the equivalent of 0.6% of GDP after running down its deposits over the 
previous 3 years. 
Growth in credit to the private sector accelerated to 34.1% last year 
(Figure 3.23.4). Concerned about this rapid pace, the central bank raised 
the reserve requirement for foreign currency deposits in commercial banks 
by 50 basis points to 12.5% in September 2012. The ratio of private sector 
credit to GDP jumped to 41.6%, well above the median for low-income 
countries. Reflecting a deepening of the financial system, the ratio of broad 
money to GDP rose to 50.5% from 45.4% in 2011. The Cambodian riel 
appreciated by an average of 0.8% against the US dollar last year.
Merchandise exports, mainly garments, footwear, and rice, rose in 
US dollar terms by an estimated 11.4%. Imports, bolstered by purchases of 
construction materials for power plants and other projects, rose by 17.0%. 
As the merchandise trade gap widened, so did the current account deficit, 
to 11.6% of GDP if official transfers are excluded. The deficit was fully 
financed by FDI and official loans and grants. Net FDI surged by 75% 
to $1.5 billion (Figure 3.23.5), contributing to an increase in gross official 
reserves to $3.5 billion, which covers 4.4 months of imports.
An International Monetary Fund analysis of debt sustainability 
published this year saw Cambodia at low risk of debt distress. It cautioned 
that structural reform and revenue mobilization, as well as the careful 
management of potential contingent liabilities from power-generation 
projects, will be important to ensuring long-term debt sustainability. 
Poverty incidence likely fell below 20%, surpassing the official target 
to reduce poverty by half from levels in the early 1990s. This reduction 
has been achieved through sustained economic growth, with particularly 
good performance in agriculture.
Economic prospects
Economic growth is forecast at 7.2% in 2013, picking up to 7.5% next year 
as recovery in Europe and the US takes hold (Figure 3.23.6). 
European demand for Cambodian garments and footwear is expected 
to maintain good growth, supported by duty-free access to the EU. 
Shipments to the US will likely be subdued this year but should pick 
up after that. Increased foreign investment is funding new industries, 
including the manufacture of automotive parts and processing of 
agricultural products, as well as diversifying garment production into 
higher-value products. Last year’s surge in building approvals bodes 
well for construction. The timing of offshore oil exploitation is unclear. 
Industry as a whole is expected to expand by 10.5% in 2013.
The service sector is seen growing by 7%. Growth in tourism 
is benefiting the hotel, restaurant, retailing, and transport and 
communications subsectors. Buoyant property development stimulates 
growth in finance and real estate services. Agriculture will likely grow 
by about 4%, assuming favorable weather. The government is supporting 
paddy production and exports of milled rice.
Fiscal consolidation looks set to continue in 2013, as the government 
targets a narrower fiscal deficit at 5.1% of GDP, to be funded by external 
grants and loans. Nevertheless, public spending could pick up ahead of 
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national elections scheduled for July 2013, making fiscal consolidation 
more difficult. The stock of government deposits in the banking system—
the country’s buffer to deal with shocks—is likely to increase to 4.6% of 
GDP, compared with 8% in 2008. 
In light of the rapid growth in credit and excess liquidity at some 
banks, additional increases in bank reserve requirements may be required 
to reduce risks to financial stability. In this regard, the authorities are 
considering such macroprudential measures as imposing higher capital 
requirements for banks, or tightening permitted ratios of loans to value 
or loans to deposits. The central bank plans to develop the interbank 
market by introducing negotiable certificates of deposit, moving toward 
more market-based monetary policy operations. To reduce the heavy use 
of the US dollar for local transactions, the government will continue to 
encourage the use of the riel. Last year, the ratio of US dollar deposits to 
total deposits was 95.7%, down only marginally from 97.0% in 2008. 
Good domestic harvests and relatively stable global food prices 
suggest that inflation this year will be on average similar to that in 2012 
(Figure 3.23.7). Inflation is seen quickening in 2014 as continued robust 
domestic demand likely encounters some supply constraints. These 
inflation forecasts will be at risk if bad weather pushes up food prices. 
Merchandise exports are projected to pick up during the forecast 
period while growth in imports moderates after the completion of large 
power projects. Receipts from tourism will keep the services account 
in surplus. The current account deficit, excluding official transfers, is 
projected to narrow (Figure 3.23.8). FDI and other capital flows are 
expected to maintain international reserves at levels that cover more than 
4 months of imports. 
Developments that enhance the environment for the private sector 
included the initial public offering of shares in the Phnom Penh Water 
Supply Authority, the first listing on the Cambodia Securities Exchange. 
An arbitration center was launched to provide businesses with a faster 
and less expensive way to resolve commercial disputes, and a credit 
bureau started to provide banks with better information on potential 
borrowers. To tackle corruption the government issued lists in January 
2013 showing the official fees for public services including customs, 
taxation, business and trading procedures, and other activities related to 
investment. Finally, the authorities are strengthening the environment for 
public–private partnerships (Box 3.23.1). 
Policy challenge—child malnutrition 
The high incidence of child malnutrition in Cambodia is a critical 
development challenge. Poor nutrition in the 1,000 days from conception 
to the second birthday causes long-term damage to physical and cognitive 
development. Functional losses in this period can never be fully recovered. 
In addition to impacts on child health and mortality, malnutrition has 
adverse health and economic consequences that persist throughout the 
individual’s lifetime and can be handed down to harm the next generation.
Chronic poor health and malnutrition stunt the growth of 40% of 
Cambodian children. Demographic surveys show 28% of children under 
5 years of age underweight in 2005—and no improvement 5 years later. 
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Indeed, severe malnutrition increased, with the incidence of wasting 
among children rising from 8.4% to 10.9% (Figure 3.23.9). The incidence 
of anemia was at epidemic proportions, affecting 55% of children under 5 
in 2010. 
The World Health Organization estimated in 2011 that Cambodia 
loses $146 million in GDP each year from the impacts of vitamin 
and mineral deficiencies alone. While the full economic impact of 
malnutrition in the country has yet to be assessed, international evidence 
cited by the United Nations Development Assistance Framework suggests 
that a 1% decrease in adult stature translates into a 1.4% decrease in 
productivity. 
Risk factors for child malnutrition include poverty (although child 
malnutrition also affects higher-income families in Cambodia), lack of 
toilets, unsafe water supply, inadequate breast feeding, and poor maternal 
nutrition. The 2010 demographic survey found that 57% of Cambodian 
households had no toilet and therefore defecated in the open, 26% of 
infants under 6 months were not exclusively breastfed, and 44% of women 
suffered some degree of anemia. 
The good news is that addressing child malnutrition early can avoid 
long-term damage to health. Further, the solutions are highly cost-
effective. The 2012 Copenhagen Consensus, a meeting of economists to 
establish cost-effective priorities to improve global welfare, found that 
fighting malnourishment should be the top priority and that the benefits 
in terms of improved health, schooling, and productivity would be 
significant. 
Child malnutrition can be countered by
•	 targeting social transfers, fortifying foods, and improving local 
food production to overcome seasonal food shortages and ensure 
food supplies of sufficient quantity, quality, and variety;
•	 promoting breastfeeding and appropriate complementary feeding 
practices for young children; 
•	 improving pregnant women’s dietary intake through nutrition 
education and communication;
•	 providing to women and children improved basic health services 
and micronutrient supplementation; and
•	 reducing nutrient loss through improved hygiene, sanitation, 
parasite control, and food processing and storage.
The key is to develop mechanisms to scale up existing and future 
small-scale pilot initiatives that are designed to address these issues, 
thereby converting them into a government-led, integrated package 
of interventions for better food security, nutrition, sanitation, and 
hygiene. This requires a program with active community participation 
and a concerted strategy to change parental behavior that hinders child 
nutrition. Malnutrition issues could be addressed under the umbrella 
of social protection, for example through cash transfers, or through 
innovative public-private partnerships. 
3.23.9 Child malnutrition
0
15
30
45
60
201020052000
Wasted
(weight for height)
Underweight
(weight for age)
Stunted
(height for age)
%
49.7
10.98.4
16.8
28.328.2
38.439.9
43.2
Note: Children under 5 years of age.
Source: Cambodia Demographic and Health Surveys.
3.23.1  Building public–private 
partnerships 
Cambodia needs investment of 
$12 billion–$16 billion to build 
infrastructure for its growing economy. 
In view of this substantial funding 
need, the government is putting 
more emphasis on public–private 
partnerships in its development 
strategy. With development partner 
support, it has an ambitious range of 
initiatives under way to strengthen 
the legal, regulatory, and institutional 
environment for public–private 
partnerships. 
These changes should improve 
the transparency and quality of  
public–private partnerships. The first 
projects under the new program are 
expected to take shape in 2013 and 
2014, for implementation soon after.
This chapter was written by Edimon Ginting and Priasto Aji of the Indonesia Resident 
Mission, ADB, Jakarta.
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Indonesia
Southeast Asia’s biggest economy achieved another year of 6%-plus growth in 2012, despite falling 
exports. Sluggish external demand combined with stronger domestic demand to shift the current account 
into deficit. Inflation fell to a 12-year low. GDP growth is forecast to quicken in the next 2 years. Near-term 
challenges are to manage risks associated with the current account deficit and keep inflation moderate. 
Economic performance
GDP growth at 6.2% in 2012 was based on robust private consumption 
and a better performance in fixed-capital investment (Figure 3.24.1). 
Net exports fell, acting as a drag on GDP growth. Private consumption 
picked up to increase by 5.3%, the strongest pace in 4 years, and it 
contributed almost half of total GDP growth on the expenditure side. 
Consumption got a lift from increases in employment and wages as well 
as lower inflation. Sales of automobiles rose by nearly 25%, even though 
Bank Indonesia, the central bank, raised minimum down payments on 
cars and motorcycles. 
Fixed investment accelerated to 9.8% in 2012, building on the 
previous year’s increase of 8.8%, and was the source of 2.4 percentage 
points of GDP growth. Driving factors included an improved investment 
climate, a record of solid economic growth over recent years, and the 
expansion of credit. Outlays on buildings and infrastructure rose by 
7.5%, and investment in machinery and equipment increased by a strong 
12.7%. Renewed efforts to improve public infrastructure saw the central 
government’s capital spending rise by 18.9%. As a result, the ratio of fixed 
capital formation to GDP rose to 33.2%, the highest in at least 20 years 
(Figure 3.24.2). 
Realized foreign direct investment (FDI) surged by 26.1% to 
$23.6 billion, nearly half into manufacturing and 17% into mining (the 
data exclude investment in oil and gas). Investment in inventories also 
rose sharply. 
The services and manufacturing sectors were key drivers from the 
supply side. Services expanded by 7.7%, contributing more than half of 
total growth (Figure 3.24.3). Telecommunications continued to record 
double-digit expansion owing to buoyant demand for mobile telephone 
and internet services. 
Growth in manufacturing decelerated to 5.7%, reflecting weaker 
export markets. Mining output was lackluster, showing growth of just 
1.5%, largely a result of declining crude oil extraction. Oil production fell 
by 42,000 barrels a day to 860,000 barrels a day last year, the outcome 
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of aging oil fields and low investment over many years. (A decade ago 
production was more than 1.1 million barrels a day.) Construction 
recorded solid expansion of 7.5% in 2012. A good harvest of food 
crops lifted growth in agriculture to 4.0%. Paddy production rose by 
5.5% to 68.9 million tons, which generated rice surpluses estimated at 
5.7 million tons. 
Merchandise exports fell by 6.3% in US dollar terms (Figure 3.24.4), 
weighed down by sagging demand in major markets and lower prices 
for export commodities. Exports of manufactured goods declined by 
6.7%. Shipments of commodities including coal and palm oil fell when 
measured by value despite higher export volumes. Merchandise imports, 
in contrast, rose by 8.3%, reflecting buoyant fixed investment, which 
requires imported capital goods, and growth in imported inputs for the 
expanding manufacturing industries. Imports of consumption goods were 
virtually flat, discouraged by a depreciating rupiah. 
These developments—lower exports and higher imports—reduced 
the trade surplus by 76% to $8.4 billion. The current account shifted into 
deficit, equivalent to 2.8% of GDP, the first deficit since 1997. This put 
downward pressure on the rupiah, which depreciated by 8.0% against the 
US dollar in 2012. 
Strong inflows of portfolio investment and FDI produced a 
substantial surplus in the capital and financial account. Portfolio 
investment nearly tripled to $9.2 billion last year, and net FDI inflows 
were a record at $19.9 billion. Foreign holdings of government bonds 
jumped by $3.4 billion to $28.0 billion (Figure 3.24.5). The balance of 
payments recorded a small surplus, and gross international reserves had 
increased by year-end to $112.8 billion, which is cover for 6.1 months of 
imports and government payments on foreign debt. 
The good harvest, lower global food prices, and the postponement of 
increases in government-controlled fuel prices brought down inflation 
to an average of 4.3% in 2012, the lowest in 12 years. Inflation generally 
has trended down over recent years, reflecting the adoption of inflation 
targeting in 2005 and improved management of supply-side price 
pressures through an official inflation task force. Food prices started to 
edge up late in 2012 (Figure 3.24.6).
New jobs generated last year exceeded the number of entrants into 
the labor market. The unemployment rate fell from 6.6% to 6.1% in the 
12 months to August 2012, though the rate of underemployment was 
barely changed at 29%. In a positive development, employment in the 
formal sector rose by 6.4%, or 2.7 million jobs, in this period, mostly in 
manufacturing and construction. Informal-sector employment fell by 
2.3%, or 1.5 million jobs, as workers left agriculture. Poverty declined 
by 0.7 percentage points to 11.7% in the 12 months to September 2012 
(Figure 3.24.7). Contributing factors were lower food price inflation, 
higher wages for agricultural and construction workers, and better 
incomes for farmers.
In the context of subdued inflation and a sagging global economy, 
Bank Indonesia lowered its policy interest rate by 25 basis points to 5.75% 
in February 2012 and reduced its overnight deposit facility rate by 25 basis 
points to 3.75%. Although the central bank later reversed the cut in the 
overnight deposit rate to drain excess liquidity, it maintained the policy 
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rate at 5.75%. A requirement since March 2011 that banks disclose base 
lending rates to the public helped to bring down lending interest rates in 
2012 (Figure 3.24.8). Growth in credit remained high at 23.1%, with loans 
for investment up by just over 27% (Figure 3.24.9). 
Fiscal policy was also set to counter the impact of the global 
slowdown on the domestic economy. The government raised spending 
and widened the budget deficit target to 2.2% of GDP in 2012, double the 
actual deficit in 2011 of 1.1%. As it turned out, shortfalls in government 
spending held the budget deficit to 1.8% of GDP. Central government debt 
fell to 24.0% of GDP, maintaining a downward trend (Figure 3.24.10).
Reflecting the country’s better performance over recent years, Moody’s 
raised Indonesia’s rating to investment grade Baa3 in January 2012, and 
Fitch reaffirmed its investment grade rating BBB– in November 2012. 
Economic prospects 
Economic growth is forecast to pick up to 6.4% this year and 6.6% in 
2014 (Figure 3.24.11), underpinned by robust private consumption, the 
improving investment performance, and a gradual pickup in world trade. 
Growth of 6.6%, projected for 2014, would be the highest in 15 years.
Private consumption is expected to quicken in 2013, fueled by rising 
employment, a 30% increase in average minimum wages, a 7% rise 
in public service wages, and a tax break from January 2013, when the 
government raised the income threshold at which income tax is payable. 
With parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2014 and a presidential 
election in July 2014, election-related spending is likely to contribute to 
consumption from the second half of 2013. A consumer survey conducted 
by Bank Indonesia in February 2013 showed an upturn in consumer 
confidence from a dip late last year (Figure 3.24.12). 
Investment, both private and public, looks likely to maintain healthy 
expansion. Support for this projection comes from the upgrades in 
sovereign credit ratings, lower interest rates, increased budget allocations 
for infrastructure, and a lengthening record of good GDP growth. A 
$2.7 billion expansion by auto maker Toyota over the next 4 years is one 
of several large FDI-funded investments planned. Businesses planned 
significant increases in investment in the first half of 2013, according to a 
survey late last year. 
Public investment will benefit from a 55% increase in the 2013 budget 
allocation for infrastructure, even though the outcome will likely fall 
short of that target because of chronic delays in the execution of budget 
projects. With this in mind, the government is directing state-owned 
enterprises to become more involved in building infrastructure and is 
making concerted efforts to accelerate budget execution. 
The government took two other steps last year to overcome obstacles 
to infrastructure development: First, it issued implementing regulations 
for the new land-acquisition law passed by Parliament in December 
2011, which provides more certainty in the resolution of land acquisition 
for infrastructure. Second, it established a viability gap fund to support 
public–private partnerships. This year, officials are reviewing investment 
regulations, including the list of industries currently closed or only partly 
open to foreign investment. 
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Exports are projected to improve in light of stronger growth in the 
PRC and some other markets in 2013. Next year, the export recovery 
should gather pace as prospects brighten for growth in major industrial 
economies. The drag on GDP growth from net exports is expected to 
moderate. Monthly data indicate that the decline in exports bottomed 
out in August 2012 (Figure 3.24.13). Prices for export commodities have 
firmed. Merchandise exports are forecast to rise by 7% in 2013. Robust 
investment will keep imports of capital goods relatively high, though 
imports of consumption goods will likely be curtailed by the rupiah’s 
depreciation.
The trade surplus is projected to rise and the current account deficit 
to narrow (Figure 3.24.14). Inflows of direct and portfolio investment 
are seen keeping the balance of payments in surplus. Downward 
pressure on the rupiah is expected to abate as the current account 
deficit shrinks.
Inflation is forecast to average 5.2% in 2013, rising since last year 
because of a 15% increase in electricity tariffs, the depreciation of the 
rupiah, and a boost in minimum wages. Higher food prices lifted 
inflation to 5.3% in the first 3 months of this year. Upward pressure from 
this source should ease as the harvest season gets underway in April. 
Inflation in 2014 is expected to average 4.7%, taking into account base 
effects from the pickup this year. These forecasts assume the government 
does not raise fuel prices in 2013 or 2014. Inflation would be higher if fuel 
prices were increased to ease the high cost to the budget of fuel subsidies 
or if food supplies are disrupted by bad weather. 
The government targets a budget deficit this year equivalent to 1.6% 
of GDP, narrowing slightly from last year’s outcome of 1.8%. The budget 
contains incentives for oil and gas exploration, the production of 
low-emission motor vehicles, and manufacturing with higher value 
added, plus the boost in infrastructure spending. 
Inflation within Bank Indonesia’s target range of 3.5%–5.5% suggests 
that monetary policy will be accommodative to economic growth. If the 
government were to increase fuel prices, the central bank might need 
to quickly lift the policy rate to dampen inflationary expectations and 
bolster market confidence. Nevertheless, bank lending interest rates will 
likely stay relatively low this year and stimulate credit growth. 
External risks to this outlook involve the global economy and capital 
inflows. Slower-than-projected growth in major export markets would 
delay the recovery in exports and hold down GDP growth. The shift of 
the current account into deficit has made the country more dependent on 
capital inflows. A sharp slowdown in inflows, or a reversal to outflows, 
would put pressure on the balance of payments and could disrupt the 
financing of the budget. The government has taken steps to manage 
this risk by establishing a bond stabilization fund and arranging for 
a $5 billion standby loan from development partners, among other 
precautionary measures. 
Domestic risks involve investment and inflation. It will be important 
to maintain efforts to improve the investment climate to safeguard the 
uptrend in fixed investment. An unexpected spike in inflation, perhaps 
caused by tight food supplies or a large increase in fuel prices, would hurt 
consumption, investor sentiment, and capital inflows. 
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Policy challenge—building infrastructure for 
inclusive growth
Economic growth averaging about 6% over the past 6 years has helped to 
lift 8.6 million people out of poverty. Yet 29 million Indonesians continue 
to live below the government’s poverty line, and another 30 million 
would join them in the event of even a small reduction in their incomes. 
Of those employed, 60% work in the informal sector, where incomes are 
low. Further, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient has 
worsened from 0.35 in 2008 to 0.41 in 2011 (Figure 3.24.15). 
Improved public infrastructure would make a significant contribution 
to reducing poverty and closing gaps in income inequality. 
Toward reducing poverty, better infrastructure, particularly for 
transportation and generating electricity, would support growth 
in manufacturing, which generates jobs in the formal sector. The 
performance of manufacturing has been lackluster since the late 1990s 
and started to improve only in the past 2 years.
Congested ports and rising logistic costs are major constraints on the 
expansion of manufacturing. The average time ships spend at Tanjung 
Priok, the country’s main port, stretched to 6.7 days in January 2012 from 
4.9 days in 2010. This compares with 1–2 days at Asia’s most efficient ports 
(Figure 3.24.16). It costs $750 to transport a container 56 kilometers from 
the Cikarang industrial zone to Tanjung Priok port, almost 70% more 
than moving a container a similar distance in Malaysia. The difference is 
primarily caused by road congestion in Indonesia. 
Toward closing income gaps, investment in infrastructure is 
needed to address high poverty rates in rural areas, which average 
14.7% compared with 8.6% in urban areas. Surveys suggest that 41% of 
district roads and 24% of provincial roads throughout Indonesia are 
in bad condition. Development prospects are poor for rural areas that 
lack good connections with towns and markets. Finally, poverty in 
some eastern provinces is even higher—at 24.1% in Maluku and Papua. 
Weak infrastructure there hinders economic activity, the growth of 
employment, and access to services such as education and health care. 
The government’s master plan to accelerate economic development, 
known by its Indonesia acronym MP3EI, has three main pillars: 
developing six economic corridors, improving connectivity both within 
the country and internationally, and strengthening human resource 
capacity and technology. Acting to support these goals, the government 
has increased its budget for infrastructure, with a large share allocated 
to eastern provinces. Substantial additional funding could become 
available if the government redirected huge budget allocations for fuel 
subsidies, equivalent to 2.6% of GDP in 2012, toward infrastructure and 
social development. The fuel subsidies benefit mainly higher-income 
households. 
Progress on infrastructure is being achieved. Work started last year 
on 182 infrastructure projects valued at $65 billion under the MP3EI 
program. Funding came from private companies (44%), state-owned 
enterprises (20%), governments (19%), and public–private partnerships 
(17%). Nearly 40% of this amount was allocated to eastern provinces. 
More projects are scheduled for this year. 
3.24.13 Merchandise exports
–10
0
10
20
–30
0
30
60
Level Growth
Jan
2013
OctJulAprJan
2012
OctJulAprJan
2011
$ million %
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 26 March 2013).
3.24.14 Current account balance
–3.0
–1.5
0.0
1.5
3.0
2014201320122011201020092008
% of GDP
Forecast
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
3.24.15 Income inequality
0.29
0.33
0.37
0.41
201120092007200520031999
Gini coecient
Source: Statistics Indonesia. http://www.bps.go.id/ 
(accessed 2 March 2013).
3.24.16 Dwell time in selected countries
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Tanjung Priok
Thailand
Malaysia (Port Klang)
United Kingdom, Los Angeles (USA)
Australia, New Zealand
France
Hong Kong, China
Singapore
Days
1.1
2
6.7
5
4
4
3
3
Note: Dwell time is the number of days a cargo container 
averagely stays in a port.
Source: Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative. 2012. Journal of the 
Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative PRAKARSA. Issue 10. April.
This chapter was written by A. Barend Frielink and Soulinthone Leuangkhamsing of the 
Lao Resident Mission, ADB, Vientiane.
3.25.1 GDP growth 
0
2
4
6
8
Agriculture
Industry
Services
GDP
20122011201020092008
Percentage points
Sources: Lao Statistics Bureau; Asian Development Outlook 
database.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Last year’s economic outcomes—solid growth and moderate inflation—are likely to be repeated this year 
and next. Foreign direct investment has doubled in the past 2 years. However, rising domestic demand, 
stimulated by credit expansion, is putting pressure on foreign reserves. Concerns over the management 
of land and other natural resources are still to be addressed. 
Economic performance
Growth in 2012 benefited from developments in agriculture, construction, 
hydropower, mining, and services. GDP increased by 7.9%, slightly above 
the average rate over the past 10 years (Figure 3.25.1).
The industry sector grew by an estimated 14% to remain a major 
driver of GDP. Mining production was boosted by the start of the Ban 
Houayxai gold and silver mine and the expansion of existing minerals 
projects. Copper output from the two largest producers, which together 
generate more than 90% of total production, rose by 8% to 149,500 tons, 
with gold production climbing by 61% to 206,240 ounces, and silver 
production up by 15% to 616,680 ounces. 
Hydropower output jumped by 29% to 13.8 billion kilowatt hours. 
The country’s biggest hydropower project, Nam Theun Two, raised 
production close to full capacity. Ample water in reservoirs enabled 
other plants to operate at higher capacity. New hydropower projects 
commissioned in 2012 increased national output by more than 
650 megawatts. About 70% of all hydropower generated is exported, 
mainly to Thailand.
Major construction projects under way last year included the 
$3.7 billion Hongsa lignite thermal power project, seven new hydropower 
projects, and expanded facilities in the capital, Vientiane, to handle a 
major international meeting and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) University Games toward the end of 2012. Cement 
production rose by an estimated 42.4% in 2012, reflecting buoyant 
construction. However, the garment industry suffered from weaker 
external demand and shortages of skilled labor. Garment exports fell by 
25% to $173 million (Figure 3.25.2). 
In agriculture, higher production of rice, cassava, maize, poultry, and 
livestock lifted the sector’s output by 2.5%.  
The service sector expanded by 8%, underpinned by a 22% boost 
in tourist arrivals to 3.3 million supporting hotels, restaurants, and 
transportation (Figure 3.25.3); growth in wholesale and retail trade; and 
the deepening of financial services. The increase in tourist arrivals from 
Asian countries outpaced declines from Europe and the US.
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Decelerating food and fuel prices brought down inflation to 2.9% 
year on year in July, at which point inflation started to edge up again 
(Figure 3.25.4). The year-average inflation rate of 4.3% was 3 percentage 
points below that of 2011. 
While growth in M2 money supply remained strong at 31%, and in 
credit at 36.2%, credit expansion moderated from the very high rates of 
previous years (Figure 3.25.5). The central bank reduced its direct lending 
for infrastructure and slowed the registration of new commercial banks 
to dampen growth in credit. Foreign exchange policy focused on keeping 
the Lao kip broadly stable against the US dollar and the Thai baht. 
The kip appreciated by 0.3% against the dollar and by 2.4% against the 
baht in 2012. Dollarization declined to about 44% of M2, maintaining a 
gradual downtrend. 
Fiscal accounts benefited from buoyant revenue from mining and 
hydropower, coupled with rising income from a value-added tax 
introduced in 2010 and external grants. The fiscal deficit, including grants 
and excluding off-budget spending, narrowed to 1.5% of GDP in FY2012 
(ended 30 September 2012). 
Growing credit and domestic demand propelled merchandise imports 
up by an estimated 17% to $5.4 billion in 2012. Exports rose by a relatively 
sedate 9% to $3.4 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of $2.1 billion. 
Receipts from tourism rose, but so did payments abroad of interest 
and income by resource-based companies, so that the current account 
deficit widened to an estimated 22.6% of GDP. Foreign direct investment 
increased to $1.4 billion last year, doubling since 2010. However gross 
international reserves of $708 million provided cover for just 1.6 months 
of goods and services imports.
Structural reforms in 2012 included improvements to trade and 
investment regulations instituted to satisfy commitments made to join 
the World Trade Organization (completed in early 2013) and the ASEAN 
Economic Community at the end of 2015. The government established 
the State Accumulation Fund to finance its responses to future natural 
disasters, economic downturns, and revenue shortfalls when global 
mineral prices slide. Fund resources are to come from additional mining 
revenue and any budget savings. 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank analyzed 
debt sustainability in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) and 
consequently reclassified its risk of debt distress to moderate from high. 
The country’s stock of external public and publicly guaranteed debt was, 
at $3.7 billion in 2011, equivalent to 44.4% of GDP, showing a decline from 
50.3% in 2010 because of economic growth and the appreciation of the kip 
against the US dollar. However, the share of non-concessional debt has 
expanded over recent years.
Economic prospects
The outlook is for further solid growth during the forecast period, 
just below 8% growth target in the government’s Seventh National 
Socioeconomic Development Plan, 2011–2015 (Figure 3.25.6).
Substantial investment flowing into hydropower and mining, coupled 
with the construction of hotels, offices, and housing, will drive GDP 
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growth. In addition to the large Hongsa lignite power plant, which is 
about 40% completed, work has started on the $3.5 billion Xayaburi 
dam and hydropower project, scheduled for commissioning in 2018 with 
capacity to generate 1.3 gigawatts of electricity. Five smaller hydropower 
projects are under development. Some new commercial–residential 
projects in the capital involve investments of several hundred million 
dollars, largely funded by foreign investment. 
The hydropower plants brought on line last year will contribute to 
an expected 12% increase in power generation in 2013. Gold and silver 
production is expected to increase, but copper output is likely to be little 
changed. The mining and processing of potash for fertilizer is an expanding 
industry, with one project starting last year and another scheduled to 
produce fertilizer this year. Coal production is expected to rise.
Agriculture, which employs more than 60% of the workforce, is 
expected to grow at a slightly faster pace in 2013 as rice production 
recovers and animal husbandry continues to expand. Logging will be 
constrained again by quotas.
Tourist arrivals are projected to rise by 5%–10% in 2013. Other 
service industries likely to maintain good growth include financial 
services, wholesale and retailing, and transport and communications. 
Manufacturing industries will benefit from the government’s promotion 
of food and beverage processing, cement production, and garments, 
which aims to reduce imports of these products. 
Fiscal policy may be more expansionary in FY2013, given that the 
target for the fiscal deficit is 3.1% of GDP, taking grants into account. 
The government is raising salaries for the civil service, police, and 
military by 165% in steps over 3 fiscal years, starting in FY2013. 
Monetary policy could tighten during the forecast period if the strong 
growth in the money supply and credit over several years is considered 
to undermine banking system stability, contribute to the problem of low 
international currency reserves, or pose other macroeconomic risks. 
The government targets holding growth in the money supply below 30% 
in 2013, and the central bank aims to keep the kip broadly stable against 
the dollar and the baht.
Inflation is projected to edge up to 5.5% on average in 2013 in light of 
buoyant domestic demand and higher salaries for government employees 
(Figure 3.25.7). Prices for meat and cooked food picked up early this year.
Rising imports of consumer and capital goods will maintain pressure 
on the external position. Merchandise imports are forecast to increase 
by 15% this year and exports by 14%, widening the trade gap to $2.4 
billion. The current account deficit will continue to exceed 20% of GDP 
(Figure 3.25.8). 
Poverty incidence has likely declined from 27% in 2008, the last 
official survey. Projected economic growth and government social 
programs should further reduce poverty, but additional efforts are 
needed in remote regions, where high concentrations of poverty 
persist. Moreover, rates of child malnutrition are still high, as 41% of 
children under 5 years of age suffer chronic malnutrition. The country 
will be challenged to meet some Millennium Development Goals by 
2015, including improvements in maternal mortality and access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation.
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Risks to economic prospects come from increasingly volatile weather 
patterns, which can have severe impacts on agriculture. Viet Nam’s 
economic slowdown poses risks because Vietnamese companies are major 
investors in the Lao PDR. 
Policy challenge—managing land and 
other natural resources 
The government has granted land concessions over a significant area in 
the past decade to encourage investment. During this period the country 
has attracted investment into agriculture; tree plantations; commercial, 
residential, and tourism property development; hydropower; and mining.
Investors, mostly from abroad, were awarded 1.1 million hectares of 
land from 2000 to 2009, according to a report prepared last year for the 
government (Figure 3.25.9). This area, which excludes land concessions for 
logging, mineral exploration, contract farming, and hydropower, is about 
5% of the country’s total land area, more than is dedicated to wet season 
rice, the main crop. Most foreign investors holding land concessions are 
from the PRC, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
While the report found that land concessions have contributed to 
economic growth and government revenue, it noted weaknesses in the 
management of concessions and the governance of land and natural 
resources.
Much of the investment in agriculture is directed to lowland areas that 
are accessible to towns and cities, with little going to poorer remote areas. 
Land concessions for agriculture and forestry are dedicated to a handful 
of mostly exotic crops, such as rubber and eucalyptus, endangering 
biodiversity and local food security. The narrow range of crops makes 
only a limited contribution to the goal of diversifying exports. Tracts 
of farmland on urban fringes are being converted for housing, 
manufacturing, and other property developments. 
In some cases, local populations have lost access to land and forests 
upon which they depended for subsistence. Inadequate compensation for 
land and the resettlement of displaced people in areas where they struggle 
to earn a livelihood have become major concerns for affected communities. 
The land-concession system could be improved by better monitoring 
of the allocation and development of land and by ensuring that displaced 
people receive fair compensation and resettlement in areas that enable them 
to maintain their livelihoods. Further, strengthening the land title system 
would provide people in rural areas with legally protected access to land for 
their livelihoods and enable the enforcement of existing land titles. 
It would be helpful to establish a system for settling disputes over land, 
which would shorten the time taken and lift the burden on the courts. 
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Malaysia
A surge in fixed investment combined with buoyant private consumption underpinned stronger economic 
growth in 2012, overriding weakness in exports. Government cash transfers and spending on infrastructure 
contributed to domestic demand. GDP growth is forecast to ease this year before picking up in 2014, 
while inflation is seen edging up from last year’s low rate. Rising imports and subdued exports have 
eroded the surplus in the current account.
Economic performance
Strong expansion in private consumption and fixed investment lifted 
GDP growth to 5.6% in 2012, close to the average growth rate in the 
5 years before the global financial crisis. Growth accelerated to 6.4% in 
the fourth quarter. 
Private consumption increased by 7.7% and made a major contribution 
to GDP growth (Figure 3.26.1). It was driven by a robust labor market, 
growth in credit, and several government decisions during the year. 
Employment grew by 3.6%, mostly in domestic-oriented sectors such as 
services, and the unemployment rate declined to 3.0%. Average wages in 
the private sector rose by a robust 5.0%. The government’s contribution to 
private consumption came from a 13.0% increase in public sector wages 
in March 2012 (directly benefitting 10% of the workforce), higher public 
sector pensions, and a range of cash transfers to low- and middle-income 
households. 
Fixed investment surged by 19.9%, its best performance in 12 years 
(Figure 3.26.2). Much of the investment was related to the government’s 
Economic Transformation Programme, which aims to lift Malaysia into 
the ranks of high-income nations by 2020 by upgrading industry and 
infrastructure. Private sector investment was particularly strong, climbing 
by 22.0%, while public sector investment rose by 17.1%. Major investment 
projects under way in 2012 included an $11.5 billion mass rapid transit 
rail system in Kuala Lumpur, expansion of oil and gas processing and 
other energy projects, and a high-speed broadband network. This surge in 
investment was an important source of GDP growth last year.
The ratio of fixed capital investment to GDP was, at 25.6% in 2012, the 
highest in 14 years, though still well below the 40% pace of the mid-1990s.
Government consumption spending decelerated from 2011 but still 
made a small contribution to economic growth last year. However, the 
external sector acted as a drag on GDP growth, as weak global demand 
flattened exports of goods and services in real terms while buoyant 
domestic demand fueled growth in imports.
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From the supply side, services grew by 6.4% such that the sector, 
which provides 55% of GDP, made the biggest sector addition to total 
growth. Major contributors were wholesale and retail trading and 
financial services. Construction soared by 18.5% as government-led 
infrastructure and industrial projects gained momentum. Residential 
construction was also buoyant. Manufacturing grew by a relatively 
modest 4.8%, weighed down by weakness in global demand for 
electronics. Mining rebounded after a contraction in the previous year to 
grow by 1.4% in 2012 on higher oil production. 
Agriculture, by contrast, had a poor year owing to declines in the 
production of rubber because of bad weather and of palm oil that reflected 
a steady decline in yield. The agriculture sector grew by just 0.8%. 
Fiscal policy stimulated the economy with the cash transfers and 
other benefits for consumers and incentives for business expansion. 
The government introduced a supplementary budget in June to fund 
additional spending, which rose by 9.5% from 2011. High global oil 
prices contributed to an 11.8% increase in government revenue. The fiscal 
deficit narrowed slightly to 4.5% of GDP in 2012, which was the fifth 
consecutive year of deficits above 4% of GDP (Figure 3.26.3). Federal 
government debt has increased over the past 5 years from 40.1% of GDP 
to 53.5%. 
Bank Negara, the central bank, kept its policy interest rate at 3.0% 
through last year and into 2013 as it balanced buoyant domestic demand 
and fiscal stimulus on the one hand against low inflation and a subdued 
global outlook on the other. Credit to the private sector picked up to grow 
by 12.5% on average in 2012. The weighted average lending interest rate of 
commercial banks declined over the year to 4.7%. The Malaysian ringgit 
appreciated by 3.9% against the US dollar.
Inflation slowed as prices of food and fuel decelerated in 2012 
(Figure 3.26.4). On a year-average basis, inflation was almost halved 
to just 1.7%. Subsidies on fuel, staple foods, and electricity, which cost 
the government the equivalent of 4.5% of GDP in 2012, helped to curb 
inflation.
Merchandise exports fell marginally to $227.6 billion as a 
consequence of sluggish demand in global markets and soft prices for 
export commodities such as rubber and palm oil. Exports of electronics 
fell, but not as quickly as in 2011. Commodity exports declined by about 
7%. By contrast imports rose by 4.3% to $187.0 billion, reflecting the 
strength of private consumption and investment. These developments 
lowered the trade surplus by 16.2% to $40.5 billion (Figure 3.26.5). The 
deficit in services trade widened sharply, mainly due to a higher deficit 
in transportation services and slower growth in tourism, and the income 
deficit deteriorated on higher payments of dividends and interest to 
foreign companies. Consequently, the current account surplus fell to 
$19.4 billion, or 7.9% of GDP, the lowest ratio since 2001.
The capital and financial account recorded net outflows last year. 
Inward foreign direct investment totaled $9.4 billion, coming off an 
unusually high level in 2011. The balance of payments recorded a small 
surplus, and international reserves rose 4.8% to $139.7 billion, cover for 
7.3 months of goods and services imports.
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Economic prospects
Forecasts assume that national elections expected to be held in late April 
2013 go smoothly and that the government pursues prudent economic and 
fiscal policies. 
Private consumption will get support from robust labor market 
conditions, low inflation, higher incomes, and, from the 2013 budget, 
further transfer payments and tax concessions. New minimum wages of 
RM900 a month for Peninsular Malaysia and RM800 for East Malaysia 
came into effect from January 2013 and benefit 27% of all workers. 
The tight labor market suggests that job losses resulting from the new 
minimum wage will likely be temporary.
Nevertheless, growth in private consumption will likely moderate 
from 2012. Softer global commodity prices will weigh on incomes 
and consumption spending, particularly in rural areas. Further, the 
government is expected to resume phasing down subsidies on fuel and 
other items or move to a system that better targets subsidies. A proposed 
broad-based consumption tax that aims to reduce the government’s 
reliance on the oil sector for public revenue would also dampen 
consumption growth temporarily if introduced. 
Consumer sentiment remains positive: the index of consumer 
sentiment compiled by the Malaysia Institute of Economic Research 
edged higher in the fourth quarter of 2012 (Figure 3.26.6). However, the 
business conditions index compiled from a survey of manufacturers 
declined on concerns about the outlook for domestic and export sales.
Investment, too, is expected to moderate this year. Private investment 
is forecast to grow at a double-digit pace, but below last year’s 22.0%. 
Large investments are planned for the oil and gas industry, for property 
developments, and to expand services. Credit to the private sector 
accelerated to 12.3% in January 2013 (Figure 3.26.7). As for public 
investment, the government is pushing ahead with its Economic 
Transformation Programme while also proposing to gradually rein in 
its fiscal deficit. The result is expected to be somewhat slower growth in 
public investment in the forecast period. 
 On the production side, solid growth in private consumption will 
boost the service sector, assisted by investments being made in high-
speed broadband and wireless technologies, but the pace of growth is 
expected to decelerate from 2012. Manufacturing will get a lift, mainly in 
2014 when recovery gathers momentum in major industrial economies. 
Production of natural gas and oil will increase this year as investment 
to develop new fields and enhance recovery at existing oil fields pays 
dividends. Agriculture is forecast to recover this year, but growth in 
construction will subside from last year’s high rate.
Fiscal policy is expected to start to tighten later this year. The 
government has targeted a narrower fiscal deficit equivalent to an 
estimated 4% of GDP in 2013. The central bank is anticipated to keep 
interest rates at levels supportive to economic growth into 2013 while 
standing ready to raise rates if price pressures gather steam. 
Robust domestic demand and an anticipated gradual reduction 
of subsidies during the forecast period will nudge prices up, with 
moderating factors anticipated to be soft global food and fuel prices and 
a firm ringgit. The impact of the new minimum wage on companies’ total 
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costs is expected to be modest. Infl ation is projected to pick up to average 
2.2% in 2013 and 3.0% next year (Figure 3.26.8). For the fi rst 2 months of 
2013 infl ation was just 1.4%.
External demand is seen improving only gradually. A better outlook 
this year for the People’s Republic of China and India, two important 
export markets, will benefi t Malaysia’s commodity exports though 
prices of commodities such as palm oil and liquefi ed natural gas will 
remain under downward pressure. Th e anticipated recovery in industrial 
economies in 2014 will improve prospects for electronics and other 
manufactured exports. Import growth will likely moderate in 2013 but 
still outpace growth in exports, given strong domestic demand. Th e drag 
on GDP growth exerted by net exports will lessen this year.
On the balance of these infl uences, GDP growth is forecast at 5.3% 
in 2013, accelerating a little to 5.5% next year as the global economic 
environment improves. Th e current account surplus is forecast to decline 
further as trade surpluses subside and defi cits persist in the income and 
services accounts (Figure 3.27.9).
Policy challenge—maximizing women’s 
contributions
Women’s rate of participation in Malaysia’s labor force is well below that 
for males and the lowest in Southeast Asia (Figure 3.26.10). Only 48% of 
Malaysian women of working age reported that they were working, in 
either the formal or the informal sector of the economy, or looking for 
work in 2011.
Increasing the female participation rate to levels comparable with 
other countries would expand the workforce by at least 500,000 and 
perhaps by 2.3 million, the World Bank estimated in an economic report 
published in November 2012. It also estimated that Malaysia’s GDP 
growth would have been 0.4 percentage points higher in 2000–2010 if the 
female participation rate had been lift ed by 11 percentage points to 57%. 
Higher workforce participation would help overcome skills shortages, 
enlarge the pool of entrepreneurs, and improve the welfare of women.
One reason for the low participation rate is that Malaysian women 
generally fi nd it diffi  cult to reconcile family with work commitments. 
Fewer of them re-enter the workforce aft er childbirth than do women 
elsewhere. Th e 2013 budget introduced tax incentives to encourage more 
childcare centers to open, which should go some way toward addressing 
this issue. Another factor is the secondary education enrolment rate for 
Malaysian girls, which is relatively low compared with countries that 
have a comparable level of income. Th e government is spending more on 
education, and it funds retraining women aft er a career break. 
Policies that have produced results in other countries include more 
generous parental leave policies, encouraging part-time work, tax 
incentives, improved arrangements for childcare and tending to the 
elderly, raising the retirement age, and a greater focus on education 
and training for women. Th e government’s 10th economic plan targets 
increasing the female workforce participation rate to 55% by 2015.
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Policy reforms stimulated economic growth last year and are expected to drive further development 
during the forecast period. Inflation is projected to remain moderate. Improved economic prospects 
have sparked a surge of interest from foreign investors. Achieving the country’s potential depends on 
maintaining momentum on the government’s reform agenda. 
Economic performance
GDP growth quickened to an estimated 6.3% in FY2012 (ended 31 March 
2013) compared with an average of 5% in the previous 5 years. The pickup 
reflects business optimism buoyed by the government’s steps since 2011 
to liberalize the economy and prospects for further reform. A modest 
slowdown in agricultural growth in FY2012, partly reflecting floods 
in August 2012, was more than offset by increases in industrial output 
and services.
(Official national accounts data are available only on an annual basis 
with a 2-year lag and they show considerably higher rates of GDP growth, 
which are inconsistent with correlates of growth such as energy use.)
The number of foreign firms granted investment approval rose to 62 
in April–December 2012, well above the total for the 3 previous fiscal 
years (Figure 3.27.1). A sharp increase in approvals for manufacturing 
indicated a welcome diversification from the past focus on energy and 
mining. Investor optimism was also signaled by an almost 14-fold surge 
from FY2011 in the number of new foreign company registrations in the 
10 months to January 2013, albeit from a low base and partly reflecting 
some domestic companies reclassified as foreign. New domestic company 
registrations have climbed in the past 2 years (Figure 3.27.2). 
Inflation has subsided since 2008, when it exceeded 20%. This follows 
reduced monetization of the fiscal deficit and a stronger kyat exchange 
rate on the unofficial market. The consumer price index fell in early 
FY2012, due to declining food prices. By December 2012, though, food 
prices were rising and inflation was 6.0% year on year (Figure 3.27.3). 
The consolidated fiscal deficit of the central government and state 
economic enterprises narrowed to an estimated 5.4% of GDP in FY2012 
from 6.0% a year earlier. Revenue benefited from the government’s 
realignment in April 2012 of the (fixed) official exchange rate of the kyat, 
bringing it closer to the unofficial market exchange rate. As state enterprises 
are net exporters, the exchange rate revaluation boosted budget receipts, 
including export tax income and customs duties. Higher revenue enabled 
the government to increase spending on health, education, and capital 
investment.
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In external accounts, the current account deficit widened to an 
estimated 4% of GDP, with the trade balance in deficit owing mainly to 
a gradual liberalization of imports and higher investment. Customs data 
show a 3.6% decline in exports in April–December 2012 from a year earlier, 
likely caused by subdued demand in Thailand, the People’s Republic of 
China, and India, as well as weaker international commodity prices. 
Exports of natural gas, which comprises 38% of total exports, were 
flat, and agricultural exports mostly declined in April–December. 
Garment exports rose by 18% year on year, benefiting from greater access 
to global markets and low domestic wages. The general weakness in total 
exports underscores the importance of sharpening competitiveness with 
higher investment, new technologies, and improved access to finance, as 
well as an appropriate exchange rate. The kyat has appreciated in nominal 
and real terms over the past few years.
Tourist arrivals and earnings from tourism have climbed as the 
country opened up after decades of isolation (Figure 3.27.4). Net foreign 
direct investment flows and renewed official development assistance 
supported an overall balance of payments surplus and increase in foreign 
exchange reserves to an estimated $5.1 billion in FY2012, equal to about  
4 months of imports of goods and services. 
Arrears to ADB and the World Bank were cleared in January 2013, 
allowing their renewed lending to the country. The Paris Club of creditors 
also reached an agreement to cancel or reschedule arrears. 
Economic prospects
Economic growth is forecast to rise gradually to 6.5% in FY2013 and 
6.7% in FY2014 (Figure 3.27.5). Projections assume the government will 
maintain momentum on policy reform over the medium term. 
Growth will get a lift from the European Union’s proposed 
reinstatement of preferential access for Myanmar’s exports under the 
Generalized System of Preferences and the United States’ suspension 
of its ban on imports from Myanmar. Two large gas fields, Shwe and 
Zawtika, are expected to come online in FY2013, more than doubling 
gas production and raising exports to the PRC and Thailand. Higher 
gas exports, greater access to international markets, and faster economic 
growth in key markets such as the PRC will support growth in exports. 
Visitor arrivals are likely to post further large gains.
Movement toward unifying multiple exchange rates and a managed 
float of the currency, along with licensing private banks to engage in 
international banking and to offer foreign exchange services, should 
shift more foreign exchange from informal to formal markets, increase 
liquidity, and facilitate the central bank’s management of the exchange 
rate. The government is establishing a formal interbank market and plans 
to develop a secondary treasury securities market. A law to modernize 
and grant operational autonomy to the central bank has been submitted 
to the parliament. 
Proposed fiscal reforms include simplifying the tax system, broadening 
the tax base, and eventually moving to a value-added tax to ease 
dependence on natural resources, which provide 23% of public revenue. 
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Steps taken last year to give state enterprises more financial autonomy 
and demand more accountability should facilitate their corporatization 
and potential privatization. Coupled with higher net export receipts, 
primarily from gas, these fiscal measures allow the government to 
increase spending on health, education, and infrastructure while reining 
in the fiscal deficit to 5.2% of GDP in FY2013. 
Inflation is forecast to average 5.1% this year and next (Figure 3.27.6). 
A lower fiscal deficit and reduced credit to the government from the 
central bank should dampen inflation over the medium term. 
In spite of expected higher receipts from exports and tourism, the 
current account deficit is projected to widen as import growth accelerates, 
reflecting higher investment and measures to lift foreign exchange 
restrictions (Figure 3.27.7). Inflows of foreign direct investment, including 
from the award of new telecommunications licenses in 2013 and higher 
official development assistance, will likely keep the balance of payments 
in surplus.
Policy challenges—forward with reform
The government’s ambitious reform agenda is commensurate with 
the catching up necessary to align policies with current international 
practice after long period of isolation. These reforms are outlined in 
the Framework for Economic and Social Reform, which sets out policy 
priorities until 2016 and guiding principles for longer-term development 
plans. The goal is higher, inclusive, and sustainable growth and reduced 
poverty, as 26% of the country’s 60 million people live in poverty.
The framework identifies 10 priorities: (i) fiscal and tax reform, 
(ii) monetary and finance sector reform, (iii) trade and investment 
liberalization, (iv) private sector development, (v) improvements in 
health and education, (vi) food security and agricultural growth, 
(vii) governance and transparency, (viii) mobile telephony and internet, 
(ix) infrastructure investment, and (x) efficient and effective government. 
While many of the reforms will take considerable time, several areas 
could yield results over the next 2–3 years. One is the underdeveloped 
finance system, in which credit to the private sector amounts to only 8% 
of GDP. Allowing greater participation by private banks and with prudent 
regulation, easing both controls on interest rates and restrictions on 
lending would boost private sector access to credit. 
Implementing important new laws on land ownership, labor, and 
foreign investment, as well as measures to simplify business registration, 
will improve the business environment. Relatively quick improvements 
to infrastructure would include rehabilitating roads, upgrading power 
systems to reduce transmission and distribution losses (Figure 3.27.8), 
and developing a sound regulatory framework for independent power 
producers and public–private partnerships. 
Tourism has substantial potential to spur employment and inclusive 
growth, especially with simpler visa requirements. In agriculture, which 
contributes 36% of GDP and the majority of employment, near-term 
measures to improve access to finance and inputs, implement small 
irrigation projects, and expand agricultural extension would shore up 
inclusive growth and food security. 
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Philippines 
Buoyant private consumption and a rebound in government spending drove strong economic growth 
in  2012. A rise in net exports also contributed to GDP growth. Robust expansion is projected over the 
next 2  years, based on buoyant consumption and an improvement in investment. Inflation is moderate 
and expected to remain so. The challenge is to translate solid economic growth into poverty reduction 
by generating more and better jobs. 
Economic performance 
Sustained growth in private consumption, a recovery in government 
spending, and positive net exports lifted GDP growth to 6.6% in 2012, 
or 4.8% in per capita terms. Inflation eased to a 5-year low, and external 
accounts were healthy. 
Private consumption rose by 6.1% and contributed the most to GDP 
growth from the expenditure side (Figure 3.28.1). Buoyant consumption 
was driven by higher remittances from overseas Filipino workers, a slight 
gain in employment, and low inflation. Remittances increased by 6.5% to 
$23.4 billion (up by 3.8% in strengthening Philippine pesos). 
Government spending rebounded from the low levels seen in 2011, 
when governance reforms slowed budget disbursements. Higher spending 
on public infrastructure, alongside expansion in private construction and 
investment in equipment, pushed up fixed capital investment by 8.7% 
(Figure 3.28.2). Growth in investment was supported by improvements 
in the domestic business environment and declining interest rates. Fixed 
investment as a ratio to GDP edged up in 2012 but was still modest at 
19.7%. A rise in net exports also contributed to growth, in contrast with 
2011, when net exports fell. 
From the production side, the service sector, accounting for over 
half the economy, remained the dominant growth driver. Its growth 
accelerated to 7.4%, which contributed nearly two-thirds of GDP growth. 
Retail trading accounted for one-fourth of services’ growth, consistent 
with robust private consumption. Other key subsector contributors were 
finance and real estate services, business process outsourcing (BPO), and 
those associated with tourism. 
Industry’s performance improved last year. Manufacturing expanded 
by 5.4%, with strong growth in food processing in particular. However, the 
communications equipment subsector, which includes semiconductors, 
shrank owing to weak export demand. Construction and utilities 
expanded, so that industry as a whole accounted for one-third of GDP 
growth. Agricultural output rose by 2.7%, mainly a result of higher 
production of rice and maize. 
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Notwithstanding strong GDP growth, inflation eased in 2012 to 
average 3.2% (Figure 3.28.3). Better harvests tempered food inflation. 
Broadly stable global commodity prices and an appreciating peso helped 
to contain price pressures. 
Modest inflation and the fragile international economy prompted 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the central bank, to reduce policy interest 
rates by 100 basis points in 2012, trimming the overnight borrowing rate 
to 3.5% and the overnight lending rate to 5.5%. Bank lending interest rates 
eased and credit extended to the private sector increased by 17.8%. 
Government spending on infrastructure jumped by 58%, after a 
decline of 29% in 2011 (Figure 3.28.4), but it still fell short of the budget 
target. Under-spending of budgeted allocations held the fiscal deficit to 
2.3% of GDP (Figure 3.28.5), below the programmed level but a slightly 
wider deficit than in 2011. The ratio of tax revenue to GDP improved to 
12.9%, though it, too, did not meet the government’s target. 
External accounts were in good shape. Merchandise exports rose 
by 8.5% in US dollar terms, a turnaround from a 6.3% fall in 2011. 
This recovery was driven largely by higher shipments of machinery 
and transport equipment, wood manufactures, furniture, fruits and 
vegetables, processed food, and beverages. Shipments of electronics 
continued to fall, though at a slower pace than in 2011. Imports grew 
by 5.1% in value so that the merchandise trade deficit narrowed by 5.3% 
to $14.8 billion. Trade in services produced a smaller surplus than in 
the previous year. After taking into account the substantial remittance 
inflows, the current account surplus rose slightly to $7.2 billion, 
equivalent to 2.9% of GDP (Figure 3.28.6).
Portfolio investment inflow rose by 14.9% to $4.7 billion and foreign 
direct investment by 9.8% to $2.0 billion—still low compared with other 
Southeast Asian countries. The overall balance of payments recorded a 
surplus of 3.7% of GDP, lifting gross international reserves to $83.8 billion 
at year-end. Reserves cover 12.0 months of imports and 10.5 times short-
term external debt. 
Remittances and capital inflows buoyed the peso, which appreciated 
by 6.6% against the US dollar to its highest rate in 5 years. In other 
financial markets, the Philippine Stock Exchange index climbed by 33% 
in 2012 to a record high; capital raised through the exchange doubled 
from 2011. Spreads narrowed between Philippine government bonds and 
US treasuries. 
Economic prospects 
The forecasts assume that the government makes further progress on 
reforms to improve the investment climate and that legislative elections in 
May 2013 go smoothly. 
Private consumption is expected to remain a key driver of growth, 
underpinned by remittances and positive consumer sentiment 
(Figure 3.28.7). These transfers from overseas Filipinos have accelerated 
since the second half of last year. The number of deployed overseas 
workers in 2012 rose by 6.7%. Domestic employment is projected to 
increase this year, and election-related spending will lift consumption in 
the first half of 2013. 
3.28.3 Inflation and policy rates 
0
2
4
6
Overnight borrowing rate
Monthly ination
Feb
2013
 Jul Jan
2012
 Jul Jan
2011
%
Source: CEIC Data Company (accessed 23 March 2013).
3.28.4 Government infrastructure outlays 
0
70
140
210
280
201220112010200920082007
P billion
Note: Includes other capital outlays.
Sources: Department of Budget and Management. Various 
years. Assessment of National Government Disbursements. 
http://www.dbm.gov.ph (accessed 23 March 2013).
3.28.5 Fiscal indicators
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
Expenditure growth
Revenue growth
Fiscal balance
20122011201020092008
% % of GDP
Sources: CEIC Data Company; Bureau of the Treasury.  
http://www.treasury.gov.ph (both accessed 16 March 2013).
3.28.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
GDP growth 6.0 5.9
Inflation 3.6 3.8
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
3.0 3.2
Source: ADB estimates. 
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Southeast Asia Philippines  241
As for private investment, a survey of businesses in February 2013 
showed they were optimistic (Figure 3.28.7) and planned to increase 
hiring. Imports of capital goods rose by 14% in 2012, a sign of positive 
business sentiment. Bank lending for production rose by 15.2% in 
February 2013 from a year earlier (Figure 3.28.8), and the buoyant stock 
market has facilitated corporate expansion. 
For the first time, the country achieved an investment grade credit 
rating in March 2013, bolstering the investment climate. Fitch raised 
its sovereign rating on long-term foreign-currency denominated debt 
to BBB– from BB+. It cited the Philippines’ strong external balance 
sheet, resilient economy, improved fiscal management, and decline in 
government debt relative to GDP. 
Fiscal spending will support economic growth, although not to the 
extent seen in 2012 when it rebounded from low levels. Government 
spending is programmed to rise by 13% in 2013, excluding interest 
payments. Reforms to speed up budget spending are making progress. 
Revenue is benefiting from higher taxes on tobacco and alcohol, effective 
January 2013, which will contribute to the goal of reining in the budget 
deficit to 2.0% of GDP in 2013–2016.
Robust consumption and investment and election-related spending 
bode well for expansion in the service sector. The BPO subsector is 
projected to grow by about 20% annually through 2016. The government 
is targeting large increases in tourist arrivals, from 4.3 million last year 
to 10.0 million by 2016. To support that aim, it is investing in tourism-
related infrastructure and encouraging the expansion of air services. 
Growth in manufacturing production quickened in the second 
half of 2012, and exports of semiconductors turned up late in the year. 
Construction is expected to maintain solid growth. High demand for 
housing and office space is spurring private construction, supported by low 
interest rates. The government has raised its budget for infrastructure in 
2013 and a program to create public–private partnerships for infrastructure 
development, which started sluggishly, is gathering some momentum. 
A projected pickup in exports of electronics will contribute to 
growth in merchandise exports in 2013. Rapidly growing Southeast Asian 
markets now buy 19% of the Philippines’ exports, up from just 13% in 
2008. However, robust domestic demand suggests that imports will be 
considerably higher, so that net external demand weighs on GDP growth 
this year.
On the balance of these factors, GDP growth is forecast at 6% for 
this year, with a similar pace anticipated in 2014 (Figure 3.28.9). Growth 
in remittances and services exports will contribute to current account 
surpluses of around 3% of GDP. 
Inflation is seen edging up to a moderate 3.6% this year owing to 
robust domestic demand and the higher taxes on tobacco and alcohol. 
These tax hikes added 0.5 percentage points to inflation recorded at 3.2% 
in the first 3 months of 2013. The firm peso and soft global commodity 
markets are expected to offset part of the upward pressure on prices 
generated by strong domestic demand in 2014, containing inflation to a 
forecast 3.8% (Figure 3.28.10). Inflation at these rates would be well within 
the central bank’s target range of 3%–5%, giving it the option of keeping 
policy interest rates accommodative to growth. 
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Concerned about risks associated with volatile capital flows, the 
monetary authorities last year moved to curb speculative inflows by 
prohibiting deposits from nonresidents in its special deposit account 
facility and cutting interest rates on these accounts. They also imposed 
a higher capital requirement for banks’ holdings of non-deliverable 
forwards, which could be used for speculative purposes and tightened 
rules governing these instruments. The central bank strengthened its 
oversight of bank lending for real estate to more closely monitor the 
impact of capital inflows. Bank balance sheets remain healthy overall: 
capital adequacy ratios are well above the 10% minimum statutory 
requirement (16.9% for universal and commercial banks in June 2012), and 
nonperforming loans are in the low single digits.
The government’s credibility as an instrument advancing reform 
has been enhanced by the higher excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, 
which will help to fund health care for the poor, and the passage of 
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act. Governance 
reform, too, has made progress, though much remains to be done. 
The 2012 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
ranked the Philippines 105th of 176 countries, still low but above 
Indonesia and Viet Nam, which had been ahead of the Philippines 
in 2011. 
In its Global Competitiveness ranking, the World Economic Forum 
elevated the Philippines by 10 places last year, to 65th of 144 economies, 
with marked improvement in terms of the macroeconomic environment. 
However, the country remained behind Malaysia at 25th, Thailand 
at 38th, and Indonesia at 50th, held back by low rankings notably on 
infrastructure, among other measures. Corruption and government 
bureaucracy remain concerns for investors, though there is a perception 
these issues are being addressed. 
Progress achieved in the Bangsamoro framework agreement, a 
roadmap for a political settlement between the government and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, could jump-start development on the 
large southern island of Mindanao.
Risks to the economic outlook include excessive portfolio capital 
flows. Portfolio investment registered with the Central Bank surged in 
the first 2 months of 2013 (Figure 3.28.11). Surging inflows risk sparking 
asset inflation, a rapid appreciation of the peso that would hurt export 
competitiveness and diminish the peso value of remittances, and 
excessive upward pressure on credit growth. A sharp reversal of the 
inflows would disrupt financial markets and business confidence. 
Policy challenge—generating employment
Higher rates of economic growth over recent years have not made 
a serious dent in the employment problem in the Philippines. 
Unemployment at 7% in 2012 and underemployment at 20% understate 
how serious the problem is. The deployment of large numbers of 
workers overseas masks the full extent of the labor market weakness. 
An estimated 7 million Filipinos, equivalent to about 17% of the domestic 
labor force, have left the country to work, taking the total number of 
Filipinos living abroad to more than 10 million. 
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Further, 40% of those working within the country are classified as 
vulnerable—unpaid family workers and the self-employed, mostly in the 
informal sector. 
A survey by the Social Weather Stations polling organization last 
year showed that 52% of respondents rated themselves as poor, the 
highest percentage since 2008. National poverty incidence in the latest 
family and income expenditure survey conducted in 2009 was 26.5%, an 
improvement on 33.1% in 1991 but still high.
Despite the acceleration in GDP growth last year to 6.6%, employment 
growth slowed to 1.2%, with nearly all the new jobs generated by services 
(Figure 3.28.12). The Business Processing Association of the Philippines 
estimates that the rapidly expanding BPO industry will employ 926,000 
full-time employees by the end of 2013, or 2% of the total labor force. 
BPO hires mostly skilled workers, however, which does not offer much 
hope to the large pool of unskilled labor. Tourism and related services 
employ 4 million people, or 10% of the labor force. Other services 
including finance and retailing also show consistent growth. Still, the 
service sector cannot absorb all new entrants to the workforce, which is 
growing by about 2% a year.
A stronger industrial base, particularly in manufacturing, could 
generate a wide range of jobs. But the development of manufacturing in 
the Philippines has lagged most other larger countries in Southeast Asia. 
The share of manufacturing in GDP declined to 22% in 2012 from 26% 
in 1990. Manufacturing in the Philippines provides only 8.3% of total 
employment, a much smaller contribution than in comparable countries 
(Figure 3.28.13).
Spurring industrial development requires broad-based reform to 
address the long-standing challenges of under-provision of infrastructure, 
an unfriendly investment and business environment, and poor 
governance. In the past 2 decades, steps have been taken on these fronts, 
as trade restrictions have been liberalized, the licensing system simplified, 
and a sound financial system established. More recently, governance 
reforms and gradual improvements in infrastructure have enhanced the 
investment environment.
While such reforms are crucial, by themselves they may not be 
enough to attract substantial new manufacturing investment in the near 
term. Targeted interventions aimed at manufacturers may be required. 
The challenge is to identify constraints on the development of particular 
industries and formulate policies to deploy against them. That requires 
considerable consultation with the industries concerned. 
A window may be opening for the Philippines to pursue such a 
targeted policy, in light of renewed interest by some manufacturers 
to invest in Southeast Asia at a time that the improvements in the 
Philippines’ investment environment are being recognized. Moreover, 
labor markets are tightening and wages rising more rapidly in several 
Asian countries that compete with the Philippines for manufacturing 
investment.
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Singapore
Growth will gradually accelerate over the next 2 years, with inflation moderating but still higher than 
average in the past decade and the balance of payments recording large but narrowing surpluses. Prudent 
economic policies, a flexible labor market, a sound banking system, and substantial foreign exchange 
reserves will counterbalance adverse developments overseas. As the government implements its growth 
strategy encouraging firms away from reliance on foreign labor, it should take measures to reduce the 
impact on small and medium-sized enterprises.
Economic performance 
The economy expanded by 1.3% in 2012, down from 5.2% in 2011 in line 
with continuing challenges in the global economy. Demand slowed 
dramatically for externally dependent sectors, particularly manufacturing 
and wholesale and retail trade (Figure 3.29.1). Manufacturing growth was 
flat as electronics output dipped owing to weaker demand for non-mobile 
technologies. 
Domestically oriented sectors—construction and business services, 
in particular—were the main engines of growth in 2012, accounting for 
half of GDP growth. Construction expanded by 8.2%, supported by robust 
public and private demand. Sales of private houses jumped 40%, boosted 
by low interest rates. Strong growth in the business services sector 
depended heavily on the buoyant real estate market.
Domestic demand remained resilient mainly due to inventory 
accumulation, while external demand weakened (Figure 3.29.2). However, 
consumption growth slowed to 2.2% from 4.6% in 2011 as spending on 
recreation and culture contracted and public consumption expenditure 
shrank by 3.6%. Weaker export growth and relatively faster import 
growth together narrowed net exports by 16.4%.
The economic slowdown took place amid ongoing economic 
restructuring. The government has adopted the recommendations of the 
Prime Minister’s Economic Strategic Committee that emphasize skills, 
innovation, and productivity as the main sources of growth. It limited 
the inflow of foreign workers by increasing the levies on nonresident 
foreign employees and lowering the ceiling on their allowed share in 
companies’ total workforce. It initiated programs to encourage firms to 
raise their productivity by increasing the capital–labor ratio and through 
efficient workflow, rather than by relying on cheap labor. Coupled with 
low unemployment, these initiatives further tightened the labor market 
and put upward pressure on wages and inflation. As productivity gains 
will not happen overnight, slower expansion of the labor force will likely 
restrain growth. 
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Inflation remained elevated but moderated somewhat to 4.6% in 
2012 from 5.2% in 2011. The largest contributors to inflation in 2012 were 
housing and transportation, the latter driven by rising prices for vehicle 
quota premiums (Figure 3.29.3). Food price hikes eased as world prices 
declined and the Singapore dollar appreciated. Core inflation, which 
excludes the costs of housing and private road transport, averaged 2.6% in 
2012, up from 2.2% in 2011. 
Given Singapore’s open capital account and its use of an undisclosed 
exchange rate band to execute monetary policy, interest rate and money 
supply developments are largely outside the control of the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore. To contain inflationary pressures, the authority 
has maintained since April 2010 a tightening bias, leading to an 
appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate by 5.9% in 2012, 
compared with 0.2% in 2011 (Figure 3.29.4). Interest rates remain lower 
than those in the US (Figure 3.29.5). Money supply growth moderated 
to 7.2% from 10% the previous year as economic activity slowed. Credit 
expansion decelerated, with credit to the private sector expanding by 17% 
in 2012, down from 30% in 2011.
Fiscal and macroprudential measures were tightened in 2012 to 
complement the central bank’s contractionary stance and discourage 
speculation in the property market. Stamp duty tax on property 
purchases were raised from 10% to 15% for foreigners, and introduced at 
5% for permanent residents; the loan-to-value ratio for mortgages was 
lowered from 60% to 50% for a second property.
The government’s fiscal position remained strong in FY2012 (ended 31 
March 2013) with revenue performing well and the overall fiscal surplus 
reaching 1.1% of GDP, almost the same size as in FY2011. Stamp duty 
collections were buoyed by the strong property market, and receipts 
from vehicle quota premiums swelled in response to government-
imposed supply restrictions (Figure 3.29.6). Development expenditures 
expanded by 6%, reflecting higher spending on health, education, and 
transportation. Current expenditure contracted slightly, though the 
FY2012 budget introduced income support for households and financing 
facilitation for firms to ease the burden from economic restructuring. 
Over the years, the economy has maintained a strong trade balance, 
with the current account surplus averaging more than 20% of GDP. In 
2012, however, the current account surplus eased to 19% of GDP from 23% 
in 2011 as the surplus declined for both the trade balance and the services 
account. Overall, the balance of payments posted a surplus of 8% of GDP, 
up from 5% in 2011, largely due to a narrower deficit in the capital and 
financial account. Singapore maintains a strong external position, with 
international reserves covering 8 months of merchandise imports. 
Economic prospects 
GDP is forecast to grow by 2.6% in 2013, near the upper bound of the 
government’s estimate of 1%–3%, and by 3.7% in 2014 (Table 3.29.1). For 
the rest of the decade, the Ministry of Trade and Industry projects GDP 
growth to be 3%–4%, which is a marked slowdown from the 6% average 
growth from 2000 to 2010.
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Domestic-oriented sectors will again be the primary drivers of growth 
this year and the next. Major infrastructure projects and residential 
construction will generate positive spillovers for other sectors. Cyclically 
sensitive industries such as manufacturing, wholesale trade, and financial 
services are expected to post modest growth, reflecting gradual recovery 
in external demand. Domestic demand will continue to be the main 
source of growth, on the back of improving fixed investments and a 
rebound in government expenditure. 
Inflation will moderate further but remain above the historical 
average, owing to tight labor and housing markets (Figure 3.29.7). Overall 
inflation will likely slow gradually to 3.8% in 2013, within the range of 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore forecast of 3.5%–4.5% but double 
the 2% average over the past 2 decades. It is expected to ease to 3.0% 
in 2014. The forecast assumes that monetary policy will retain its bias 
toward Singapore dollar appreciation, that measures will be taken to 
cool the property market and expand housing supply, and that global 
commodity prices will moderate. Excessive capital inflows may also be 
a risk for inflation, but the authorities will likely introduce additional 
macroprudential measures, if necessary. 
Singapore has a tradition of fiscal prudence with budget surpluses, 
except during recessions. Fiscal rules do not allow a cumulative deficit 
over the term of any one government. The budget for FY2013 estimates 
another overall fiscal surplus of S$2.4 billion, or 0.7% of GDP and lower 
than what was recorded in FY2012 (Figure 3.29.8). Authorities expect 
a slight decline in revenues, as receipts related to transport and the 
property market fall in the next 2 years. Expenditures are likely to be 
higher owing to increased outlays for higher education and health. 
A slower pace of export growth and a relatively faster rise in imports—
as domestic demand expands with government social spending—will 
likely narrow the current account surplus over the coming years. It is 
forecast at 16% of GDP in 2013 and 15% in 2014, down from 19% in 2012 
(Figure 3.29.9).
The high degree of uncertainty over the global economy poses the 
highest risk to growth. As a trade-dependent city-state, Singapore will 
remain at risk from the patchy developments in the US, protracted 
sovereign-debt crisis in Europe, and moderation in PRC economic growth. 
A sharp and abrupt correction in property values could cause substantial 
bank losses, as housing loans account for 31% of total loans. However, 
Singapore’s strong fiscal position, flexible labor market, well-capitalized 
banking system, and substantial foreign exchange reserves can provide a 
buffer, if any of these risks materialize. 
Policy challenge—supporting small and 
medium-sized enterprises 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—businesses with annual 
sales of up to S$100 million or up to 200 employees—are an integral 
part of the Singapore economy. SMEs account for 99% of all enterprises, 
more than 50% of output, and 70% of employment. Recent years have 
been particularly challenging for SMEs in Singapore. In addition to weak 
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demand in the protracted global recession, SMEs face a labor supply 
squeeze and rising domestic costs, which are largely induced by the 
government’s economic restructuring policy. SMEs feel the consequences 
of these shocks more strongly because of their limited access to finance 
and their less-developed financial and management capabilities. Recent 
surveys indicate that profits margins have narrowed, the number of SMEs 
reporting losses has risen, and enterprises are less optimistic regarding 
sales, profits, hiring, and capital investment in the coming months. 
Recognizing SMEs’ predicament, the FY2013 budget introduces a 
3-year package worth S$5.35 billion to help businesses cope with rising 
costs (Table 3.29.2). It provides incentives for firms to invest in raising 
productivity and pay correspondingly competitive wages. Other programs 
specifically for SMEs are being implemented by a government agency 
facilitating the development and growth of indigenous firms. While these 
incentives will not fully offset costs in the short run, they provide a buffer 
for firms adjusting to the economic restructuring program.
The recent economic situation in Singapore, though not as severe as 
during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, calls for more attention to 
the complex challenges that SMEs face. In the short term, SMEs must 
be willing to trim their margins and pay more for labor while building 
new business models. The measures announced in FY2013 will be helpful, 
but more needs to be done. Going forward, the government’s policy of 
pushing firms toward less reliance on foreign labor, capital deepening, 
knowledge and systems upgrades, and innovation could be taxing for 
SMEs. Any shrinkage of the sector would have important unemployment 
and inequality consequences. 
The challenge is to get the right balance such that restructuring 
toward higher productivity and sustainable growth does not happen at 
a very high social cost, while ensuring that policies do not encourage 
long-term dependency. This objective warrants well-targeted and 
incentive-compatible transfers to the most vulnerable firms, especially 
micro enterprises. Rigorous evaluations of government support are 
necessary to assess actual impact on SMEs as a guide to policy makers. 
With a comfortable fiscal cushion, the government is well positioned, 
despite the sluggish global economy, to push for reforms toward a more 
sustainable and inclusive growth path that takes SMEs’ requirements 
into account.
3.29.2  Selected Budget 2013 measures 
for SMEs
Programs Details
Wage credit 
scheme
•	 The government 
co-funding 40% of the 
wage increase for a 
Singaporean employee 
with a gross monthly 
salary of up to S$4,000
Productivity 
and 
innovation 
credit bonus
•	 A business spending at 
least S$5,000 on a credit-
qualified activity receiving 
a matching bonus up to 
S$15,000 
Corporate 
income tax 
rebate
•	 Each year, 30% of 
corporate income tax 
refunded, subject to a cap 
of S$30,000 per company
Helping SMEs 
upgrade 
productivity, 
innovation, 
and 
capability 
•	 Enhanced productivity 
and innovation credit 
scheme
•	 Collaborative industry  
projects
•	 Technology adoption 
program
•	 Land productivity grant
•	 SME talent program
•	 Workforce and training 
support
Helping 
SMEs tap 
opportunities 
for growth 
and others
•	 Market readiness 
assistance grant
•	 Enhanced partnerships for 
capability transformation
•	 Support to enhance 
companies’ access to 
financing
•	 Increase in central 
provident fund and lower 
contribution rates for low-
wage workers
•	 Lower tax on household 
benefits
•	 Road tax rebate
SMEs = small and medium-sized enterprises.
Source: Standards, Productivity, and Innovation 
Board of Singapore. 
This chapter was written by Luxmon Attapich of the Thailand Resident Mission, ADB, 
Bangkok.
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Policy stimulus supported a strong recovery last year after severe flooding devastated the economy in late 
2011. While domestic demand rebounded in 2012, exports weakened on soft global demand and flood-
related disruptions to manufacturing. GDP growth is seen moderating toward trend, with inflation forecast 
to remain modest. The country faces critical challenges in equity, public investment, and governance. 
Economic performance 
The economy rebounded last year from flooding that swamped industrial 
estates, farmland, and parts of the capital Bangkok in late 2011. GDP rose 
by 6.4% in 2012 compared with just 0.1% in the previous year (Figure 3.30.1).
Private consumption increased by 6.6% to contribute about half 
of total GDP growth. Consumption was stimulated by demand to 
replace household items after the floods and by several government 
policies. These included increases in minimum wages by up to 40% in 
seven provinces and in public service salaries, a tax rebate to first-time 
buyers of domestically made cars, which some 1.2 million car buyers 
took advantage of, tax breaks for first-time buyers of houses, and a 
government decision to buy unmilled rice from farmers at prices well 
above international levels. 
Growth in employment and wages supported consumption, as average 
wages rose by 11.8% and employment by 1.2%. The unemployment rate fell 
to just 0.5% by year-end. 
Fixed capital investment rose by 13.3%, propelled by the reconstruction 
of flood-damaged factories, houses, and other infrastructure and the 
replacement of capital equipment. Public construction was spurred by 
the building of mass rapid transit projects in Bangkok and mobile 
telecommunications networks. 
However, external demand weakened last year due to sagging 
economic growth in major markets and disruption to export-oriented 
manufacturing caused by the floods. Net exports of goods and services 
acted as a drag on GDP growth.
Some manufacturers were able to return to full production relatively 
quickly, particularly those targeting the domestic market, but others—
including makers of computers, hard drives, and semiconductors—took 
several months to rebuild and replace equipment. These industries also 
faced sluggish export demand. 
Car and truck production jumped by 72%, reflecting the low base 
caused by the 2011 floods and additional demand stimulated by the 
rebate for first-car buyers. Manufacturing production rose by 7.0% 
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and the industry sector as a whole contributed 3.4 percentage points 
to GDP growth, the biggest sector contribution from the supply side 
(Figure 3.30.2).
The service sector grew by 5.8% and was also an important source of 
GDP growth. A 16% rise in tourist arrivals, to 22.3 million, contributed 
to 8.8% growth in the hotels and restaurants subsector. Financial services 
grew by 6.6%, with insurance benefiting from buoyant auto sales. 
Agricultural output increased by 3.1% with higher output of rice, cassava, 
natural rubber, and oil palm. 
Food price inflation eased and fuel prices were fairly stable. Despite 
picking up in the fourth quarter because of an increase in electricity 
tariffs and higher excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, inflation for 2012 
was the lowest in 3 years (Figure 3.30.3). 
The Bank of Thailand, the central bank, lowered its policy interest 
rate to 3.0% to assist economic recovery after the floods, and reduced 
the rate again in October 2012 to 2.75%, slightly below the inflation rate 
(Figure 3.30.4). Lending interest rates declined, and commercial bank 
lending expanded by 13.7% in 2012, with a 21.6% surge in consumer loans. 
Fiscal policy also stimulated the economy. The fiscal deficit widened 
to 4.1% of GDP in FY2012 (ended 30 September 2012) from 1.3% in 
FY2011. About 90% of planned spending was disbursed, though this fell 
to 66% for the capital budget owing to delays in approving the FY2012 
budget after a change of government in August 2011 and shortages of 
construction materials after the floods. The wider deficit reflects new 
government subsidies and tax breaks to support households, farmers, and 
businesses, including a cut in the corporate tax rate to 23% in 2012. 
Moreover, considerable spending was funded off-budget. Parliament 
approved an emergency decree allowing the government to borrow the 
equivalent of $11.7 billion by June 2013 to be spent over several years on 
water management projects. About $100 million of this was spent in 2012. 
Merchandise exports rose by just 3.2% in US dollars last year. The 
value of rice exports shrank by 28% because the subsidy on the domestic 
purchase price pushed Thai rice prices well above international levels. 
Exports of automobiles increased by 26%, but those of electronic products 
edged up by just 0.9%. 
Imports outpaced exports, rising by 7.8% in US dollars, in part a 
result of capital equipment purchased to replace that damaged by the 
floods. Consequently, the trade surplus shrank by half to $8.3 billion 
(Figure 3.30.5). Insurance payouts after the floods contributed to a 
narrowing in the services trade deficit, but the sharply lower trade surplus 
meant the current account surplus fell to 0.7% of GDP. 
The capital and financial account recorded a substantial surplus, 
largely because of net portfolio inflows and loans to businesses. The overall 
balance of payments remained in surplus, and gross international reserves 
rose by 3.7% to $181.6 billion, cover for 10 months of imports.
Higher capital inflows contributed to 6% appreciation of the Thai baht 
against the US dollar in 2012. The central bank indicated it would further 
liberalize outward foreign direct and portfolio investment, partly to take 
pressure off the baht. The Stock Exchange of Thailand index of share 
prices climbed by 35.8% over last year, and yields on government bonds 
generally declined. Housing prices showed modest gains. 
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3.30.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
GDP growth 4.9 5.0
Inflation 3.2 3.1
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
0.8 0.1
Source: ADB estimates. 
Economic prospects 
After the rebound in 2012, economic growth is expected to moderate 
to about 5% this year and next (Figure 3.30.6), the pace seen in the 
3 years leading up to the global financial crisis. Projections assume the 
government follows through with large public investments it plans in water 
management and transport infrastructure during the forecast period. 
Private consumption will continue to benefit from a tight labor market 
and the minimum wage increases, which were extended throughout 
the country from January 2013. A study by the Thailand Development 
Research Institute found that last year’s 40% increase in minimum wages 
in seven provinces did not cause significant layoffs.
Despite concerns that the rice price subsidies may not be the most 
cost-effective option for raising rural incomes, the government extended 
the rice-purchase program into 2013. However, the impact of flood-relief 
payments and low-interest loans offered in 2011 will fade during 2013 and 
beyond. The tax break for first-time house buyers is scheduled to end in 
May 2013, while the incentive for first-time car buyers expired at the end 
of 2012. While consumer confidence rose in February to its highest level 
in 18 months (Figure 3.30.7), growth in private consumption is unlikely to 
match that in 2012. 
Growth in private investment will also moderate as post-flood 
reconstruction winds down, though investment is likely to remain robust. 
Cement sales were strong early this year, suggesting that construction 
remains buoyant. The Board of Investments approved investment 
incentives for 2,262 planned projects valued at $330 million in 2012, 
double the value of the previous year. Business sentiment generally was 
high early in 2013 (Figure 3.30.7) and lending rates relatively low. 
Government investment is expected to contribute more to economic 
growth, with public investment projected to rise by 12.5% this year. 
The water management program should gather momentum from the 
second half of 2013, with $1.3 billion projected to be spent this year. 
The government plans legislation under which it can borrow the 
equivalent of $67 billion off-budget over 7 years to invest in transport 
infrastructure: roads, railways, seaports, and airports. Investment in this 
program could start early next year. The fiscal deficit, including budget 
and off-budget spending, is projected to widen to 4.8% of GDP in FY2013. 
Early in 2013 the central bank noted positive signs for continued 
economic growth, pointing to increases in indexes of consumption and 
investment, buoyant tourism, and an uptrend in exports in January.
Modest inflation—slightly above 3%—is projected for the forecast 
period (Figure 3.30.8). The government has extended a tax exemption on 
diesel fuel into 2013 and is expected to maintain controls on a range of 
consumer items. Global prices of oil and other commodities look likely 
to remain broadly stable. Rising domestic wages are anticipated to have a 
modest impact on inflation, which averaged 3.1% in the first 3 months of 
this year. 
Monetary policy is expected to remain accommodative to growth 
for some time in light of low inflation and strong capital inflows. Higher 
government borrowing for public investment will likely drain some 
excess liquidity from the banking system. The monetary authorities have 
indicated they stand ready to take macroprudential measures to manage 
3.30.6 GDP growth
–4
0
4
8
2014201320122011201020092008
%
Forecast
5-year moving average
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
3.30.7  Consumer confidence and business 
sentiment
70
75
80
85
30
40
50
60
Business
sentiment
Consumer
condence
Feb
2013
Jan
2012
Jan
2011
Jan
2010
Jan
2009
Index Index
Sources: Center for Economic and Business Forecasting; 
Bank of Thailand. http://www.bot.or.th (both accessed 
11 March 2013).
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Southeast Asia Thailand  251
rising household debt if consumer lending continues at the high rate seen 
in 2012. The baht appreciated by 4.5% against the US dollar in the first 
3 months of 2013 (Figure 3.30.9).
Stronger economic growth in some major export markets, including 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and pickup in world trade indicate 
that growth in merchandise exports will quicken to about 10% in 2013, 
and step up again in 2014. Manufacturing industries’ return to full 
production will support the increase in exports. Imports are forecast 
to increase by 11% this year, accelerating in 2014 when the government 
starts the new transport infrastructure projects. The current account is 
expected to record small surpluses (Figure 3.30.10).
Risks to this outlook include the challenges discussed below, potential 
significant delays affecting infrastructure projects, and capital inflows that 
maintain upward pressure on the baht, damaging the competitiveness of 
exports. Failure to address weaknesses in education is a longer-term risk 
to economic development.
The government is incurring substantial losses from its purchases of 
rice from farmers at prices above the international market. Thai rice 
inventories were estimated at 15 million tons early in 2013 as overseas 
buyers turned to lower-priced rice from India and Viet Nam 
(Figure 3.30.11). Losses could exceed the equivalent of 1% of GDP annually. 
Policy challenges—equity, public investment, 
and governance
Thailand faces several critical policy challenges. One is inequality, which 
undermines social and political stability with associated risks to investor 
confidence. Inequality is reflected in large rural–urban and regional gaps 
in incomes and access to social and economic services (Figure 3.30.12). 
Such structural problems are unlikely to be resolved by ad hoc measures 
to boost incomes through subsidies and tax concessions. More effective 
targeting of public investment in social and physical infrastructure will 
be important to address these concerns. 
A second issue is inadequate public investment, which dents the 
country’s competitiveness. Public investment as a ratio to GDP has 
declined over many years (Figure 3.30.13). The World Economic Forum 
ranks Thailand 38th of 144 countries in its Global Competitiveness 
Report 2012–2013. However, Thailand’s ranking sinks to 46th for 
infrastructure and lower still for railway, port, and telephone components 
of infrastructure. Also of concern is the country’s lowly ranking on basic 
education, at 89th, and on adoption of technology, at 84th. A separate 
World Bank benchmark that measures the performance of logistics 
ranked Thailand 38th of 155 countries in 2012, below the PRC and 
Malaysia. 
Public investment is needed in transport infrastructure to reduce 
logistics costs and in water management infrastructure to mitigate the 
social and economic impacts of climate change and flooding. Increased 
investment in social infrastructure is needed to ensure equitable 
improvements in skills and social capital that will boost creativity and 
productivity to generate sustained gains in living standards. 
3.30.8 Inflation
–2
0
2
4
6
2014201320122011201020092008
%
Forecast
5-year moving average
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
3.30.9 Exchange rate
38
36
34
32
30
28
1 Apr
2013
Jan
2012
Jan
2011
Jan
2010
Jan
2009
Jan
2008
B/$
Source: Bloomberg (accessed 23 March 2013).
3.30.10 Current account balance
0
3
6
9
2014201320122011201020092008
% of GDP
Forecast
5-year moving average
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
3.30.11 Rice exports
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
500
575
650
725
800
875
Export priceVolume 
Feb
2013
OctJulAprJan
2012
OctJulAprJan
2011
Thousand metric tons $/metric ton
Source: CEIC database (accessed 2 April 2013).
252  Asian Development Outlook 2013
Mobilizing and effectively managing resources to ensure more 
equitable, efficient, and effective delivery of public services is one of 
Thailand’s most pressing challenges. The government lacked resources for 
public investment following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. More recently, 
political instability has interrupted the planning and implementation of 
large public investment projects. Moreover, the government prioritized 
spending on fast-disbursing stimulus programs when the economy 
slumped during the global financial crisis in 2008–2009 and after the 
extreme flooding in 2011. Large public finance allocations were directed 
at incentives for first-time buyers of cars, pay rises for the public service, 
tax cuts for companies, popular measures such as the diesel fuel subsidy, 
and subsidized rice purchases from farmers. 
The government is now beginning to address declines in public 
investment with significant multiyear programs for water management 
($11.7 billion) and transport infrastructure (as much as $67 billion), 
funded off-budget. However, considerable uncertainty surrounds the pace 
of implementation.
Investment in transport infrastructure aims to reduce logistics 
costs by 2 percentage points, from about 15% of total production costs. 
Most of the investment in transport will go to rail networks to improve 
transport links within Thailand and to neighboring countries. The water 
management projects are designed to mitigate the social and economic 
impact of flooding and better manage water resources.
While the commitment to increased public investment is a positive 
development, off-budget programs have the disadvantage of compromising 
transparency. Instead, increases in budget funding for public investment 
could be generated by broadening the tax base or phasing out the 
economic stimulus programs. The government could also consider 
amending the Public Debt Management Act to raise borrowing limits 
while maintaining its fiscal sustainability framework to keep public debt 
below 50% of GDP.
This leads to a third challenge: the need to improve public sector 
management and accountability, and to fight corruption. This will become 
increasingly important as public investment expenditure rises. 
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This chapter was written by Dominic Mellor, Chu Hong Minh, and Nguyen Luu Thuc 
Phuong of the Viet Nam Resident Mission, ADB, Ha Noi.
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The economy stabilized in 2012 as previous policy tightening suppressed inflation and bolstered external 
accounts. Subdued economic growth prompted an easing of monetary policy last year, but lending was 
constrained by problems in the banks. GDP growth is forecast to edge up this year and next, with inflation 
in the high single digits. Sustaining foreign direct investment inflows and maintaining competitiveness 
requires intensified efforts to reform banking, state-owned enterprises, and the business environment.
Economic performance
GDP growth ebbed to 5.0% in 2012 (Figure 3.31.1), the slowest in 13 years, 
as fiscal and monetary tightening in 2011 continued to have an impact 
into last year. While the policies took a toll on growth, they achieved 
sharp reductions in inflation and a more stable exchange rate, and 
they contributed to a record current account surplus and to rebuilding 
foreign reserves.
All sectors—agriculture, industry, and services—recorded slower 
growth in 2012 than in 2011. Manufacturing decelerated to 4.5%, reflecting 
weak domestic demand, high inventories, and reduced bank lending. 
Construction grew by a modest 2.1% after contracting in 2011 when the 
government squeezed credit and cut public investment. Services expanded 
by 6.4% to make the biggest sector contribution to GDP growth last year. 
Tourism-related services benefited from 9.5% growth in visitor arrivals, 
though this was a slowdown from 2011. Agriculture grew by just 2.7%.
From the demand side, growth in private consumption eased to 3.4% 
owing mainly to a weaker labor market. About 116,000 businesses closed 
in the past 2 years. Investment grew by 2.2%, a turnaround from its 
contraction in the previous year. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
remained substantial, but private domestic investment was dampened 
by weak credit growth. The government brought forward some planned 
capital spending, which lifted public investment. Strong exports and 
sluggish imports meant net exports made a significant contribution to 
GDP growth for the second consecutive year. 
The stabilization policies, together with good domestic harvests and 
soft global food prices, tamed inflation in 2012. It decelerated sharply 
from over 20% year on year in October 2011, bottoming out at 5.0% in 
August 2012 (Figure 3.31.2). On a year-average basis, inflation receded to 
9.2%, half the rate of 2011.
Steep declines in inflation allowed the State Bank of Viet Nam, the 
central bank, to lower its refinancing and discount rates, and its caps on 
short-term deposit rates, by 600 basis points (Figure 3.31.3). It also increased 
its limit on credit growth for some banks and reintroduced, then later 
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lowered a ceiling on bank lending interest rates for priority industries. 
Nevertheless, growth in credit estimated at 8.9% last year was the slowest 
for many years and fell short of the central bank’s 15%–17% target (Figure 
3.31.4). 
Broad money supply (M2) increased by 22%, above the central bank’s 
target of 14%–16%, suggesting sufficient liquidity but lack of demand for 
credit. Banks were cautious in extending credit due to their impaired 
balance sheets, illustrated by rising nonperforming loans (NPLs), 
and their concerns about the financial health of borrowers and other 
banks. Firms and individuals hesitated to take on debt at a time of 
weak domestic demand and a declining property market. Lending for 
consumption, real estate, and marketable securities was only 4% of total 
lending, well below the 16% cap on lending for these activities introduced 
by the central bank in 2011. 
The Viet Nam dong, after depreciating against the US dollar for 
several years, traded within its official exchange rate band for most of 
2012 (Figure 3.31.5). The more stable exchange rate mainly resulted from 
lower inflation, positive real interest rates, stronger external accounts, a 
cap on US dollar deposit interest rates, and lower domestic gold prices. 
Fiscal stimulation of the economy was relatively modest in 2012. 
The government brought forward capital spending and made some 
concessions on taxes and fees. Budget spending relative to GDP was little 
changed from 2011 while tax revenue declined on this basis. The budget 
deficit widened slightly to 4.8% of GDP. On-budget capital spending as 
a share of total budget outlays fell from an average of 30% in 2008–2011 
to 22%, in part a result of higher salaries in the public sector. Off-budget 
expenditures and lending was funded through domestic bond issuances. 
High liquidity allowed the government to boost its net issuance of 
government bonds to the equivalent of about 3.6% of GDP, from 1.2% in 2011. 
Strong growth in exports and subdued imports produced a record 
trade surplus estimated at $10 billion on a balance-of-payments basis. 
Merchandise exports rose by 18.2%, a much stronger performance than 
other countries in Southeast Asia. Viet Nam became the world’s biggest 
exporter of rice and coffee in 2012. Manufactured exports rose steeply, 
reflecting the start of operations of foreign-invested factories making 
mobile phones, computers, and other electronics. Customs data show the 
proportion of high-tech products in total exports has climbed to 18% from 
4% in the past decade (Figure 3.31.6). 
Merchandise imports increased by 7.5% on sluggish domestic demand. 
The trade surplus, coupled with tourism receipts and remittance inflows, 
contributed to a current account surplus estimated at 6.4% of GDP, a 
huge turnaround from 4 years earlier, when the current account recorded 
a deficit of 11.9% of GDP. Together with higher capital inflows, these 
developments helped rebuild foreign reserves to an estimated 2.6 months 
of goods and services imports (Figure 3.31.7). FDI inflows rose by 11% to 
an estimated $8.4 billion, medium and long-term loans by 19% to nearly 
$4 billion, and portfolio investment by 36% to $2 billion. 
The government continued to grapple with banking sector problems. 
Banks reported in October 2012 that NPLs were about 4.8% of total loans, 
but based on closer surveillance of the banking system the central bank 
estimated that the ratio of bad loans was 8.8% at mid-year. It trimmed 
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that estimate to 6.0% in February 2013. Independent analysts estimate that 
NPLs could be in double digits using international accounting standards 
(Figure 3.31.8). NPLs have proliferated because of rapid growth in lending 
over several years followed by the squeeze on credit in 2011, the downturn 
in the economy and property market, and poor performances by some 
highly leveraged state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
In March 2012 the government approved a reform plan to strengthen 
the banking system through mergers, recapitalization, the adoption 
of international prudential standards, and improvements in bank 
supervision. Several financially stressed banks were merged, and the 
authorities disclosed additional data on the health of the banking system. 
However, there was little progress on recapitalizing banks or resolving 
NPLs. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking system fell to 13.6% in 
January 2013 from 14.6% in April 2012 (Figure 3.31.9). While this ratio is 
still well above the 9% floor set by the authorities, banks’ capital positions 
may be weaker than reported if they have underestimated NPLs and not 
made adequate provision for them. 
The government also outlined a plan to improve SOEs’ disclosure, 
governance, and operations. More information on this strategy is 
scheduled to be disclosed in 2013.
Moody’s downgraded Viet Nam’s credit rating to B2 from B1 in 
September 2012, citing banking system weaknesses and lower economic 
growth. Standard & Poor’s has a long-term rating for Viet Nam of BB– 
and revised its outlook to stable from negative in June 2012. Meanwhile 
Fitch, which has a B+ long-term rating, affirmed its stable outlook rating 
in January 2013.
Economic prospects
Government statements indicate that macroeconomic stability remains 
the main priority. The discussion below assumes policy stimulation to 
support growth during the forecast period will be moderate.
The central bank is targeting credit growth of 12%, stronger than the 
2012 outcome of 8.9%, and M2 growth of 14%–16%, down from last year’s 
actual growth of 22.4%. The central bank has removed restrictions on 
lending for consumption, real estate, and marketable securities. After 
inflation eased to 6.6% year on year in March 2013, the central bank 
lowered a number of interest rates, including its refinance and discount 
rates by 100 basis points to 8% and 6%, respectively. The impact of these 
lower rates on credit growth may be muted until the banking sector 
problems are addressed more decisively.
On the fiscal front the government has maintained the budget deficit 
target at 4.8% of GDP for 2013. In January it allowed small and medium-
sized enterprises and labor-intensive manufacturers to defer corporate 
income tax and value-added tax payments, and it offered subsidies and 
tax breaks to revive the property market. Capacity to provide greater 
fiscal stimulation is constrained by public debt, which has increased to 
55% of GDP, and contingent liabilities in SOEs and banks. 
Private consumption will get support from the downtrend in inflation, 
though labor market weakness remains a dampener. The outlook for 
investment has improved with a surge in FDI commitments from Japan 
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last year and the policy decisions mentioned above. However, questions 
over the soundness of the banking system will continue to weigh on 
domestic private investment.
Exports are projected to maintain solid expansion, given higher 
economic growth in the PRC and some other markets this year, and the 
anticipated pickup in major industrial economies in 2014. Manufactured 
exports will continue to trend up as FDI-funded factories come into 
production. Imports also will increase, though, as domestic demand 
gradually recovers, as well as to supply inputs for the export-oriented 
manufacturers. 
GDP grew by 4.9% in the first quarter of 2013, marginally higher 
than the year-earlier period, and the purchasing managers’ index 
trended up slightly as orders increased. On the down side, growth in 
industrial production at 4.9% and in real retail sales at 4.5% showed slight 
decelerations from a year earlier. 
Taking these factors into consideration, GDP growth is forecast at 
5.2% in 2013, picking up to 5.6% in 2014 (Figure 3.31.10) if progress is made 
in strengthening the banking sector and recovery in major industrial 
economies gathers momentum in 2014. 
Inflation is seen easing to 7.5% on average this year before 
quickening to 8.2% in 2014. This view assumes reasonable weather for 
food production, a broadly stable dong exchange rate, and restrained 
policy stimulation. The trade surplus is expected to climb to a record 
$12.5 billion in 2013 and the current account surplus to increase further 
this year before easing in 2014 as imports accelerate in tandem with GDP 
growth (Figure 3.31.11).
Risks to the outlook center on the soundness of the banking system 
and the scale of NPLs. The NPL problem started spreading to the 
interbank money market from late 2011, when some banks were unable 
to recover funds provided to smaller banks with high NPLs. The central 
bank responded last year by, among other measures, restricting banks 
with interbank debts overdue by more than 10 days from borrowing 
through the interbank market. Those measures reduced interbank 
transaction risks but also restricted the functioning of the market. 
The central bank eased some restrictions at the start of this year.
A finance sector assessment, conducted by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank with the agreement of the 
government, will be completed this year. Meanwhile, the authorities 
have introduced regulation that requires commercial banks to increase 
risk provisioning against NPLs and report on loan classification by 
June 2013. Compliance might take longer because banks need to upgrade 
their accounting systems. The central bank’s supervisory and regulatory 
functions need to be strengthened to ensure compliance with the new 
regulations.
Cleaning up bank balance sheets would pave the way for a more 
robust expansion of lending. With this in mind the central bank intends 
to establish an asset-management company to acquire bad loans from 
banks. Adequate funding will be critical to the success of this plan, as will 
a transparent process by which assets are priced and an insolvency system 
with improved capacity to manage the resolution of distressed assets.
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A revival of the property market could ease pressure on the banks, 
at least temporarily. In this regard the government unveiled in 
January 2013 a package of measures that targets social housing projects 
with subsidized mortgage rates for low-income earners and public 
servants, reductions in state land rents, deferment of land use fees, and 
cuts in corporate income and value-added tax. The measures also involve 
a streamlining in the building permit process. 
As a way to draw in foreign capital and expertise, the government 
is expected to increase the cap on foreign ownership in domestic banks 
by an institutional investor from 10% to 15%, and up to 20% for strategic 
investors, as well as allow more than 30% total foreign ownership in weak 
banks undergoing restructuring. 
Plans for broader finance sector reform include the development of 
the bond market over the medium term as outlined in a government 
blueprint in February 2013. Policy actions will involve establishing credit 
rating agencies, a benchmark yield curve, primary dealer system, and 
a legal framework to encourage investment in government bonds by 
voluntary pension funds and insurance companies. The government aims 
to increase the value of bonds outstanding from 18% of GDP in 2011 to 
38% in 2020 and to raise the percentage of bonds held outside banks from 
12% to 20% in that period.
As for the SOE sector, the government has committed to issuing 
a road map for reform by mid-2013. Implementation will require 
interagency coordination as SOE reform cuts across the mandates of 
several ministries. Restructuring plans have been approved for 24 large 
SOEs, and more such plans are expected, including equitization or 
partial privatizations through share offerings if market conditions allow. 
Equitization has slowed in recent years (Figure 3.31.12). One goal is to 
divest SOEs’ noncore businesses by 2015, as many SOEs have accrued 
debts by investing in areas unrelated to their core businesses. The absence 
of an overarching regulatory framework for SOE reform could put at risk 
the implementation of restructuring plans developed through an ad hoc 
approach. For example, support for SOE restructuring will be difficult to 
muster until programs are put in place to support and retrain workers 
displaced during the shakeup of state firms. 
Despite these concerns, Viet Nam has remained an attractive 
investment destination in light of its growing working-age population 
and low labor costs. This is illustrated by an increase in FDI from Japan 
(Figure 3.31.13). Nevertheless, the country faces increased competition for 
FDI in Southeast Asia particularly from Indonesia. Viet Nam’s ability 
to remain competitive and drive economic growth back up to 7%–8% 
will depend in large part on the timely and decisive implementation of 
structural reforms to the banking and SOE sectors and the improvement 
of other aspects of the business environment.
Indicating the extent of this challenge, Viet Nam’s ranking in the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index fell by 16 places 
in the past 2 years to 75th of 144 countries (Table 3.31.2). That puts it 
below other larger Southeast Asian economies. Viet Nam scored poorly 
on several index components, including infrastructure (95), business 
sophistication (100), respect for property rights (113), irregular payments 
and bribes (118), and soundness of banks (125). The World Economic 
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Forum report noted that the country’s relative strengths are its labor 
market (ranking 51) and large domestic market (32).
Policy challenge—wastewater threat to 
water resources
Less than 10% of urban wastewater in Viet Nam is treated adequately. 
Most urban households use poorly maintained septic tanks or similar 
on-site systems that only partly treat sewage and can pollute freshwater 
resources. A study of water resources in 2009 found that the safety of 
water supplies in several river basins was at risk from the discharge of 
untreated and partly treated wastewater, including domestic sewage and 
industrial wastewater. 
A rapidly growing urban population means the government will need 
to invest substantial amounts in wastewater collection and treatment 
to protect public health and guard against the pollution of freshwater 
resources. The government aims to connect 70% of the urban population, 
or about 35 million people, to central wastewater collection and treatment 
systems by 2025. Currently, only about 2.5 million people are centrally 
connected. The average per capita cost to connect to a new wastewater 
system with adequate treatment is $200–$600, suggesting the government 
will need to invest $6.4 billion–$20.0 billion over 12 years to meet its 
target (Figure 3.31.14).
Responsibility for urban infrastructure rests with local governments, 
but most do not have the financial or technical capacity to manage 
the scale, complexity, and cost of urban environment programs. Many 
wastewater utilities are not fully prepared to operate on commercial 
principles and attract private sector financing and expertise. Neither do 
they have access to capital markets. A sustained capacity-building effort is 
therefore required to implement urban wastewater management systems 
on a large scale. 
While new wastewater treatment facilities have been constructed, 
a recent performance review found that legislation and regulations 
governing these projects need to be amended to ensure limited financial 
resources are directed to high-priority areas. Some investments were 
misdirected to unnecessarily costly treatment options or systems with 
high energy requirements. Local implementation of new sewer systems 
has on occasion resulted in poor coverage and failure to improve public 
health or the environment. 
Looking further ahead, the government could supplement public 
funds by attracting private investment into wastewater management. 
This would require clarity on asset ownership, reliable information on 
existing infrastructure, clear assignment of responsibility for operation 
and maintenance, accounts and procedures that are consistent with 
international standards, and the timely imposition and enforcement of 
water and wastewater tariff increases to ensure at least cost recovery. 
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Fiji
Stronger consumption and investment demand underpinned higher growth in 2012, despite the adverse 
impacts of three natural disasters and continuing weak global demand. Near-term growth is expected to 
be driven by tourism and public infrastructure investments. Longer-term economic prospects are likely to 
be influenced by political as well  as economic developments.
Economic performance
According to the latest official estimate included in the 2013 budget, 
GDP growth rose to 2.5% in 2012 from 1.9% in the previous year as 
consumption demand strengthened (Figure 3.32.1). The Reserve Bank of 
Fiji, the central bank, reported that new consumption lending increased 
by 25.4% last year. Net value-added tax collection increased by 4.9% in 
real terms, reflecting higher consumption expenditure prompted by lower 
tax and interest rates. Lending for investment also increased, by 28.1%, 
according to the central bank. Increased loans to borrowers in real estate, 
tourism, and building and construction fueled the rise. Imports of 
capital goods showed an increase of 8.8% in the first 11 months of 2012. 
Sales of cement also trended upward over the year on the back of higher 
government capital spending.
However, the performance of some key sectors deteriorated during 
the year. Some agricultural output in 2012 was lost to flooding in January 
and March. Production of sugar, the country’s primary agricultural 
export, fell by 7.1% during the year (Figure 3.32.2). Cyclone Evan caused 
damage estimated at $42 million, equal to 1% of GDP. Just under half of 
this loss was to agriculture outside of sugar. Despite the start of bauxite 
production in Naiwalevu, mining remained weak and production of gold, 
Fiji’s primary mineral resource, fell by 8%. Tourist arrivals declined by 
2.1% relative to 2011, at least in part because of successive floods early in 
the year, with arrivals from Australia being down modestly (Figure 3.32.3). 
In December, flight cancellations caused by the cyclone drove down 
departures to Fiji that month from Australia and New Zealand—the two 
main markets—by 11% and 16%, respectively, year on year. Given these 
late developments, the official 2012 GDP growth estimate is likely to 
be revised downward, particularly when flow-through effects on other 
sectors are fully taken into account.
This chapter was written by Caroline Currie of the South Pacific Subregional Office, 
ADB, Suva.
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In 2012, inflation ran at 4.3%—less than half of the rate in 2011 
(Figure 3.32.4). Floods in January and March disrupted the supply of 
locally produced fruits and vegetables, fueling higher inflation early in 
the year. Inflation then fell gradually as commodity prices stabilized.
Fiji’s net budget deficit in 2012, excluding principal repayments on 
loans, was estimated to be equivalent to 1.6% of GDP. This was larger than 
the 1.4% of GDP recorded in the previous year, but on-target expenditure 
and unexpectedly high revenue collections—particularly corporate 
taxes following the adoption of an advance tax payment system for 
companies—brought the deficit down to below the target of 1.9% of GDP. 
The central bank maintained an expansionary monetary policy, 
keeping its overnight policy rate at 0.5%, which it has maintained 
since October 2011. This contributed to low interest rates on loans and 
time deposits at commercial banks and kept liquidity high. In 2012, 
commercial banks’ outstanding loans increased by 7.6% year on year. 
The central bank also loosened exchange rate controls in response to 
rising foreign reserves. Nonetheless, at the end of 2012, foreign reserves 
totaled $922 million, sufficient to cover 5.2 months of imports, up from 
5.0 months in December 2011. 
The 2013 budget reports Fiji’s current account deficit as narrowing 
to 6.1% of GDP in 2012 from 7.0% in 2011. However, the actual current 
account deficit may widen because of a higher trade deficit late in the year 
reflecting lower sugar and gold export earnings, as well as lower tourism 
receipts. Merchandise exports, including re-exports, grew by only 5.1%, 
far short of the forecast 12.3%. Import growth estimates for 2012 have been 
revised upward to 5.4% from 4.7%.
Economic prospects
Fiji’s economy is forecast to grow by 2.0% in 2013, driven mainly by 
tourism and higher public capital expenditure (Table 3.32.1). The increased 
public capital expenditure will focus on constructing new transport 
infrastructure, valued at more than $225 million, and infrastructure 
rehabilitation.
Consumption expenditure is expected to strengthen further in 2013, 
propelled by improved household disposable income from lower personal 
income tax rates, and the implementation of a 10% wage increase for 
public employees earning below F$10,000 per annum. Rising investment 
is expected to tighten the labor market and spur higher consumption. 
Investment is expected to reach 25% of GDP in 2013, up from 18% in 2012. 
The size of the investment expansion will raise fiscal risks and further 
stretch public fiscal resources.
Higher consumption, combined with public infrastructure work, 
election-related expenditure, and continued expansion in tourism in line 
with an improving global economy, support a prediction of growth rising 
to 2.3% in 2014. 
Supply disruptions caused by Cyclone Evan are expected to accelerate 
inflation in 2013, particularly early in the year. Full-year average inflation 
is projected at 4.5%, as planned increases in capital spending push up 
prices, slowing to 4% in 2014 in line with declining international food and 
fuel prices.
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Fiji’s 2013 budget projects a net deficit equivalent to 2.8% of GDP, 
wider than the 1.6% recorded in 2012 (Figure 3.32.5). The government plans 
expansionary fiscal policy this year, with capital expenditure increasing 
to 32% of total spending, up from 29% in the previous year, to improve 
roads, water supply and sanitation, and information and communication 
technology infrastructure. This will entail deficit spending financed with 
domestic borrowing and loans from the export–import banks of the PRC 
and Malaysia. It will further tax the government’s capacity to implement 
multiple projects. 
The central bank plans to keep interest rates low to support domestic 
economic growth. The current account deficit is projected to widen to 
22.5% of GDP in 2013 on the back of worsening terms of trade. Imports 
are expected to increase substantially as the national airline buys three 
new Airbus A330 aircraft this year, hoping to improve fuel efficiency, 
cargo capacity, and ultimately profitability. These developments are likely 
to put pressure on the country’s foreign reserves.
Policy challenge—reinvigorating 
private sector growth
The current business regulatory environment and political uncertainty 
continue to weigh on Fiji’s growth prospects. Barriers to higher growth 
include limited fiscal flexibility under current debt levels, challenging 
business and political environments, and a longstanding need for 
structural reform, particularly in the sugar sector. 
The budget deficit could be larger than expected if economic growth 
below the government assumption of 2.7% reduces government revenues. 
Planned sales of government real estate to the Fiji National Provident 
Fund (FNPF) help finance the government’s projected deficit. A larger 
deficit could prompt the expanded use of FNPF resources to finance it, 
which could raise concerns about the fund’s long-term sustainability. 
Public debt is relatively high at 50.4% of GDP, about three-quarters of it in 
the form of government bond purchases by the FNPF (Figure 3.32.6).
Despite significant investment in recent years, the outlook for Fiji’s 
sugar industry remains uncertain. The government’s planned purchase 
of equipment to mechanize production and improve its efficiency may 
be insufficient to overcome the challenges the industry faces trying to 
compete internationally. Sugar production and its supply chain need deeper 
structural adjustment, the list of needs headlined by land tenure reform and 
an improved business environment. Such reforms would help revive the 
sugar industry and stimulate broader private sector development. 
While new investments and signs of greater interest from investors 
are encouraging, the political situation will affect how much new 
foreign investment is realized. The process leading up to national 
elections scheduled in 2014 and the credibility of election results will 
be important determinants of Fiji’s future economic performance. If a 
new democratically elected government is installed in a process that is 
acceptable domestically and internationally, renewed business confidence 
and development partner reengagement should follow. This would help 
harness the country’s rich resource base and its natural position as a 
regional hub for the Pacific, shifting Fiji onto a higher growth path. 
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This chapter was written by Aaron Batten of the Papua New Guinea Resident Mission, 
ADB, Port Moresby.
Papua New Guinea
Growth in 2013 is expected to slow considerably as the construction of a liquefied natural gas project 
winds down. Deficit spending will offset some of this slowdown, but future spending growth must be 
contained to maintain macroeconomic stability. With growth increasingly dominated by mining and gas, a 
challenge for the government will be to stimulate other sectors offering more jobs and higher investment 
in the country’s abundant renewable energy resources. 
Economic performance
The largest developing economy in the Pacific maintained its position 
as one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia and the Pacific in 2012, 
with economic growth of 9.2%. Construction was the strongest performer, 
contributing 4.5% to growth, or nearly half of the outcome. Transport, 
finance, and retail trade added a further 2.8% on the strength of domestic 
demand created by the peak construction period of a new liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) project and government expenditure that was higher 
than expected. Mining output recovered from weather and technical 
disruptions experienced in 2011, adding a modest 0.3% to overall growth 
in 2012. Dragging on growth was falling oil output as reserves declined. 
Growth in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries output also slowed as the 
sector expanded by only 0.2% in 2012, down from 8.1% in 2011. Adding 
to this outcome were poorer growing conditions and moderating export 
prices, which depressed coffee, copra, and cocoa output. New investment 
in processing mills helped to support palm oil production (Figure 3.33.1). 
The current account deficit grew to 17.5% of GDP in 2012 (Figure 3.33.2). 
This reflected moderation in agriculture and mining exports and higher 
imports tied to the construction of the LNG project. With rising imports 
financed largely by foreign direct investment, the large current account 
deficit poses little risk to macroeconomic stability. The central bank’s 
foreign exchange reserves remained at near record highs throughout 
the year. At over $4 billion, reserves were sufficient to cover 11 months 
of imports. 
The headline inflation rate fell to 4.1% in 2012, down from 8.5% in 2011 
(though the outdated consumer price index basket likely underestimates 
inflation). Contributing to this official outcome was a significant rise 
in the value of the local currency due mostly to large inflows of foreign 
direct investment, which saw the exchange rate rise by 16% relative 
to PNG’s major import partners. A higher exchange rate, declining 
commodity prices, and the government’s ongoing tariff-reduction 
program reduced prices for tradable goods by 0.2%. Lower import prices 
late in the year flowed through to non-tradable or domestic inflation, 
3.33.1 Supply-side contributions to growth
–3
0
3
6
9
12
–3
0
3
6
9
12
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
%Percentage points 
GDP
Forecast
Agriculture
Industry, non-mining and petroleum 
Industry, mining and petroleum 
Services
Sources: PNG Department of Treasury. 2012. 2013 National 
Budget. December; ADB estimates.
3.33.2 Current account balance
–30
–15
0
15
30
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
% of GDP 
Forecast
Transfers balance
Goods balance
Services balance
Income balance
Current account balance
Sources: PNG Department of Treasury. 2012. 2013 National 
Budget. December; ADB estimates. 
264  Asian Development Outlook 2013
causing it to slow to 4.2% in 2012 (Figure 3.33.3). Rising domestic prices 
were mostly attributable to locally produced meat, alcohol, and tobacco, 
as well as transport costs. 
The budget outcome in 2012 was a deficit of 1.2% of GDP against an 
original forecast of a balanced budget (Figure 3.33.4). This reflected lower-
than-expected revenue caused by unanticipated declines in international 
commodity prices, an appreciating currency that depressed the value in 
PNG kina of mining and petroleum taxes denominated in US dollars, and 
higher spending mainly related to national elections.
In response to lower inflation, the central bank lowered its target 
interest rate from 7.75% to 6.75% in September 2012, signaling easing 
monetary policy intentions. However, with the central bank unable to 
fully absorb the high liquidity in the commercial banking system, the 
impact of target interest rate movements on market interest rates and 
inflation continued to be limited. Private sector credit growth remained 
near 10% per annum during 2012, well off its peak of 40% in 2007 
(Figure 3.33.5).
Economic prospects
Economic growth is expected to slow to 5.5% in 2013 before picking up 
again to 6.0% in 2014. The non-mineral economy is expected to slow 
most sharply as the winding down of LNG project construction will 
dramatically curtail construction and transport activity, eventually 
spilling over into lower domestic consumption and retail and wholesale 
trade. Moderating international agricultural prices are expected 
to depress rural incomes derived from the sale of crops for export. 
A significantly increased national budget, which plans for large budget 
deficits of 7.2% of GDP in 2013 and 5.9% in 2014, will counter some of the 
effects of falling domestic demand on the non-mineral economy. 
The mineral sector is expected to lead growth, expanding by 13.0% 
in 2013 as production bottlenecks clear at a number of gold and copper 
mines and production at the new Ramu nickel and cobalt mine ramps 
up. Continued declines in petroleum production, as reserves in major oil 
fields become depleted, will offset some of this growth in 2013, but the 
onset of LNG exports will greatly boost mineral output late in 2014, with 
overall growth in the sector expected to surpass 60% in that year. 
In 2013, an expected easing of the kina exchange rate could fuel 
resurgence in imported inflation, while high government spending is 
likely to stoke domestic inflation. The winding down of LNG plant 
construction will be a counterinfluence subduing price growth later 
in 2013 and throughout 2014. This period will see up to 8,000 workers 
demobilized, easing a shortage of skilled labor and other private 
sector capacity constraints, particularly in construction and transport. 
Declining capital imports associated with the LNG project will relieve 
port congestion. On balance, inflation is projected to bounce back to 6.5% 
in 2013 and 7.5% in 2014.
The 2013 current account deficit is expected to narrow to 15.1% of GDP 
as reduced LNG capital imports reduce the trade deficit. A rebound in 
production at existing mines and the ramping up of production at the 
Ramu facility will help boost export earnings. A further narrowing of 
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the current account deficit to 8.4% of GDP is expected in 2014 as LNG 
exports begin. 
Although large budget deficits are planned for 2013 and 2014, public 
debt is expected to remain low by historical standards, peaking at 35% of 
GDP in 2014. While such public indebtedness is moderate, PNG will need 
to ensure that higher spending does not undermine the fiscal buffers that 
have allowed it to withstand recent shocks (Figure 3.33.6).
Foremost is the need for spending to remain in line with the 
government’s own deficit-reduction plan. To keep public debt below 35% 
of GDP, the 2013 budget plans for zero nominal growth in government 
wages and salaries and just 2.5% annual growth in spending on goods 
and services up to 2017. Such recurrent expenditure restraint will be 
difficult to achieve and risks starving service delivery by, for example, 
undercutting salaries for teachers and health workers. The government 
may therefore need to reprioritize spending away from capital investment 
and toward recurrent goods and services to ensure service delivery within 
designated spending limits. 
The government faces growing challenges in financing its deficit 
spending. While domestic bank liquidity remains high, local commercial 
banks are approaching regulatory limits on their lending to the 
government. A result will likely be deficit financing sourced from 
international markets in 2013 and 2014, significantly increasing the 
government’s cost of borrowing and exposure to exchange rate risk.
Fiscal risks arising from the budget must be better coordinated 
with those generated separately. The reduction in public debt over the 
past decade has been offset by a rise in off-budget liabilities, which now 
equal between 15%–20% of GDP. Major components include borrowing 
to finance the state’s equity in the LNG project, large unfunded 
superannuation liabilities, and contingent liabilities surrounding the 
successful completion of the LNG project. Progressively reducing these 
state liabilities will be important to taming fiscal risks. 
In the medium-term, the outlook for growth remains strong and 
for public debt to remain low. While government plans to increase 
investment in critical national infrastructure and social services are 
commendable, this priority must be balanced against its need to maintain 
fiscal buffers against future shocks. Building up the country’s economic 
resilience will be vital to avoiding reprising past boom–bust cycles. 
Policy challenge—realizing energy potential 
and fostering employment growth
The last decade has witnessed dramatic growth in job creation, with the 
number of jobs in the formal private sector expanding by 70% since 2002. 
Underpinning this achievement has been broad-based growth across the 
non-mineral economy, with finance, retail and wholesale trade, transport, 
manufacturing, and construction all contributing strongly to employment 
(Figure 3.33.7).
As labor-intensive construction of the LNG project draws to a close 
and gas production begins in 2014, the main engine of growth will shift 
toward mineral exports and away from the non-mineral economy. Unless 
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new sources of non-mineral growth can be mobilized, private sector 
employment growth is likely to slow, potentially eroding inclusiveness in 
the country’s economic prospects. 
Central to meeting this challenge will be the government’s ability to 
address structural constraints that discourage higher investment in the 
non-mineral economy. One critical constraint is the worsening adequacy 
of infrastructure for energy supply and distribution, which is now a major 
barrier to productivity, output, and employment growth, as well as to 
improving the welfare of the poor. Power outages are frequent, forcing 
many businesses to invest in generators instead of new machinery and 
technology. Schools and hospitals are unable to function efficiently, while 
the 11% household electrification rate leaves the overwhelming majority 
in the dark and without common appliances. As most private power is 
generated using diesel or gasoline, the portion of all electricity generated 
by hydropower fell from 76% in 1994 to 59% in 2011. This significantly 
raised the average cost of power production and nation’s admirably low 
carbon emissions. 
PNG has abundant energy resources. In addition to natural gas, 
it enjoys high rainfall over rugged mountains, but less than 5% of its 
hydropower potential is currently developed. Unlocking this potential 
will require the government to address a number of challenges through 
a coordinated policy response. For urban centers, PNG needs to upgrade 
deteriorating generation and distribution infrastructure while developing 
a more transparent and clearly defined access regime able to attract 
private investment. Promoting energy access in rural and remote areas 
presents additional challenges, as low population density raises supply 
costs. Current regulatory arrangements pose daunting disincentives for 
investment in new rural electricity infrastructure, as revenues tend to be 
insufficient to cover capital and maintenance costs. Achieving widespread 
rural electrification will thus require implementing a policy that entails 
community service obligations, clearly quantifies the cost of providing 
power in areas where cost recovery from the community is impossible, 
and compensates energy providers accordingly, be they private or public. 
Focusing on reform priorities will be key to unlocking the vast 
potential for energy projects in PNG, expanding access to electricity in 
remote communities, and creating a business environment that can speed 
growth in the non-mineral economy, employment creation, and poverty 
reduction.
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Solomon Islands
Growth moderated but remained strong in 2012, driven by ramped up mining activity. Further moderation 
in growth is expected over the next 2 years as forestry resources dwindle. To offset the decline of logging, 
the country needs to further develop other industries and revenue sources, as well as control the growth 
of government expenditure.
Economic performance
Growth slowed to 5.5% in 2012, from 10.6% in the previous year 
(Figure 3.34.1). The deceleration mainly reflected a much smaller increase 
in forestry sector output than in recent years. Logging provides 16% 
of output but, having reached record levels, grew by only 0.5% in 2012, 
compared with annual increases of around 36% in the previous 2 years 
(Figure 3.34.2). Agricultural output fell in 2012 with the production 
of cocoa falling by 33% and copra by 19% because of sluggish demand 
overseas. Palm oil and fisheries recorded small increases in production.
Industry (mostly mining, manufacturing, and construction) and 
services (mostly trade, transport, and communications) drove growth in 
2012. Gold production from the Gold Ridge mine ramped up, and exports 
were 2.4 times higher in 2012 than in 2011. Solomon Islands’ hosting of 
the Festival of Pacific Arts and higher foreign direct investment helped 
fuel growth outside of mining.
After a current account deficit in 2011 equivalent to 8% of GDP, 
the deficit for 2012 is estimated at 6% of GDP, as higher grants from 
development partners offset declines in export revenues (Figure 3.34.3). 
The country has seen a significant rise in its foreign reserves, bolstered 
by large inflows of grants and foreign direct investment. Higher fishing 
license revenues were also a significant source of foreign currency inflows 
in 2012. Foreign exchange reserves equaled 10.4 months of imports in 
December 2012, up from 8.9 months in December 2011.
Inflation declined from 7.4% in 2011 to 5.9% in 2012 because of slower 
economic growth, the revaluation of the domestic currency, and the 
Central Bank of Solomon Islands mopping up liquidity (Figure 3.34.4). 
In October 2012, the central bank replaced the Solomon Islands dollar 
peg to the US dollar with a peg to a basket of currencies. This was to 
enable the Solomon Islands dollar to respond more flexibly to market 
fluctuations.
The government incurred a fiscal deficit equivalent to 1.9% of GDP in 
2012, reversing a surplus equivalent to 5.1% of GDP in 2011. It financed the 
deficit by running down fiscal reserves that had been built up as a buffer 
This chapter was written by Milovan Lucich of the Pacific Liaison and Coordination Office, 
ADB, Sydney.
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against volatile revenue flows. The deficit reflected both lower revenues 
and increased spending. Revenue in 2012 increased by 17% over 2011 in line 
with strong nominal GDP growth, but this was less than the government 
budgeted, as lost revenues from doubling the income at which personal 
taxes are levied were higher than expected. Rises in spending were related 
to hosting the Festival of Pacific Arts—whose cost equaled 2.5% of GDP—
and increasing constituency funds paid to members of Parliament, which 
have doubled in recent years to 4% of GDP.
Public debt continued to fall from the equivalent of 19% of GDP in 
2011 to 15% in 2012 (Figure 3.34.5). The country resumed concessional 
borrowing in 2012 to finance the sovereign component of the Broadband 
for Development Project, which will connect the country to an undersea 
fiber optic cable.
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to slow further, to 4%, in 2013. Although agricultural 
production and gold output are projected to increase, log production is 
seen to decline. A scaling up of gold mining is expected as the Gold Ridge 
mine reaches full production capacity of 95,000 ounces per year, up from 
79,400 ounces in 2012. 
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands will start to 
wind down in 2013 and thereafter focus largely on building the capacity 
of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. The mission’s military 
component will be withdrawn from mid-2013 as the country transitions 
from post-conflict and crisis recovery to sustainable development based 
on the National Development Strategy, 2011–2020. The mission has also 
been a major development partner, but the effect of withdrawal on the 
economy will be minimized by transferring its development activities to 
the programs of other development partners, in particular Australia and 
New Zealand.
In 2014, growth is projected to remain at 4% with continued 
investment in mining and its spillover effects on the economy. Additional 
investment in telecommunications is expected to harness opportunities 
created by the broadband project. 
Typical price lags in Solomon Islands mean international food price 
rises from mid-2012 are expected to affect inflation in early 2013 but 
dissipate by midyear. Over the full year 2013, average inflation is expected 
to ease to 4.5% as economic growth slows. Similar inflation is expected in 
2014, in line with the modest growth forecast for that year.
The 2013 budget marks a return to fiscal consolidation with a 
balanced budget planned. Expenditure growth has been limited to 
7% despite a planned increase in public wages. This compares with an 
average 22% annual increase in expenditure from 2004 to 2011. Revenue 
growth is estimated at 8% in 2013, creating a small budget surplus of 
$100,000—effectively a balanced budget.
The central bank is expected to continue to soak up excess liquidity 
through the sale of short-term bills. The exchange rate will continue to be 
managed against a basket of currencies, and the central bank may allow 
further appreciation if inflation accelerates.
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The current account deficit is expected to increase slightly to 10% of 
GDP in 2013, as the logging decline severely depresses export growth, 
and import growth—driven by construction and mining—remains firm. 
The deficit will be funded through continued inflows from development 
partners and foreign direct investment. Import cover is expected to 
remain comfortable at 7–8 months in 2013 and 2014.
Policy challenge—encouraging fiscal sustainability
Logging provides 15% of government revenue, 60% of exports, and 32% of 
foreign exchange earnings. It is the largest source of formal employment 
after the government, providing 5,000 jobs. Forests have been extensively 
exploited, with logging rates reaching several times the sustainable 
rate in recent years. One study warns that natural forest resources may 
be exhausted before 2020. A decline in logging would adversely affect 
the government’s finances and require it to identify new sources of 
revenue, such as a new taxation regime for the mining sector, to support 
government expenditures.
In addition to developing alternative sources of revenue, the 
government will need to contain public expenditure growth and improve 
the quality of public spending. Despite a return to fiscal consolidation in 
the 2013 budget, the economy continues to face large fiscal risks. Major 
risks in the budget include the potential for overestimating domestic 
revenue, a greater-than-expected decline in logging, and expenditure 
pressures that may arise if the government needs to accommodate a 
fractious coalition. The large wage and salary bill will remain an ongoing 
fiscal strain, particularly with the planned increase in public wages, and 
could displace funding for investment and essential public services if the 
revenue outcome is lower than expected.
An issue that warrants particular attention is that of constituency 
development funds. Funds are given directly to members of Parliament 
for projects in their electoral areas. Amounts have increased substantially 
in recent years, growing to equal about 4% of GDP, and the use of these 
funds remains a part of government spending without accountability. 
The projects financed by these funds are not even enumerated in budgets 
or medium-term development plans. Capping and monitoring the 
use of constituency funds would be warranted. A welcome first step 
to improve the transparency and accountability of these funds is the 
drafting of a constituency development fund bill. The draft bill provides 
for establishing constituency development offices to help administer 
the funds in line with constituency development plans and brings the 
funds under the Public Finance and Audit Act, making them subject 
to audit and a complaints mechanism. Strengthening this bill to reduce 
the discretion available to parliamentarians, together with its passage 
and implementation, would significantly improve governance and public 
financial management in Solomon Islands.
This chapter was written by Christopher Edmonds of the Pacific Department, ADB, Manila.
3.35.1 GDP growth
14.6
12.8
9.5 10.8 10.6 10.0 10.0
–5
0
5
10
15
20
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Percentage points 
Forecast
Agriculture
Industry
Services
GDP
Sources: Timor-Leste National Statistics Directorate; 
ADB estimates.
Timor-Leste
Economic growth remained high in 2012, buoyed by a large increase in government spending. Double-
digit growth is expected to continue in 2013 and 2014 with modest declines due to planned fiscal 
tightening. Inflation moderated from 2011 but remained above 10%, prompting the government to 
postpone some infrastructure initiatives. The biggest challenge facing leaders is to effectively channel 
petroleum revenues into ambitious plans to build infrastructure and human resources while sustaining 
the Petroleum Fund.
Economic performance
Strong economic growth continued in 2012, with non-oil GDP expanding 
by 10.6% (Figure 3.35.1). Government spending, particularly on public 
infrastructure, continued to drive the economy. This spending propelled 
growth both directly and indirectly through spillover effects on non-oil 
business investment and demand for the goods and services provided by 
private businesses. Government expenditure totaled $1.8 billion, up by 
64.8% from 2011. The United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste departed at 
the end of 2012, but this appears to be having little impact on economic 
activity, as only 1% of GDP was linked to it and government spending has 
continued to rise. 
Inflation in 2012 remained high at 10.9% (annual average basis) 
but moderated from 13.1% in 2011 (Figure 3.35.2). This reflected easing 
world food prices and lower import costs with the strengthening of 
the US dollar, which Timor-Leste uses as its official currency, against 
the currencies of some of Timor-Leste’s important trade partners. 
Government spending in the face of persisting bottlenecks and spending 
linked to the midyear elections countered some of the deflationary impact 
of these external developments. 
Capacity constraints in carrying out infrastructure development 
plans caused a significant portion of budgeted 2012 expenditures to 
be postponed amid implementation delays. Nonetheless, the ratio 
of government expenditures to non-oil GDP reached 192.7% in 2012, 
surpassing the previous high set in 2011. The largest increase was in 
capital expenditures, which grew by 78.4% over 2011. The vast majority 
of this spending went to national electrification. The system is being 
built to accommodate future electricity demand but currently has excess 
generating capacity. Despite rising Petroleum Fund returns and overall 
balance, the rise in spending has necessitated withdrawals from the fund 
that exceed what the Ministry of Finance estimates can be sustained over 
the long run.
3.35.2 Inflation
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The government posted another large budget surplus of $1.8 billion, 
which was about 1.4 times non-oil GDP in 2012. However, the surplus 
was much smaller than in 2011 when it equaled 2.4 times non-oil GDP. 
The government received $3.0 billion in income from its oil concessions 
in 2012, down from $3.5 billion in 2011. As in recent years, these revenues 
dwarfed the government’s domestic revenues of $146 million (Figure 3.35.3). 
Public savings, defined as the Petroleum Fund plus foreign exchange 
reserves, are $11.6 billion, which is more than 9 times annual non-oil GDP.
The value of goods and services imported into Timor-Leste in 
2012 increased by 15%, but this was much lower than in the previous 
year, when there were particularly large imports of heavy construction 
equipment. Nonpetroleum exports, mostly coffee, increased by 10.9% but 
still covered only 4.4% of the cost of imported goods. The surplus in the 
income account from petroleum revenue continued to outweigh the wide 
trade deficit in 2012, providing a current account surplus equivalent to 
1.7 times non-oil GDP.
Economic prospects 
Strong economic growth is expected to continue in 2013 and 2014, driven 
largely by government expenditures and more modest rises in investment 
outside the petroleum sector. Total budgeted expenditures of $1.6 billion 
make the government’s 2013 budget 8.8% lower than in 2012. However, 
economic growth is projected to continue at about the rate observed in 
2012, as the budget, if fully executed, would push actual expenditure up 
38% from 2012 actual expenditures. Actual government expenditures have 
been consistently below budgeted levels in recent years.
High inflation is consistent with the economy’s high rate of growth. 
Inflation is projected to remain high at 9.0% in 2013, but this is lower 
than in 2012, reflecting some success in the government’s efforts to stem 
inflation. These efforts include postponing planned expenditures on the 
Tasi Mane project and a new national development bank in 2012. Another 
factor seen to moderate inflation is the dissipation of inflationary pressures 
from one-time events that raised prices in 2012, including election-related 
spending and increased congestion at Dili’s international port. Inflation 
is projected to continue to moderate to 7.7% in 2014, despite planned 
increases in government spending, as more public infrastructure comes 
online, supply chain bottlenecks are addressed, and the entry of new 
businesses increases competition in wholesale and retail markets.
The budget for 2013 has a large increase in government spending to 
$1.8 billion (Figure 3.35.4), or 200% of non-oil GDP, of which $1.6 billion 
will come from the Petroleum Fund and other sources of domestic 
revenue (with the remainder sourced from development partners). 
Capital expenditure, funded from the multiyear Infrastructure Fund, 
will remain prominent in the budget, with spending projected to rise to 
100% of non-oil GDP. Outlays on the national electrification program are 
tapering off but will still be $280 million. Expenditure on the Tasi Mane 
project—intended to trigger development on the south coast—is budgeted 
at $1.32 billion. The budget also allocates $544 million for road upgrades 
over the next 5 years. World oil prices are projected to fall slightly in 2013 
and 2014, which could reduce Timor-Leste’s petroleum revenue and its 
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budget and current account surpluses. Budget surpluses are projected to 
fall to about 100% of non-oil GDP in 2013 and 50% in 2014. The country’s 
current account surplus is forecasted to fall to just over 100% of non-oil 
GDP in 2013 and 66% in 2014.
Policy challenge—spreading the benefits of 
energy exports 
Balancing the policy objectives of achieving high economic growth and 
controlling inflation is an important policy challenge facing Timor-
Leste’s leaders. Although 2012 saw progress in bringing down inflation, 
high growth and persistent supply constraints mean inflation remains a 
concern. Inflation will likely decline in 2013 as some events that drove it in 
2012 are unlikely to reoccur. If the US dollar continues to strengthen, that 
would lead to lower import prices and reduce inflation as well. However, 
planned increases in government expenditure in 2014 and beyond are 
likely to renew price pressure. Measures to address supply constraints, 
such as developing public infrastructure to address bottlenecks in supply 
chains and encouraging new businesses to operate in Timor-Leste, offer 
the most promising avenues for stemming inflation in the long run. 
Disagreement between the government and oil companies over tax 
payments raises concern about the prospects for developing the Greater 
Sunrise field. How this disagreement is resolved could have important 
implications for the country’s long-term fiscal position. Projected 
balances in the Petroleum Fund—and the amounts that can be taken 
out of it to finance development without sacrificing the fund’s long-term 
sustainability—take into account projected petroleum revenues only from 
areas currently being exploited (Figure 3.35.5). However, the finite nature 
of the country’s petroleum reserves, the sensitivity of revenues to global 
price fluctuations, and events like the tax payment dispute highlight the 
need for the government to ensure that fiscal balances are kept in check 
and that scarce government resources are used efficiently.
The longer-term challenge facing Timor-Leste’s leaders is steering the 
economy away from growth that depends primarily on oil revenues and 
public sector stimulus, and toward growth in which the private sector 
plays the lead role. The inaugural Business Activity Survey, covering 2010, 
illustrates the nascent state of the private sector. The survey confirmed 
the high concentration of formal sector businesses in Dili, which provide 
more than 80% of national employment and value added. It showed that 
retail and wholesale, construction, and accommodation and food service 
accounted for more than half of national employment and value added 
(Figure 3.35.6). The long-term prospects for the economy and private sector 
development are encouraging, as spillover from government spending 
should create business opportunities and successful past investments 
should encourage further investment. Economic diversification and 
private sector development would be fostered by further progress in 
improving the business environment. The government’s One-Stop Shop 
initiative to simplify procedures for starting a new business, the passage of 
a public–private partnership framework, and progress toward developing a 
new law to govern land titles are promising steps.
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This chapter was written by Rommel Rabanal and Cara Tinio of the Pacific Department, 
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North Pacific economies
Slower growth has been set largely by infrastructure projects. In the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI), 
delays affecting a major airport upgrade held performance below expectations. Growth slowed in the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) as airport improvement reached completion, and in Palau as market 
saturation and infrastructure capacity constraints at peak periods moderated growth in visitor arrivals. 
Economic prospects depend on infrastructure projects in the near term, but longer-term growth could 
hinge on economic links with Asia.
Economic performance
North Pacific economies continued to expand in FY2012 (ended 
30 September 2012 for all), but growth was generally more moderate than 
in previous years (Figure 3.36.1). In the RMI and the FSM, growth was 
determined largely by movements in government spending, particularly 
on infrastructure projects. Economic growth in the FSM declined to 1.4% 
from 2.1% in FY2011 as infrastructure projects neared completion. In the 
RMI, a delay in the ongoing airport upgrade had held growth in FY2011 
at only 0.8%, lower than expected, but resumed activity helped restore 
growth to 1.9% the following year. Another important contributor to 
growth in these economies has been earnings from fisheries. These rose 
as El Niño drove fish into colder, deeper waters such as those found in the 
exclusive economic zones of the RMI and the FSM.
Government spending, including outlays related to elections, 
contributed to Palau’s 4.0% GDP growth in FY2012, but tourism was the 
main driver. Visitor arrivals increased by 13.4%, building on the 25.8% 
growth achieved in FY2011 and marking the third consecutive year of 
such double-digit growth following 2 years of declining tourist arrivals 
(Figure 3.36.2).
Inflation in all three North Pacific economies accelerated in FY2012, 
largely because of sharp increases in fuel prices in the last quarter of 
calendar year 2011. Inflation in the RMI increased slightly to 5.7% from 
5.4% in FY2011, while inflation in the FSM rose to 5.6% from 4.7% in the 
same period, spurred by the higher availability of consumer loans. Prices 
in Palau similarly experienced additional upward pressure, in this case 
from robust tourism-related demand and possible capacity constraints 
in peak periods, as inflation soared to 6.0% from 2.6% in FY2011 
(Figure 3.36.3).
The North Pacific states are consolidating expenditure to achieve 
long-term fiscal sustainability. This is especially important in light of 
the key role that public infrastructure projects play in driving economic 
growth, and because grants under their compacts of free association with 
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the US are ebbing annually and less available to fuel government spending. 
The RMI and the FSM compacts are set to expire in about a decade. 
The FSM has in the past 4 years realized surpluses in its consolidated 
budget, which combines the accounts of the federal government and 
all four state governments. This trend continued with a consolidated 
surplus equal to 1.2% of GDP in FY2012, reflecting better revenue 
administration at the state level, economic growth, and more stable 
public wages. In contrast, the RMI realized a fiscal deficit estimated at 
1.1% of GDP in the same period, reversing the 3.7% surplus recorded in 
FY2011. Unstable domestic tax collection and diminished foreign grants 
reduced government revenue and exacerbated the impact of off-budget 
expenditures arising from ad hoc directives. Palau recorded a fiscal 
deficit equal to 3.2% of GDP in FY2012, but this was a slight improvement 
from the FY2011 deficit of 3.5%, stemming mainly from higher revenue 
collection related to the strong economic performance driven by tourism.
Increased tourism also drove a current account surplus in Palau, 
which was equal to 6.0% of GDP in FY2012. Meanwhile, the RMI and 
the FSM continued to run current account deficits, equal to 6.3% of 
GDP for the RMI and 15.0% for the FSM. However, these deficits were 
narrower than in previous years. as the winding down of infrastructure 
projects, or delays in implementing them, cut imports of machinery and 
capital inputs. 
Economic prospects
Infrastructure development will remain a key driver of economic growth 
in the North Pacific, with construction providing short-term stimulus 
and the resulting capacity upgrades boosting longer-term prospects. 
Growth in the FSM is expected to moderate to 1.0% in FY2013 as most 
airport improvement projects are completed. In contrast, GDP growth 
in the RMI is projected to accelerate to 2.3% in the same period on the 
back of its recommenced airport rehabilitation project and spending 
related to the country’s hosting of the Pacific Islands Forum. Because the 
growth outlook in Palau depends heavily on sustaining tourism’s robust 
performance, it may slow as the limited capacity of tourism-related 
facilities and infrastructure imposes constraints during peak periods, 
and as recent high rates of growth translate into market saturation. 
Given these constraints, GDP growth in Palau is expected to moderate to 
3.0% in FY2013.
Growth in the RMI is projected to moderate again to 1.5% in FY2014 
as airport rehabilitation winds down. Conversely, the start in FY2014 of 
ADB-supported projects to upgrade ports in the FSM, and to improve 
water and sanitation in Palau, is expected to accelerate growth in the FSM 
to 1.5% and in Palau to 3.5%. Longer-term growth prospects are weighed 
down by outmigration, the lack of growth drivers from the private 
sector, and annual decrements in compact grants, particularly in the 
RMI and the FSM, where scheduled decrements are already taking place 
(Table 3.36.1). 
With international prices of food and fuel projected to decline over 
the next couple of years, inflation in the North Pacific is expected to 
trend downward in the near term. In the RMI and the FSM, inflation is 
3.36.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
Marshall Islands 2013 2014
GDP growth   2.3   1.5
Inflation   4.5   3.5
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
 –2.5  –2.5
Federated States of Micronesia
GDP growth   1.0   1.5
Inflation   4.5   3.5
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
–14.3 –14.0
Palau
GDP growth   3.0   3.5
Inflation   5.5   5.5
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
  7.5   7.5
Source: ADB estimates.
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projected to moderate to 4.5% in FY2013 and 3.5% in FY2014. It is expected 
to remain higher in Palau because domestic activity is more robust 
and tourism facilities remain close to capacity. That said, a projected 
moderation in tourism-led growth is expected to push inflation slightly 
lower in FY2013 to 5.5%, a rate likely to be sustained in FY2014 by demand 
arising from the implementation of the large water and sanitation project.
The lower cost of food and fuel imports is also expected to affect 
current account balances across the North Pacific. The resulting savings, 
together with a sharp increase in grants, are seen to narrow the RMI’s 
current account deficit from 6.3% of GDP to 2.5% in FY2013. The FSM’s 
current account deficit is expected to improve to 14.3% of GDP from 15.0% 
in FY2012, in part because of lower imports of machinery and capital 
inputs as infrastructure projects are already completed. Current account 
deficits in the RMI and the FSM are generally financed through capital 
grants. High tourism receipts have supported current account surpluses 
over the past 3 years in Palau, and a lower merchandise import bill is 
projected to boost surpluses to 7.5% of GDP in both FY2013 and FY2014. 
The governments of the RMI and the FSM have made good progress 
in controlling expenditure and generating more revenue. However, the 
International Monetary Fund estimates that the RMI must build up fiscal 
surpluses equivalent to 6.0% of GDP by FY2017, and maintain them at this 
level until FY2023, to generate sufficient replacement income for expiring 
compact grants (Figure 3.36.4). The FSM’s fiscal adjustment is even more 
challenging, requiring surpluses equivalent to 6.4% of GDP by FY2016 
(Figure 3.36.5). Recent fiscal surpluses are far below these goals. The FSM’s 
consolidated budget surplus is projected to slim to 0.8% of GDP in 
FY2013, even with planned cuts to current and capital expenditure, 
because of the continuing decline in compact grants. The RMI’s fiscal 
account is expected to remain in deficit despite anticipated cuts in current 
expenditure. While similar fiscal contraction is expected in Palau, its 
realization remains uncertain as the newly elected government, which 
assumed office in January 2013, has yet to submit a national budget. In the 
meantime, continuing budget authority legally allows expenditure up to 
the same amount as in FY2012.
Policy challenge—stronger linkages with Asia
The end of the compact agreements will require comprehensive fiscal 
reform to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. Revenue reform may 
include imposing value-added taxes. Cuts in current expenditure must 
reduce large public wage bills. Parallel improvements will need to improve 
tax administration. In addition, the end of payments under the compacts 
will mean that subsidies to state-owned enterprises and generous social 
security schemes will no longer be sustainable.
Asia’s rising importance in the global economy presents 
opportunities for North Pacific economies to boost their growth 
potential by tapping into the region. The North Pacific’s economic links 
with Asia have been gaining importance, and in some cases are already 
quite significant, as detailed by the article Changing tides—evolving 
North Pacific economic linkages? in the December 2012 edition of ADB’s 
Pacific Economic Monitor. For instance, Palau’s merchandise trade 
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is almost exclusively oriented toward Asia, at 99.8% for exports and 
90.5% for imports in 2011, and over 80% of its visitor arrivals are from 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China. The RMI’s tuna exports 
reach a wide range of Asian countries such as the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and Japan, its two biggest markets as of 2011, as well as 
the Philippines and Singapore. The FSM already imports key items 
from Asia, such as cars from Japan, fuel from the Republic of Korea, 
and household appliances from the PRC. Trade linkages with Asia are 
likely to continue expanding with cheaper transport costs to and from 
Asian markets, and lower production costs in the larger economies of 
developing Asia. Expanding such opportunities in a changing global 
economic landscape will help balance the group’s economic ties, which 
remain heavily tilted toward the US. Stronger links with Asia are 
particularly relevant in the medium to long term as annual financial 
assistance from the US is scheduled to decline and eventually expire.
However, to fully benefit from Asia’s rapid growth, the North Pacific 
should further develop these emerging economic links, particularly 
those in the areas of trade and investment. This requires substantial 
improvements to the business environment. In the World Bank’s Doing 
Business 2013 survey, North Pacific economies fared poorly, with the RMI 
ranked at 101 of 185, Palau at 111, and the FSM at 150—all weak in terms of 
protecting investors, enforcing contracts, and registering property, among 
other shortcomings (Figure 3.36.6). In particular, rigid investment and 
labor policies must be relaxed. Better business environments should help 
expand private sector sources of growth in these economies, particularly 
in sectors that can be viable even in small island economies. For example, 
a better business environment is likely to unlock the potential of 
underdeveloped tourism in the RMI, which receives only 3,500 arrivals 
annually, and in the FSM, with 15,000 arrivals, both dwarfed by the more 
than 100,000 annual arrivals to Palau. 
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South Pacific economies
Public investments and tourism earnings continue to drive economies in the South Pacific. Increased 
visitor arrivals and public spending led economic expansion in the Cook Islands and Vanuatu, while 
growth decelerated in Samoa and Tonga as major infrastructure projects were completed. Growth in 
the South  Pacific is expected to slow in the near term as construction on public investment projects 
continues to wind down.
Economic performance
South Pacific economies expanded in FY2012 (ended 30 June 2012 in the 
Cook Islands, Samoa, and Tonga, and coincided with the calendar year 
in Vanuatu). The rate of growth varied across countries (Figure 3.37.1). 
Growth in the Cook Islands accelerated to 3.3% in FY2012, from 1.0% 
in the previous fiscal year, driven by public spending on infrastructure 
projects and the continued strong performance of the tourism sector. 
Tourist arrivals in the Cook Islands have increased by an average of 8.0% 
over the past 2 years (Figure 3.37.2). Higher tourist arrivals were also 
a main reason why Vanuatu’s economy expanded by 2.0% in FY2012, 
accelerating slightly from 1.4% in FY2011 (Figure 3.37.3).
Infrastructure spending funded by development partners has been 
the main determinant of fluctuations in economic growth in Samoa and 
Tonga. The Samoan economy expanded by 1.2% in FY2012, compared 
with 2.0% the previous fiscal year, as reconstruction and rehabilitation 
following the 2009 earthquake and tsunami were completed. FY2012 was 
the second consecutive year of modest expansion in private remittances, 
but, when adjusted for inflation, remittances have been nearly flat 
(Figure 3.37.4). Tourism in Samoa showed signs of recovery from natural 
disasters in 2009, but the sector was hit by Cyclone Evan in December 
2012. The cyclone caused damage estimated at $210 million, equivalent to 
30% of GDP.
Despite a slight improvement in tourism performance, Tonga saw 
growth decelerate to 0.8% in FY2012 from 2.9% in FY2011 as major 
projects wound down. Remittances continued to fall, totaling $67 million 
in FY2012, which was equal to 15.0% of GDP. This number is down from a 
high of $107 million, or 30.0% of GDP, in FY2008 (Figure 3.37.5). 
Inflation in Tonga slowed to 4.6% in FY2012 from 6.1% in FY2011 as 
infrastructure projects wound down and weak domestic activity relieved 
pressure on domestic prices (Figure 3.37.6). These factors offset increases 
in international food and fuel prices recorded in calendar year 2011, 
which made accelerated inflation the rule elsewhere in the South Pacific. 
This chapter was written by Caroline Currie, Malie Lototele, and Laisiasa Tora of the 
South Pacific Subregional Office, ADB, Suva; Milovan Lucich of the Pacific Liaison and 
Coordination Office, ADB, Sydney; and Cara Tinio of the Pacific Department, ADB, Manila.
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In the Cook Islands, higher transport and utility costs worsened inflation 
to 2.8% during the period from 0.6%. Higher food prices in early 2012 
drove up inflation in Samoa to 6.2% from 2.9% in FY2011, and in Vanuatu 
to 1.3% from 0.8%. However, lower international price rises for food and 
fuel in the latter part of calendar year 2012 caused consumer prices to 
trend lower in the Cook Islands, Vanuatu, and Samoa, the last of which 
experienced deflation.
Public expenditures over FY2012 caused fiscal deficits across the 
South Pacific, though fiscal consolidation has narrowed budget gaps 
in some economies. In the Cook Islands, infrastructure spending 
resulted in a fiscal deficit, but at 2.2% of GDP it was well within the 
3.0% government target. As of September 2012, Vanuatu had incurred a 
deficit of 1.7% of GDP, compared with a 2.3% deficit for the whole of 2011. 
Election-related spending in Vanuatu and the introduction of subsidies 
to copra farmers fueled expenditure growth in the face of flat tax 
revenue collections and declining grants.
Fiscal consolidation has helped improve the fiscal positions of Samoa 
and Tonga. Although Samoa’s FY2012 deficit of 4.5% of GDP exceeded 
government targets, it was an improvement over the 5.3% deficit incurred 
in FY2011. During the same period, Tonga’s budget deficit narrowed to 
2.9% of GDP from 7.4% a year earlier, mainly reflecting lower personnel 
costs and capital expenditure. 
Monetary policy across the South Pacific has remained accommodative. 
Despite excess liquidity in the banking sector, the central banks of Samoa, 
Tonga, and Vanuatu have kept interest rates stable and low in a bid to 
stimulate credit growth. In addition, the National Reserve Bank of Tonga 
stopped requiring banks to pay interest on their exchange settlement 
accounts to encourage lending to the private sector. The Cook Islands has 
no central bank and uses the New Zealand dollar as its official currency.
Most South Pacific economies have continued to run current account 
deficits. Tonga’s current account deficit widened to 17.9% of GDP in 
FY2012 from 11.1% in FY2011, as imports of goods and services grew 
more quickly than exports. Samoa’s current account deficit also widened, 
to 10.8% in FY2012 from 9.2% in the previous fiscal year. In contrast, 
Vanuatu’s current account deficit narrowed slightly to 6.0% of GDP in 
2012 from 6.3% in 2011. 
Economic prospects
Public investments and tourism will continue to drive growth in the 
South Pacific in FY2013 and FY2014 (Table 3.37.1). However, except in 
Vanuatu, growth will be slower than in recent years. Growth in the 
Cook Islands is projected to slow to 3.0% in FY2013 as infrastructure 
construction winds down and public spending declines, and as 
agricultural output slumps. Growth is expected to accelerate to 3.2% 
in FY2014 on the back of expected improving economic conditions in 
Australia and New Zealand. Future growth may be constrained if tourism 
service providers do not expand facilities. In Tonga, growth is projected 
at 0.5% in FY2013 and 0.3% in FY2014. The expected slowdown reflects the 
completion of public investment projects, weak business activity, and slow 
recovery in remittances and private sector credit.
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The Samoan economy is projected to grow by only 0.9% in FY2013 as 
infrastructure damage caused by Cyclone Evan depresses output from 
agriculture, tourism, and other productive sectors. Economic recovery 
efforts, once fully in place, are expected to have a positive impact on 
GDP in FY2014, with projected growth picking up to 2%. Restoring 
productive capacity and reconstructing essential infrastructure are 
expected to take 2–3 years.
In Vanuatu, growth is expected to pick up to 3.2% in 2013 and 3.4% 
in 2014, as delayed construction projects commence implementation and 
agricultural production likely recovers. Visitor arrivals are expected to 
increase modestly as tourists avoid destinations affected by Cyclone Evan 
and travel to Vanuatu instead. 
The Cook Islands’ fiscal deficit is expected to edge up to 2.3% of GDP 
in FY2013—still within government targets—as increases in personnel 
and capital expenditures are largely offset by higher tax collections and 
grant inflows. Samoa’s fiscal deficit is forecast to increase substantially, 
to 11.8% of GDP, as the fallout from the cyclone severely depresses tax 
revenue collections and causes a spike in expenditures to restore essential 
infrastructure. Tonga’s FY2013 budget plans a small surplus of 0.2% of 
GDP, in spite of a projected current expenditure increase. This is because 
the bulk of the increases will be covered by scheduled large project grants. 
Vanuatu has yet to pass its 2013 budget because the new government has 
not submitted an appropriation bill. However, a deficit of 2.6% of GDP is 
expected for the year as expenditure growth is seen to continue to outpace 
revenue growth, which is constrained by the country’s narrow tax base. 
International food and fuel prices are projected to decline over the 
next couple of years. In line with this, inflation in the Cook Islands is 
expected to remain relatively low at 3.0% through FY2013–FY2014. Tonga’s 
inflation is seen to moderate to 2.7% in FY2013 and stabilize at that 
rate through FY2014 in light of the economy’s low growth outlook and 
international price movements.
Despite experiencing deflation in the first half of FY2013, Samoa is 
expected to see inflation remain relatively high, at 4.5% for the full fiscal 
year, as cyclone-related supply disruptions push up domestic food prices. 
Inflation is expected to slow to 4.0% in FY2014 in line with declining 
international food and fuel prices, and as the domestic distribution 
network is restored.
In Vanuatu, prices are expected to rise by 2.5% in both 2013 and 2014 
as the implementation of major construction projects and economic 
acceleration exert upward pressure on prices.
Central banks in the South Pacific are expected to retain their 
accommodative monetary policies to support economic activity. Inflation 
and international reserves are forecast to remain at acceptable levels, but 
sluggish private sector investment remains a concern. 
South Pacific economies are expected to continue running current 
account deficits in FY2013. Imports of materials for post-cyclone 
reconstruction are seen widening Samoa’s deficit to 13.4% of GDP, 
while stronger imports arising from growing domestic demand and 
construction projects funded by development partners will expand 
Vanuatu’s current account deficit to 10.0% of GDP. In contrast, the current 
account deficit in Tonga is expected to narrow to 6.3% in FY2013. Weaker 
3.37.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
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domestic demand arising from the completion of infrastructure projects 
and the slow growth outlook will depress imports.
Policy challenge—the burden of debt
Borrowing to finance development spending has worsened debt positions 
in the South Pacific. The resulting financial obligation could limit 
governments’ fiscal flexibility and resulting ability to respond to future 
economic shocks. Exchange rate fluctuations could affect countries’ 
capacity to repay debt involving large loans denominated in foreign 
currency.
Samoa’s government has borrowed heavily to repair damage wrought 
by natural disasters. As a result, the economy’s external debt reached 
45.0% of GDP in FY2012 (Figure 3.37.7). This ratio was projected to 
increase to 54.0% in FY2013, but it may turn out to be higher because 
of the impact of Cyclone Evan on agricultural and tourism output, 
and thereby on domestic revenues, which may prompt higher actual 
borrowing to finance rehabilitation. For its part, Tonga has borrowed to 
finance reconstruction following civil unrest that took place in 2006. Its 
total public debt was estimated at 45.0% of GDP in FY2012, above the 40% 
maximum recommended by the International Monetary Fund for most 
low-income countries (Figure 3.37.8). 
Most South Pacific countries plan fiscal consolidation toward reducing 
expenditure, improving fiscal balances, and easing public debt burdens. 
However, countries at high risk of debt distress must appropriately pace 
their fiscal consolidation to avoid disrupting governments’ delivery of 
basic services or inducing economic contraction. Consolidation efforts 
must be complemented by structural reform to further ease fiscal 
pressures and help promote private sector-led economic growth. For 
economies receiving budget support, maintaining the implementation of 
these measures is central to the joint policy reform matrix agreed with 
development partners.
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Small island economies
Higher fishing revenues helped boost GDP growth and fiscal positions in the otherwise import- and aid-
dependent small Pacific island economies of Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu. Australia’s reopened Regional 
Processing Centre in Nauru and externally funded projects in Kiribati and Tuvalu are expected to boost 
growth in 2013. Inflation is seen reappearing after a 3-year absence as growth accelerates and the impact 
of the stronger Australian dollar wanes. Paramount concerns are the longer-term sustainability of growth 
and intergenerational equity.
Economic performance
In 2012, inflows of development partner assistance, the positive effect 
of the El Niño weather pattern on fish stocks near the equator, and the 
introduction of a new fishing licensing scheme boosted government 
revenues and bolstered economic growth in Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu. 
Conversely, continuing declines in seafarers’ remittances stemming from 
weak global trade weighed down growth in Kiribati and Tuvalu.
Looking ashore, phosphate exports from Nauru reached 519,000 tons, 
the highest annual figure since the country recommenced production in 
2007, and contributed strongly to economic growth of 4.9% in FY2012 
(ended 30 June 2012). Expanded education and private retail services in 
Tuvalu contributed to growth of 1.2% in 2012 after 3 consecutive years of 
economic contraction. In Kiribati, development partner-funded seaport 
reconstruction and roadwork projects contributed to growth of 3.0% in 
2012 (Figure 3.38.1).
All three countries use the Australian dollar as legal tender. None 
has its own central bank or an independent monetary policy or exchange 
rate flexibility. In recent years, the appreciation of the Australian dollar 
vis-à-vis the US dollar has effectively reduced the price of imports on 
average, greatly constraining consumer inflation (Figure 3.38.2). In Kiribati, 
consumer prices are estimated to have fallen by 1.8% in 2012, the second 
year of deflation in the past 3 years. Deflation has persisted in Nauru since 
FY2010. Tuvalu recorded inflation of 0.5% in 2011 and 1.4% in 2012. These 
low rates were held down by shifting trade patterns and stiffened retail 
competition (Figure 3.38.3).
Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu are party to the Nauru Agreement, which 
recently implemented the Vessel Day Scheme, wherein fishing access and 
license fees are calculated using the number of days a foreign fishing 
vessel operates within a country’s waters. This new policy combined with 
transitory catch improvement caused by El Niño to garner governments 
additional domestic revenue that improved the small island economies’ 
fiscal positions. 
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Higher fishing fees and fish catches overturned original budget 
estimates that anticipated deteriorating fiscal balances in all three 
economies in 2012 (FY2012 for Nauru). Tuvalu posted a fiscal surplus, 
and the Kiribati and Nauru deficits were much smaller than expected, 
which at least temporarily eased perennial fiscal strains. It remains to be 
seen if higher fishing license revenues will become a permanent feature 
of government budgets. If the revenue increases are mostly attributable to 
licensing, higher collections may become permanent, but if they largely 
reflect El Niño-induced bumper catches, they can be expected to revert to 
historical levels.
Economic prospects
Infrastructure upgrades will likely be the primary drivers of growth 
over the next 2 years. The September 2012 reopening of the Regional 
Processing Centre (RPC) in Nauru for asylum seekers attempting to enter 
Australia without authorization is projected to boost economic growth to 
8% in FY2013 and FY2014 through its impact on construction, hotels and 
accommodation, restaurants, and retail trade, as well as on government 
finances. The RPC, which currently holds around 400 refugees and 
directly employs 200 Nauruans in a population of 10,086, is expanding 
to a capacity of 1,500 asylum seekers. Partial repayment of government 
salaries in arrears, equivalent to 1.3% of GDP and funded by RPC-related 
revenues, will likely boost domestic consumption.
Meanwhile, the government expects phosphate production to slow 
from 519,000 tons in FY2012 to 450,000 tons in FY2013 because of poor 
weather and disruptions caused by the RPC’s commandeering of mining 
equipment to clear land for construction (Figure 3.38.4). The phosphate 
industry employs about 700 Nauruans.
Kiribati’s economy is projected to grow by 3.5% in 2013 and 2014 as 
construction picks up to implement projects funded by development 
partners: upgrading airports at Tarawa and Kiritimati, upgrading the 
South Tarawa Road, and extending Betio Port. In Tuvalu the airport 
upgrade, also funded by development partners, and continued retail 
expansion will drive economic growth of 1.3% in 2013 and 1.5% in 2014.
The recent trend of low inflation is expected to continue. Although 
the impact of a strengthening Australian dollar has probably ended, 
international food and fuel prices are expected to decline. Over 2013 and 
2014, inflation is projected to remain at about 3% in Kiribati and 2% in 
Tuvalu. For Nauru, inflation is projected at a low 0.5% in FY2013, before 
rising to 2.5% in FY2014.
Island governments plan fiscal expansion to help support economic 
growth in the near term. In Nauru, the FY2013 budget already 
incorporates an expansionary stance supported by higher-than-expected 
revenues from fishing licenses and continued aid flows. As the reopening 
of the RPC will mean higher visa fees, fuel sales, and customs duty 
collections, the expansionary fiscal stance has been further amplified, and 
domestic expenditure will be almost double in FY2013. Fiscal expansion 
is also expected in Kiribati and Tuvalu, driven by planned increases in 
recurrent expenditures and by capital spending associated with ongoing 
infrastructure projects.
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Policy challenge—sustainability and 
intergenerational equity
Limited resources and narrow economic bases give rise to reliance on 
aid flows, which account for as much as half of GDP in some of these 
countries. The pace of resource exploitation, the sustainability of growth, 
and intergenerational equity are therefore major issues in these small 
island economies. Financial resources from sovereign investment funds 
in Kiribati and Tuvalu, and phosphate reserves in Nauru, are being 
depleted at unsustainable rates to fund current expenditures, raising 
concerns regarding the tradeoff between supporting growth now versus 
ensuring that future generations share the benefits provided by finite and 
exhaustible resources. 
The Government of Kiribati’s target for drawing down the Revenue 
Equalization Reserve Fund is A$15.0 million annually from 2013 to 2015. 
The 2012 drawdown of an estimated A$37.5 million raises concerns about 
the fund’s long-term sustainability. The real value of the fund per capita 
has been trending downward in recent years to well below the benchmark 
of A$4,500 (Figure 3.38.5).
The Tuvalu Trust Fund has languished below its target maintenance 
value since 2008 and been unable since then to transfer resources to 
the Consolidated Investment Fund, through which budget deficits are 
financed. The investment fund neared utter depletion in 2012, prompting 
an A$4 million contribution from Australia (Figure 3.38.6). 
Nauru has recently ramped up its exploitation of secondary phosphate 
reserves, digging deeper to reach a production high in FY2012. The proper 
management of phosphate wealth and of revenues from the reopening of 
the RPC will largely determine Nauru’s fiscal and economic sustainability 
over the long run. In addition to effects on local employment and 
construction, the RPC has the potential to increase visa fee revenues 
by as much as A$16 million per year when operating at full capacity. 
However, full scaling up depends on the government and landowners 
reaching agreement on the terms of the land lease for two of the three 
RPC sites. Like phosphate revenues, RPC earnings may be transitory, so 
the government could consider saving RPC-related revenues for future 
generations and investing in priority infrastructure projects and human 
capital development.
Prioritizing investments and building up savings will allow future 
generations to benefit from the current use of resources. In addition to 
equity concerns, such adjustments to fiscal policy would address issues 
affecting the sustainability of growth. Broadening the economic bases 
of these small islands through private sector development, the reform 
of state-owned enterprises, and other improvements to the business 
environment will help reduce reliance on foreign assistance and promote 
more inclusive growth over the longer term.
3.38.5  Kiribati Revenue Equalization 
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Statistical 
appendix
Statistical notes and tables
The statistical appendix presents in 18 tables selected economic indicators 
for 44 developing member economies of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and for Brunei Darussalam, an unclassified regional member. 
The economies are grouped into five subregions: Central Asia, East Asia, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Most of the tables contain 
historical data from 2008 to 2012; some have forecasts for 2013 and 2014.
The data were standardized to the degree possible to allow 
comparability over time and across economies, but differences in 
statistical methodology, definitions, coverage, and practices make full 
comparability impossible. The national income accounts section is 
based on the United Nations System of National Accounts, while the 
balance-of-payments data are based on International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) accounting standards. Historical data were obtained from official 
sources, statistical publications and databases, and documents of ADB, 
the IMF, and the World Bank. Projections for 2013 and 2014 are generally 
ADB estimates made on the basis of available quarterly or monthly data, 
although some projections are from governments.
Most countries report by calendar year. Some economies record their 
government finance data by fiscal year: Armenia; Azerbaijan; the Cook 
Islands; Hong Kong, China; Kazakhstan; the Kyrgyz Republic; the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR); Samoa; Singapore; Taipei,China; 
Tajikistan; Thailand; and Uzbekistan. The Federated States of Micronesia, 
Nauru, the Republic of Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau 
report government finance and balance-of-payments data by fiscal year. 
Myanmar, Samoa, Tonga, and countries in South Asia except for the 
Maldives and Sri Lanka report all variables by fiscal year.
Regional and subregional averages and totals are provided in seven 
tables: A1, A2, A6, A11, A12, A13, and A14. In tables A1, A2, A6, and A14, 
the averages are computed using weights derived from gross national 
income (GNI) in current United States (US) dollars following the World 
Bank Atlas method. The GNI data for 2008–2011 were obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators online. Weights for 2011 
were carried over through 2014. The GNI data for the Cook Islands were 
estimated using the Atlas conversion factor. Myanmar and Nauru have no 
GNI data. For tables A11 and A12, the regional and subregional averages 
were computed on the basis of a consistent sum, which means that if 
country data are missing for a given year, the sum of the prior year used 
for computing the growth rate excludes the corresponding country data. 
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Data for Myanmar and Nauru are excluded from the computation of all 
subregional averages and totals.
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5. These tables show related data on 
output growth, production, and demand. Changes to the national income 
accounts series for some countries have been made owing to a change 
in source, methodology, and/or base year. The series for Bhutan and 
India reflect the fiscal rather than the calendar year data, while those for 
Timor-Leste reflect gross domestic product (GDP) unrelated to oil or the 
United Nations mission. 
Table A1: Growth rate of GDP (% per year). The table shows annual 
growth rates of GDP valued at constant market prices, factor costs, or 
basic prices. GDP at market prices is the aggregation of the value added 
of all resident producers at producers’ prices including taxes less subsidies 
on imports plus all nondeductible value-added or similar taxes. Constant 
factor cost measures differ from market price measures in that they 
exclude taxes on production and include subsidies. Basic price valuation 
is the factor cost plus some taxes on production, such as property and 
payroll taxes, and less some subsidies, such as labor-related subsidies but 
not product-related subsidies. Most countries use constant market price 
valuation. Fiji, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka use constant factor costs, 
while the Maldives and Nepal use basic prices. GDP growth for 2008 is 
excluded for Nauru because of consistency issues.
Table A2: Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year). The table 
provides the growth rates of real per capita GDP, which is defined as 
GDP at constant prices divided by the population. The series for most 
of the Pacific countries were revised to reflect a change in the source of 
population data. Also shown are data on per capita gross national product 
in US dollar terms for 2011, sourced from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators online. 
Table A3: Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year). 
The table shows the growth rates of value added in agriculture and its 
corresponding share in 2011. The agriculture sector comprises agricultural 
crops, livestock, poultry, fisheries, and forestry.
Table A4: Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year). 
The table provides the growth rates of value added in industry and its 
corresponding share in 2011. This sector comprises manufacturing, 
mining and quarrying, construction, and utilities.
Table A5: Growth rate of value added in services (% per year). The 
table gives the growth rates of value added in services, as well as its 
corresponding share in 2011. Subsectors generally include trade, banking, 
finance, real estate, public administration, and other services.
Table A6: Inflation (% per year). Data on inflation rates represent 
period averages. Except for India, which reports the wholesale price 
index, the inflation rates presented are based on consumer price indexes. 
The consumer price indexes of the following countries are for a given 
city or group of consumers only: Afghanistan is for Kabul until 2010, 
Cambodia is for Phnom Penh, Marshall Islands is for Majuro, Solomon 
Islands is for Honiara, and Nepal is for urban consumers. 
Table A7: Growth in money supply (% per year). This table tracks the 
annual percentage change in the end-of-period supply of broad money as 
represented by M2 (for most countries). M2 is defined as the sum of M1 
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and quasi-money, where M1 denotes currency in circulation plus demand 
deposits and quasi-money consists of time and savings deposits including 
foreign currency deposits.
Tables A8, A9, and A10: Government finance. This set of tables refers 
to the revenue and expenditure transactions as well as the fiscal balance 
of the central government expressed as a percentage of GDP in nominal 
terms. For Cambodia since 2006, the People’s Republic of China, India, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, and Tajikistan, transactions 
are those reported by the central government, while for Turkmenistan 
data are those reported by state governments.
Table A8: Central government revenues (% of GDP). Central 
government revenues comprise all nonrepayable receipts, both current 
and capital, plus grants. These amounts are computed as a percentage of 
GDP at current prices. For the Republic of Korea, revenues exclude social 
security contributions. For Singapore, revenues refer to receipts credited 
to the three accounts listed for the previous table, including investment 
income, capital receipts, and investment adjustments. For Kazakhstan, 
revenues include transfers from the national fund. Grants are excluded 
in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; revenues 
from disinvestment are included for India; and only current revenues are 
included for Bangladesh. 
Table A9: Central government expenditures (% of GDP). Central 
government expenditures comprise all nonrepayable payments to both 
current and capital expenses, plus net lending. These amounts are 
computed as a share of GDP at current prices. For Thailand, expenditures 
refer to budgetary expenditures excluding externally financed 
expenditures and corresponding borrowing, while that for Tajikistan 
includes externally financed public investment programs. One-time 
expenditures are excluded for Pakistan.
Table A10: Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP). Fiscal 
balance is the difference between central government revenues and 
expenditures. The difference is also computed as a share of GDP at 
current prices. Data variations may arise from statistical discrepancies, 
e.g., balancing items for both central and local governments, and 
differences in the concept used in the individual computations of 
revenues and expenditures as compared with the calculation of the fiscal 
balance. For Fiji, the fiscal balance excludes total loan repayments. For 
Thailand, the fiscal balance is a cash balance composed of the budgetary 
and nonbudgetary balances. 
Tables A11, A12, A13, and A14: Balance of payments. This set of 
tables shows selected international economic transactions of countries 
as recorded in the balance of payments. These items cover annual flows, 
except that some countries show data as of a specified period only. 
Tables A11 and A12: Growth rates of merchandise exports and 
imports (% per year). The annual growth rates of exports and imports, 
in terms of merchandise goods only, are shown in these tables. Data are 
in million US dollars, primarily obtained from the balance-of-payments 
accounts of each country. Exports are reported on a free-on-board basis. 
Imports are also generally reported on a free-on-board basis, except for 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, the 
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Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, and Thailand, 
which value them on a cost, insurance, freight basis. 
Table A13: Trade balance (US$ million). The trade balance is the 
difference between merchandise exports and merchandise imports. 
Figures in this table are based on the exports and imports levels used to 
generate Tables A11 and A12.
Table A14: Current account balance (% of GDP). The current account 
balance is the sum of the balance of trade for merchandise, net trade in 
services and factor income, and net transfers. The values reported are 
divided by GDP at current prices in US dollars. In the case of Cambodia, 
the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam, official transfers are excluded from the 
current account balance. 
Table A15: Exchange rates to the US dollar (annual average). The 
annual average exchange rates of each economy are quoted in local 
currencies per US dollar. The rate for 2012 for India is for the period April 
2012–March 2013. 
Table A16: Gross international reserves (US$ million). Gross 
international reserves are defined as the US dollar value of holdings of 
foreign exchange, special drawing rights, reserve position in the IMF, 
and gold at the end of a given period. For Turkmenistan, gold is excluded 
from the computation. For the Marshall Islands and Taipei,China, this 
heading refers to foreign exchange reserves only. In some countries, 
the rubric comprises foreign assets and reserves of national monetary 
authorities and national oil funds, i.e., foreign assets of the Maldives 
Monetary Authority, net foreign reserves of the State Bank of Pakistan, 
assets of the National Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, and official external assets 
of Kiribati. The data for India are as of 15 March 2013.
Table A17: External debt outstanding (US$ million). For most 
economies, external debt outstanding—public and private—includes 
medium- and long-term debt, short-term debt, and IMF credit. For 
Cambodia, Georgia, the Lao PDR, and Tajikistan only public external 
debt is reported. For Azerbaijan, India, Kazakhstan, and Singapore the 
figures for 2012 are as of the end of September.
Table A18: Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services). 
This table generally presents the total debt service payments of each 
economy, which comprise principal repayments (excluding on short-term 
debt) and interest payments on outstanding external debt as a percentage 
of exports of goods and services. For Cambodia and the Lao PDR, 
debt service refers to external public debt only. For Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, and Viet Nam, exports of goods are used as the denominator 
in the calculation of the ratio; for the Philippines, exports of goods, 
services, and income are used as the denominator. For Bangladesh, the 
ratio represents debt service payments on medium- and long-term loans 
as a percentage of exports of goods, nonfactor services, and workers’ 
remittances, while for Azerbaijan the ratio represents public and publicly 
guaranteed external debt service payments as a percentage of exports of 
goods and nonfactor services. For India, Kazakhstan, and Singapore data 
for 2012 are as of the end of September.
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Table A1 Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
6.5 3.2 6.8 6.8 5.6 5.5 6.0
6.9 –14.1 2.2 4.7 7.2 4.5 4.6
10.8 9.3 5.0 0.1 2.2 3.1 4.8
2.3 –3.8 6.3 7.2 6.1 5.5 6.0
3.3 1.2 7.3 7.5 5.0 5.2 5.6
8.4 2.9 –0.5 6.0 –0.9 5.5 4.5
7.9 3.9 6.5 7.4 7.5 6.5 6.0
14.7 6.1 9.2 14.7 11.1 9.0 8.0
9.0 8.1 8.5 8.3 8.2 7.5 8.0
7.3 6.8 9.8 8.2 6.5 7.1 7.1
9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.8 8.2 8.0
2.1 –2.5 6.8 4.9 1.4 3.5 3.8
2.3 0.3 6.3 3.7 2.0 2.8 3.7
8.9 –1.3 6.4 17.5 12.3 16.5 14.0
0.7 –1.8 10.8 4.1 1.3 3.5 3.9
6.4 7.7 8.5 6.0 5.0 5.7 6.2
3.6 21.0 8.4 7.2 11.9 3.3 5.1
6.2 5.7 6.1 6.7 6.3 5.7 6.0
10.8 5.7 9.3 10.0 7.5 8.6 8.5
6.7 8.6 9.3 6.2 5.0 6.0 6.5
12.2 –3.6 7.1 7.0 3.4 4.3 5.5
5.8 3.9 4.3 3.8 4.6 3.5 4.2
3.7 1.7 3.1 3.0 3.7 3.6 3.5
6.0 3.5 8.0 8.2 6.4 6.8 7.2
4.4 1.4 7.9 4.7 5.5 5.4 5.7
–1.9 –1.8 2.6 2.2 1.0 1.8 2.0
6.7 0.1 6.0 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2
6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.4 6.6
7.2 7.3 7.5 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.7
4.8 –1.5 7.2 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.5
3.6 5.1 5.3 5.5 6.3 6.5 6.7
4.2 1.1 7.6 3.9 6.6 6.0 5.9
1.7 –0.8 14.8 5.2 1.3 2.6 3.7
2.5 –2.3 7.8 0.1 6.4 4.9 5.0
6.3 5.3 6.8 5.9 5.0 5.2 5.6
6.1 4.3 5.5 8.3 7.3 5.2 5.5
–3.5 1.0 –2.9 1.0 3.3 3.0 3.2
1.1 –1.3 0.1 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.3
2.8 –0.7 –0.5 3.3 3.0 3.5 3.5
–1.9 –1.5 5.6 0.8 1.9 2.3 1.5
–2.5 0.9 2.5 2.1 1.4 1.0 1.5
–18.6 0.0 3.8 4.9 8.0 8.0
–6.1 –4.6 0.3 5.8 4.0 3.0 3.5
6.6 6.0 7.4 11.1 9.2 5.5 6.0
4.3 –5.1 0.4 2.0 1.2 0.9 2.0
7.2 –1.0 6.9 10.6 5.5 4.0 4.0
14.6 12.8 9.5 10.8 10.6 10.0 10.0
1.9 3.2 3.3 2.9 0.8 0.5 0.3
11.6 –2.3 –1.4 –0.6 1.2 1.3 1.5
6.5 3.3 1.6 1.4 2.0 3.2 3.4
6.7 6.1 9.2 7.3 6.1 6.6 6.7
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Table A2 Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Per capita GNP, 
US$, 2011
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
5.1 1.4 5.3 5.2 4.3 4.0 4.8 ...
6.7 –14.4 1.9 4.3 6.8 4.2 4.3 3,360
9.6 7.1 3.8 –1.1 0.8 1.8 4.3 5,290
2.6 –3.9 5.0 6.4 6.8 4.8 6.0 2,860
1.8 –0.7 5.5 5.9 3.5 3.7 4.1 8,260
6.8 0.7 –1.6 4.6 –2.9 3.9 2.9 880
5.6 1.8 5.5 7.4 4.7 4.9 4.4 870
12.8 4.2 9.2 12.8 9.3 7.2 6.2 4,800
7.3 6.3 6.8 5.3 7.5 5.3 6.6 1,510
6.8 6.3 9.3 7.7 6.1 6.7 6.7 ...
9.0 8.7 9.9 8.8 7.3 7.7 7.5 4,940
1.5 –2.7 6.0 4.1 0.5 2.8 3.1 36,010
2.0 0.0 6.0 3.4 1.8 2.6 3.6 20,870
7.1 –3.1 4.5 15.5 11.0 15.0 12.5 2,310
0.4 –2.2 10.6 4.0 1.1 3.3 3.7 20,200
4.8 6.2 6.9 4.5 3.7 4.3 4.7 ...
1.5 18.6 6.3 5.2 9.7 1.3 3.0 470
4.8 4.4 4.7 4.1 5.0 4.3 4.6 780
8.7 3.8 7.3 8.1 5.7 6.7 6.7 2,130
5.2 7.1 7.8 4.8 3.7 4.7 5.2 1,410
10.5 –5.2 5.3 5.3 1.7 2.6 3.7 5,720
4.6 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.2 2.1 2.8 540
1.5 –0.4 0.9 0.9 1.6 2.2 1.7 1,120
4.9 2.4 7.0 7.1 9.2 2.6 3.0 2,580
2.5 0.1 5.8 2.8 4.6 4.2 4.5 ...
–3.2 –3.1 0.8 0.5 –0.6 0.3 0.5 31,800
3.2 –1.4 4.8 5.2 5.7 5.0 5.8 820
4.7 3.3 3.4 3.6 6.0 5.4 5.6 2,940
4.9 5.0 5.3 5.7 6.5 5.9 6.1 1,130
3.5 –2.8 4.6 3.7 4.3 4.0 4.2 8,770
2.0 3.8 3.2 3.4 4.2 4.4 4.6 ...
2.0 0.5 6.1 1.9 4.8 4.3 4.3 2,210
–3.5 –3.7 12.8 3.0 –1.1 0.4 1.5 42,930
1.6 –3.1 7.2 –0.4 5.9 4.4 4.5 4,440
5.2 4.2 5.7 4.8 4.0 4.1 4.5 1,270
4.2 2.6 3.6 6.4 5.4 3.0 3.3 ...
–3.9 0.7 –3.2 0.6 3.0 1.7 ... ...
0.4 –1.9 –0.6 1.4 1.9 1.5 1.8 3,720
0.9 –2.5 –3.9 –0.3 1.4 1.9 1.9 2,030
–3.4 –1.8 4.9 –0.2 0.9 1.3 0.6 3,910
–2.0 1.5 3.2 2.7 1.9 1.5 1.9 2,860
... –19.8 0.5 –0.7 4.9 8.0 8.0 ...
–6.6 –5.2 –0.3 5.2 3.4 2.4 2.8 6,510
4.3 3.8 5.1 8.7 6.9 3.3 3.7 1,480
3.9 –5.5 0.1 1.8 1.0 0.7 1.8 3,160
2.9 –3.3 4.5 7.9 3.2 1.6 1.5 1,110
11.9 10.1 6.8 8.2 8.0 5.5 5.5 2,730
1.3 2.9 3.0 2.6 0.6 0.2 0.0 3,820
12.5 –2.8 –1.9 –1.1 0.7 0.8 1.0 4,950
4.1 1.1 –0.8 –0.9 –0.3 0.9 1.1 2,750
5.8 5.2 8.3 6.4 5.4 5.8 6.0 ...
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Table A3 Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Sector Share, 2010, % 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
3.3 6.0 –16.0 13.6 9.3 20.7
6.1 3.5 –2.2 –8.0 3.7 5.4
–4.4 –6.8 –4.8 8.0 –3.3 10.4
–6.1 13.5 –11.6 26.5 –17.8 6.1
0.9 6.7 –2.6 1.9 1.2 18.7
7.8 10.5 6.8 7.9 10.4 ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
4.7 5.7 6.8 6.6 7.0 31.2
5.4 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.5 7.8
–17.0 –4.6 3.8 0.8 –0.7 0.1
5.6 3.2 –4.4 –2.1 –0.6 2.9
4.7 3.6 –16.6 –0.5 21.3 16.6
0.1 –3.0 1.7 7.2 –5.8 1.4
–14.9 44.6 –6.4 –7.9 31.5 20.0
3.2 4.1 5.2 5.1 2.5 20.0
0.8 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.8 14.4
0.1 0.8 7.9 3.6 1.8 14.1
–3.4 –2.5 –0.9 1.1 4.9 3.3
5.8 3.0 2.0 4.5 4.9 35.1
1.0 4.0 0.6 2.4 3.1 21.2
7.5 3.2 7.0 1.4 5.8 11.2
3.8 5.6 –5.8 4.6 ... 1.1
5.7 5.4 4.0 3.1 4.0 28.3
4.8 4.0 3.0 3.4 4.0 12.8
2.5 2.4 2.0 1.8 2.5 29.4
3.8 0.1 2.4 5.9 0.8 7.8
5.6 5.6 4.7 ... ... ...
3.2 –0.7 –0.2 2.7 2.7 11.5
–4.6 3.1 3.9 3.2 1.2 0.0
4.2 1.3 –2.3 4.1 3.1 8.6
4.7 1.8 2.8 4.5 2.7 16.2
–9.9 7.2 1.5 –6.6 ... 5.5
5.0 –13.0 –4.1 11.5 ... 13.4
15.0 –8.2 –2.5 5.7 ... 23.8
–1.8 12.7 24.3 4.8  ... 12.9
–0.2 –0.9 0.7 4.5 ... 26.3
1.7 1.7 ... ... ... ...
–7.1 6.0 ... ... ... ...
4.3 0.7 2.9 8.6 0.2 32.7
2.4 –10.8 –3.2 –1.4 –5.1 9.5
10.5 –1.3 ... ... ... ...
7.6 8.5 –2.1 0.0 0.0 ...
–5.3 –1.4 0.5 2.0 0.5 18.9
–0.6 0.7 2.2 0.5 ... 20.1
2.6 0.7 4.8 5.9 ... 22.2
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Table A4 Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Sector Share, 2010, % 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
7.8 –29.6 5.8 1.0 3.5 35.6
9.7 10.6 4.4 3.4 –1.9 65.6
–3.9 –3.5 9.1 9.4 9.9 27.2
2.6 1.4 7.2 3.4 1.2 38.6
14.0 –0.3 2.5 7.0 –13.8 29.5
–8.9 –6.5 9.7 5.9 10.4 ...
6.5 9.7 8.3 6.7 8.0 35.0
9.9 9.9 12.3 10.3 8.1 59.9
1.8 –5.1 7.6 8.8 5.6 7.2
2.0 –0.6 10.7 5.1 1.7 40.0
–0.8 –0.4 4.3 9.1 10.1 31.7
0.2 –4.1 23.1 5.7 0.9 36.3
5.7 6.1 6.3 9.8 7.2 26.6
6.8 6.5 6.5 8.2 9.5 30.4
20.4 4.8 8.2 8.1 8.8 45.2
4.4 9.2 9.2 3.5 3.1 27.5
9.5 –26.1 4.3 14.6 14.0 15.4
1.7 –0.6 4.0 2.9 1.7 15.3
1.4 –0.1 6.1 0.7 3.4 25.5
5.9 4.2 8.4 10.3 10.3 29.3
–5.4 –5.0 1.7 0.9 ... 51.9
4.0 –9.5 13.6 14.5 9.2 30.6
3.7 3.6 4.9 5.3 5.2 40.7
10.2 17.4 14.5 14.2 13.7 28.6
0.1 –7.2 8.0 2.0 5.1 37.4
18.0 17.7 18.6 ... ... ...
4.8 –1.9 11.6 2.3 6.5 32.1
–1.5 –1.3 24.7 7.4 1.2 33.5
3.2 –5.0 12.8 –3.9 7.2 46.8
6.0 5.5 7.7 5.5 4.5 41.8
2.5 –2.2 –8.7 8.7 ... 9.4
–1.4 –0.4 5.7 1.4 ... 18.7
–25.2 21.3 –9.9 11.8 ... 8.6
3.3 –7.4 –6.2 –6.4 ... 9.7
7.6 36.3 16.2 12.8 ... 8.9
404.9 –41.1 ... ... ... ...
–30.7 –11.6 ... ... ... ...
7.0 8.1 10.8 13.0 15.9 35.9
5.9 –15.7 2.7 1.0 2.7 27.5
13.0 1.3 ... ... ... ... 
24.7 13.8 11.1 ... ... ...
0.7 12.9 11.6 5.5 1.2 21.2
81.9 –14.4 –6.9 –28.7 ... 12.1
27.5 27.6 12.6 –20.9 ... 9.4
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Table A5 Growth rate of value added in services (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Sector Share, 2010, % 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
5.0 –3.6 4.6 5.9 8.4 43.7
14.0 9.1 7.2 –2.1 9.9 29.0
7.4 –3.4 7.8 5.7 5.8 62.4
4.3 –1.1 7.1 9.0 9.8 55.3
11.0 2.3 –1.1 6.9 6.2 51.8
12.0 9.5 4.6 13.5 14.5 ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
15.3 9.3 11.6 12.7 10.4 33.7
10.4 9.6 9.8 9.4 8.1 32.3
2.4 –1.7 7.0 5.2 2.0 92.7
2.8 1.1 3.9 2.6 2.5 57.1
16.6 0.8 9.8 16.8 13.4 51.8
1.3 –0.2 4.8 3.1 1.0 62.3
13.8 17.2 18.1 12.7 7.3 53.3
6.5 6.3 6.5 6.2 6.1 49.6
5.4 9.1 12.7 13.8 9.0 40.4
10.0 10.5 9.8 8.2 6.6 58.4
13.5 1.7 8.0 6.0 1.4 81.3
7.3 6.0 5.8 3.6 5.1 49.6
6.0 1.7 2.6 4.4 4.0 53.4
5.6 3.3 8.0 8.6 4.6 59.5
2.6 2.1 3.8 3.7 ... 47.0
9.0 2.3 3.3 5.0 8.0 41.1
8.7 5.8 8.4 8.5 7.7 46.5
9.5 6.2 8.0 8.5 8.0 41.9
8.6 2.9 7.2 7.0 6.4 54.8
11.6 12.2 11.6 ... ... ...
4.0 3.4 7.2 5.1 7.4 56.4
4.5 –0.7 10.7 4.4 1.2 66.5
1.3 –0.2 4.6 3.8 6.2 44.5
7.4 6.6 7.5 7.0 6.4 42.0
–2.9 2.4 –2.5 0.4 ... 85.2
0.9 0.9 –0.5 0.3 ... 67.9
5.4 1.1 1.4 –1.2 ... 67.6
–2.4 –0.5 3.2 0.9 ... 77.4
–3.5 –1.5 1.6 0.2 ... 64.9
32.8 1.0 ... ... ... ...
–1.9 –1.8 ... ... ... ...
8.6 9.7 8.5 11.5 10.1 31.4
3.9 1.5 0.0 3.0 1.5 64.3
1.3 –1.3 ... ... ... ...
18.2 13.2 12.9 ... ... ...
4.1 0.8 1.0 1.8 0.5 59.9
3.1 3.5 2.5 6.4 ... 67.8
5.0 3.3 3.1 3.6 ... 68.4
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Table A6 Inflation (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
16.4 5.9 7.0 8.9 5.3 6.7 6.7
9.0 3.4 8.2 7.7 2.6 3.6 3.2
20.8 1.5 5.7 7.9 1.1 6.0 7.0
10.0 1.7 7.1 8.5 –0.9 3.0 4.0
17.0 7.3 7.1 8.3 5.1 6.7 6.5
24.5 6.8 7.8 16.6 2.8 7.5 5.5
20.4 6.5 6.5 12.5 5.8 6.5 7.0
14.5 –2.7 4.4 5.3 5.3 6.0 6.5
12.7 14.1 9.4 13.1 12.9 9.5 9.0
5.5 –0.1 3.1 5.0 2.6 3.1 3.3
5.9 –0.7 3.3 5.4 2.6 3.2 3.5
4.3 0.6 2.3 5.3 4.1 3.9 4.3
4.7 2.8 3.0 4.0 2.2 2.5 2.8
28.0 7.6 10.1 9.1 14.3 13.0 10.0
3.5 –0.9 1.0 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.8
8.0 5.6 9.4 9.3 8.0 7.4 7.1
26.8 –12.2 7.7 11.8 6.2 6.1 5.8
9.9 6.7 7.3 8.8 10.6 7.8 7.0
6.4 7.1 4.8 8.6 10.2 9.3 7.4
8.1 3.8 9.6 8.9 7.5 7.2 6.8
12.0 4.5 6.1 11.3 10.9 9.3 8.5
7.7 12.6 9.6 9.6 8.3 10.5 9.0
12.0 20.8 10.1 13.7 11.0 9.0 9.5
–20.8 3.5 6.2 6.7 7.6 7.5 6.5
8.5 2.6 4.1 5.5 3.9 4.2 4.1
2.1 1.0 0.4 2.0 0.5 1.0 1.2
25.0 –0.7 4.0 5.5 2.9 3.0 3.5
9.8 4.8 5.1 5.4 4.3 5.2 4.7
7.6 0.0 6.0 7.6 4.3 5.5 5.0
 5.4 0.6 1.7 3.2 1.7 2.2 3.0
 22.5 2.3 8.2 2.8 3.5 5.1 5.1
8.3 4.1 3.9 4.6 3.2 3.6 3.8
6.6 0.6 2.8 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.0
5.4 –0.9 3.3 3.8 3.0 3.2 3.1
23.0 6.9 9.2 18.6 9.2 7.5 8.2
9.3 5.4 5.1 8.5 5.3 6.1 6.3
4.3 10.3 1.8 0.6 2.8 3.0 3.0
7.8 3.7 5.5 8.7 4.3 4.5 4.0
11.0 8.4 –2.8 1.2 –1.8 3.0 3.0
14.7 0.5 1.8 5.4 5.7 4.5 3.5
6.6 7.8 6.3 4.7 5.6 4.5 3.5
1.0 21.2 –0.6 –3.5 –0.5 0.5 2.5
10.0 4.7 1.1 2.6 6.0 5.5 5.5
10.8 6.9 6.0 8.4 4.1 6.5 7.5
6.3 14.6 –0.2 2.9 6.2 4.5 4.0
17.4 7.1 1.0 7.4 5.9 4.5 4.5
7.6 –0.0 5.6 13.1 10.9 9.0 7.7
9.5 6.0 5.1 6.1 4.6 2.7 2.7
4.7 –5.5 –1.9 0.5 1.4 2.0 2.0
4.8 4.3 2.8 0.8 1.4 2.5 2.5
6.6 1.4 4.4 5.9 3.7 4.0 4.2
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Table A7 Change in money supply (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor–Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
2.4 15.1 11.8 23.7 19.5
44.0 –0.3 24.3 32.1 20.7
6.9 8.2 33.1 14.5 11.4
35.4 19.5 13.3 15.0 7.9
12.6 17.9 21.1 14.9 23.8
6.3 39.6 26.2 44.2 23.2
62.8 10.9 43.4 36.3 16.6
38.7 40.9 52.4 32.3 25.0
17.8 27.6 19.7 13.6 13.8
2.6 5.3 8.1 12.9 11.1
12.0 9.9 6.0 5.5 4.8
–5.5 26.9 62.5 37.0 18.8
7.2 5.8 5.4 4.8 3.5
27.0 33.1 26.9 21.3 9.3
17.6 19.2 22.4 21.3 17.4
2.3 24.6 30.1 21.2 –1.0
19.3 16.8 16.0 13.2 12.3
21.8 14.4 14.6 20.0 5.0
25.2 27.0 30.5 12.3 22.7
15.3 9.6 12.5 15.9 14.1
8.5 18.6 15.8 19.1 17.6
21.6 –16.8 9.4 14.5 ...
4.8 36.8 20.0 21.5 20.9
14.9 13.0 15.4 16.4 14.9
18.3 31.3 38.9 29.2 31.0
13.4 9.5 7.2 14.6 9.6
23.4 34.8 36.3 26.3 28.6
15.6 8.3 10.6 6.3 10.6
12.0 11.3 8.6 10.0 7.2
9.2 6.8 10.9 15.1 10.3
20.3 29.0 33.3 12.1 22.4
4.0 65.9 –2.3 –13.4 ...
–5.4 7.4 4.2 14.8 6.3
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
7.8 21.9 10.0 17.6 6.4
5.8 9.1 7.1 –4.0 –6.4
8.0 16.8 16.6 15.6 ...
34.1 29.6 18.2 9.3 26.2
8.4 –1.9 5.1 2.7 ...
... ... ... ... ...
13.2 0.5 –6.0 1.3 –0.6
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Table A8 Central government revenues (% of GDP)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
22.0 22.0 22.6 23.3 23.6
26.8 29.0 26.9 30.1 32.0
30.7 29.3 28.3 28.2 28.9
25.1 20.6 19.7 19.5 19.3
29.9 32.2 30.5 27.2 28.6
22.0 23.4 23.2 24.9 26.5
20.9 20.4 16.1 18.9 20.5
34.5 33.8 32.5 31.8 30.8
19.5 20.1 20.7 22.0 22.6
18.5 19.2 21.2 22.6 21.8
21.2 20.4 19.1 19.9 21.6
33.1 30.3 37.1 40.3 35.6
13.0 12.4 11.1 12.2 12.3
17.5 20.6 22.0 20.6 25.0
11.1 10.4 10.9 11.7 12.6
35.2 40.4 46.4 35.6 35.8
19.9 19.1 21.0 20.1 21.3
30.8 22.6 24.0 31.5 28.1
15.4 16.7 18.1 17.8 18.3
14.6 14.5 14.0 12.5 12.4
15.6 15.0 14.9 14.5 14.2
60.2 39.4 51.9 46.8 ...
13.3 11.9 13.2 13.2 14.5
19.8 15.1 15.4 16.3 16.2
14.4 14.9 15.7 16.4 17.7
20.8 22.3 20.1 21.0 22.1
13.5 11.7 13.0 13.0 19.8
15.6 14.0 13.4 14.0 14.5
16.8 16.9 16.9 17.7 18.2
16.9 16.8 17.6 17.8 19.1
29.3 28.1 30.1 26.6 25.1
32.1 33.7 29.0 28.7 41.6
25.1 24.7 24.9 26.8 ...
69.3 79.0 81.5 82.9 74.1
70.1 69.2 66.9 63.7 60.8
57.3 65.9 68.2 65.8 65.2
61.7 80.7 49.5 62.1 85.3
39.5 40.4 43.0 37.1 37.5
32.2 29.3 31.0 30.1 30.8
31.2 34.5 36.2 37.5 34.3
33.6 34.1 34.1 43.3 40.3
381.6 275.5 308.4 354.4 276.7
25.9 32.3 27.0 26.3 27.0
74.6 83.2 69.9 82.7 88.0
27.0 25.9 24.0 21.6 ...
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Table A9 Central government expenditures (% of GDP)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
22.7 29.6 27.6 26.1 25.1
26.6 29.7 27.7 29.6 31.7
37.0 38.4 34.9 31.8 31.9
27.2 23.5 22.1 21.5 22.3
29.3 36.1 36.6 31.9 35.2
27.0 28.6 26.1 27.0 26.4
10.9 13.4 14.1 15.2 14.5
33.2 34.2 32.8 33.3 31.5
19.9 22.4 22.4 23.1 24.2
18.5 17.6 17.0 18.9 18.7
22.9 25.2 21.7 22.2 24.5
37.6 35.5 36.6 45.1 43.3
13.9 16.0 14.1 14.1 14.0
21.7 22.1 21.1 21.2 25.1
15.8 14.3 14.6 16.1 17.6
34.4 38.6 44.7 37.8 39.9
28.3 28.5 27.5 28.1 28.3
42.0 43.1 39.6 39.0 40.4
17.4 20.0 20.0 20.2 20.4
22.2 19.9 20.3 19.2 21.0
22.6 24.9 22.8 21.4 20.4
30.0 33.4 27.2 23.3 ...
15.9 20.5 21.3 20.7 19.7
19.9 16.7 16.2 17.4 18.0
20.2 20.7 24.6 24.4 25.6
25.4 28.9 25.5 25.9 26.6
16.0 16.9 18.4 16.9 25.3
16.5 17.7 16.9 16.0 16.8
16.8 17.2 16.6 16.5 17.1
18.3 18.8 16.9 16.2 20.5
32.4 37.4 37.4 31.6 32.0
28.8 35.9 28.8 28.0 43.7
29.0 33.4 30.7 35.7 ...
88.9 91.8 92.0 97.1 94.2
61.0 61.4 54.7 60.0 61.9
59.0 64.3 67.7 65.2 64.0
71.8 80.4 43.5 61.4 86.5
43.2 46.5 44.5 40.6 40.7
34.4 28.7 30.3 27.8 32.0
32.6 37.6 42.8 42.7 38.8
39.6 50.2 32.8 38.2 42.2
110.8 104.7 116.9 112.3 139.7
22.9 33.2 32.3 33.7 29.9
74.3 91.9 99.3 90.0 80.4
24.8 24.9 26.0 23.9 ...
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Table A10 Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu –
... = data not available.
–0.7 –7.6 –5.0 –2.8 –1.5
0.2 –0.7 –0.9 0.6 0.3
–6.3 –9.2 –6.6 –3.6 –3.0
–2.1 –2.9 –2.4 –2.1 –3.0
0.0 –3.7 –6.3 –4.8 –6.6
–5.5 –5.4 –3.7 –2.5 0.1
10.0 7.0 2.0 3.6 6.0
4.5 0.6 1.8 –1.5 –0.7
–0.4 –2.3 –1.7 –1.1 –1.6
0.1 1.6 4.2 3.7 3.2
–1.7 –4.8 –2.6 –2.2 –2.9
–4.5 –5.2 0.5 –4.8 –7.7
–0.8 –3.5 –3.0 –1.9 –1.6
–4.1 –1.6 0.9 –0.6 0.0
–4.7 –3.9 –3.7 –4.4 –5.1
0.8 1.9 1.6 –2.1 –4.0
–8.4 –9.3 –6.5 –7.9 –6.9
–11.2 –20.5 –15.6 –7.5 –12.3
–2.1 –3.3 –1.9 –2.4 –2.2
–7.6 –5.3 –6.3 –6.6 –8.5
–7.0 –9.9 –8.0 –6.9 –6.2
30.2 6.0 24.7 23.6 ...
–2.7 –8.6 –8.1 –7.5 –5.2
–0.1 –1.6 –0.7 –1.1 –1.8
–5.9 –5.8 –8.9 –7.9 –7.9
–4.6 –6.7 –5.4 –4.8 –4.5
–2.5 –5.2 –5.4 –3.9 –5.4
–0.9 –3.7 –3.5 –2.0 –2.3
0.1 –0.3 0.3 1.2 1.1
–1.3 –4.8 –2.7 –1.3 –4.1
–3.1 –9.3 –7.3 –5.0 –6.9
3.3 –2.2 0.2 0.7 –2.2
0.5 –4.0 –2.1 –1.4 –1.6
–19.6 –12.8 –10.6 –14.2 –20.0
3.4 1.3 4.5 3.7 –1.1
–1.7 1.6 0.5 0.6 1.2
–10.1 0.3 6.0 0.6 –1.2
–3.7 –6.1 –1.4 –3.5 –3.2
–2.2 0.6 0.7 2.3 –1.2
–1.5 –3.1 –6.6 –5.3 –4.5
–6.1 –16.1 1.4 5.1 –1.9
270.7 170.8 191.6 242.1 136.9
3.0 –0.9 –5.3 –7.4 –2.9
–0.7 –3.1 –30.0 –4.6 7.6
2.1 1.0 –2.0 –2.3 ...
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Table A11 Growth rate of merchandise exports (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
42.6 –32.1 28.4 38.7 3.6 4.4 4.6
–7.1 –32.7 57.0 34.4 7.0 8.5 9.0
43.8 –31.0 25.5 30.3 –4.1 –2.3 2.2
16.3 –22.0 30.0 32.2 8.1 11.5 14.8
48.9 –39.0 40.2 43.7 4.4 5.0 5.0
40.1 –9.6 5.0 27.7 –13.1 20.0 15.0
–4.2 –28.2 18.3 5.2 8.2 8.5 7.5
29.3 –24.1 8.0 46.9 19.3 8.0 7.0
40.5 –4.2 4.7 31.3 2.2 6.9 –1.0
13.4 –16.0 30.0 18.3 5.4 9.2 9.4
17.6 –16.1 31.4 20.4 8.0 10.0 9.0
7.3 –10.8 22.8 12.5 6.4 9.8 10.8
11.6 –17.6 28.8 19.6 0.1 7.5 10.5
30.1 –25.6 54.3 65.6 –9.0 34.3 35.8
3.4 –20.2 34.6 12.1 –2.4 5.5 8.0
14.2 –3.3 31.1 24.6 –3.4 7.1 14.2
34.4 2.1 12.3 –4.7 –3.0 –2.4 3.0
17.4 10.1 4.2 39.2 6.2 6.0 8.0
4.4 –13.8 5.5 22.2 –10.6 –36.6 –30.8
13.7 –3.5 37.3 23.7 –4.0 8.0 16.0
46.0 –49.0 16.8 75.4 –4.8 6.3 3.9
9.3 –4.7 –6.3 11.7 5.7 0.2 5.5
18.2 –6.4 2.9 28.9 –2.8 1.0 3.5
6.2 –12.7 21.0 23.2 –7.4 4.0 5.0
12.1 –15.1 30.7 15.1 4.4 6.6 9.6
40.4 –33.0 29.8 32.5 1.5 2.2 3.2
7.6 –14.2 29.7 34.4 11.4 13.0 17.0
18.3 –14.3 32.1 27.0 –6.3 7.0 12.1
21.8 –5.5 44.4 42.0 9.0 14.0 13.9
13.0 –21.1 26.6 14.6 –0.0 2.0 7.0
12.3 –1.4 25.8 13.3 11.2 14.1 17.5
–2.5 –22.1 34.9 –6.3 8.5 9.1 10.3
6.7 –14.2 31.4 6.9 6.0 4.0 8.0
15.9 –13.9 27.1 14.3 3.2 10.0 11.0
29.1 –8.9 26.5 34.2 18.2 16.0 12.0
21.7 –24.4 31.7 24.6 –30.7 – –
83.5 –16.2 11.3 –2.3 –24.8
20.4 –32.1 38.9 29.0 5.1
–23.2 –26.7 52.4 22.9 9.3 6.2 5.8
10.4 2.7 55.2 55.2
5.4 –8.8 17.2 37.9 6.9 8.8
– –31.4
12.4 –34.6 –13.3 –5.6 4.4
21.4 –23.9 30.9 21.8 –36.7 33.7 20.0
–18.8 –1.3 13.8 –13.9 –6.1
27.6 –21.4 35.6 84.6
0.0 –31.5 163.1 –18.5 0.0 22.7
–9.6 –32.4 –8.1 38.0 7.3 6.0 8.1
35.4 –18.2 –2.4 53.0 9.4
41.6 33.2 –8.4 24.6
13.9 –15.6 30.2 18.5 4.4 8.3 9.7
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Table A12 Growth rate of merchandise imports (% per year)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
24.8 –16.4 6.8 27.5 14.2 12.7 5.8
35.0 –25.0 13.4 14.0 1.7 6.5 5.0
25.3 –14.0 3.6 50.7 –3.6 45.9 –12.6
25.6 –31.4 17.7 33.6 15.0 7.0 7.5
15.6 –24.7 13.6 23.2 16.5 10.0 10.0
43.6 –25.0 5.9 32.0 26.2 15.0 15.0
33.2 –21.4 3.5 19.9 18.6 9.0 6.5
41.9 50.5 –8.0 28.8 24.4 5.0 6.0
48.5 –2.7 –6.8 26.5 11.4 9.1 4.2
16.6 –15.4 36.0 22.1 3.4 9.0 9.8
18.8 –11.2 39.1 25.1 4.4 9.0 9.0
8.6 –7.9 27.1 15.4 9.4 10.9 11.1
21.9 –25.4 31.5 23.4 –1.1 8.0 11.0
57.4 –34.1 49.7 106.2 2.1 15.0 15.0
9.4 –26.9 43.1 12.9 –3.6 7.0 10.0
21.1 –3.8 –73.7 30.3 0.1 5.3 12.4
14.7 –0.8 11.6 3.6 8.7 6.3 2.8
25.6 4.2 5.4 41.8 5.4 –2.0 6.0
27.4 –9.6 39.0 40.5 –9.5 –20.5 –14.9
19.8 –2.6 26.7 31.1 –1.0 6.0 14.0
26.4 –34.4 14.8 38.9 3.1 6.6 1.7
24.1 8.3 35.5 8.9 4.7 18.7 13.7
31.2 –10.3 –1.7 14.9 11.9 0.0 2.2
24.7 –27.6 31.8 50.7 –5.8 6.0 10.0
18.4 –21.7 32.8 15.4 6.6 7.6 10.3
44.1 –20.3 2.0 19.3 20.5 25.0 28.5
12.4 –11.6 21.7 22.8 17.1 11.0 13.0
36.9 –24.0 43.7 30.3 8.3 6.7 11.2
31.5 2.0 23.5 29.7 16.8 15.2 19.5
6.6 –20.6 34.0 14.3 4.3 3.0 7.0
25.6 1.9 15.8 24.4 22.0 15.0 17.0
5.6 –24.0 32.9 2.4 5.1 9.4 10.9
15.1 –19.1 30.3 8.2 9.5 6.0 9.0
26.7 –25.1 37.0 24.9 7.8 11.0 12.5
27.9 –14.3 19.6 25.8 7.5 15.0 13.0
19.8 –16.1 20.7 22.3 –10.8 – –
–0.1 –27.9 –4.5 26.8 10.0
20.8 –37.3 24.7 23.6 2.2
5.3 –9.6 20.4 18.7 14.2 0.4 –2.1
2.4 4.8 41.1 –10.8
14.4 2.9 4.3 9.1 1.0 0.6
–1.3 11.0
21.1 –28.6 8.2 23.6 0.2
18.6 –8.1 23.0 21.5 –23.1 52.3 2.6
9.9 –8.0 14.1 2.5 –11.5
6.5 –14.1 50.8 15.4
61.7 9.9 2.8 87.3 15.0 13.0
37.8 –13.2 –4.8 16.9 21.0 0.1 3.9
63.2 –18.7 35.4 18.7 –6.9 –8.0
38.9 –1.9 1.9 1.0
17.7 –15.7 –10.2 21.6 3.9 8.3 10.1
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Table A13 Trade balance (US$ million)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Total
... = data not available.
54,920 25,245 46,345 72,063 65,315 59,889 61,190
–2,664 –2,081 –2,033 –2,078 –2,030 –2,128 –2,161
23,012 14,583 19,730 24,328 23,270 18,000 20,500
–3,833 –2,399 –2,590 –3,494 –4,246 –4,385 –4,427
33,519 14,969 28,670 47,925 45,156 45,053 44,709
–1,879 –1,120 –1,202 –1,665 –2,993 –3,344 –3,845
–1,863 –1,559 –1,463 –1,930 –2,419 –2,643 –2,800
6,423 875 2,232 4,622 5,026 5,785 6,315
2,205 1,976 3,000 4,354 3,550 3,550 2,900
408,594 330,269 322,848 292,680 367,147 407,922 435,210
360,646 249,511 254,179 243,549 323,100 372,749 406,296
25,010 12,592 2,365 –8,596 –22,672 –30,000 –35,000
5,170 37,866 40,083 31,660 38,338 38,642 39,922
–710 –252 –292 –1,781 –2,354 –1,859 –913
18,478 30,553 26,513 27,848 30,735 28,390 24,904
–156,079 –148,752 –164,662 –231,609 –245,022 –251,269 –275,760
–6,480 –6,355 –7,070 –7,559 –8,530 –9,298 –9,549
–5,330 –4,710 –5,155 –7,744 –7,995 –5,928 –5,775
–72 –90 –299 –519 –477 –474 –464
–119,519 –118,202 –130,593 –189,759 –197,155 –203,036 –225,038
–1,318 –913 –1,044 –1,379 –1,449 –1,546 –1,565
–2,410 –2,733 –4,084 –4,422 –4,623 –5,672 –6,529
–14,970 –12,627 –11,536 –10,516 –15,481 –15,247 –15,258
–5,980 –3,122 –4,881 –9,710 –9,313 –10,067 –11,582
113,548 140,255 160,857 160,904 118,627 111,999 111,826
7,879 4,914 7,011 9,595 9,211 8,651 7,870
–1,584 –1,494 –1,582 –1,490 –2,043 –2,152 –2,169
22,916 30,932 30,627 34,783 8,417 9,545 12,426
–1,228 –1,372 –1,378 –1,516 –2,014 –2,361 –3,040
51,501 39,928 41,826 48,389 40,544 39,485 42,249
303 72 796 –10 –1,112 –1,376 –1,541
–12,885 –8,842 –10,966 –15,652 –14,818 –16,350 –18,471
42,080 51,105 69,907 70,267 62,221 57,052 57,557
17,348 32,620 29,751 16,989 8,337 6,992 4,135
–12,783 –7,607 –5,136 –450 9,884 12,512 12,810
139 –457 32 197 –1,299 –318 1,556
–108 –78 –74 –95 –105
–1,106 –647 –723 –849 –838
–65 –60 –71 –83 –96 –95 –92
–70 –74 –101 –69 –69 –68
–122 –128 –131 –134 –133 –130 –129
6 –8
–118 –85 –93 –118 –117
2,655 1,524 2,221 2,712 1,132 901 1,956
–238 –218 –249 –257 –227
–68 –74 –137 –3
–261 –295 –280 –565 –654 –736
–145 –128 –123 –142 –173 –172 –179
–15 –13 –17 –20 –19 –17
–201 –182 –191 –181
421,121 346,559 365,418 294,235 304,767 328,223 334,023
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Table A14 Balance of payments on current account (% of GDP)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
8.1 0.4 4.9 8.1 5.3 3.1 4.5
–11.8 –15.8 –14.8 –10.9 –10.4 –9.8 –9.1
33.7 23.0 28.4 25.7 22.6 13.0 17.0
–22.8 –11.2 –10.2 –12.8 –13.5 –11.9 –10.7
4.7 –3.6 1.2 7.2 4.3 2.5 4.0
–13.7 –2.2 –7.2 –6.1 –20.9 –7.0 –5.0
–7.6 –5.9 2.1 –2.3 –3.5 –5.0 –4.8
16.5 –14.7 –10.6 2.0 1.5 2.0 3.0
8.9 2.2 6.6 8.1 4.7 4.3 3.2
7.7 5.3 4.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.8
9.3 4.9 4.0 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.1
15.0 9.5 6.6 4.8 1.1 4.0 5.0
0.3 3.9 2.9 2.3 3.8 3.0 2.5
–12.3 –7.5 –14.3 –31.5 –31.3 –22.0 –15.0
6.9 11.4 9.3 8.9 10.5 11.0 12.0
–3.0 –2.7 –2.2 –3.5 –4.3 –3.7 –3.2
0.9 –2.8 3.9 3.0 4.0 1.6 0.3
0.9 2.7 3.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 1.0
–2.2 –1.1 –9.9 –23.5 –18.9 –20.0 –20.0
–2.4 –2.8 –2.7 –4.1 –5.0 –4.4 –3.7
–32.3 –11.1 –9.2 –21.4 –26.3 –27.8 –22.0
2.9 4.2 –2.3 –0.9 4.9 –0.5 –1.8
–8.5 –5.7 –2.2 0.1 –2.0 –0.8 –0.9
–9.5 –0.5 –2.2 –7.8 –5.8 –5.0 –4.5
4.4 7.1 6.4 5.3 3.3 2.9 2.7
48.5 37.3 48.5 45.5 47.0 45.0 47.0
–11.1 –10.3 –10.4 –8.8 –11.6 –11.1 –10.1
0.0 2.0 0.7 0.2 –2.8 –2.3 –1.8
–18.5 –21.0 –18.3 –21.4 –22.6 –21.5 –23.6
17.1 15.5 11.1 11.0 7.9 5.8 5.6
–3.1 –2.6 –1.2 –2.5 –4.0 –4.2 –4.4
2.1 5.6 4.5 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.2
14.9 18.4 28.4 23.8 19.0 16.1 14.7
0.5 8.3 3.1 1.7 0.7 0.8 0.1
–11.9 –6.8 –4.0 0.2 6.4 6.9 5.6
47.7 15.6 21.5 41.7 15.0 4.8 4.4
–17.4 –5.2 –7.5 –7.0 –6.1 –22.5 –7.0
–34.3 –30.5 –22.9 –27.2 –26.6 –23.9 –20.0
–1.8 –16.9 –28.1 –6.2 –6.3 –2.5 –2.5
–16.8 –18.5 –16.5 –18.8 –15.0 –14.3 –14.0
11.9 –7.0
–17.8 –1.5 2.0 4.1 5.9 7.5 7.5
9.8 –7.1 –6.4 –1.3 –17.5 –15.1 –8.4
–11.1 –6.2 –9.3 –9.2 –10.8 –13.4 –15.5
–17.8 –20.9 –28.3 –7.8 –5.8 –10.0 –10.0
297.8 164.0 201.3 261.5 153.5 102.8 66.0
–11.9 –15.7 –13.4 –11.1 –17.9 –6.3 –6.3
–26.6 15.1 –15.5 –39.8 –8.4 –3.3
–6.6 –6.1 –5.5 –6.3 –6.0 –10.0 –10.0
5.4 4.0 3.5 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.8
Statistical appendix    303
Table A15 Exchange rates to the US dollar (annual average)
Currency Symbol 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central Asia
Armenia Dram AMD
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan new manat AZN
Georgia Lari GEL
Kazakhstan Tenge T 
Kyrgyz Republic Som Som
Tajikistan Somoni TJS
Turkmenistan Turkmen manat TMM
Uzbekistan Sum SUM
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of Yuan CNY
Hong Kong, China Hong Kong dollar HK$
Korea, Rep. of Won W
Mongolia Togrog MNT
Taipei,China NT dollar NT$
South Asia
Afghanistan Afghani AF
Bangladesh Taka Tk
Bhutan Ngultrum Nu
India Indian rupee/s Re/Rs
Maldives Rufiyaa Rf
Nepal Nepalese rupee/s NRe/NRs
Pakistan Pakistan rupee/s PRe/PRs
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka rupee/s SLRe/SLRs
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam Brunei dollar B$
Cambodia Riel KR
Indonesia Rupiah Rp
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Kip KN
Malaysia Ringgit RM
Myanmar Kyat MK
Philippines Peso P
Singapore Singapore dollar S$
Thailand Baht B
Viet Nam Dong D
The Pacific
Cook Islands New Zealand dollar NZ$
Fiji Islands Fiji dollar F$
Kiribati Australian dollar A$
Marshall Islands, Rep. of US dollar US$
Micronesia, Fed. States of US dollar US$
Nauru Australian dollar A$
Palau, Rep. of US dollar US$
Papua New Guinea Kina K
Samoa Tala ST
Solomon Islands Sol. Islands dollar SI$
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of US dollar US$
Tonga Pa’anga T$
Tuvalu Australian dollar A$
Vanuatu Vatu Vt
... = data not available.
306.0 363.3 373.7 372.5 401.8
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7
120.3 147.5 147.4 146.6 149.1
36.6 42.9 46.0 46.1 47.0
3.4 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.8
2.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
1,319.6 1,465.6 1,576.8 1,710.9 1,885.4
6.9 6.8 6.8 6.5 6.3
7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
1,100.5 1,275.0 1,155.4 1,107.4 1,125.7
1,165.8 1,437.8 1,357.9 1,265.2 1,359.2
31.5 33.1 31.6 29.5 29.6
51.0 49.3 45.8 47.7 50.9
68.6 68.8 69.2 71.2 79.1
40.4 47.8 46.7 45.3 50.3
45.9 47.4 45.6 47.5 54.4
12.8 12.8 12.8 15.4 15.4
64.7 76.6 74.2 72.1 80.7
62.5 78.5 83.8 85.5 89.2
108.3 114.9 113.1 110.6 127.6
1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
4,060.0 4,148.3 4,188.5 4,065.9 4,033.7
9,699.0 10,389.9 9,090.4 8,770.4 9,386.6
8,734.9 8,501.0 8,248.6 8,011.4 7,994.0
3.3 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.1
917.0 918.0 803.0 772.0 852.0
44.3 47.7 45.1 43.3 42.2
1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
33.4 34.3 31.7 30.5 31.1
16,302.0 17,065.0 18,621.0 20,490.0
1.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2
1.6 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8
1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.1
2.6 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5
7.8 8.1 8.1 7.6 7.4
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.8 2.1 2.0 1.7
1.2 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9
101.4 105.9 97.2 94.6
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Table A16 Gross international reserves (US$ million)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
1,407 2,004 1,866 1,932 1,799
6,467 5,364 6,409 10,274 12,000
1,480 2,110 2,264 2,818 2,873
19,872 23,091 28,275 29,328 28,280
1,225 1,588 1,719 1,835 2,067
150 278 476 572 662
9,534 12,226 14,580 19,780 23,000
1,966,200 2,453,200 2,914,200 3,255,800 3,352,300
182,539 255,816 268,731 285,408 317,336
201,223 269,995 291,571 306,402 326,968
637 1,294 2,197 2,457 4,091
291,707 348,198 382,005 385,547 403,169
3,591 4,209 5,403 6,208 6,867
6,149 7,471 10,750 10,912 10,364
589 704 792 906 770
252,326 277,042 303,482 294,398 292,317
241 261 350 335 305
2,477 2,872 2,759 3,003 4,238
8,577 9,118 12,958 14,783 11,901
1,753 5,097 6,610 5,958 6,877
751 1,357 1,563 2,487 3,315
2,164 2,367 2,653 3,032 3,463
51,639 66,105 96,207 110,123 112,781
636 633 727 677 708
91,648 96,744 106,590 133,257 139,658
2,254 2,909 3,309 3,818 5,071
37,551 44,243 62,373 75,302 83,831
174,196 187,809 225,754 237,737 259,307
111,008 138,418 172,129 175,124 181,608
23,022 14,148 12,382 13,500 25,400
351 557 679 852 922
44 59
2
45 53 57 77 77
2,095 2,623 3,092 4,323 4,296
96 95 165 143 145
92 144 266 397 497
210 238 394 450
48 64 87 120 140
25 23 24 25
128 137 155 172
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Table A17 External debt outstanding (US$ million)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
1,577 2,967 3,299 3,568 3,738
3,001 3,422 3,734 4,841
2,691 3,658 4,219 4,506 4,820
107,933 112,867 118,270 125,153 134,878
3,591 4,118 4,381 4,872 5,403
1,498 1,692 1,911 2,093 2,260
606 485 2,347 2,049 4,820
3,748 5,022 5,753 7,899 9,100
390,161 428,648 548,938 694,997 850,000
686,664 712,784 879,656 982,701 1,045,244
317,370 345,677 359,757 398,724 413,437
2,184 2,986 5,928 9,628 15,260
90,361 81,963 101,581 122,528 124,325
2,069 1,150 1,303 1,242 1,340
20,266 20,859 20,336 22,086 22,095
820 795 873 1,312 1,358
224,500 260,935 305,852 345,357 365,315
879 934 962 909 942
3,197 3,495 3,442 3,658 3,863
46,161 52,331 57,363 61,844 65,833
15,107 18,662 21,438 24,466
2,776 2,940 3,337 3,841 4,281
155,080 172,871 202,413 225,375 251,200
2,575 2,694 2,809 2,990 3,100
68,243 67,965 73,643 81,009 82,662
12,744 13,207 13,643 14,632 12,251
54,328 54,856 60,048 60,442 60,337
901,379 888,314 989,210 1,089,884 1,148,412
76,102 75,306 100,561 105,957 130,500
21,816 27,929 32,501
299 269 286 469 537
15 14 18 28 34
99 96 107 105 101
74 85 84 87 87
63
75 80 78 75 80
1,040 1,028 922 979 1,260
229 211 289 329 278
140 134 125 113 124
43
86 95 121 166 186
15 14 16 15 13
100 102 111
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Table A18 Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands, Rep. of
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau, Rep. of
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
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